>>23326282
Hume is the man Nietzsche wished he could have been.

>>23326282
Schopenhauer was his successor.

Is there a single thing he got right? Nothing comes to mind.

>>23326444
all his sceptical arguments. Philosophers mostly ignore them and go on as normal as if they didn't exist. You don't see philosophers of science dealing with the problem of induction because there aren't any good counter arguments against it.

Kant made a crazy attempt with his critique of pure reason (which was trying to figure it out). But it is at best just adding concepts and balancing them until an answer has been shoehorned in and there are plenty of philosophers that argue that it is nonsense.

>>23326282
why is he wearing a shower cap?

>>23326473
There have been reinventions of his problem in something like gettier's justification paper but they are all the same concepts he addressed albeit in modern language.

>>23326282
He was literally a phenomenalist. I don’t think there is any reasonable justification for such a position.

>>23326691
So you choose to be in the category of wrong philosopher.

>>23326691
He was a skeptic, he never claimed any metaphysics beyond what science had shown which is what philosophers are almost always inclined to do despite his warnings that what they do can't lead to truth or knowledge, Its almost like dealing with post tolkien fantasy, the retarded inclination to copy him and create new worlds and languages is cringeworthy.

>>23326282
why is he wearing that thing

>>23326473
Nobody should read Hume after Kant-it's outdated shit.

>>23326816
Ah yes, Kant, one of the earliest philosophers who spent his life trying to cope with Hume being correct.
>I freely confess: it was the objection of David Hume that first, many years ago, interrupted my dogmatic slumber

>>23326473
Because the problem of induction is only a problem for retards who think knowledge requires absolute certain 100% rationalism or nothing.
Yeah he's right about it but it's a non-issue.

>>23326717
>By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us? It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not from anything external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. And nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body should so operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a substance, supposed of so different, and even contrary a nature.
This is phenomenalism. Have you read Hume?

>>23326698
How do you justify sense perception by sense perception or what is not presented to the senses but existing (atoms for instance), according to phenomenalism?

>>23326840
The problem of induction also applies to probabilistic inferences. If you think you escape the problem of induction by retreating to probability, you have failed to fully appreciate the problem of induction.

>>23326851
Intuition is evidence, I don't need probability. Hume killed rationalism so why do you think I'd retreat into more rationalism lol.

>>23326300
Schopenhauer put an end to humean skepticism in the world as will and representation. Hume thought causality could be derived from our experience of the world, but Schopenhauer proved that this experience is only made possible by presupposing causality in our faculty of understanding.

>>23326831
Yes, but it's solved now, so it belongs to the trash now.

>>23326880
and if you didn't have the same thoughts independently anyway, it's ngmi for you. same with descartes etc.

>>23326871
Presuppositions of causality derive from assuming experience retard. You are not born presupposing it, you need experience and repetition to form it.

>>23326846
>How do you justify sense perception by sense perception
You could start with some typical epistemic frameworks, give some skeptical hypotheses, then show that many beliefs are undermined by skeptical hypotheses but beliefs that stick to what we strictly know via the senses are not undermined.

So take for instance the belief that I have a physical body.

If I were a brain in a vat, I would not have a physical body. I don't know I am not a brain in a vat. Therefore I don't know that I have a physical body.

It would however be true that I have certain sense perceptions that I assumed a physical body was responsible for causing.
>or what is not presented to the senses but existing (atoms for instance)
You don't. And that's the correct view to take.

>>23326852
yes you do, intuition is formed probabilistically, you have more intuition that sweet smelling fruit is sweet and not bitter, that is formed probabilistically and probability is not rational/deductive, its inductive, it relies on statistics, ie collection of repeating data

>>23326880
Kant? Agreed. His work is pure cope. Cast it to the flames.

>>23326899
But the point is that phenomenalism is neutralized by the discovery of non-observable entities or even not experienced peceptions underlying surface perceptions, if you prefer.
>You don’t.
So you just ignore the fact that you press a button to generate electricity, for instance?

People still can't accept Hume's dominance?

>>23326943
>discovery of non-observable entities
hume maintains you have no knowledge to make such claims

>>23326943
>So you just ignore the fact that you press a button to generate electricity, for instance?
I just gave an argument for why you should doubt the existence of a physical body being responsible for your sense perceptions you organize around the thought of you having a physical body. Why do you think it's a sudden leap to say that same argument works for electrons?

Also, this is a normal position anyway. It's called scientific instrumentalism. I don't need to assume electrons actually exist to understand that theories that make use of electrons, like say the Drude model, are useful for predicting observations.

>>23326948
See how the skeptic becomes a stringent dogmatist. Lmao. I didn’t even need to proceed, but I want you to explain microscopic observations. Is science just a specific kind of collective hallucination? But even so, how do you distinguish their “scientific perceptions” from what is not hallucination? Both are perceptions.

>>23326964
>I just gave an argument for why you should doubt the existence of a physical body being responsible for your sense perceptions
That is completely irrelevant to the issue of phenomenalism, we are not discussing objective realism.
>Instrumentalism
Instrumentalism does not posit the same principles of phenomenalism, non-observable, non-perceived entities are completely fine in instrumentalist view, they are justifiable in some way, whereas they are not in a phenomenalist point of view.

>>23326896
>implying experience is "assumed"
Experience is simply experienced, and is only made possible by this presupposition of causality. Spiteful twat.

>>23326984
I’m the one arguing against Hume’s phenomenalism, but what are you talking about? What is presupposed in an immediate sensation?

>>23326982
>That is completely irrelevant to the issue of phenomenalism, we are not discussing objective realism.
Phenomenonalism is the claim that our domain of knowledge is restricted by the senses. I gave an argument that generally undermines knowledge that isn't obtained by the senses while preserving some knowledge obtained by the senses. It just so happens that some knowledge that is claimed to be justified by the senses, like the existence of separate objects supposed to be causing our sense perceptions, are also undermined. Nonetheless the phenomenalist thesis that our knowledge is restricted to the senses is maintained.
>non-observable, non-perceived entities are completely fine in instrumentalist view, they are justifiable in some way, whereas they are not in a phenomenalist point of view.
Instrumentalists don't believe that the success of scientific theories sheds any light on whether any non-observable entities posited by those theories are true, which is a position a phenomenonalist can also take. The justification for non-observable entities in scientific theories for the instrumentalists is that it is useful to posit these theories, not that these theories indicate what is true.

>>23326998
Again, the hypothesis of the brain in a vat is an issue concerning the metaphysical problem of the correspondence of perceptions and the elements of these perceptions as they are in themselves. The issue here, however, does not regard these elements as they are in themselves, it is not a question of the transcendental cognition of objects, but simply of what is not observable yet is in experience. We do not observe, we do not have the perception of electrons in what is given as the sense perception of light. But these electrons are separate objects, not from experience (in themselves) but separate from what phenomenalism gives as the only justified knowledge, the images of senses.
> success of scientific theories sheds any light on whether any non-observable entities posited by those theories are true, which is a position a phenomenonalist can also take
Phenomenalists have no reason at all to consider scientific theories concerning non-observable phenomena. But instrumentalists can justify them by their reference to what is observable, it is a very different take.

>>23326282
Professor Quirrell looking ass
You think I'd trust a pawn of the dark lord

>>23327039
>Again, the hypothesis of the brain in a vat is an issue concerning the metaphysical problem of the correspondence of perceptions and the elements of these perceptions as they are in themselves. The issue here, however, does not regard these elements as they are in themselves, it is not a question of the transcendental cognition of objects, but simply of what is not observable yet is in experience. We do not observe, we do not have the perception of electrons in what is given as the sense perception of light. But these electrons are separate objects, not from experience (in themselves) but separate from what phenomenalism gives as the only justified knowledge, the images of senses.
Without recycling, all I have to do to defend phenomenalism is demonstrate that our knowledge is restricted to what is obtainable from the senses. I have given an argument that supports a form of that, so I have defended a form of phenomenonalism. The fact that it also happens to undermine claims to know that electrons exist and claims to know that hands exist doesn't take from the fact that I supported the phenomenalist's view that our knowledge is restricted to the senses.
>Phenomenalists have no reason at all to consider scientific theories concerning non-observable phenomena. But instrumentalists can justify them by their reference to what is observable, it is a very different take.
Of course the phenomenalist does. Take a set of observations, like say the set of observable phenomena explained by General Relativity. General Relativity is not taken by instrumentalists to predict observable phenomena or data because it is true or approximately true. They consider it a useful condensing of data into an organized framework that can be used in scientific investigation for purposes like making predictions. But the instrumentalist does not take that to mean that the theory is true or approximately true. It can be a useful fiction for all the instrumentalist cares. There's no problem with the phenomenalist taking the same view of scientific theories and the entities they posit.

>>23327088
First, I have no idea why you are defending a position Hume himself couldn’t defend. Hence why he resorted to a sort of fideistic realism. He just thought that phenomenalism posited rational problems for classical epistemological contrivances.
Second, that is the very point I’m making, our knowledge does not come only from what is immediately observable and what is a sense-image. Phenomenalism undermines justification for the very sense-images perceived, a non-observable and testable hypothesis that is explanatory is far ahead, without needing to posit a sort of objective, scientific realism. Beliefs and the effects they have are already enough to undermine skeptical quietism. Hume literally vouches for that against the skeptic in the end of the Enquiry.
>view that our knowledge is restricted to the senses.
There is no knowledge without justification, Hume does not employ phenomenalism to justify it, but in order to refute rational attempts to justify realism.
> There's no problem with the phenomenalist taking the same view of scientific theories and the entities they posit.
Yes the issue is about phenomenalism, thank God you remembered it after writings lines about instrumentalism. Now, how can phenomenalism justify what is not presented as sense images even if it is useful or whatever?

>>23326282
There is no such thing as a “right” philosophy. Philosophy is a living being and evolves over time.

>>23327173
>First, I have no idea why you are defending a position Hume himself couldn’t defend.
You gave the challenge of justifying phenomenalism. That is what I am doing.
>that is the very point I’m making, our knowledge does not come only from what is immediately observable and what is a sense-image.
That's what I'm undermining, and you haven't responded to me undermining it.
>Phenomenalism undermines justification for the very sense-images perceived, a non-observable and testable hypothesis that is explanatory is far ahead
No it doesn't. Which is why I gave an argument that undermines knowledge that isn't obtained via the senses while explaining why that same argument doesn't undermine all knowledge obtained by the senses.
>Yes the issue is about phenomenalism, thank God you remembered it after writings lines about instrumentalism.
You are behaving as amnesia about previous claims you're making. You were claiming that a phenomenalist can't take an instrumentalist stance on non-observable entities. I explained why they could in response.
>Now, how can phenomenalism justify what is not presented as sense images even if it is useful or whatever?
In terms of epistemic justification, it can't. That's not a problem for phenomenalism.

>>23327230
How have I not responded? I did so repeatedly by pointing to non-observable elements (not presented in our sense perception) having verified effects in experience.
>I gave an argument that undermines knowledge that isn't obtained via the senses while explaining why that same argument doesn't undermine all knowledge obtained by the senses.
What is the difference of justification for two different sense images of an object? The stick in and out of the water, a table seen at different distances, etc. What is knowledge here?
>Phenomenalism can posit the same justification for non-onservable entities as instrumentalism
I asked you how phenomenalism can justify what is not presented as sense datum even if useful (which instrumentalism justifies) and you gave me the answer that it indeed cannot posit a justification. But I wonder how it is not a problem if phenomenalism can justify only what is presented as perception, regardless of the effects it might have and the beliefs it might generate: if you have no justification for the knowledge of how electricity functions and how electric light operates, what justifies your action from your belief that by pressing the button you will have light from the lamp in your room?

>>23327326
>How have I not responded? I did so repeatedly by pointing to non-observable elements (not presented in our sense perception) having verified effects in experience.
Electrons and other non-observables can't be proven to be responsible for the effects we observe that are consistent with electrons existing. To say otherwise is to be guilty of the logical error of affirming the consequent. You keep just asserting that you know of the existence of non-observable entities like electrons when I have already undermined knowledge of their existence (and more) via skeptical hypothesis.
>What is the difference of justification for two different sense images of an object? The stick in and out of the water, a table seen at different distances, etc. What is knowledge here?
I can just take it that these are sense impressions I can experience, know that I have these sense experiences, and leave it at that. There's only a problem if you insist on some kind of knowledge obtained beyond the senses. A naive realist for instance might have taken it that their sense impressions are caused by physical objects whose shape roughly correspond to how they look. The phenomenalist doesn't make that assumption and so there's no challenge here.
>if you have no justification for the knowledge of how electricity functions and how electric light operates, what justifies your action from your belief that by pressing the button you will have light from the lamp in your room?
Induction. Which fundamentally can't prove the light will turn on just because it did in the past, but likewise we can't be certain that scientific theories that made successful predictions in the past will continue to do so.
Put another way, I have the same rough mental models of the world that you do. You take it that you have strong evidence that these mental models correspond to reality when you start talking about things beyond experience. I don't. They're just useful for predicting future experience. I get to function in the world the same way you do at the end of the day.

>>23327385
>undermined knowledge of their existence (and more) via skeptical hypothesis.
What skeptical hypothesis? Whatever it is, it does not undermine the explanatory effect that the electron hypothesis has and is strengthened by observable tests and verification. If this is not proof (not 100% certain, but we are not dealing with logical truths) then we can't even keep discussing, since you'll be assuming a criterion that can't even be addressed.
>I can just take it that these are sense impressions I can experience, know that I have these sense experiences, and leave it at that.
Leave it at that as what? As different or as identical? How can you differentiate with justification one from the other?
>There's only a problem if you insist on some kind of knowledge obtained beyond the senses.
It depends on what you mean by beyond the senses. But you don't need to go beyond experience toward transcendental cognition of objects to actually posit the fact that the stick and the events it goes through make alterations in the observed object. There can be coherence and generalities here, but not in phenomenalism.
>Induction
Inductive reasoning as justification. Brilliant. So now we have senses and what is beyond senses as a matter of justifying beliefs and behaviors.
>You take it that you have strong evidence that these mental models correspond to reality when you start talking about things beyond experience
What? I'm only taking into account experience. It is not because something is beyond immediate perception that it is beyond experience itself. I never claimed any correspondence of what is experienceable and reality in itself, but conflated the two.
>They're just useful for predicting future experience. I get to function in the world the same way you do at the end of the day.
Yes, because you do not operate by phenomenalistic principles, otherwise you wouldn't behave at all, since sense impressions give you nothing but themselves.

>>23327482
>What skeptical hypothesis?
I don't like repeating points so >>23326899
That's of course one among many I could have made.
>Whatever it is, it does not undermine the explanatory effect that the electron hypothesis has and is strengthened by observable tests and verification. If this is not proof (not 100% certain, but we are not dealing with logical truths) then we can't even keep discussing, since you'll be assuming a criterion that can't even be addressed.
I don't take the explanatory power of something to be particularly indicative that it points to the truth or approximately points to the truth. Even if I did, for any set of observations, there are an infinite amount of hypotheses that explain the data. So even if the most likely hypothesis is the electron hypothesis, the distribution would have to be divided over an infinite amount of possible explanations also consistent with the observations it explains.
Plus, I deny that explanatory power strongly points to a hypothesis being true. One straight forward problem would be if your best explanation is being selected from a bad lot where none of the ones being considered are even approximately true.
>It depends on what you mean by beyond the senses. But you don't need to go beyond experience toward transcendental cognition of objects to actually posit the fact that the stick and the events it goes through make alterations in the observed object.
What object? The bundle of sense perceptions I am calling the stick?
>Inductive reasoning as justification. Brilliant. So now we have senses and what is beyond senses as a matter of justifying beliefs and behaviors.
I have the Humeian view of induction. That people will by habit come to anticipate inductive connections but that the problem of induction is insurmountable and we can't actually know anything via induction. So it's not a valid means of epistemic justification.
>What? I'm only taking into account experience. It is not because something is beyond immediate perception that it is beyond experience itself. I never claimed any correspondence of what is experienceable and reality in itself, but conflated the two.
Not sure of your meaning. I hold it to be the case that something beyond sense perception is beyond experience or things I can beyond experience.

>>23326282

As far his points against Causality, yes. Incidentally, Occasionalism is by no means a Humean idea, and, in this sense, all of his other points are typical Angloid subhumanity.

>>23326984
Presupposition is not needed for experience you faggot. Children don't wake up presupposing anything, they get surprised when you cover your eyes and reappear when you expose them, where is the presupposition here you idealist retard?

>>23326967
science lmao, science can barely handle induction, go back to sci and run your experiments

>>23327544
But I'm sure you love making others repeat their points.
Anyway, the skeptical hypothesis can work on specific epistemological commitments. So the one and only one hypothesis you presented, a Cartesian skeptical hypothesis, can work against the epistemological commitment of corresponding brute matter with reality, positing that everything in experience is reducible to that brute matter. But how the hell can it undermine the observations and effects explanatory of each other contained in experience itself without that particular epistemological commitment?
>I don't take the explanatory power of something to be particularly indicative that it points to the truth or approximately points to the truth
You are again assuming truth to correspond to a particular epistemological conception of truth instead of truth being just what works in experience.
>for any set of observations, there are an infinite amount of hypotheses that explain the data
That is what an explanatory effect implies, that some hypotheses work better than others.
>an infinite amount of possible explanations also consistent with the observations it explains.
They are not equally consistent because they don't posit the same explanation and the difference among them makes their effective strength... different!
>The bundle of sense perceptions I am calling the stick?
The representation of the object corresponding to it.
>I have the Humeian view of induction. That people will by habit
Which is not phenomenalistic. Habit is the product of beliefs, beliefs are justified opinions. You haven't justified anything beyond having sense data impressions.
>but that the problem of induction is insurmountable and we can't actually know anything via induction. So it's not a valid means of epistemic justification.
Ok, you don't seem to know what you are talking about. You affirmed induction as justificatory and know depletes it of justificatory power.

>>23327631
Inductive beliefs work. Period. Yes, it is a belief not justified by a priori reasoning as Hume’s dilemma posit, so even his being right it does not make induction useless and unjustified.

>>23327634
Not sure what you mean with your opening.

The skeptical hypothesis undermines anything that is not just a direct reporting of the senses. You seem to want to go beyond that in some manner. If you don't then I'm not sure what our disagreement is.
>You are again assuming truth to correspond to a particular epistemological conception of truth instead of truth being just what works in experience.
I am, because that's what most people mean by truth. If I want to say a hypothesis is useful, I'll say it's useful.
>That is what an explanatory effect implies, that some hypotheses work better than others.
>They are not equally consistent because they don't posit the same explanation and the difference among them makes their effective strength... different!
For sake of argument, let's take it to be the case that the hypothesis that best explains observations is the most likely one to be true, i.e. the strongest one is likely to be true. The maximum of a continuous probability density distribution still has a probability of zero of occuring. You're not just assuming your explanation has epistemic favorability but that in a sense it's infinitely favored.
>Which is not phenomenalistic. Habit is the product of beliefs, beliefs are justified opinions. You haven't justified anything beyond having sense data impressions.
Beliefs are not justified opinions. Someone could believe they are the reincarnation of Alexander the Great. It does not mean they are justified. You seem to really contort the meanings of terms like "belief" "justified" and "truth" for purposes of avoiding talking about whose mental representations correspond to reality (reality as in what is real and actual, I.e beyond appearances.)
>You affirmed induction as justificatory and know depletes it of justificatory power.
I don't affirm induction has justificatory power. You do. I hold that beliefs formed on the basis of induction are not epistemically justified.

>>23327674
Inductive beliefs don't always work, this is why falsification in science is a thing, I don't know what science you practice, you saying they work is a belief in itself that has no basis other than self reference

>>23327735
Having inductive beliefs work, produces useful effects. I didn’t mean that they work necessarily, but that it works in producing effective results.

>>23327758
Useful for what? Who decides this, are guns useful, are cars useful? Are spoons useful, this is not something we can say with any certainty. It's another self referential belief. Consider the misery arising from technology today and tell me whether its useful, now consider the hunter gatherer cavemen and tell me if they need it. Useful does not mean inductive beliefs work

>>23326840
Good point, I don't hold that it is necessary. I'm an engineer and a bridge works and holds up even though strictly speaking it is based on some irrational animal instinct. a purely rational creature would never be able to make a bridge. and would be amazed that we claim to have built such a thing. But many people have a epistemological point of view where they kinda imply 100% rationalism and just ignore the problem of induction.

Epistemologically i prefer Paul Feyerabend. But what Hume found out is still a fantastic observation. With just one stroke he disqualified a whole strategy of knowledge, but at the same time he showed that what we insist on as knowledge anyway (like cause and effect judgements) is irrational. Regardless of any possible evidence, it is clever and requires someone with a very peculiar attitude to figure out something like that.

>>23327845
A purely rational creature would have no need for a bridge since they would be able to know truth without experiments. Everything to them would follow from definitions.

>>23326852
Intuition is fine evidence for a prima facie judgement. Until something comes along to disprove your intuition then it is rational to make a judgement based on it. it is like making judgement based on senses I think.

>>23326911
I don't think it has anything to do with probability. Humanity had intuition long before any probability and intuition judgements are not mathematical or even judgements made from rational argument or any process like that. when people talk about intuition it is a emergent property like emotion. just something thoughts settle on.

>>23327855
They wouldn't know truth without experiments. it they were infinitely intelligent they might know anything that Kant would call a priori. But no reason to think they would know anything at all about the physical world. they wouldn't be able to know how to build a bridge or even how to create an experiment to figure it out since any judgement about cause and effect is irrational.

>>23327869
The only way they could be purely rational is if they had no capacity for inductive reasoning which means they don't experience time, i,e 4 dimensional beings, they would not need bridges or experiments, kant's assumptions wouldn't even apply to them.

>>23327866
Intuitition is inductive, wtf are you talking about. Intuitition relies on your experience, i.e inductive judgements, policemen have intuition from doctors because of their experience, these are probabilistic, a policeman makes guesses that a doctor doesn't, this is well captured in bayes rule, the priors that doctors use are not the same that policemen use, etc. You would understand this if you took a graduate course in probability.

>>23327702
>The skeptical hypothesis undermines anything that is not just a direct reporting of the senses. You seem to want to go beyond that in some manner
Because you think I must conflate every experience with the specific immediate sense perception we have in experience. This immediate sense perception is not the only kind of perception we have in experience, we have disjunctive experiences of relating to the very impression, consciousness of these instances which are mediated, not immediate. If we only had these instances of immediate percetion there would have no continuity of experience, phenomenalism itself would not be possible.
Tell me now, are you defending it by pure tenacity or because you believe it? You said that I challenged you into defending it, and it seems that you are doing it simply for the sake of it, but then it will matter naught whatever I have to say here. See how you come up with this skeptical hypothesis all the time even when it is irrelevant to what is being discussed. If it only takes instances of immediate senses, where does its criterion of truth come from? Immediate sensations posit nothing that is either true or false.
>that’s what most people mean by truth
It isn’t mainly due to Kant. But Renaissance skeptics also didn’t believe in the possibility of truth meaning transcendental cognitions.
>if I want to say it useful
What do you even mean? Phenomenalism can posit something because it is useful? Lol
>The maximum of a continuous probability density distribution still has a probability of zero of occuring
I don’t know how scientific hypotheses have anything to do with it, but there are not an infinite number of hypotheses available for explaining things in experience. You keep bringing irrelevant things into the discussion.
>beliefs are not justified opinions…
The belief of one’s being Alexander would only be a belief if it had a minimum of justification, otherwise people simply can’t believe. To have an opinion is little more than being in doubt, but a belief is a solid opinion with minimum justification.
>for purposes of avoiding talking about whose mental representations correspond to reality (reality as in what is real and actual, I.e beyond appearances.)
Holy fucking shit how many times do I need to tell you this fucking objective transcendental realistic epistemological point of view is not the point here, that Hume’s phenomenalism is taken up to show the problems with it but not meaning it itself is above any other epistemological commitment, since he himself admits in the end of his book.

Me: if you have no justification for the knowledge of X what justifies your action from your belief that X happens?
You: induction
You again: i dont affirm induction has justificatory power, you do!

Plus: it can give us useful knowledge about the world, but it is a knowledge that isn’t justified.
Anyway, sterile exchange since you are certainly arguing by tenacity (hence not even baiting me).

i personally like hume but part of his philosophy is leaving some things open to speculation which means not blanket statement saying all other philosophers are wrong thats just memeing

>>23327887
I have taken a graduate course in probability. I have a MSc in engineering. They don't teach about the epistemology of intuition in those classes. it is still mathematics at that level.

>>23327788
>who decides what works in experience
Are you retarded by any chance? How can it be some arbitrary criterion of what works in experience the effect of walking on solid ground only and not of just keep going wherever there is no ground past its border?
>useful does not mean inductive beliefs work
It is the opposite, gigabrain. They are useful because they work. The usefulness, the effectiveness in practice need not conform to necessary non-contradictory tautology, because even if there is no necessity in induction and not granting a priori that it will necessarily work, its justification is cogent by the practical effects it has for us in experience.

>>23327931
You are not smart enough to see probability is a thing because of intuition, probability is a mathematical abstraction of inductive thinking.

>>23327954
No you are the retarded one who is too stupid to see that we can't use self reference, i.e useful is good, and what is good is useful type of arguments to say any meaningful thing. Walking on solid doesn't mean anything, human lives mattering is not useful, you are arguing from an unfounded belief that you hold because you are alive not because you have any special knowledge that not being alive is not good.

>>23327993
It is not self reference retard. It is literally effectiveness in cohering experience, it has nothing to do with what is useful as in good or bad for human beings.

>>23328009
It is self reference you ignorant faggot, your experience of useful is what is good, you don't know any different, you are not an outside entity who can look at the world impartially and decide what is useful and what is good, those are self referential terms that change with space and time. 1000 yrs ago it was good to worship pagan gods and rape women in battle, and it was therefore useful to start as many wars for this reason, today it is good to be a liberal and call yourself a tranny because it is progressive and useful, etc, you have no idea what you are talking about with your myopic ideas about usefulness and goodness, who knows what those terms will mean 10 yrs in the future??

Kant BTFO’d him. Induction is a necessary category through which the mind constructs reality and it’s results can be held as true without qualms insofar as we do not extend induction to the things-in-themselves.

Empiricism sucks I love schizophrenia

>>23328059
Lmao, how does kant know this, how can he have this knowledge, and even if it was a category it still doesn't solve the problem of induction, it just tells us that humans are predestined to form unjustified beliefs, like kant does.

>>23328021
>It is self reference you ignorant faggot, your experience of useful is what is good
Nigger, coherence of experience has nothing to do with what is relatively good or not. We can’t posit anything just because it is good for us if it contradicts our experience. It just that many of these effective truths end up being useful for our survival. Induction is effective for us to predict things that don’t affect us and also what does affect our lives. Obviously both affect us in the sense that they are both knowledge, but not that the two affect us practically.

>>23327889
>This immediate sense perception is not the only kind of perception we have in experience, we have disjunctive experiences of relating to the very impression, consciousness of these instances which are mediated, not immediate. If we only had these instances of immediate percetion there would have no continuity of experience, phenomenalism itself would not be possible.
Conscious thoughts exist, sense impressions exist, and conscious thoughts pertaining to sense impressions exist. I agree with these statements.

So if I see what I interpret as a red ball on the floor, there's the sensation of red, there's the round shape impression, there's my mind that organized these impressions as "red ball on the floor", and perhaps we might add dimensions of me evaluating or reasoning from these thoughts and sense perceptions.

Are you trying to say anything essentially more than that? If so, add what I am missing.
>This immediate sense perception is not the only kind of perception we have in experience, we have disjunctive experiences of relating to the very impression, consciousness of these instances which are mediated, not immediate. If we only had these instances of immediate percetion there would have no continuity of experience, phenomenalism itself would not be possible.
I'm saying what I believe is so. If you don't believe I do, feel free to use that as an excuse for not having to reply.
>It isn’t mainly due to Kant. But Renaissance skeptics also didn’t believe in the possibility of truth meaning transcendental cognitions.
The correspondence theory is most popular, and if we asked the layperson who doesn't know who Kant is, they'd also say something like truth is that which represents reality.
>Phenomenalism can posit something because it is useful? Lol
If I'm not taking myself to be engaging in an activity that is in pursuit of truth but is a fiction I judge to be useful, why would phenomenalism stop me?
>I don’t know how scientific hypotheses have anything to do with it, but there are not an infinite number of hypotheses available for explaining things in experience. You keep bringing irrelevant things into the discussion.
I wasn't talking about scientific hypotheses. I was talking about possible explanations to a given phenomenon. That's all I meant by hypothesis. For any given phenomenon, there are an infinite amount of possible explanations. Although maybe you have a failure of imagination. Let's go for a red ball you see. How would you explain it? I'll show you have there are an infinite amount of explanations that would undermine your favored one.
>The belief of one’s being Alexander would only be a belief if it had a minimum of justification, otherwise people simply can’t believe.
Someone gets high on marijuana and believes they can fly. They crawl from a 5 story window, jump, and fall to their death. Are you denying that they believed they could fly or that they had a justification?

>>23328109
There is no relatively good as i keep saying. Just because its useful today doesn't mean it will be useful tomorrow. What is good contradicts our experience all the time as i've shown in my example. 20 yrs ago, social media was good for us, now its not, 3yrs ago, pfizer vaccine was good for us, now its not, there are countless examples like these being experienced everyday all over the world.

>>23327889
>Me: if you have no justification for the knowledge of X what justifies your action from your belief that X happens?
>You: induction
>You again: i dont affirm induction has justificatory power, you do!
I use induction as an account of the mental processes that lead me to the belief I have. I don't use that as a justification that my belief is true. If I were talking about someone who isn't me, I might be able to explain why they believe as they do. Say they read a particular book that gave some argument. That wouldn't mean I think they have a justified belief. You want to conflate these two things, and so you put in my mouth that I believe I have a justification and do not.

>>23328149
Good is a relative concept. Anyway, I’m wasting time here.

>>23328177
A belief must be justified because otherwise you have no means of fixating a particular belief instead of another belief. Beliefs do not spring arbitrarily, randomly.
I won’t even responde the rest in the other post because this is the level of corrections I have to make, you don’t know what a belief is and wants to discuss theory of knowledge.

>>23328188
concept that is based on what is useful, you are wasting time since you can't even convince yourself that what you are saying is meaningful

>>23328206
So by your definition, the guy who was high on marijuana and jumped off a five story building only to fall to their death had a justified belief. Because the belief was not arbitrary or random. Some process happened in his brain and interacted with the mind altering substance to give him that distinct impression.

Anyway, you're more interested in obfuscating language, so not a productive discussion to continue.

>>23328215
Useful in practical sense? Useful in coherence sense? Useful is also relative, but I don’t know why you’re trying to make the point that useful and good are not relative, if you’re reducing the coherence theory to what is relatively good or useful for us only. Where are you from?

>>23328232
That’s literally how you would justify his false belief, according to impression. I’m literally saying the opposite, that we don’t have only instances of immediate impressions and these are not enough for justifying anything, since justification already goes beyond those instances themselves.

>>23328243
>That’s literally how you would justify his false belief,
I wouldn't epistemically justify his false belief. Already wrong. I won't respond to the rest of your post because of the amount of corrections I'd have to make (talk about being fractally wrong.

>>23328249
You wouldn’t even if your theory of knowledge is reducible to sense impression? I’d say he would be plainly justified to believe in that according to your phenomenalism.

>>23328065
>how does kant know this
Read the first critique
>even if it was a category it still doesn't solve the problem of induction
Yes it does because induction is a property of things as they appear to us. Likewise, things as they appear to us are caused by our own mind. This means that induction is actually just long form deduction with a detour through the faculty of space and time.

>>23328238
Useful in any sense, i am not reducing anything i am generalizing through time and space. You have no counterexample to my position, all you do is nitpick at the definition and get angry at my generalization of relative and absolute when i have repeatedly shown such distinctions are irrelevant when spanning time and space. What is relatively good for an eskimo might be bad for a khoisan, that doesn't say anything special about the distinction btn the relativeness of good, what is being discussed here is the self reference btn useful and good not the pedantic faggotry that you are attempting.

>>23328272
Things as they appear to us doesn't solve the problem lmao, that's metaphysics not epistemology, it doesn't say anything about knowledge, justification etc.

>>23328277
>time and space
Yes, thanks for proving me right hahahahahahahah

>>23328292
proving what right, time and space mean what they mean inductively, it doesn't prove you right, you unimaginative faggot who can't argue for shit

test

>>23328358
>proving what right
see? you barely know what is being discussed here lol

>>23328372
see, i have now btfod your argument, lol

>>23327622
>Presupposition is not needed for experience
Causality itself is needed for experience. It is presupposed and made possible by causality, not causality made possible by experience.
>Children [...] get surprised when you cover your eyes and reappear when you expose them
Yes, they do for an empirical, causal reason, aka a cause.

>>23328407
experience is needed for causality, it is presupposed, see i can make the same argument, this is the chicken and egg problem, the first time you open your eyes, you know nothing about causality and yet you are having an experience.

>>23328443
You could say they presuppose each other, or are implied in each other. Experience without causality simply doesn't exist.

>>23328264
> I’d say he would be plainly justified to believe in that according to your phenomenalism.
Nope.

>>23328497
Then what is the criterion of justified belief according to phenomenalism besides images of sense data?

That’s the bad guy from the first Harry Potter movie

>>23328530
Answer my questions and I'll return the favor. Until then you ask without reciprocation, and I'm not feeling that charitable.

>>23328486
It could, experience is something real while causality is an assumption we make about how those events play out. For instance some people say they see ghosts, they experience without causality coming into the picture.