>Strategic suicide which yielded zero benefit & greatly hastened their own defeat on the Eastern FrontHad Hitler and the Wehrmacht top brass gone lunatic by summer 1943 owing to the stresses of command and the Stalingrad debacle??
>>18772463Yes. If they wanted an easy morale builder in 1943 they should’ve tried seizing Leningrad instead.
No, the battle of Kursk was a completely rational decision. Their intention was to punch the Soviets so hard, that for the rest of the year they wouldn't be able to do much, but recover. This would have allowed us valuable time to deal with the Western Front.We also had massive success. The Soviets build multiple extremely fortified defensive lines, which were all breached. Manstein, an actual genius on par with Napoleon and other great generals, also was in favor of the operation. But here is the critical part: They didn't follow Manstein's plan. He wanted to attack much earlier and with more troops, before the Soviets build up. The other general staff was way too cautious and constantly gave Hitler advice to delay and delay. Manstein had the right idea and they should have went with whatever he said. But the other generals were so inept and jealous of his genius, that they constantly put stones in his way.
>>18772474you are a complete retard, there was no way for manstein to attack in may after having exhausted his reserves in counterattacking. Also its funny you saying he is an actual genius on par with napoleon.Read The Wehrmacht Retreas by Robert Citino, an actual historian shows how he wasn't such a brilliant general and that his tactics were normal tactics taught in german military academy.Like this retard kept begging hitler to send him every division available for winter storm which made hitler send him the last reserve that could have been used to slow down significant operation little saturn. He didn't give the breakout order and then later lied in his memoirs saying it was madman hitler's fault.What is his genius? Retreat to berlin and counterattack with no fuel?"In their text, Frieser and Klein reproduce the entire operational plan for Manstein's February 21 counterattack, and it is a model of traditional Prussian-German brevity.""Frieser and Klein are correct to set Manstein's achievement into context and perspective. As they point out, even the mechanics of the operation itself were hardly new. Since the 1880s, German staff officers had been practicing the rapid shifting of armies to ward off threats that might arise suddenly or surprisingly."The Wehrmacht Retreas, Fighting a Lost War,1943, Robert M. Citino, page 73
>>18773072I miss TIK...
