>>18740079
In all seriousness Vox Day dismantled this claim in The Hard Problem of Consciousness: Triveritas and the Third Impossibility.

>The empirical evidence for consciousness relies on first-person reports: the subject tells us what
>they experience. This raises a legitimate epistemological question (Dennett, 2003): how do we
>know the report accurately reflects the experience? The answer is that we do not know with
>certainty, but the alternative is worse. If first-person reports are inadmissible as evidence for
>phenomenal states, consciousness science is impossible under any framework, including
>illusionism and eliminativism, both of which rely on first-person reports to characterize the
>phenomena they claim to eliminate. The Triveritas treats first-person reports as evidence that can
>be validated by convergence with third-person data: a report is more credible when it is anchored to
>a controlled intervention, replicated across subjects, and consistent with independent measures.
>This does not eliminate error, but it provides the same epistemic footing that all empirical science
>rests on: fallible evidence evaluated under structural constraints.
He refers to five different lines of evidence which
>[constitute] an interventional demonstration that specific
>physical manipulations produce specific phenomenal outcomes, confirmed by first-person reports
>anchored to third-person measurements. Each is a base case where the recursive tree of physical-to-
>phenomenal mapping terminates at a confirmed report. The field has undervalued this evidence
>because it has been evaluating it under Reading B: the data tell us that specific physical states
>produce specific phenomenal states, but they do not tell us why in a way that eliminates conceptual
>surprise. Under Reading A, the evidence is precisely what warranted explanation looks like. The
>diagnosis is not that the evidence is insufficient.
(1/3)

The five lines:
>Psychophysics
>The Weber-Fechner law and Stevens' power law specify mathematical relationships between
>stimulus intensity and perceived intensity. Color matching functions map wavelength mixtures to
>perceptual equivalence classes with six-decimal precision. Just-noticeable differences quantify the
>smallest detectable change in any stimulus modality. These are physical-to-phenomenal mappings
>with full mathematical structure: the functions are derivable, not merely curve-fitted; the
>predictions are confirmed across populations; the experiments are interventional.

>Cortical Stimulation
>Penfield's pioneering work (1930s-1970s) demonstrated that electrical stimulation of specific
>cortical areas in awake patients produces specific phenomenal experiences: somatosensory
>stimulation produces localized body sensations, temporal lobe stimulation produces memory
>recall, hallucinations, and affective experiences. Of his 520 patients, 40 reported vivid experiential
>phenomena during temporal lobe stimulation, including specific smells, visual hallucinations, and
>emotional states. These experiences persisted only during stimulation and ceased immediately
>when stimulation stopped.

(2/3)

>Differential Anesthesia
>Sarasso et al. (2015) tested propofol, xenon, and ketamine in eighteen healthy volunteers using
>transcranial magnetic stimulation to measure cortical complexity during unresponsiveness.
>Subjects reported no conscious experience after emergence from propofol and xenon, but reported
>long, vivid dreams after ketamine. The neural dynamics are measurably different: propofol
>suppresses cortical complexity; ketamine preserves complex spatiotemporal activation patterns
>resembling wakefulness.
>The pharmacology is known. Propofol potentiates GABA-A receptors, causing widespread
>inhibition. Ketamine blocks NMDA receptors, preserving cortical dynamics while blocking
>sensory input. Different receptor profiles produce different neural dynamics produce different
>phenomenal outcomes. The mapping from physical mechanism through neural dynamics to
>phenomenal report is specified at every level and confirmed by first-person reports on emergence.

>Blindsight
>Patient DB (Weiskrantz et al., 1974) had damage to V1 and reported no conscious visual
>experience in his affected field, yet performed above chance on forced-choice tasks. Patient TN
>suffered complete bilateral V1 destruction, lost all conscious vision, yet navigated an obstacle-
>filled hallway without his cane and without prior knowledge of the layout, avoiding every object.
>Blindsight demonstrates that V1 is necessary for conscious visual experience: destroying it
>eliminates the phenomenal state while preserving the functional capacity. This is causal evidence
>(necessity) rather than constitutive evidence (realization). It establishes a boundary condition:
>whatever constitutes visual consciousness, V1 must be part of the physical configuration.
(3/3)

>Split-brain
>Sperry and Gazzaniga's split-brain studies (1960s-present) demonstrate that a specific structural
>intervention (severing the corpus callosum) produces specific changes in the organization of
>conscious experience. Patient W.J. could name objects in the right visual field but reported seeing
>"nothing" in the left field, while simultaneously using his left hand to point accurately to what he
>had "not seen." Whether this constitutes one consciousness with divided access or two separate
>consciousnesses remains debated. Under either interpretation, the data confirm that a specific
>physical intervention produces a specific, measurable alteration in the structure of conscious
>experience, replicated across multiple patients.

Source: https://zenodo.org/records/18930279
(4/3)

>>18740079

>Everything in the entire universe is causal except your mind which is somehow magically acausal. Because reasons.

>>18740127
>In all seriousness Vox Day dismantled this claim in The Hard Problem of Consciousness: Triveritas and the Third Impossibility.
Sorry chud, you can't talk about him when atheist liberal GutsickGibbon and her polycule of balding millennial liberals owned him epic-style for being old, racist, and white.

>>18740195
Determinism is an abstraction formed by subjects in a mind-based reality.

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>>18740195
What does causality have to do with consciousness being an illusion or not?

>>18740243
Great image.

>>18740079
>Only an NPC would come to this conclusion.
Correct. Which means that their consciousness is an illusion. It is a mistake to assume that consciousness is a required aspect of humans, rather than something that a gifted few possess. When someone tells you that their consciousness is an illusion, believe them.

He was just being consistent with his naturalism, something remarkably few are willing to do, and unwittingly exposing the rotten edifice for the absurdity masquerading as reason that it is.

>>18740079
this only happens because people have to take into account niggers and treat all humans the same, niggers are subhumans so they have to then disregard consciousness and soul because then either everyone has one or they dont