Wish me luck, guys.
I've heard this is more readable than Tractatus although I haven't tried to read Tractatus since I was like 23 or whatever
>>25429851It is, especially to philosophy tourists. Tractatus requires you to understand formal logic at some point.
>>25429853isn't in basically a historically unordered list of different philosophers' conclusions?
>>25429403Its trite common sense. Honestly a waste of time
>>25429865Which book and which philosophers are you talking about
If you're not reading the 4th edition then you are literally ngmi.
>>25429898Tractatus
>>25429865No, it's a series of Wittgenstein's statements arranged like a proof. It's hard to understand because he assumes the reader can recognize logical atomism and formal logic.
>>25429403>this man behaves like a human and occasionally a machine. >>25429905Just as Germanisms creep into the language of a German who speaks English well, although he constructs the sentence first in German and translates it to English.>We often think as if our thinking were founded on a thought schema. As if we were translating from a more primitive mode of thought into our own.>>25429865>it may look as if we were doing Nominalism. Nominalists make the mistake of treating all words as if they were names, they do not describe the use, but only offer a draft of a description.
>>25429973>No, it's a series of Wittgenstein's statements arranged like a proof. It's hard to understand because he assumes the reader can recognize logical atomism and formal logic.sure, but a lot of his assertions are lifted directly from other philosophers. maybe not all of them i guess.>>25430023>>it may look as if we were doing Nominalism. Nominalists make the mistake of treating all words as if they were names, they do not describe the use, but only offer a draft of a description.it's kind of weird to me that nominalism says that when realism about universals supposes there's a capital R red out there
>>25429851Seems fine to me
>>25430060Nominalism does not suppose this. It could be an intention, and has no compounding effect on matter and form and is offered as something like a genus definition for common purposes. It could be used as a differentia. It could be used as a property but if used in this manner there is an assumption of universality which may not apply every time. If it's used as an accident then there is always a denial whether it be childish objection and you are denying the external world, or a serious objection and you are positing the existence of something that doesn't exist.
>>25430086there is a gap between being able to do logic and recognize what logical expressions are/mean i suppose. i don't think that tiktok is exactly sincere though though
>>25430102you're right, nominalism supposes that
>>25430105it's an extremely small gap to anyone not as philosophically-autistic as neil degrasse
>>25430143would philosophy not not be coherent without misunderstandings themselves being coherent?
>>25430150You wouldn't last a month in a Leibniz or Frege class. Does that answer the question?
>>25430116>if as a matter of logic you exclude other people's having it, it loses its sense to say you have it.>there is no objection to saying look here, other people have just the same as you! What should be gained from this account? Nothing. >the sollipsist may not want any kind of practical advantage when he offers his account.
>>25430157I can't tell whether you're in a bad/good mood or not but I imagine you are
>>25430167Yeah, I don't believe that comment either
>>25430166it's the expressly wrong understanding of moral luck
>>25430150>t.
>>25430183
>>25430174I fail to see how color perception influences realism as it pertains to morals.
>>25430211you got the bad version. because there are certain states of ignorance that could be considered morally praiseworthy as a consequence of the way things are. that is just to say someone who misunderstands something can accidentally make a good argument. you know, like that onion article.
>>25430216You're trying to claim moral realism as just realism.
>>25430241justification through moral goodness- apt or adroit?
>>25430245In this sense you could claim nominalism denied moral realism since it was principly about physical particulars. In this same sense you would have to justify the actions of the pope who was worried about obtaining donations when he went after some monks who chose to forego private property due to Jesus having done so. The nominalists defended them and some were excommunicated. This doesn't make much morality in moral realism.
>>25430278>In this same sense you would have to justify the actions of the pope who was worried about obtaining donations when he went after some monks who chose to forego private property due to Jesus having done so.This is the fine-grained difference outcome where there is such a thing as a reliable understanding of the subject. inasmuch as such a justification only results in knowledge i imagine it wouldn't be good or bad. with that i meant one thing at first and then my attention was diverted to another thread i decided to comment on. when you say physical particulars do you mean things that are necessarily discernible? idk
>>25430288I agree there is nothing realist about you.
>>25430328alright i suppose i've wasted enough of your time then
>>25430333No time was wasted. You likely hold views about both but haven't developed them fully yet. >practical > theoretical in your case
>>25430060>sure, but a lot of his assertions are lifted directly from other philosophers. maybe not all of them i guess.No, what you're saying is wrong. It could only be true in the sense that all books lift from other authors, and TLP is a book, so it lifts from other authors. You don't seem to even know who you think Wittgenstein is ripping off, so why do you think TLP is just a disordered collection of other author's conclusions? If someone told you this, they're either wrong or you misunderstood them. Maybe they were making a joke?
>>25431095Even the first statement in the book is just a modification of how Kant defines nature, except it uses facts instead.
>>25431487Me againNevertheless, >>25431095I grant you are entirely correct about everything
