so what is this opus postumum thing about?
>>25557814>practical and theoretical balancing act>I really don't know why I call> I have everything I want>last fragment of the prisonerThere is no need to keep making threads, I assure you. It doesn't matter who you side with, if you go the 1844 route or the Althusser route, eventually you will wind up at the Grundrisse (plan/outline). Your opinion as to whether or not this was the most revolutionary or most mundane book ever written doesn't matter. It doesn't matter whether the left or the right goes back to it. It doesn't matter whether you reject general knowledge and go for Nietzsche vs the machines. It doesn't matter whether you think internal contradictions win out or not. Think of this like a Spinozistic flow chart for which religion to go with based on fast food preference because in complete rationality that is all this boils down to. When labor time hits near 0 all routes become obsolete, when material conditions render art general then labor time hits near 0 for the purposes of the equation. It doesn't matter whether there is immaterial or material labor. Some will say one will last longer than the other but that is about all they can speculate on. >the fragment of the machine still stands>a machine enters a machine>only at this time does the machine become desirable outside of socioeconomic conditions>is this machine the same machine or a different machine?Give it a try and see if you're recognized. The worst thing that can happen is withdrawals from youself.
>>25558177>Q: "What's this book about?">A: *white lights and indistinct noises*
>>25558234The very first line.>m-m-muh CLARITY>m-m-muh goystoi m-m-muh schopie m-m-muh METAYou can't recognize the answer. I'm not even sure why you made the thread.
>>25558177Wouldn't you agree that the cultural initiation of Godel-coding potential produces an instantaneous Planomic mutation slanted towards nomadic multiplicities: virtually enveloping Oecumenic segmentarity into a side-process of flat numerical systems. Godel-numbering accomplishes a revolutionary redirection of kantianism - according to a nomad rather than a copernican schema - by turning it towards the operationalization of transcendental synthesis as method, and away from the programmatic exhaustion of a self-limiting a nalytical endeavour. It converts the Kantian discovery of numerical synthesis from doctrinal commitment to procedural machinery: subsuming philosophy into transcendental arithmetic, with annihilating critique of the Hilbert programme as surplus product.
>>25558618>response still indicates the usage of Hilbert's groupings.>D&G jargon. Mentioned Godel. Kant thread. >Rhyzome time (.,?)>If you only use Axioms 1-4 then you don't have enough to propose every possible constructible point. >If you only use Axiom 5 then you have a potential to construct a statement that cannot be proven in Axioms 1-4.>If you only use Axiom 5 then the system will always be categorical. >Any theorem of synthetic geometry can be proven in analytic geometry.>The inverse doesn't always hold.>for circumstances where this basic modeling matters then synthetic > analytic.>for circumstances of use then analytic geometry is modeled more as a system for disproving since the synthetic method can be performed independently and arithmetic geometry can be derived with or without Axiom 5. (Note that going without is just planing a Pythagorean field)>given the aforementioned I'm not sure you could say synthetic is logically incomplete but you could justifiably claim not every possible statement can be constructed.>given the aforementioned it should also be noted that synthetic also produces higher logical consistency.>given the aforementioned there is no justification to assume a lack of measurement in either.>given the aforementioned there is no reason to discontinue the use of one or the other. (I.e. with axiom 5 and the use of an axiom concerning intersection then the analytic component has now been categorized in the same completeness/incompleteness as the synthetic component.)Tldr: you still have to do math.
uh wtf is happening here? i scared
>>25558894Basically, both passages are circling the same problem from opposite ends. The first is saying that once you follow Marx past the ideological choice between “1844” and “Althusser,” you eventually hit the Grundrisse as a kind of abstract machine: the decisive variable is not which interpretation you prefer but the progressive decomposition of necessary labour-time, until the old categories of labour, art, even political alignment become increasingly inadequate. The machine then becomes interesting in itself>machine inside machine, production detached from its immediate socioeconomic coding.The second passage is doing something similar with Kant through Gödel, but in a deliberately more absurd mathematical register: Kant’s transcendental synthesis is being recast as an *operation* rather than a doctrine, while Gödel marks the point where a sufficiently productive formal system cannot completely account for its own generative procedures. “Nomadic” Kantianism therefore means moving the transcendental away from fixed conditions toward something recursively productive: not *what are the axioms?*, but *what can the system generate from them, and what necessarily escapes them?* >“you still have to do the math”is basically the anchor: all the Deleuzean/Gödelian/Kantian machinery ultimately cashes out in actual construction rather than endlessly producing another layer of theoretical commentary.
>>25558992>ultimately cashes out in actual construction rather than endlessly producing another layer of theoretical commentary.this is what philosophers today don't get. except the construction must be philosophical not mathematical.
>>25558609I didn't make the thread, but I know bullshit non-answers when I see them.
>>25559166You are always welcome to read the book and find out. Given the nature of it, run on sentences, topic hopping, going against previous material, jarring interjections, social calender, shopping lists, and the ether section, you could legitimately ask the question what the point of philosophical texts are at all when unfinished and littered with unpolished thoughts. If you are the muh clarity anon, then you probably won't like it.
>>25559190You're always welcome to communicate like a human being instead of a bad parody of a Continental thinker filtered through an incomprehensible appeal to game theory.
>>25559325The shopping list and social calendar parts were jokes but they may as well not be, parts of it will read like a shopping list and the social calender part is Kant pulling a Neetch with unpublished notebooks, pulling a schope with will, pulling a Hegel with world spirit, pulling a Spinoza with the ether (link to D&G existed before you started your nitpicking), pulling another Neetch with criticisms of objective truth, pulling another Neetch and Schope by claiming organic origination of thermodynamic systems by going over the finer points of splitting rocks by jamming soaked wood into the cracks and letting temperature do the rest. Pulling a Schelling by defaulting to natural philosophy. Pulling a Hegel by using always alpha and EtherSpinoza to pull a Hinduism style reconciliation of Descartes and Spinoza. Turning around and pulling another Neetch by claiming the ether doesn't account for physiological differences. >the list goes onWhether you like it or not Kant's posthumous notes, as chaotic and jumbled as they were, still go with the link to rational decision making and epistemology and game theory is that. >no clarity.
>>25559190>jarring interjections, social calender, shopping lists*sigh* ngl i thought those parts were lowkey kino
>>25559498He also wrote about identity and how unity of apperception links it to one person spread out across time but also still accounts for various phase shifting. If you like Kant then read it but don't expect Critique of (insert) Kant. >the futility of perfect porn.
>>25559537what's with the perfect porn thing man, huh? you some kind of perve or something?
>>25559562No. It was a joke for the bataille anon. It does require a dialectical setup but Bataille recognized Hegelian dialectic in pornography as presence. The joke is that it's absence. Dialectic is smut for pornography enthusiasts.
i hate him so much
>>25557814The metaphysical foundations of natural science contain the principles according to which matter, insofar as it is merely thought as the movable in space, can be cognised a priori. Physics, however, contains the laws of those moving forces of matter which are given in experience. Now although it may seem that, since the former is intended for application to experience, one has only to pass from the metaphysical principles of matter to those properties of it which observation discovers, this apparent proximity conceals a difficulty. For that which reason determines a priori must possess completeness according to a principle, whereas that which experience teaches is always capable of increase, and if the latter is merely appended to the former as it happens to be discovered, then there arises indeed an aggregate of empirical cognitions, but no science of physics.There must consequently be a transition between these two, if by transition is understood, not a passage from one territory to another by a leap, but a determination of that which belongs to both and through which alone the application of principles of the one to the objects of the other can be rendered lawful.For in the metaphysical foundations matter is determined through the original moving forces of attraction and repulsion, since without these the concept of matter filling a space cannot be constructed. But nothing is thereby decided concerning gravity, cohesion, elasticity, fluidity, heat, light, magnetism, and the other specifically determined forces with which physics has to do. These cannot be invented a priori, for then they would not be physical properties at all, but neither can their mere discovery by experience give us the completeness which belongs to a science. What experience discovers is always only this or that force. That there shall be a place in a system for every kind of moving force which experience can exhibit is another proposition altogether.Thus there is required an elementary system of the moving forces of matter. By this, Kant does not understand a doctrine which anticipates the physicist and tells him, before observation, which particular matters and forces nature contains. Such a doctrine would undertake to cognise existence from mere concepts. Kant understands only a topic, that is, a determination a priori of the relations under which whatever moving forces may be empirically given must be brought if physics is to constitute a system rather than a rhapsody of observations. Accordingly the table of categories can here serve as the clue, because quantity, quality, relation, and modality contain the universal forms under which the relations of moving forces can be determined, although the forces themselves, as specifically determined forces, can be learned only empirically.
>>25560652The problem is therefore peculiar. Its matter must be empirical, since physics concerns nature as an object of experience. Its form must nevertheless be capable of being anticipated a priori, since without this no completeness of the division according to principles, and consequently no proper science, would be possible. The transition belongs neither to metaphysics of nature alone nor to empirical physics alone, but contains the formal principles in accordance with which the latter can proceed from the former as a system.This first determination of the problem, however, does not yet suffice. For a body is not given to physics merely as a geometrical quantum occupying space. It is a system of moving forces, and even those predicates of matter which appear to be the simplest already presuppose such forces. If a body is said to be ponderable, for example, its weight is determined only through an instrument, but the instrument must itself preserve its form, and this presupposes cohesion. If cohesion is again to be explained through attraction and repulsion, the possibility of the communication and opposition of moving forces through matter again demands investigation. Thus the attempt to descend from the universal moving forces of the metaphysical foundations to the particular determinations of physical bodies continually encounters conditions which themselves belong neither simply to pure metaphysics nor simply to an already constituted empirical physics.From this arose the question concerning a matter which penetrates all bodies and fills cosmic space, which may be called caloric, ether, or by some other name, provided only that the name is not mistaken for the concept. The question is not whether physicists have observed a subtle fluid and may therefore employ it hypothetically in the explanation of certain appearances. Such an hypothesis belongs to physics and can possess only the degree of probability which experience permits. The question is whether the possibility of one interconnected experience of moving matter itself requires the presupposition of a matter universally distributed in space as the vehicle of the communication of moving forces.If this were established, the ether would have to be postulated, not as an explanatory fiction contrived for appearances already given, but as belonging to the conditions under which the moving forces of matter can constitute an object of one possible experience.
>>25560656Here, however, one must guard against an illusion which readily arises from the expression a priori. From the fact that something is required as a condition of possible experience it does not follow without further inquiry that a particular existent, with empirically determinate properties, may be generated from pure reason. The difficulty of the ether proof consists precisely in this, that a proposition concerning the existence of a material thing appears to be required to possess the necessity of a transcendental principle. The various attempts at such a proof must therefore be regarded as attempts to determine whether the material condition here sought can be included in the concept of the possibility of experience itself, and not as though an empirical body had been discovered by analysis of the understanding.The difficulty thereby changes its place. For even if all the kinds of moving forces could be classified according to an a priori topic, it would still not follow that there is experience. A perception is an empirical representation with consciousness. Many perceptions, however numerous, do not by their mere aggregation constitute experience. For experience contains the connection of perceptions according to a principle, and this connection is not itself another perception. What is given to sense can furnish the manifold. The unity in accordance with which the manifold belongs to one experience must be made.Physics is therefore in an important sense not merely an empirical science, although all the specifically physical determinations with which it is occupied must be given empirically. For a science of experience requires principles by which perceptions are combined into one possible experience; and these principles are not themselves borrowed from the perceptions whose objective connection they first make possible.This is the point at which the problem of the transition first receives its transcendental significance.In his lectures on metaphysics, Kant has often distinguished receptivity from spontaneity. By sensibility the subject is affected; by the understanding it combines. The composition of the manifold is never itself perceived. We may perceive the parts, but the act through which their manifold is represented as one is an act of the understanding. The category signifies precisely the consciousness of such synthetic unity. It is consequently a mistake to suppose that, when physics combines perceptions into an experience, the understanding merely reads from nature a connection already deposited there in the same manner in which a colour or a pressure is given in sensation. Nature, insofar as it is the object of experience, must conform to those formal acts without which no object of experience can be thought.
>>25560658Yet the transition requires something more determinate than this familiar proposition of transcendental philosophy. For its question is not merely how an object of experience in general is possible, but how physics, as the system of those moving forces through which the subject is affected, is possible.The subject which perceives moving forces is itself a moving and moved being in the world. Its body belongs to the complex of matter whose forces are to be investigated. Thus the relation in which the object affects the subject cannot be considered while abstracting altogether from the moving forces of the subject itself. Observation alone presents what occurs. Experiment, on the contrary, is an interrogation of nature in which the subject itself introduces determinate conditions, produces an action, and judges the reaction in accordance with a rule. Only those determinations which can enter into such a law-governed relation of action and reaction can belong to a physics as science.It may indeed sound paradoxical to say that we must put something into appearances in order afterwards to take it from them. Yet this is no more contradictory here than in the case of experience generally. We do not put the sensation into the object. That would be an absurd idealism. We put into the manifold the form according to which alone its determinations can have objective unity for us. The empirically real is given, the systematic form of its connection is an achievement of the cognitive faculty.Accordingly the transition cannot consist merely in proceeding from the concept of matter to an enumeration of its forces. What had first been sought objectively, in a system of moving forces, must also be sought subjectively, in the conditions under which those forces can be combined in one experience.Space and time consequently acquire here a function which the mere enumeration of physical predicates could never disclose. They are not things, nor properties belonging to things as they might exist independently of our mode of intuition. They are forms in which the subject intuits itself as affected and outer objects as affecting it. But the formal unity of space and time is not itself an affection. It belongs to the manner in which the subject, through its own activity, combines the manifold which can be given to it.Hence the possibility of physics brings us back to the synthetic unity of apperception, though under a determination which the general transcendental deduction did not have occasion to develop in this form: the subject must determine itself as a subject in the world.
>>25560662This proposition is easily corrupted either into rational psychology or into an extravagant idealism. The representation I in pure apperception contains no intuition of a substance called the soul. That I can attach the I think to my representations proves the unity of the act through which they belong to one consciousness; it does not disclose whether the thinking subject, considered as it may be in itself, is simple, persisting, or a substance separable from the body. Rational psychology exceeds its right whenever it converts the logical unity of consciousness into cognition of the ontological constitution of the soul.This was already evident in the metaphysical lectures. The soul, as an object of inner sense, cannot assign itself a place in the body as though it perceived itself through outer sense. The question where the soul is located is therefore falsely posed if it is taken to demand a point in space at which an immaterial substance is seated. The human being, however, undoubtedly represents himself as in the world. He determines the place of his body relative to other bodies, is affected by moving forces, and himself acts through moving forces. The question left by rational psychology is consequently transformed: not, Where in the body is the soul? but, How can the subject of representation determine itself, in appearance, as a sensible being standing in relations to other appearances?Here lies what may be called the positing of oneself. The term positing must not be taken to mean creation. The subject does not produce its existence by thinking it, nor does it produce the matter of sensation, still less the things which affect it. To posit is here to determine according to a form. The subject, which in pure apperception is conscious merely of the act of combination, determines itself through the pure forms of intuition and the categories as belonging to that world of appearances whose representations it combines.There are accordingly two aspects which must not be confounded. The subject posits itself as given, dabile, insofar as it is conscious of itself in intuition, but the synthesis by which a manifold is composed according to a rule is cogitabile, an act which is thought as proceeding from spontaneity. The empirical subject is given to itself under conditions of sensibility. The form under which alone it can be so given proceeds from the subject's own faculty of representation.
>>25560664Self-affection must be understood from this distinction. If inner sense contains only the manner in which the subject appears to itself, then the determining activity of the understanding and the determinability of inner sense belong to one and the same subject, without the latter thereby being divided into two substances. The subject affects itself insofar as its spontaneous act of combination determines the manifold under the temporal condition in which alone it can intuit itself. That I determine myself is an act, what I thereby intuit in myself is appearance.The significance of this for the transition to physics can now be seen. An external moving force is not an object for me merely because a modification occurs in my state. I must be able to determine that modification as belonging to an object in one space, at one time, under relations of interaction with other appearances and with my own body. Hence the subject itself enters, as appearance, into the system of relations through which an empirical representation acquires objective significance.The subject is in this sense made into an object for itself, though only as it appears, never as it might be in itself. The doctrine of the thing in itself must likewise be protected here against a misunderstanding. If I distinguish the object as appearance from the thing as it may be in itself, I do not thereby possess two objects, one lying before and another concealed behind it. The expression thing in itself marks the abstraction from those subjective conditions under which alone an object can be given to us. If these conditions are removed, no positive intuition of another object remains. The x which is thought here cannot be exhibited as dabile. To convert this limiting thought into knowledge of a supersensible thing would be to make precisely the transcendental use of the categories which the Critique forbids.The later formulas according to which the thing in itself is an ens rationis or a thought-object therefore do not authorise the assertion that sensible objects are inventions. They express, rather, with a severity perhaps insufficiently guarded in earlier formulations, that objectivity for us is objectivity within the unity of possible experience, and that an object abstracted from every condition under which it could be given cannot again be surreptitiously treated as though it were given in another manner.Thus the transition, which at first appeared to lie between two sciences of nature, has carried us to transcendental philosophy itself. If physics is to be a system of experience, the possibility of that system depends upon the acts by which a subject constitutes the formal unity of experience, and if this subject is itself an appearance within nature, its self-determination must belong to the account.
>>25560666But the subject which determines itself in the world is not exhausted by its relation to nature. A rational being can be considered as a natural being whose actions, insofar as they are appearances, stand under causal laws. It can also be considered as a person, namely as a being to whom actions can be imputed because it determines itself according to a law of reason. This distinction too was already present in the doctrine of the human soul. Merely to be able to say I gives psychological personality in a certain sense; practical personality requires freedom and imputability. The latter is not an empirical predicate added to the former. It concerns the kind of causality under which the subject regards itself in acting.The transition from theoretical self-determination to practical self-determination therefore arises from the same subject considered under another legislation. Nature is that according to which appearances occur under laws; freedom is the causality of a rational being insofar as its determining ground is not an incentive of nature but the law which reason gives to itself. The reality of freedom cannot be presented in an intuition, as though freedom were one more force in nature. It is disclosed practically in the categorical imperative. The consciousness that I ought absolutely contains the consciousness that I regard myself as capable of determining my causality independently of sensible incentives.The human being is therefore the remarkable being in whom the concepts of nature and freedom meet without being homogeneous. As appearance he belongs to the world. As person he stands under laws which cannot be derived from the mechanism of appearances. From here the ideas of the world and of God acquire their place in the final division of transcendental philosophy.The world, if it is taken for the absolute whole of sensible things as though this whole were itself given in experience, is an object which no possible experience can exhibit. Experience progresses from perception to perception and never supplies the unconditioned completion which reason demands in the idea of a world-whole. Yet experience itself must be one: its perceptions must be capable of belonging to one systematic connection. The idea of the world is therefore not a perception enlarged beyond all bounds, but the representation of the systematic unity of appearances as a whole.In the older language of rational cosmology the world was called a totum substantiale, a whole whose members stand in real connection. Critical philosophy had to show why the sensible world cannot thereby be treated as a completed thing in itself, since this generates the antinomies. The late problem is correspondingly transformed. The world is required as the idea of the unity under which the manifold of possible experience is thought, rather than as a supersensible cosmological object whose magnitude or beginning could be determined through pure reason.
>>25560668The idea of God must be treated with still greater care. No inference from the mere concept of the most real being can establish an object corresponding to it, nor can the order of nature permit us to cognise a supersensible author as an object of theoretical knowledge. Nothing in the transition to physics restores the dogmatic theology which the critique of speculative reason rendered impossible.The concept acquires objective practical significance from another source. A rational being finds within itself a law which commands categorically. Insofar as all duties are represented under the unity of a supreme moral legislation, reason forms for itself the idea of a highest moral lawgiver. This idea is not dabile: no object corresponding to it is or can be given in sensible intuition. It is cogitabile and has its reality for moral-practical reason.Hence when Kant says, in these late reflections, that “there is a God” in moral-practical reason, the proposition must not be transformed into a theoretical proposition asserting the existence, among things generally, of a supersensible substance whose properties speculative reason has cognised. What is asserted is the necessary relation of practical reason to the idea under which its unconditional legislation can be represented as one supreme moral government.This explains at once why God must not be represented as the soul of the world. Such a representation would make the supersensible ground into a constituent part of the sensible whole and would confuse the legislation of freedom with a natural force. God is not a moving matter, not an anima mundi, not an object occupying a position within the system of appearances. The world and God signify heterogeneous poles in the employment of reason: the former the systematic whole of objects of possible sensible experience, the latter the idea belonging to the unconditional unity of moral-practical legislation.Between them stands man. This expression must again be understood systematically rather than spatially. Man is not a third thing inserted between two independently existing objects called God and the world. He is that rational being in whom both ideas arise and in whom their relation must be thought. As a sensible being he belongs to nature, as a person he legislates through reason under the idea of freedom, and it is the same subject which must be conscious of both determinations without converting either into the other.
>>25560670Hence the final standpoint can be designated by the three ideas: God, the world, and man in the world. The route by which we have arrived there is now intelligible. The transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics required a principle through which empirically discovered moving forces could belong to a system. The attempted elementary system supplied an a priori topic of such forces, but the mere classification of forces did not yet explain the possibility of physics as one experience. The attempted doctrine of ether sought a material condition of their universal interaction, but thereby brought into view the more fundamental question of what it means for moving forces to constitute an object of possible experience. This required the distinction between perception and experience, and with it the activity of the subject which makes from perceptions a system. The subject consequently had to determine itself as a sensible being in that system; and this self-determination, when considered practically, disclosed the same subject as person under the law of freedom. The system therefore could no longer terminate in physics, since the being for whom there is a nature is itself subject to a legislation which is not natural.Accordingly the problem underwent a change without becoming another problem. What was first called the transition from metaphysical foundations to physics becomes, in the more comprehensive plan, a transition from physics to transcendental philosophy and from transcendental philosophy to the system of nature and freedom. This enlargement is required because a transition is not accomplished merely when two bodies of doctrine are placed next to one another. Their connection must be derived from a principle. If the principle of the possibility of physics refers us to the self-determining subject, and the complete determination of this subject refers us to nature and freedom, then the architectonic itself must be enlarged until these moments can be comprehended within one system.This does not mean that the drafts have already achieved such a system. They are the labour of finding its principle. The repeated beginnings, altered divisions, abandoned deductions, and transformations of terminology belong to the matter itself because the point at which the transition was originally sought repeatedly proved to lie one condition deeper than had first been supposed.
>>25560675The unpaid bill of critical philosophy concerned the possibility of passing from a doctrine whose completeness is secured a priori to a science whose material is inexhaustibly empirical without surrendering the demand that science be systematic. To solve this required an account of the elementary forms of physical forces. That account led to the conditions of a single experience. These led to self-affection and the subject's positing of itself in the world; and the complete determination of this subject led finally to the distinction and unity, for reason, of nature and freedom.The Opus postumum is the investigation of this transition, and, precisely because the transition proves to concern the possibility of system itself, it becomes in the end an investigation of transcendental philosophy as the act by which reason determines the sources, extent, and limits of its own synthetic a priori cognition, and thereby comprehends its own position as theoretical and practical reason in relation to the world.The two hinges are nature and freedom. The being in whom both are represented is man. The ultimate task is consequently self-cognition, not as empirical knowledge of the states of an inner object called the soul, and not as speculative knowledge of the subject in itself, but as cognition by reason of its own legislation and of the conditions under which there can be for it a world of experience and an order of freedom.
