The shrimp is the site of a radically subaltern way of being, both exceeding and subsuming the bounds of western juridicality. To grapple with the question of the shrimp will require radically new frameworks for inaugurating their amphibious way of being, in which they participate as subsumed but yet never cohere through the radical frameworks of Man. It is in this that the shrimp becomes a site of radical resistance, neither capturable nor reducible to the necessarily radically unformed linguistic attempt to capture their way of being, in which juridicality is produced as a radically unstable mode of being.It is in this paradox that, for Husserl, the shrimp is always both recognized and unrecognizable—both grasped and ungraspable, both seen and unseeable, and both thought and unthinkable. The shrimp inevitably exceeds the bounds of coherency neither being able to be conceived nor able to conceivable, both imminent and inevitable, both past and present. It is in this way that the shrimp transcends particularities, becoming a site of struggle both for radical resistance movements and a parasite representing the incoherence of Western manifestations of being.
>>18159042For Butler, however, the non-human is conceived not as something that isn’t human but instead as some uncapturable, alien other. Butler uses the example of the Grichstach to illustrate that the unhuman cannot be made manifest nor represented but exceeds the bounds of signification. It is in this that the stunners used to kill shrimp represent a radical movement towards un-un-un-othering and make manifest the ways in which reality both exceeds and is exceeded by the bounds of signification.While for Lacan, such an analysis would have represented the lack through which coherence itself is unable to be cohered, for “Merleau-Ponty,” this becomes the very site of “coherence” through which neoliberalism enters and penetrates. It is in this very act that resistance movements become subverted and produce fungibility in their subjects; it is in this sense that things are beyond what they are that renders radical subaltern interiority incoherent, bringing in the inevitable and necessary exteriority that associates attempts to capture the Nous.Thus, when we say the shrimp “is” we do not mean that it is just one thing among many, distinct from and distinguishable from the linguistic frameworks in which its production was made manifest. We mean it is the radically unconditioned conditioner; the site of subaltern made manifest in the ways that capital production unseats the linguistic frameworks in which it is constructed. It is in this that capital coheres and is cohered; in which it produces fungible frameworks of manifestation leading to its own internal coherence. Yet because it always presupposes in this, some exteriority on which to base its “objective” claims, it always unseats the grounds on which it is based. In this, the incoherence of its manifestation is made manifest; the very nature of making is unmade and radical lines of subsumption open up.
>>18159043One might worry that in conceptualizing the shrimp as a not as a “thing” but as a radical disruption of the frames of which things would draw their being in the first place, one loses their ability to speak about this meaningfully. If shrimp “are” what makes them “be?” What renders them “coherent?” If “shrimp” are “constructed,” what is it that “constructs” them? Such questions reflect the inherent instability of neoliberal conceptions of the body and the aquatic other. In this way the shrimp is not an animal but the very inexpressible unutterable other on which animality subsumes its conceptual (in)coherence.It is in this that new frameworks will need to be developed not to “capture” (if, indeed, such capturing is possible) the “meaning” of “shrimp” but instead to radically “unseat” ways in which it is rendered coherent. Such a project will occur, not in immediacy, but in disrupting the granularity behind its own construction. I look forward to more valuable research being done on this subject.Everything I’ve said here has been very clear, and if you don’t get it, you probably cannot read. Though for a more precise version, see below.https://benthams.substack.com/p/the-best-charity-isnt-what-you-think
Utilitarians just don't know when to admit they're wrong.
>>18159180There's no utility to being wrong
Didn't read.Brevity is the soul of wit.
>>18159180Explain
This is all very interesting. Calculating the suffering of lil shrimpies as a unit of human suffering, an intriguing idea. I wonder if he mentions->A final objection claims that shrimp welfare doesn’t matter. I think so long as shrimp can suffer, their suffering matters.Ah, yep, there it is. I'm surprised he actually addressed it, although he did just brush it off with his own opinion and then move on.You see OP, the suffering of shrimp does NOT matter. At all. To anyone. And get this, neither does the suffering of poor people. Or blacks. Or basically anyone outside my ape tribe. That's the way it is and you're not going to change it, sorry.So I think I'll keep my dollar, not stun the shrimp, and buy 2/3rds of a soda pop. Thanks for the read though.
>>18159261At least you're consistent and are racist and speciesist But I wouldn't trade places with you if someone offered to pay me a billion dollars to do so. I don't want to live like a beast chasing food and sex
>>18159261>>18159180>>18159191https://benthams.substack.com/p/moral-realism-is-true?utm_campaign=posts-open-in-app&triedRedirect=trueMoral realism is true and more suffering all else equal is bad
>>18159295>>18159261>>18159191>>18159180suffering is a bad thing. It is bad to hurt. I believe this because I have hurt before, and when I did, it seemed obvious it was bad. I recently banged my knee and was given a new chance to test the “hurting is bad” hypothesis. And yep, it was.But if hurting is bad, then we are not the center of the moral universe. Because there are hundreds of thousands more fish than us—and fish can hurt, plausibly very intensely. There are 10,000 times more amphibians than us. If hurting is among the things that matter, the endless cries of the amphibians certainly drown out our own. And don’t even get me started on the insects. https://benthams.substack.com/p/insect-suffering-is-the-biggest-issue?utm_source=publication-searchWhenever I make the point that pain is a bad thing, lots of people get very confused. So let me clarify three things I don’t mean.I don’t mean that hurting is the only bad thing in the world. There might be more stuff that’s bad than hurting, like betrayal, ignorance, and so on. I just mean it’s among the things that is bad. If hurting is bad, and the animal kingdom has millions of times more hurting than humanity, then what happens to animals matters a lot.When I say hurting is bad, I don’t mean that it’s a bad thing all things considered that the world has pain. Pain serves a useful role, sending important biological signals. When I say pain is bad, I mean it is bad all else equal. A headache is bad, because it has pain and no compensating benefit. Pain is bad in itself, though it can sometimes be good overall if it leads to something good.
>>18159311>>18159311I’m not necessarily talking about all pain. Maybe some kinds of pain—e.g. hurting during a workout—are good. That’s totally irrelevant to the argument. Whether some kinds of pain are good, the typical experience of intense pain accompanying being eaten alive, starving to death, and dying of thirst, is clearly a bad thing.My claim, then, is very modest. It’s simply that barring exceptional circumstances, hurting a lot is a bad thing. It is bad to feel bad. The experience you have when you have a really bad headache, are very hungry, or get punched in the face is intrinsically unfortunate. All else equal, the world is worse if there’s more of it.The argument, in a nutshell, is this:Intense pain is one of the world’s major bad things.Only a tiny portion of the world’s intense pain is experienced by humans.Therefore, much that is morally important lies outside of what happens to humans.Pain isn’t the only thing along these lines. I think pleasure is good too, and animals also experience very large quantities of pleasure. If any of this is correct then we are not the center of the moral universe.Now, the attitude that most people have is that pain doesn’t matter much unless it’s experienced by humans. When rats are poisoned to death, no one cares much. But this seems like a very untenable position.Pain is bad because of how it feels. When I have a bad headache, and it feels bad, I don’t think “ah, this detracts from the welfare of a member of a sapient species.” No, I think it’s bad because it hurts. So if animals can hurt too—if they, in the aggregate, hurt millions of times more than us—then they matter. And given that there is very compelling scientific evidence https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain_in_animals that animals feel pain and can hurt like us, what happens to them matters a great deal. Even simple creatures can plausibly feel intense pain. https://benthams.substack.com/p/betting-on-ubiquitous-pain
I've lost the plot on utilitarian logic problems I think.
>>18159692that's your fault not utilitarianisms
Bunp
>>18160379Bump
>>18159042>>>/pol/>>>/x/
>>18160996It's philosophy and on topic
