retarded anon here. when mining becomes unprofitable what happens if they all decided to quit? would the network still tick on? or does it all come to a halt.
high network fees. developers need to make it more energy efficient.
>>61436378Satoshi's wallets will re-awaken. And he will exit scam.
>>61436378I literally hadn't thought of that. Just keep it quiet or else the markets are fucked.
>>61436383>high network feesonly for poor "investors" who want to sent 50USD
>>61436378Mining new btc won’t be profitable but mining fees will be. During height of ordinals craze fee rewards surpassed mining rewards. All btc needs to keep people supporting the network is fees.Also I don;t think btc actually needs a bunch of computers to keep the network alive. The only reason for a huge amount of computers is they compete for rewards, if it is no longer profitable then the big farms will stop and a few smaller farms will compete for the scraps, there will always be somebody scooping up scraps
>>61436490tulips are in fact, limited. and they also wither and die too.
>>61436378We already saw an example a few years ago when China banned mining and started enforcing that ban. Almost one third of hashrate shut down within just a few days.The block time stretched out as one would expect until the next adjustment period, and then the difficulty adjusted to the limit, and things were still a little slow until the next adjustment, and then the next adjustment lowered the difficulty some more and things went back to normal.I don't recall what happened with fees but they probably rose a bit.>>61436383There wouldn't be any direct effect on fees. Congestion might drive fees up if blocks were normally full.Bitcoin's blocks haven't been getting filled up for a while now. The last time the mempool was ridiculously overfull was when "Inscriptions" and "Ordinals" both launched and flooded the mempool with retarded NFT transactions. That took 16 months to get cleared out.>>61436492>The only reason for a huge amount of computers is they compete for rewards, if it is no longer profitable then the big farms will stop and a few smaller farms will compete for the scraps, there will always be somebody scooping up scrapsExactly. Retards constantly parrot shit about hashrate leading price, but that's because they're retarded. Hashrate follows price; if it's profitable to mine blocks then mining companies add capacity trying to snarf those profits, and when it's not profitable to mine blocks, mining companies add fresh ASICs because the newer ones are more efficient than the shitty old ones they're retiring.
>>61436378not much, difficulty per block will adjust down
>>61437968>>61436816just read up on that and wasnt really aware of how that all worked. i see now the difficulty adjustment pretty much eliminates that possibility.
>>61436378When some miners quit all the rest get a slightly bigger slice of the pie so there will always be at least some who keep mining. But the problem is if there's too few miners (and lots of unused ASICs waiting to be sold/rented) the risk of a 51% attack rises and the network becomes less secure.>>61436492>fees will replace block rewardNothing guarantees this. Fees won't magically increase just because the network needs it to survive, they increase because of demand. Big fees have always been short spikes that didn't last longer than few weeks. There just isn't enough people wanting to pay $100+ transaction fees.>Also I don;t think btc actually needs a bunch of computers to keep the network aliveHigh hashrate keeps Bitcoin secure. It absolutely needs a bunch of "computers" to stay usable.
>>61436378>or does it all come to a halt.Yes. /thread>>61438228>risk of a 51% attack rises4 companies/pools own 60% of the hashrate today. The risk already exists and is already concentrated enough to pull a 51% attack.
>>61438240>4 companies/pools own 60% of the hashrate todayActually it's 2 pools. Foundry and AntPool with its proxy pools. https://b10c.me/blog/015-bitcoin-mining-centralization/
>>61436378Governments will subsidize it. They can’t let their number 1 racket go down
>>61438270Ah yes, the best consensus mechanism, Proof of Government
ChatGPT response:Factors Resisting a 51% AttackBitcoin's resilience is built on several key factors that counteract the risk posed by pool concentration:1. Astronomical Cost and Financial DisincentiveThe cost to launch and sustain a 51% attack on Bitcoin is enormous and constantly rising with the network's increasing hash rate.Operational Cost: Maintaining 51% control would cost millions of dollars per hour in electricity and rental fees.Economic Suicide: A successful attack (e.g., double-spending) would instantly and severely damage market trust in Bitcoin, causing its price to crash. The attacker, who would have spent billions to control the network, would be simultaneously destroying the value of the asset they hold, making the short-term profit from double-spending negligible in comparison to their total loss. This makes the attack an irrational economic choice.2. The Internal Decentralization of Mining PoolsThe concentration of hash rate in a few large mining pools is often misleading regarding the network's true centralization.Pools are not Single Entities: A mining pool is simply a coordinator that aggregates the hash power of thousands of independent miners from all over the world.Miner Autonomy: If a pool operator attempted to collude or launch an attack, the individual miners who own the underlying hardware would likely notice unusual behavior (like blocks being withheld) and could switch to a different pool within minutes. This rapid defection would cause the attacking pool's hash rate to plummet below the 51% threshold, causing the attack to fail.
>>61438317In practice, that's what we have now. To answer >>61436378, just look at the state of mining today. Mining is already massively unprofitable. Miners are sustained by debt and by preferential deals with local governments and power producers. There is a huge asymmetry between the modern "professional miner", who can continue operating because of extensive subsidization, and everybody else. Hashpower has already been concentrated into a small set of hands, and miners are beholden to the will of whoever pays them. This influence has (and will continue to) determine which updates to bitcoin node software get implemented
