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File: physicalism.jpg (100 KB, 1200x690)
100 KB JPG
can you refute it?
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>>18799188
God gave me a soul
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>>18799194
>God gave me a soul
which god
also prove it
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>>18799197
The Islamic God,
>Prove it
The Caliph James Quran attests to this fact.
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>>18799201
Amenshallah
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>>18799188
>refute
It's just a picture that says physicalism.
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>>18799204
yes, can you refute physicalism?
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>>18799188
I wouldn't necessarily refute just show that its less favourable than something like idealism. Additionally I'm not going to debate theory of mind on /his/ the net amount of people which actually read articles on theory of mind is 0, i will just give what i would do.


This is kinda just going to be to Type-B physicalism, I will post about functionalism later.

Well it works, but idk why you would favour it over some other type of hypothesis, I would Just invoke the hard problem and it would just centre around the idea that there’s an ideal epistemic and explanatory gap between the physical truths and the phenomenal truths, from which an ontological gap can be inferred. then show that other theory's of minds is more coherent, has a stronger explanatory power and just shows a conceptually parsimonious account of reality.

And that quantities are just descriptions of a underlying qualitative reality
qualities would be like, what red looks like, pain feels like what stake tastes like, so just phenomenal qualities.
quantities are just mathematical discerptions structure, function, relationships we find in physics and motion

So every word everyone as every experienced is a world of qualities, no one has ever encountered a non-experiential reality by something like reductive physicalism; before anyone says anything this doesn't mean physicalism is false. So experience is epistemically given and a fundamental non experiential reality is an additional metaphysical proposal about what is underneath it

A lot of people define physicalism as that reality consist of the entitles described by fundamental physics, but if those descriptions don't uniquely establish the underlying nature of reality, then their success in science doesn't inferentially justify treading them as an exhaustive physicalist ontology. That is a metaphysical commitment over the mathematical descriptions.
Then this just brings us to the original methodological circularity.
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>>18799238
we began in a world of qualities, we constructed quantitative descriptions by putting these qualities aside then we try to explain the qualities using the descriptions that excluded them. This just links to Alfred north whitehead fallacy of misplaced concreteness, then when we mistake an abstraction of reality for concert reality itself. Its like if you had a fruit, dried it and then tried to squeeze out juice out of it. of course you are goanna have a hard problem

i sure people would appeal to some examples like water is H2o or heat is molecular motion, change the brain and conscious experience changes. But this dose not establish what a type b physicalist needs them to establish. With water we have independent chemical evidence that its H2O and polarity gives us hydrogen bonds, hydrogen bonds give us surface tension and thats why water is in droplets. Now lets do consciousness, neuroscience can describe the mechanism behind visual discrimination (the easy problem) and such; but non of that explanans why those processes are accompanied by phenomenal qualities, thats like joseph levines explanatory gap and chamars hard problem. Again its not a proof that the identity is false but its a problem.

The type b physicalist would just say that experience is neuronal bioelectric electricity, thats not logically impossible but it require independent justification and the usual identities don't provide it because they earned their place by explaining the top. The neuroscience establishes an intimate relationship between brain activity and experience but that relationship is compatible with idealism. so pointing to water and H2O doesn't independently establish that particular identity and even granting the identity we still have to wonder why that particular neuronal process has that particular phenomenal character or any phenomenal character at all.
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>>18799239
Instated reality is fundamentally qualitative, the physical world, including the brain, is the extrinsic appearance of underlying experiential processes. Physics describes the structure and behaviour of those processes. This rejects the inference from successful quantitative descriptions to an exhaustive non-experimental ontology. So we would just understand quantities as descriptions of an already qualitative reality.
Of course this view isn't perfect. If reality is fundamentally experiential, how does it differentiate into apparently private individual perspectives? This is the decomposition problem. From the idealist view, living organisms are the extrinsic appearances of dissociated mental processes, so biological life is how these individual perspectives appear from the 'outside'. But there is still an individual problem, but there would be a distinction between our explanatory burden and yours. I would just have to explain how experience differentiates, like a whirlpool forming in a body of water. We don't have to explain why those whirlpools produce the water.

My remaining problem concerns the organisation and individuation of an already experiential reality. their theory has to independently justify an identity between phenomenal qualities in a physical reality characterized in fundamentally non-experiential terms. Those commitments have different explanatory costs and ultimately that's what this is all about. Every ontology has unanswered questions. Every objection has possible responses. The issue is what those responses cost us.

So to summarise i would just argue idealism offers the more coherent explanation with greater explanatory scope and fewer independently unmotivated commitments.

my explanation is shit so just read here
https://philarchive.org/archive/YETDTP-2
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>>18799238
>>18799239
>>18799240
All you managed to prove is that you're stupid enough to take Bergson seriously.
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>>18799238
>This is kinda just going to be to Type-B physicalism, I will post about functionalism later.
I'm curious about that one, type b is a copout anyway which is why nonphysicalists like to pick on it. so far i have to hear a sane refutal (or tradeoff discussion, you took the right approach here) of type a physicalism.
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>>18799248
Wallahi you haven’t read Bergson
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>>18799206
>yes, can you refute physicalism?
"Physicalism" isn't an argument. There's nothing to refute. Can you make an actual argument or not?
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>>18799253
Idk i always thought type a physicalism is the least sane physicalism.
A lot of these type A physicalists do like Daniel Dennett, are just confused, its like saying a painting (consciousness) is real but the paint (phenomenal states) isn't.
Idk I might do something like this; this would be an argument against Dennett world view, I know not all type a physicalists old to it but a lot do and I remember some guy on here waving his hand and just saying read Dennett bro when getting questioned so maybe people on here stan him.
But anyways:

P1: There are undeniable correlations between physical brain states and subjective experiences.
P2: To explain these correlations, we must choose a starting point either treating the physical brain as primary, or treating subjective experience as primary. (You can posit something like dual aspect monism but thats relevant to the point and you are admitting that generally physicalism is false).
P3: Daniel Dennett chooses physicalism, treating the physical brain as primary and viewing the brain as a fundamentally non-experiencing mechanism.
P4: A challenge people say for physicalism is not explaining complex thoughts or emotions (easy problem), but explaining why we have any subjective experience at all rather than operating mechanically without anything (hard problem).
P5: Dennett points out that the brain creates visual illusions, and he argues by analogy that subjective consciousness itself is just another like "magic trick" or illusion generated by the brain.
P6: An analogy is not direct evidence, and the explanation for how a visual illusion tricks us cannot simply be copied and pasted to explain why subjective experience exists.
P7: Every illusion is, by definition, a subjective experience (you have to be subjectively experiencing something in order to be fooled by an illusion).
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>>18799361
P8: A brain must either already possess the capacity for subjective experience, or lack it completely.
P9: If the brain already possesses subjective experience, than I would just link it back to my comparative argument against type B
P10: If the brain lacks subjective experience, it cannot experience any illusions, including the supposed "illusion" of being conscious.
P11: Claiming that a non-experiencing brain "tricks itself" into experiencing an illusion of consciousness is circular and self-contradictory, even when Dennett retreats to claiming that introspection is unreliable.
P12: Therefore, Dennett’s physicalist approach is either deceptive or confused, and it leaves the central mystery of consciousness completely unsolved.
C1: Consequently, we should abandon the attempt to explain consciousness through his theory and instead take subjective experience as the primary foundation for explaining mind-brain correlations.

Im not that interested in motivating my claims rn, I'm binning FMA, but thats ruffly how I would do it
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>>18799363
binging*
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>>18799188
Physicalism is very reductionist and doesn't really fit well with current day science.

Something like emergent materialism works much better if you want to be anti idealist (like you should)
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>>18799379
For type B>>18799238
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>>18799361
>the explanation for how a visual illusion tricks us cannot simply be copied and pasted to explain why subjective experience exists.
Why not
It works for being alive, why wouldn't it work for consciousness
>P7: Every illusion is, by definition, a subjective experience (you have to be subjectively experiencing something in order to be fooled by an illusion).
my main criticism with denett is that he picked illusion as a term, while he actually just meant that consciousness is not greater than the sum of its parts, like everything else in the world. You don't need a subjective experience to realize that. This is a fundamental misunderstanding of reductionism.
>Claiming that a non-experiencing brain "tricks itself" into experiencing an illusion of consciousness is circular and self-contradictory
How so
>C1: Consequently, we should abandon the attempt to explain consciousness through his theory
It's not really a theory, more of a philosophical explanation
>and instead take subjective experience as the primary foundation for explaining mind-brain correlations.
Hooooly conjecture
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>>18799379
>Physicalism is very reductionist and doesn't really fit well with current day science
Lmao who told you that?
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>>18799382
stopped reading at "invoking the hard problem" like it is some kind of trump card against any kind of materialsim

otherwise reads like a confused phenomenalist

most of the "theory of mind" writings are utter crap

I dont think you even realize how deeply you've swallowed the dualist premise without noticing

the entire "hard problem" bs needs to disappear
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>>18799388
>Why not
You cannot copy and paste the explanation of a visual illusion onto consciousness itself because they explain two fundamentally different things: one explains a distortion inside an existing experience, while the other tries to explain how experience exists at all.

>while he actually just meant that consciousness is not greater than the sum of its parts
this really doesn't do anything and the problem is still there and is kinda a non answer because he is still claiming that a what appears as a subjective experience is something that we are deceived by appearing different from what it actually is; are you clamming that he doesn't think subjective experience is an illusion???

>How so
Yea because Dennett because attempts to explain the appearance of an actuality of subjective experience by saying it is due to a non-subjectively-experiencing brain having the subjective experience of an illusion that it is subjectively experiencing. and again as sated before in my argument thats incoherent because every illusion is, by definition, a subjective experience (you have to be subjectively experiencing something in order to be fooled by an illusion).

>It's not really a theory, more of a philosophical explanation
No illusionism is a theory is a theory (or family of views) within the philosophy of mind.

>Hooooly conjecture
Well technically speak yes, but what's left are very fringe types of physicism what not much people hold and my argument already links to my other b theory argument and how you should favour a world view which takes subjective experience as the primary foundation for explaining mind-brain correlations and this comparative argument maybe could work for the other theory's. Although I should of just removed the last part of the C retrospectively looking at it >:

>>18799390
>just seethes and says nothing of value
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>>18799405
>that we are deceived by appearing different from what it actually is
Anon, is a table an illusion because it consists of atoms? This is what is meant by consciousness is an illusion.
>every illusion is, by definition, a subjective experience
See above for the table example
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>>18799408
>Anon, is a table an illusion because it consists of atoms? This is what is meant by consciousness is an illusion.
Yea this just commits the same thing I already motioned before, that you cannot copy and paste the explanation of a visual illusion onto consciousness itself because they explain two fundamentally different things: one explains a distortion inside an existing experience, while the other tries to explain how experience exists at all.
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>>18799405
lets summarize history of philosophy of science

materialism as a premise = contributes immensely to solving real world problems

idealism as a premise = contributes nothing except when it fails

thats really all there is to this
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>>18799421
Already addressed this point in>>18799238
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>>18799415
>you cannot copy and paste the explanation of a visual illusion onto consciousness itself because they explain two fundamentally different things: one explains a distortion inside an existing experience, while the other tries to explain how experience exists at all
This would be a valid argument if you were the only person with a consciousness to exist in the universe, because then you couldn't observe your own consciousness. But you clearly aren't
Also you misunderstood the analogy. The table is an illusion because it doesn't really exist as a separate magical entity. It is JUST this specific arrangement of atoms, just like consciousness would be + time as the magic ingredient.
You have yet to prove why consciousness would be something more than just the sum of its parts.
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>>18799428
>This would be a valid argument if you were the only person with a consciousness to exist in the universe, because then you couldn't observe your own consciousness. But you clearly aren't
This is the whole "what is it like to be a bat" by Thomas Nagel all other again. I want you to read this for justification for this point.
Observing other people doesn't solve this at all. like Thomas Nagel pointed out in the article, you can study every physical detail of a bat's brain, sonar, and behaviour from the outside, and you will still have zero access to what it subjectively feels like to be that bat from the inside. At most you would be a human imagining what you would feel like if you had a bat's wings, sonar, and habits, not what it actually feels like to be a bat.
(Again read the article for justification for this point)

Looking at other people only lets you observe their physical bodies and brain activity you never 'observe' their consciousness. And you don't observe your own consciousness like an external object; you are the first-person perspective experiencing it.

>Also you misunderstood the analogy. The table is an illusion because it doesn't really exist as a separate magical entity. It is JUST this specific arrangement of atoms, just like consciousness would be + time as the magic ingredient.
Yea but nobody is claiming consciousness is a 'separate magical entity.' The point is that an arrangement of atoms a table has zero inner point of view, there is nothing 'it is like' to be a table. please understand my point

>You have yet to prove why consciousness would be something more than just the sum of its parts.
yea but I just did by showing that its incoherent
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>>18799437
>Yea but nobody is claiming consciousness is a 'separate magical entity.
What are you claiming then? Your points get more and more confusing. If you're not claiming this, only the physicalist worldview is left. Unless you're maybe a solipsist
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>>18799437
>what it's like to be a bat
This argument works against dualists and idealists though, because clearly the bats experience is different due to its different biological markup



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