"The Deity himſelf cannot ſee that to be certain, Which is in itſelf contingent or that to be contingent, which is abſolutely certain. Now, what is meant by any thing being contingent, but that it either may, or may not be? But for a thing to be ſeen as certain, it muſt in itſelf be certain; and, therefore, the poſſibility of its not being muſt be excluded. Conſequently, any event being foreſeen certainly to be, is incompatible with its being even poſſeble not to be. Nothing, therefore, of which it can be truly ſaid that it either may, or may not be, can be an object of fore-knowledge, even to the Deity himſelf. To maintain the contrary is, in fact, the ſame thing as ſaying, that the ſame event is both contingent in itſelf, and yet certain to God; or that, though, in reality, it may, or may not be, yet, contrary to the nature and truth of things, he knows that it certainly will be" -Joseph Priestley, The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated
>>18589629the argument is correct for absolute free will, but it's worthless practically for beings like us which arent omnipotent, then we, for all intents and purposes, have a (very limited and basic/shit) free will to choose.
>>18589662Choose what? This argument precludes multiple possibilities that we might choose from.
