In Kripke's specific example, wouldn't someone who intends to perform quaddition rather than addition have to recognize, when quadding two numbers whose sum is less than 57, that their sum is less than 57 and so the answer isn't 125? Even if this recognition is subconscious, wouldn't it presumably consist in some internal/brain state that would distinguish him from an otherwise identical counterpart who intends to perform addition?
>>25297109i hate kripke so much
>>25297109read it as 'Rube Following Paradox' and was really confused for a second
Part of the framing of the example is that there is no physical record of calculations that would distinguish plus and quus and>nothing in my mental history establishes whether I meant plus or quusThat said the entire discussion is just a longwinded way of saying "you cannot deductively prove a referent has not changed across time absent direct evidence of consistency" which is borderline just saying "induction is not a substitute for deduction". No, shit Sherlock!And god damn does this motherfucker drone on and on.
>>25297221No, wait, I can make his argument even simpler. 5 words.>Symbols don't have inherent meaning.
>>25297230It actually makes me angry to think about how many times I've seen this argument done better. Why would anyone read this trash?
>>25297221>Part of the framing of the example is that there is no physical record of calculations that would distinguish plus and quus and>>nothing in my mental history establishes whether I meant plus or quusI know he wants to take this for granted but I don't see how someone could intend to perform quaddtion without taking the extra step of recognizing whether the sum of the two numbers is less than 57
>>25297249>I know he wants to take this for grantedHe doesn't "want" it to be taken for granted. He says to take it for granted. It is a given as part of the framing. You're to treat it as true within the universe of the problem. Whether that universe could actually physically exist is immaterial. You're overthinking this.
>>25297255well I agree it's immaterial to the fact of the matter as to which rule(s) are being followed, but it does seem material to the more specific question of which rule one "means" or "intends" to follow. it's not even necessarily about whether the world could physically exist, but even using non-physical terminology, I'm questioning whether there really could be no difference in internal states, even in principle.
>>25297276>I'm questioning whether there really could be no difference in internal states, even in principle.Given it is assumed that there is no physical or mental evidence of a contradiction within the framing, I fail to see what internal state you would be considering. However even if you could describe one, be it the soul or the Akashic records, I would suggest that you would be extending the hypothetical beyond what is intended.They've built a very tiny box to house a point and claimed the point is true in the box. If you contradict that point by knocking down the walls of that box and finding a counterpoint outside it, all you've done is prove the point doesn't hold true outside that box. You've failed to argue against what is actually being claimed.
>>25297294I guess I'm thinking about it in light of Wittgenstein's views, which do seem to specifically be targeting how we think about semantics/norms "in the real world". I guess if the idea is just "supposing it were that identical mental states can realize distinct semantic contents, then mental facts underdetermine semantic facts", then I agree that what I'm saying is irrelevant, but it doesn't seem that interesting then
>>25297334>but it doesn't seem that interesting thenIt really isn't.
>>25297109It's a very long session of navel gazing to end with an inferior form of what Saussure did long before. That's what you get for reading analytics.
>>25297536i hate analytic philosophy so much and i hate how ignorantly smug they are.
>>25297109Making a primary measurement symbolization is analogous to reading a text and vice versa, part of the way those symbols get meaning is by taking the measurement of those symbols where the measurement and symbolization of those symbols is often connected as the discrete physical heuristics for nature would seem to indicate and for a symbolization there would also be a primary measurement symbolization to that symbolization and also a secondary measurement to that symbol also and primary and secondary measurement symbolizations are made by the texture to a mind that is reality perceiving and also the context of a group of semiotic signs where primary and secondary and triune measurement symbolizations could get made are potentially things that might the example situation that kripke poses for us
>>25297109Mapping computations to physical systems is also famously underdetermined. Kripkenstein is just another example of how empiricism cannot handle underdetermination, like Hume re causality, Quine re reference, etc. This just proves that empiricism is a shitty epistemology and anthropology though, but analytics set up these reductios and then embrace the absurdity lol.
>>25300764>Mapping computations to physical systems is also famously underdetermined.What do you mean by this?
>>25297221Its a variaten of the New Problem of Induction.>>25297845Why?>>25301059I guess I know.Do you believe that floating point error teach us something about numbers?If not, then you already see a difference between numbers as a abstraction and the calculation.
>>25301072Didn't the other anon mean something like modeling
