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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hempel%27s_dilemma

>Physicalism, in at least one rough sense, is the claim that the entire world may be described and explained using the laws of nature, in other words, that all phenomena are natural phenomena. This leaves open the question of what is 'natural', but one common understanding of the claim is that everything in the world is ultimately explicable in the terms of physics. This is known as reductive physicalism. However, this type of physicalism in its turn leaves open the question of what we are to consider as the proper terms of physics. There seem to be two options here, and these options form the horns of Hempel's dilemma, because neither seems satisfactory.

>On the one hand, we may define the physical as whatever is currently explained by our best physical theories, e.g., quantum mechanics, general relativity. Though many would find this definition unsatisfactory, some would accept that we have at least a general understanding of the physical based on these theories, and can use them to assess what is physical and what is not. And therein lies the rub, as a worked-out explanation of mentality currently lies outside the scope of such theories.

>On the other hand, if we say that some future, "ideal" physics is what is meant, then the claim is rather empty, for we have no idea of what this means. The "ideal" physics may even come to define what we think of as mental as part of the physical world. In effect, physicalism by this second account becomes the circular claim that all phenomena are explicable in terms of physics because physics properly defined is whatever explains all phenomena.
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>>10123643
OK
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>>10123643
You need to discern existence from reality
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>>10123643

Why is ideal physicalism so vacuous?
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>>10123910
Because right now you simply have no idea what physicalism as a metaphysical theory will come to actually entail once the ideal physics is on the table, so you can't appeal to the fact that "everything is physical" to discredit dualism, because what if your ideal physics come to describe mental phenomena in the very same way as dualism? It's simply a completely empty claim.
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>>10124307

It's an acceptable position to have though till it is either proven or disproven as long as the holder doesn't place too much emphasis on it.
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>>10124307
All claims are ultimately empty. This is simply a fact of language, because language doesn’t have infinite precision and never will.
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>>10124652

Please elaborate.
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>>10124660
When someone says
>the physical refers to X
you can always say
>but what is X?
>well X consists of Y and Z
>but what are Y and Z?
ad infinitum. Ultimately you have to rely on certain intuitions. Axioms, if you will.
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>>10124437
No it's a completely meaningless position because all it's saying is "all that exists are things that will turn out to exist".

>>10124652
Not sure how it follows that just because language has limited precision means that any claim made using language is empty. By that same logic, are newtons laws completely empty since they aren't as accurate as our current quantum models?

>>10124955
This feels like a separate, more deeper epistemological issue. What hempels dilemma is getting at is not about repeatedly asking "but what does X mean", because it's already on the first answer that we start to see issues. If you want to have a metaphysical thesis that states "everything is physical" and fall back on that to dispute all sorts of claims you don't like, then you're gonna need to at least try to explain what it means for something to be physical, and then account for the problems that arise with whatever you answer with, otherwise as stated before, it's a completely empty claim.

You can of course avoid all this by staying neutral on the metaphysics.
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>>10124955
To clarify, when two people rely on different base intuitions, they cannot make a good argument to convince the other. Similarly, if I make two logical systems, one with the axiom that 1+1=2 is true and the other that it is false, these systems cannot agree.

I reject the hard problem of consciousness, because I don’t think it helps me to predict the future. Indeed, the idea may actively prevent me from thinking about other things that will help me to do that. The better I can predict the future, the better the chance of maintaining control of my environment. I’ve seen others say that they prefer holding on to cherished beliefs that do not help to maintain control of the environment. If that is how we differ in our values and we cannot find more fundamental axioms on which we agree from which these values can be derived, then we simply cannot agree, because we have different intrinsic values/intuitions that are not open for debate.
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>>10124992
I can agree that the question of what it means to be physical is a problem. For what it’s worth, my idea of physical is that it refers to observations that follow rules (natural laws). This is a bit tautological, because it does not make sense to me that anything could exist without following certain rules. But I don’t see how the hard problem of consciousness even asks to be described in terms of its rules, because it doesn’t even ask for certain observations to be described in terms of rules. And once the problem is defined to do so, it becomes a purely physical thing and then we could agree. I’m always up for finding the rules that describe observations, but the hard problem isn’t about that. Therefore it doesn’t even in principle help me to predict anything and therefore it doesn’t help me to control my environment and therefore it is a dangerous idea that prevents people from actually spending time taking control of their environment. If controlling your environment is not what you want, then I think we fundamentally disagree.
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>>10124955

Useful clarification. Thanks.
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>>10124992

Good point. Sorry for being such a tard.
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>>10125059

From 10124437
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>>10124992
If I say "let's try to explain as many things as we can without any references to non-physical phenomena (in sense of current physical theories)", will this statement be metaphysically neutral? Why should we add non-physical elements to our models, if all they provide is only extra complexity but not predictive or explanatory power? Here I'm not claiming everything that exists can be reduced to physical objects or causes, I just refuse to add such things to my model of the world without some good reasons. And nobody yet have shown me any such reasons.
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>>10123643
why are you posting that hack fraud with something he didn't write
>if I term qualia "experience" then you're denying experience when you're denying qualia, and who doesn't have experience??
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>>10125004
By all means you can take this instrumentalist position and only interest yourself in making predictions which help to benefit you or humanity as a whole, but then you also give up your right to partake in any discussion on the metaphysical questions and the fundamental nature of reality as it independently of its usefulness to us. You have decided to only care about certain facts & problems about the universe, which is not the same as disputing or rejecting those facts or problems, as you argue to have with the hard problem.

>>10125051
>For what it’s worth, my idea of physical is that it refers to observations that follow rules (natural laws)
Sure, I think my idea of physicalism is somewhat similar, though it focuses more on the metaphysics rather than our observations. Physicalism in my view is that matter only have behavioral and structural properties, which means that all there is to matter is the form it takes and the way it acts. This would get around hempels dilemma because I'm not hinging what physicalism is on some ideal future physics, but instead postulating that any future physics will be describing behavioral properties and nothing else. But in the light of the hard problem, this version of physicalism gets in trouble, because it seems impossible for me to account for qualia, that it feels like something to experience things, with simply behavioral and structural properties, leading me to believe there are fundamentally different properties of matter beyond its structure and the way it acts, properties which are unavailable to study with the way we do science today. This is why I'm not a physicalist.

>>10125136
If you're simply using models to predict future observations then that alone is metaphysically neutral. It's only when you try to explain what the matter that you're predicting really is (whether it be physical or non-physical) that you're going into metaphysics.
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>>10125240
>why are you posting that hack fraud with something he didn't write
I just needed a picture of someone laughing who's not a physicalist and my boi Chalmers was there.
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>>10125283
>By all means you can take this instrumentalist position and only interest yourself in making predictions which help to benefit you or humanity as a whole, but then you also give up your right to partake in any discussion on the metaphysical questions and the fundamental nature of reality as it independently of its usefulness to us. You have decided to only care about certain facts & problems about the universe, which is not the same as disputing or rejecting those facts or problems, as you argue to have with the hard problem.
I am not arguing that we shouldn’t discuss things beyond their usefulness to us, I’m arguing that it’s impossible. It’s impossible because you can only know about things that can interact with you, and those happen to also be the things that are potentially useful to us, because things that interact with you affect you. You say you can know things about the universe through metaphysics. But if you really could, that could potentially help us in the future to predict things and it wouldn’t be metaphysics; it would be physics, and then it’s worth discussing. Metaphysics is just fantasy, like arguing about which Star Wars character is stronger in the Force.
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>>10125725
The insidious thing about metaphysics and consciousness is that it pretends not to be a fantasy.
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>>10125725
>Metaphysics is just fantasy
?
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>>10125728
Consciousness is literally a necessary precondition to anyone's experience, to deny it is absurd.
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>>10126112
Physical consciousness is sufficient.
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>>10125725
It's true that normally metaphysical questions don't seem to be answerable empirically, but I don't that then allows you to say that you can't come any closer to an answer that is at least coherent and provides explanatory power over how the world fits together as a whole. And I do think it can be useful to us, as some metaphysics (but moreso philosophy in general) challenge us to constantly rethink the meaning of our discoveries, and could potentially aid the current sciences in discovering new ways to think about world. This is certainly the case somewhat when it comes to interpretations of quantum mechanics, and the development of Einsteins theory of relativity. To anyone who is actually interested in understanding the world, crunching your numbers and being able to predict things is just not enough, and you're missing out on what the actual meaning of what you're investigating is.

Even if some questions turn out to be unanswerable and a waste of time, I think it's still worth engaging with them, not only because we could be wrong about them being fruitless, but also because it's intriguing for anyone who is curious about the nature of the world.
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>>10127361
Basically this. Read The Value of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell (it's a short read).
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>>10127361
Well, if that’s what you mean by metaphysics, then I agree. For example, I would agree that it’s useful to wonder about the many worlds interpretation, even if it doesn’t make a difference to the predictions. But quantum theory provides exceptionally precise predictions of measurements, therefore it’s plausible that interpretations of the theory will leave clues that may eventually lead to better theories (by “better” I mean computationally simpler or more accurate).

The hard problem of consciousness is not this kind of metaphysics. It is not tied to any kind of measurement in any way. It is not based on substantial evidence such as the Schrödinger equation, therefore taking it seriously is more likely to lead to quasi-religious beliefs than anything else. If you take the hard problem of consciousness seriously, you might as well debate whether or not Jesus was the son of God. Do you? How plausible is it that pondering that question is ever going to lead anywhere?

It seems like a far more reasonable thing to me to ask ourselves how whatever we call “experience” is created by our brain in purely physical terms. In other words, I think we should focus on the “easy” problem of consciousness, which is an open question, and leave the hard problem aside. I think we will eventually build machines that behave as we do and on that basis will be accepted as having consciousness as much as we do. If we persistently cannot create such machines, then I will reconsider looking at the hard problem, but I’m not holding my breath.
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>>10124992
>Not sure how it follows that just because language has limited precision means that any claim made using language is empty. By that same logic, are newtons laws completely empty since they aren't as accurate as our current quantum models?
Inductive reason would give use the understanding that claims that hinge almost entirely on semantics at the expense of sense data tend to posit phenomena, and underlying structures which are then in turn dependent entirely on philosophical and dialectical logical assertions. The physicalist simply states, with due honesty and self-awareness, that they have every reason to believe that most of the observations that informed their substratum theories are consistent over time and that there ubiquitous consistency, and predictive power assures as that at worst, without the terminus of evidence requisite for an absolute prediction machine/theory of everything, we as a species, in our duration on Earth, can expect this manner of intellectual inquiry to outperform all others, this based on things like duration, and information density both of which are foreign to the world of philosophical and more specifically metaphysical claims (you can try to string along a genealogy from Parmenides to Hegel and beyond but this is tennuous at best compared to ~300 years of progressively self-consistent and self-revising methodologically sound, and technologically proven inductive reasoning from Science). You're now also ignoring really what you and Chalmers have somewhat dishonestly pushed forward w/r/t the future completeness of physicalism, something both not necessitated for the veracity of physicalist epistemology atm and something which has never ever been the sole basis for the claims of that veracity. Here you ignore the incompleteness of German idealism, the incoherence and paucity of rigor, even merely deductive rigor, in the Panpsychist metaphysics, and the dependency upon highly questionable, largely archaic language machine.
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is there some small group of /lit/posters responsible for the influx of this faggy philosophy shit on this board

>There are 10 posters in this thread.
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>>10124992
(cont.) The potency of a term like Being was brought into question as early as the time of the pre-socratics, and has been assaulted vigorously in the face of the dynamic nature of physiology, of Earth systems like Climate and Ecological networks, and of the fluxing universe itself. Heidegger himself doubted the utility of onto-theological interpretations of spirit as defined by the hegelians and the Scholastics and further the legibility of a logoic theory of culture, and even the revanchist primitivism of panpsychism, which closely related to phenomenology, backs off most telic claims about the unfolding of matter and life do not seem to necessarily admit much beyond a monistic and solvent apeiron "consciousness/awareness" which betrays impoverished analytical and predictive force. You could say that the absolute or that the fundamental of Nature does not at all require any relationship with predictive force, with semantic consistency, but again and again you cut off your own legs by resorting to the desperate maneuvering required to escape the initial shortsighted critiques. If you can't admit semantic consistency, if the primeval process or substance cannot be logically or mathematically modeled, if there is no ability to link it with the more intricate and disparate phenomena that drive material/physical systems and if this itself is not guaranteed, its final enunciation cannot be or will not be for so long as to be just as trivial as the physicalist claim of a theory of everything, then you yourself have little to say about the world that is relevant to us and you've forced yourself through the tiniest mote of faith and idealist speculation into the exact same pitiful position of a Descartes, Leibniz or a Bishop Berkeley. that so much consideration has to be reserved for this line of thought and with its clear animosity towards, rather than organic congruence with the scientific paradigm should be troubling at the very least.
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>>10127581
>dismissing religion out of hand
Fuck off fedora.
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>>10125283
>Because it seems impossible for me to account for qualia, that it feels like something to experience things, with simply behavioral and structural properties
Why though? why you dismiss it as impossible just because it's somewhat anti-intuitive?
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>>10127612
You should be happy there is some rational discourse in this shithole.
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>>10123643
this kills the STE (M purposely omitted) fag.
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>>10127606
>>10127613
Nice word salad.
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Philosophy is the definition of a brainlet field





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