>>25504094
I want to watch them fuck.

>>25504094
Late Witty belongs on the left , Frege should be the face of analytic movement
>>25504635
I’m this poster and I love continental phil, I don’t think both clash with each other as if they address the same things always

>>25504094
schizophrenia vs autism

>>25505021
which is which?

>>25505021
That tracks

>>25505233
Schizophrenics have trouble with continuity so each item, experience and sometimes even each moment in time is a thing in itself, separate from other things. In extreme cases that leads to delusions such as thinking my-wife-today and my-wife-yesterday are two different people and one must be an impostor.
Autism is too diverse to summarize, but I do see them yap about definitions and explicit language a lot so...

>>25504094
Hey, I've been doing some thinking and wondering, is free will real?
>CONTINENTAL: Before we can pose the question such as the one that has been asked by you, we must first start with the thing that is its origin; that is to say, its fertile ground, or its site of first creation -- ignorance. That is not a little being said of itself to be little, in all certainty, as the freedom of ignorance, the freedom to not know, the freedom to know nothing, is not what is not within the state's capacity to proclaim to or command the subject, which is itself constituted in no small part by the state itself in order to proclaim its own authority to itself. For as is told to us in the film "Speed" starring Keanu Reeves, the fact of the matter, or to be clearer, the hot blood-jet consisting of the thing in its actuality and not in its perception, is less so the question itself and much more of the mark at the end of the words that signifies a question, which itself is a pale shadow of the upturn at the end of the voice that signifies ignorance, or a request for information -- in that the bus must not drop below a certain speed is the matter, and not the reason that the bomb is in the bus, which is the question of the oppressor, and not the question of the oppressed subject under terror within the artifice of public transportation in itself. In much the same exact way, this is what is being expressed within the question you posed, in that the phonemes of meaning are helplessly crammed into the "seats" of words or Reason, as they inexorably progress to the "bomb" of the question mark at the end of the sentence, for it is the interrogation, that is, the not-knowing, which is the site of fierce resistance to all that proclaims to know, and all proclaims of knowledge are also already always commands to assent to a given social arrangement, which are also already always the arrangements of what should be over what is, flattening and bleeding into lifeless imitations of what could not have possibly been conceived within the oppressive logics of the state. Moreover,
>ANALYTIC: Hmm. Good question. I think free will is fake in the sense that you're asking, but I think free will is real in all the ways that matter to our actual lives. Here's why I think that's the best way to think about this problem. Here's Argument A. Here's Argument B. You might think of Counterarguments 1 and 2, but 1 is self-contradictory and 2 just collapses into 1. So I think the answer is "no in an absolute sense, but yes in the day-to-day sense." Let me know if this wasn't clear!

>>25505266
Please don't post AI slop

>>25505385
:( this hurts my feelings because it's not LLM output :(((

>>25504647
>I don’t think both clash with each other
The clash with each other insofar as what they think can be answered

>>25505386
I saw the -- and thought you had just done a quick replace of the em dashes I'm sorry

>>25505266
Is free will real?

Continental:
>Well it depends what you mean. The Western tradition is rich in texts discussing the issue, but obviously from a bunch of different angles. For example Christians often argue for or against free will based on which one is necessary for divine omnipotence and foreknowledge to hold, or for the choice to accept Christian salvation to be meaningful. These debates laid the logical groundwork of the issue, which then became discussed more in non-theological, purely metaphysical terms in the Early Modern period.

>The ancients, by the way, are relatively scanty on the free will issue; most of the ones who address it directly come down pretty hard on determinism, and again, even those ones (e.g. the Stoics) are mostly discussing the issue for ethical reasons - something like "given that you can't change the outcome of anything in the world, and the world just does what it does, what can you do about THIS fact itself? how should you attune yourself to a world that might at any moment crush or immiserate you? perhaps the inner core of the self, which makes this decision, is free in the only sense that matters." But that's not quite freedom in the sense we want, when we ask whether we have free will today. Similarly, some of the atomists posit atoms as having a kind of ultimate anti-deterministic move: the clinamen or "swerve" that prevents them from being purely deterministic in their motions. But this too is motivated: it's to avoid an alternative atomistic model in which matter swerves so deterministically that the agglomerations that make up the manifest world never occur.

>One issue is that freedom requires definition, as an equivocal term. Freedom relative to what? We can imagine someone saying "I was free to make that choice one way or the other," but not really meaning that his soul (or whatever is the ground of his existence as a distinct thing - assuming he is one) is "radically free." (Radically means "at the root.") The concept of God's absolute freedom is developed in the Early Modern period to the point that it becomes possible to argue about whether human souls are god-like in their "absolute" freedom; absolute means "un-tied from anything," uninfluenced by anything, undetermined by anything outside itself. But here again we can see that absoluteness need not entail non-determinism; a being can be determined by its internal necessity, always being destined to do the same thing, even if nothing else can impinge upon it.

>>25505660
>Kant interestingly says: "Our minds can only see, understand, and explain things AS determinate; we are destined and in a sense doomed to only ever see things 'under the aspect of' determinism." But then says: "But that doesn't mean that that is really the essential nature of the things themselves, beyond how we see them. We are also bound, by our innate ethical ideas, to posit freedom as morally necessary, as morality is built upon the possibility of choosing differently - one has to make the right decision WITHIN a field of wrong ones. So, perhaps despite only being able to see ourselves and other humans as deterministic mechanisms when we try to understand them through natural science, what is demanded by our morality is also a hint at what things really are, beyond the veil of how they appear to us." In other words: It may be that the human mind can only logically describe any entity as ultimately determinate in some sense or another, but that doesn't preclude that a mind beyond the human mind's (e.g., God's) could conceive freedom directly without logical contradiction.

>Schopenhauer, one of Kant's great (though very ambivalent) admirers, a few years later writes a devastating takedown of the possibility of free will in dialogue with Kant. He agrees that you have a two-sided self or soul, in a sense: there is the side you can see, and the side you cannot see. But he almost inverts Kant: on the side you can see, the inside of your own mind, you feel free; you talk as if you're free; etc. But on the other side, in the deepest metaphysical grounds of what you are and why and how you are what you are, you are utterly determined. So you can choose to have a peanut butter sandwich or a ham sandwich today, and this apparent radical indeterminacy of your choice is visible to you; but the choice you end up making will have been conditioned by something you can't see, "behind" your mind so to speak.

>>25505661
>Most philosophers today tend to be either determinists (usually because they are scientific naturalists who think the world is fundamentally physical and the human mind is either epiphenomenal or quasi-epiphenomenal to more fundamental physical entities and interactions), or compatibilists (a notoriously difficult position to hold; many compatibilists are really "hard determinists in the metaphysical sheets, indeterminists in the ethical streets," preserving freedom as a social value while acknowledging that describing "free" behavior in non-mental physical stuff is very difficult, while typically believing that mind is not its own special stuff that could have its own special un-material rules. Even some more speculative thinkers like Whitehead, who try to "build freedom into" the ultimate constituents of matter so to speak, still end up turning it into something like a mix of the absolute concept ("this thing is bound by nothing but itself") which isn't quite freedom in the sense we want, and the clinamen concept ("each little bit can act totally randomly, thus it's not determined"), which also isn't the meaningful human freedom of the will that we are concerned with.

Analytic
>Read chapter 4 of your textbook on the 3 possible positions. It will tell you about Stevenson's Raped Rabbit paradox which shows why position 2 is retarded. I subscribe to position 1 and you're my student and so do you. Now for today's lesson
>∀x(PxQx)
>∀x(QxRx)
>∀x(Rx¬Px)
>∃xPx
>Pa
>Pa Qa 1 ∀E
>Qa 5,6 E
>Qa Ra 2 ∀E
>Ra 7,8 E
>Ra ¬Pa 3 ∀E
>¬Pa 9,10 E
>⊥ 5,11 ¬E
>∀y∀z(y = z) 12 ⊥E
>a = a 13 ∀E, ∀E
>a ≠ a 12 ⊥E
>∃x(x ≠ x) 15 ∃I
>∀x(Px ¬Px) 12 ⊥E
>∃x(Px ∧ ¬Px) 12 ⊥E
>∃x∀y(x = y ∧ x ≠ y) 12 ⊥E
>∃x∀y(x = y ∧ x ≠ y) 4, 5–19 ∃E
>∴ □◇¬□◇□⊥ 20 ⊥E

>>25505660
>>25505661
>>25505666
>takes three posts to imply absolute free will is incorrect but can't bring himself to say it outright
>asserts that compatibilism is notoriously difficult to hold without giving evidence
>never actually makes an argument, only handwaves toward what other people thought
That's a continental for sure lol

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>>25505697
It's an invitation to actually read books, something analytics are bad at

>>25504122
wtf is wrong with you?

>>25505697
>takes three posts
Brother this is philosophy, it is long-winded by design

>>25505726
>"There are two sorts of people interested in philosophy, those interested in philosophy and those interested in the history of philosophy."
kek
>entire screenshot is handwaves toward what other people think
>entire screenshot still makes no argument that the remark is wrong, misdirected, confused, or mistaken
Was this supposed to bolster your point or mine?

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>>25505834
Sure about that? Gettier's paper that overturned justified true belief was three pages long, btw

>>25505908
>justified true belief needed to be "overturned" after analytics obsessed over it for decades
>it's literally "If you say the clock is on 2 and someone says 'wow ur right' but you didn't even look at the clock and just guessed, did you possess Knowledge?"
not making the case for analytic philosophy m8, although you did inadvertently mention a good example of one of the reasons it's retarded (since this kind of bullshit is very typical)

it's also a good example of why continental is superior: any continental hearing about the JTB bullshit reflexively goes "wait, you mean the thing from the theaetetus?" and then gets increasingly troubled as the analytic says "yeah!" and proceeds to lay out logical squiggles about whether the clock-knowledge was correct, because the continental already knows "but.. if you actually read it in the context of the dialogue, plato was just passing over it in a much more complex discussion of the nature of belief and knowledge... why have you decontextualized it to turn it into an autistic slapfight like this?"

>>25506012
And the analytic will keep trying to turn their attention to a specific philosophical question ("what constitutes knowledge? is justified true belief knowledge?") and the continental will keep waving their hand and blabbering on about how we simply must understand that within the context of the Ancient Greek world there is no blah blah, and the analytic will ask "Yes or no, is the statement 'knowledge is justified true belief' true?," and once again the continental will refuse to answer the question, continue blabbering, and act as if all this talk isn't avoidance but is actually the answer to the question, and the analytic will sigh and ask for a third time "is that statement true or false?" and finally the continental will say "that's not what you should be asking," and the analytic will say "that's just something you've asserted, you have to argue it, and regardless whether or not I should be asking it is beside the point right now, the fact of the matter is it's what I'm asking you, please answer it," and the continental will scoff and talk talk talk talk some more about how we simply must first understand the literary form of the Greek dialogue, and at that point the analytic will walk away and answer the question themselves -- no.

>nobody noticed that reams of epistemology across centuries and centuries of western philosophy rested on an assumption from Plato
>one person overturned this assumption with a thought experiment so easy a child could understand it
Yes, that's exactly what happened. Continentals could never have gotten there because "it's the wrong question okay!" isn't an argument, but I don't know why I'm surprised that continentals don't know what the word "argument" refers to

>>25506039
>And the analytic will keep trying to turn their attention to a specific philosophical question ("what constitutes knowledge? is justified true belief knowledge?")
"I am a-logical, if not illogical, and glad to be so when I find Bertie Russell trying to excogitate what 'true knowledge' means, in the absence of any concrete universe surrounding the knower and the known. Ass!"
- William James

>"Yes or no, is the statement 'knowledge is justified true belief' true?,"
>Also, the object of contentious arguers—though it is less their aim in these days than formerly—would have been carried out, namely, that the person questioned should answer ‘ Yes’ or ‘No’; as it is, however, because the questioners put their questions improperly, the person questioned is obliged to add something in his answer by way of correcting the unfairness of the proposition, since, if the questioner makes adequate distinctions, the answerer must say either ‘ Yes’ or ‘ No.’
- Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 175b

>act as if all this talk isn't avoidance
https://www.logicallyfallacious.com/logicalfallacies/Ad-Hominem-Circumstantial
"But what matter, said Charmides, from whom I heard this?
No matter at all, I replied; for the point is not who said the words, but whether they are true or not."
- Plato, Charmides

More prosaically, to answer your post: yes, when your terms are impoverished and you use them to question someone else, and that person sees they are impoverished, they are likely to say: "your terms are impoverished and your question malformed as a result; perhaps we could improve your terms and thus the discussion by actually reading the fucking topos the question arose from."

>>25506065
>handwave to what someone else thought, doesn't answer the question
>handwave to what someone else thought, doesn't answer the question
lol
>you did a fallacy!
lol
>for the point is not who said the words, but whether they are true or not.
Surely you see the irony here, right? All you've been doing is referencing who said the words, all I've been doing is saying that what actually matters is whether or not they're true

>your terms are impoverished and your question malformed as a result
Analytics do this all the time, all day, every day. Continentals call it hair-splitting
>perhaps we could improve your terms and thus the discussion by actually reading the fucking topos the question arose from
And would it matter? "Oho but Plato doesn't actually if you read him carefully what really matters is considering the form and the socio-cultural Weltanschauung of the Greeks as evinced by this play" Didn't you just imply that what matters is whether they are true or not? You can't hide behind "but that's the wrong thing to be asking" forever, at some point you actually have to state and defend a claim. I get it, it's scary because you could be wrong and could look dumb, but that's how philosophy progresses. (If you have an autoimmune reaction to "progresses," then swap in "functions" for the idea I'm trying to get at.) In all fairness, some continentals do actually do this -- Heidegger is a good example, at least the B&T Heidegger, he says "wrong question, here's why, the right one is this, here's the answer" -- but most continentals have gotten really, really good at posing questions, and think that this exempts them from giving a straightforward, definite answer

>>25504094
LLM thread

>>25506088
>No matter at all, I replied; for the point is not who said the words, but whether they are true or not.
I quoted Aristotle, James, and Plato not to distract but because they are correct and say elegantly what I would have said anyway. Your circumstantial ad hominems are valueless in argument; your questions are mal posées and thus cannot be answered "yes or no" (as you demand) for the reasons Aristotle gives; and one of the ways in which they are mal posées is that they ask what something "is" as if it exists in a vacuum and this can be deduced from the term and its colloquial predicates alone (what Hegel would call talking about it "abstractly"), as James says.

Your complaint is that continentals talk too much, which is fair, I am not defending Derrida or some retard American Derridean in 1993 working at NYU. I'm just saying that the countercomplaint about analytics, that they are too decontextualized and accustomed to arguing over "stock paradoxes" summarized in textbooks, is worse. At least with continentals, you occasionally get someone who ignores his retard Derrida professor in 1992 and goes and actually reads Leibniz. Analytics have a serious problem of only reading what the textbook said and getting themselves down blind alleys for decades at a time.

Everything I have posted has been in support of this simple point. I cited analytics talking about problems with their own discipline, and then gave examples of how you yourself were showing signs of the problem.

>>25506099
I refuse to stop typing -- because of the machine
>>25506111
>trips
Checked
>throwing in a french phrase for no reason
lol
>okay FINE here's why your question is wrong: they ask what something "is" as if it exists in a vacuum and this can be deduced from the term and its colloquial predicates alone
Was that so hard? You didn't have to do all of that genuflecting toward The Tradition. You could've just said this to start. In fact, if what matters is the ideas, you don't have to talk about the philosophers at all, really. You can just describe various ways of approaching the problem and append names to give credit as you see fit. Then you could group various ways of approaching the problem by their common features, give those sets of common features simple names to refer to them, and if you notice that common feature X shows up and is majorly substantive of the argument in Philosopher 1, 2, or 3, you don't have to spend pages in the proper prostration, you can just argue against that common feature X and by extension you've argued against 1, 2, and 3 simultaneously. This is analytic philosophy at its best -- it rescues us from this anxious worry over whether or not we're "closely" or "properly" understanding the broader context around a thinker, keeps us focused on the ideas rather than descending into argumentless, impugning stares once a word like "slavery" or "capitalistic" is lobbed, and cuts through the awkward, needless throat-clearing to speak frankly about the heart of the matter at hand
>the counter about analytics is worse
Is it? I'd rather have certainty on a "higher-order truth about chmess" than piles of subordinate clauses that constantly threaten to be profound but whose meaning nobody can agree on. I can't imagine a philosophical world without analytic metaethics -- what's more important than questions like "is there such a thing as right and wrong?" And I can't imagine a worse approach to that than the vague profundity approach that refuses to answer the question, let alone rejects the audacity to ask it so frankly
>actually reads Leibniz
Most of the best readers of Leibniz are analytics. Or Spinoza, or Nietzsche, or or or. They take them on the terms they want to be taken on: serious thinkers in their own right who are making claims that are either true or false -- while continentals more often do a different thing entirely, half-listening to them and mostly ransacking their graves for whatever they think could be valuable. (Deleuze makes so much of the will-to-power, and it's so wonderful to hear Deleuze talk, it's so exciting, it's so invigorating, but there's very, very little textual evidence that Nietzsche thought of it the way Deleuze claims, and decent evidence that the reading Deleuze runs with is actually counter to what Nietzsche intended -- just to pick one example offhand.)
>in support of this simple point
And yet everything you've done has gone the other way. We agree in practice but you just don't know it

>>25506142
But a reasonable amount of "genuflecting toward The Tradition" is why I was able to instantly recall that your argumentative technique was called retarded by the guy who invented argumentative technique in his book "How to Argue with Retards Who Deliberately Use Bad Argumentative Techniques," and to know instantly that the example you cited of good analytic philosophy is actually a terrible distortion of a much richer source material that does a better job of answering the question at issue than what you posted.

>if what matters is the ideas, you don't have to talk about the philosophers at all, really
If this is your approach, and we take you as proof of concept, it led you to use formal fallacies and to miss obvious points and to simply restate "is God big: yes or no?!"

More substantively though, the reason it's good to know the philosophers is stated above: because the original text is often richer than the simplifications made for textbooks, as in the Plato/JTB example. More than that though, it teaches you something very very important that analytics miss, something that the James quote I cited was supposed to tip you off to: languages and concepts change, so it's silly to try to ask "is X Y?" and not even consider whether X and Y are well-defined, whether there are other possible definitions, and whether there are other notions or views of reality that might make them faulty concepts altogether.

For example if you read the Plato, instead of the textbook summary of a mutilated excerpt of Plato turned into a puzzle for midwits, you will realize that Plato's answer to it is a) extremely sophisticated, b) probably not our answer, c) a very Greek answer that makes perfect sense not only within the Greek understanding of thought and reality but is arguably a culmination of that thought. This can make you reflect on the fact that very very smart people are capable of reaching "the" logical solution to something, as self-evident within their culture and language, and this answer nevertheless being completely unsatisfying to another culture. Even as I type this, I'm aware of many different ways of expressing and thinking about it as a problem and as an opportunity for conceptual refinement, and that's because I have read a decent amount of The Tradition (Hegel, Kuhn, Wittgenstein, Gadamer, whatever). The Tradition is not all bad.

Much of what you say is answered, at least to my satisfaction, by what I just said. To sum up: You cannot speak of "the heart of the matter at hand" if you don't know what that matter and its heart are, and to know that you need to be able to give an account of how you know it and how you know your knowing of it is adequate. That's not continental blathering, that's just philosophy.

Much of what you say is about style. Kit Fine is no more enjoyable to read, and David Lewis is no less insane, than Hegel.

I've read thousands of pages on and by Leibniz and I assure you the best work is not by analytics.

I've read about 120 pages of Hegel and it's a lot to process :)

grrrrr i hate philosophy grrrr dont do nothing grrrr just saying words ??? how can philosophy be real if my table is real grrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr

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>>25504094
scholasticism / german idealism
judaeo-british neoliberal shilling

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>>25505666
>Stevenson's Raped Rabbit paradox
...that rape causes the raped to identify with the rapist instead of identifying with the rapists enemy, God

>>25505021
Schizotism

>>25504094
whole philosophy is nominalism vs realism and we can't get past that