>According to the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Bessarabia was recognized as being within the Soviet sphere of influence. However, Bukovina was never mentioned. Its inclusion was a unilateral Soviet expansion that Hitler considered the first major breach of their agreement.> Upon hearing Molotov's demand for Bukovina, Hitler was reportedly furious and "thundered and lightninged" against Stalin for violating his own commitments. He viewed it as a "slap in the face".>Hitler dismissed the Soviet justification, that Bukovina was the "last part missing from a united Ukraine", as a mere pretext for further westward expansion.>To avoid a wider conflict and protect vital Romanian oil supplies, Germany pressured Romania to cede Northern Bukovina. However, Hitler's official response stressed that this was a "new" (ein Novum) issue and that Bukovina had historically been an Austrian crown land with a significant German population.So even after all of this, when Hitler again invited Molotov to Berlin, he got hit with a new slew of demands.>Molotov insisted on the withdrawal of ALL German troops from Finland, which he considered to be within the Soviet sphere of influence.>Molotov demanded that Soviet influence in Bulgaria be recognized, specifically through a mutual assistance agreement between the two countries. >Molotov again raised the issue of Southern Bukovina, stating that Germany must recognize Soviet interest in the region. > The Soviets demanded military bases on the Dardanelles and Bosporus. Hitler only offered a contractual assurance of free passage for Soviet warships, which Molotov rejectedSo who was the warmonger all along? Barbarossa was not some retarded race war for colonial expansion, it was a reactionary strike.
>>18718263Once you get older and mature you will move on from WW2. Far more interesting areas in history to study and discuss.You are partly true, but Hitler wanted living space in the east, in particular, the wheat from the Ukraine and the oil in the caucuses. He did not keep this ambition a secret. Germany was basically starved out during WW1 because of a lack of natural resources. Another factor in his invasion of the Soviet Union, was the realisation that Britain was trying to get the USA involved.
>>18718538Well OP is kinda correct but he misses the larger pictureMolotov-Ribbentrop pact had critical economic deal to it (in fact it began as a economic negotiation) where Germany would receive millions of tons of grain, oil, rubber and metals in exchange for weapons, engineerings and machinery (Germany currency was basically worthless on the global market so Germany mostly bartered manufacturing goods).The food and oil from the USSR was vital for Germany to bypass the British blockade which began at the onset of hostiltiies on September 3rd, thereby avoiding the same conditions from the ww1 blockade.But with every year, the war kept expanding, Germany occupied more countries, and these countries were also subjected to British blockade, meaning Germany had to feed and fuel these countries as well, and when Britain refused to sue for peace in 1940, the war kept expanding across sea and air and overseas which put an even greater strain on raw material, which meant Germany had to constantly ask Stalin to increase the trade quota in order to sustain Germany, her allies, her occupied territory, and the armed forces.Stalin did not do this for free, and simultaniously started to demand more from Germany. More demands for weapons and machinery, but ultimately also more demands for geopolitical concessions, which was what really troubled Hitler (OP mentioned a few of them).This put Hitler in a difficult position since he could never refuse Stalin as the trade (and an increase in trade) was vital, but Germany was progressively making the USSR stronger and stronger while Germany was becoming increasingly weaker from its war with Britain. The USSR invested their trade gains while Germany squanderd theirs.Likewise Hitler realised that the British strategy was the win the war through the US and the USSR eventually joining, since Britain alone did not have the means to fight Germany alone on the continent.1/2
>>18718574And with all this said, the trade with the USSR simply wasnt enough to cover the demands - this led Hitler to firmly believe that the answer to every problem listed was to eliminate the USSR; remove it as a factor for the British to compell a peace deal, or otherwise win the resources necessary to continue the war and defeat the British, while removing the USSR as a growing geopoltiical force and threat.Likewise what also convinced Hitler was how exceptionally well the wehrmacht had performed against France, winning a war few believed Germany could have won, while simultaniously having seen the catastrophic failure of the Red Army in Finland, this only cemented Hitlers belief that not only would his problems be solved by destroying the USSR, but that the time to do it is now, before the Red Army can learn from its mistakes, modernize, rearm, and expand (which is was, and getting help from by the German trade).Hitler no doubt saw an opportunity to also realise his ideological ambition to gain the lebensraum and autarky that he desired with this course of action, and ideological was still central since Hitler firmly believed that communist bolschevism was a threat to the civillized world, but a lot of people completely ignore the strategic pragmatic and reactionary aspects that also dictated Barbarossa.2/2
>>18718574>>18718576This wiki article explains all this in greater detailhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German-Soviet_economic_relations_(1934-1941)
>>18718576Could the M-R pact have been extended with different diplomatic choices. Perhaps the Germans could have avoided occupying Finland. Or the Soviets accepted German proposals to orient themselves toward the Middle East, and avoid laying claim to Bulgaria/Straits. The decision to launch Barbarossa was ultimately made in late 1940 after the failure of the Bucharest Conference in resolving disputes. Under more pragmatic leadership these could have been resolved, yet neither side sought to budge due to their own ideological ambitions. This might have been a missed opportunity by the Soviets in delaying Barbarossa.
>>18718576>since Hitler firmly believed that communist bolschevism was a threat to the civillized worldHe gave Stalin the benefit of the doubt on that point, early on he was somewhat enthusiastic about possible future relations from some stenographs I read. I mean geopolitics was all over the place, before agreeing to deal with the Soviets, he wanted Lithuania and Poland in the axis.
>>18718619>Bucharest ConferenceWhich one was that
>>18718263germutts always get raped by Soviet and Polish warriors
>>18718637>Following the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia in the summer of 1940 and after Soviet representations to Germany an agreement was negotiated abolishing the European Commission and the International Commission and setting up an Amalgamated Danube Commission consisting of the USSR, Germany, Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Yugoslavia. A conference on Danube problems was held in Bucharest in October 1940 but without results since agreement apparently could not be reached on the control of the mouth of the river.It preceded the more famous Molotov Trip to Berlin during November, but set the wider diplomatic failure and unraveling of the M-R Pact by late 1940.
