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>>537286226
>t.

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>>537286226
This presents a massive problem for anyone who believes in the power of modern moral theory. If your intuition is screaming that cannibalism is fundamentally wrong, but the law and the experts can’t find a logical reason to stop it, who has the blind spot: you, or the theories? Let’s see. Section 1 will involve surveying reasons for cannibalism, Section 2 will draw conclusions about major moral theories based on this, and in Section 3 I will give a few arguments that cannibalism is wrong despite the failure of the big moral theories to explain it. One of these arguments has not been given before and presents cannibalism and necrophilia as companions-in-guilt, arguing that the wrongness of one entails the wrongness of the other. I also do this with murder.

Contents

Introduction, The new cannibal wave in anthropology and ethics.

1) Types of Cannibalism. 1.1 Racism towards Cannibal culture. 1.2 The Utilitarian Butcher. 1.3 Kant the cannibal. 1.4 We owe nothing to the dead

2) Verdict: “Shooting Fish in a Philosophical Barrel”

3) Respect beyond the Person Club. 3.1.1 Virtue Ethics and Justice. 3.2 Every argument for cannibalism implies necrophilia. Conclusion (what did we learn?)

The new cannibal wave in anthropology and ethics

>>537286279
Going back to the 16th and 17th centuries, we see that the “best and brightest” in Europe practiced it as a high-end medical necessity. This seems strikingly similar to what people accuse elite billionaires of today. If you were a wealthy Englishman with epilepsy in 1800, your doctor might have prescribed you a cocktail of powdered human skull mixed with molasses. If you had internal bleeding in Germany, the “based” move was to soak an Egyptian mummy in vinegar and drink the result.

The thought behind it was that “like cures like.” In Germany, the poor would literally crowd around execution docks with cups, paying the executioner a few coins for a splash of fresh, warm blood. The intellectuals of the time argued that criminals were a burden on the state while alive, but their corpses could finally serve the public good by being consumed for health.

Anthropologists today tell us that to truly understand the ethics of cannibalism, you have to move past the Jeffrey Dahmer archetype and confront the uncomfortable reality that many philosophers and anthropologists see the practice as not only permissible but, in some contexts, deeply moral. If you are looking for a moral reason to condemn eating a human body, you are going to have a difficult time. As ethicists like J. Jeremy Wisnewski, John Shand, and Muzainy Shahiefisally have argued, once you remove murder from the equation, what they call “pure cannibalism,” or “passive cannibalism,” the moral case against cannibalism becomes quite tricky to figure out. And in light of standard deontological and consequentialist theories, the case against cannibalism is actually quite weak. This isn’t something good about cannibalism but rather something bad about such theories.

>>537286326
Consider the Wari’ people of the Western Amazon. For the Wari’, burying a loved one in the cold, wet ground to rot was a horrifying, heartless act. Instead, they practiced what anthropologist Beth Conklin calls “compassionate cannibalism.” In their funerary rites, the family would eat the roasted flesh of the deceased as a supreme act of respect and grief. To the Wari’, this was the only way to help the soul transition and to transform the painful memory of the physical corpse into a collective social body. As she claims, they were eating out of love. This challenges our deepest intuitions: if the act is done with consent, provides emotional closure for the family, and treats the body as a vessel for honor rather than trash, on what grounds do we call it “evil”? Like seriously, this strikes us as deeply wrong, and to anyone who takes ethical intuitions seriously, they’d hope the biggest theories of morality can account for why it’s bad. Something similar is found in Amerindian Perspectivism, a concept championed by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. In his book Cannibal Metaphysics, he explains some wacky theory about how to some indigenous groups, “predation” is the fundamental way of relating to the world. So eating an enemy is not about dehumanizing them; it is about absorbing their point of view. It was a ritualized way of acknowledging the “other” as a subject with their own power.

The goal of this article is to see if we can find a solid floor beneath our revulsion, or if the ethicists are right: that your disgust is nothing more than disgust.

1) Types of Cannibalism

It’s important we roughly distinguish between a few types of cannibalism, each of which has their own moral question.

>>537286362
1 Murderous cannibalism: This is the absolute floor of human behavior. This grade involves the intentional termination of a life specifically to harvest the body, whether for food, power, or some perceived spiritual transaction (maybe a demonic ritual). William Irvine has opted to call this “active cannibalism” but this doesn’t strike me as a helpful term.

2 Passive cannibalism: Think of the 16th and 17th century Europeans using already-dead bodies as consumable medicine. They are merely using the body as material, not ending any life themselves (another example might be using skulls as decorations, like in the Paris Catacombs). In the literature this is sometimes given the name “pure cannibalism,” which, again, isn’t helpful at all.

3 Survival cannibalism: Eating a body out of necessity for survival. Think of a plane crash or freezing hike, where one is on the verge of starving to death.

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>>537286226

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>>537286405
One more clarification: any of these categories can be fundamentally altered by the presence of consent. Consensual cannibalism is when any one of these types happens and the party being eaten pre-mortem consented to it. Also, when it comes to cannibalism, this may occur when the body is pre- or post-mortem. This may also change how we evaluate it morally. Many philosophers want to argue for the permissibility of the second type, as well as consensual cannibalism. I want to argue that neither is morally permissible.

1.1 Racism towards the Cannibal culture

The most effective way to test our moral boundaries is to start with the absolute floor of human behavior: murderous cannibalism. When a life is ended specifically for such a purpose, our mind’s “evil detector” literally screams at us. If anyone can picture Jeffrey Dahmer’s rampage, and go, “Yea, this is morally permissible,” then there is no point in arguing with them. However, passive cannibalism is different. It involves no murder. It might not be as easy to point to a specific fact about cannibalism per se that shows its wrongness. That’s one reason, at first glance, to reconsider cannibalism.

>>537286487
average non vegan

>>537286513
Cannibal island: in 1933, nearly 5,000 Died In One Of Stalin’s Most Horrific Labor Camps (from an rferl.org article).

In Stalin’s gulag, the wrong actions were not the eating of humans in itself, no no, it’s the prior murder; that’s what they argue. But to sane people, intuitively both are wrong. Why do we think it’s wrong? They say because it’s been etched into public consciousness. We just happen to constantly associate cannibals qua murderers with cannibals qua cannibals.

Also, it is argued, calling cannibals evil might be prejudiced, racist, and disrespectful to other cultures. By my likes this argument just sounds like ethicists trying to place themselves up on a moral high-horse again, shouting, “I am tolerant to cannibalism and you aren’t!!”

This argument, first given by guys like Michel de Montaigne, was that our hatred of cannibalism was just a sophisticated form of racism. 15th-century Spanish colonizers invented the ‘savage cannibal’ trope to justify slaughtering indigenous tribes in the West Indies. Therefore, if you find cannibalism repulsive, you’re just a victim of a 500-year-old campaign designed to dehumanize uncivilized people. Even today, you’ll find academic voices claiming that “cannibalism qua cannibalism” is a neutral cultural practice that we only view through a pejorative, Western lens. Furthermore, they say that outsiders of their tribe, if they claim the tribe to be immoral, are reaching “unduly Eurocentric conclusions that would necessarily marginalise cultures where ritualistic cannibalism is or was normalised.” As Wisnewski has pointed out: “There have been few philosophers who have defended cannibalism.

>>537286577
Most partial defenses of this behavior have amounted to endorsing relativism: there is some tribal practice of which the consumption of human flesh is an integral part. One must thus respect this practice despite its seeming dissimilarity to one’s own. It would be an ethnocentric mistake to say that the practice is wrong. This sort of argument is not a defense of cannibalism so much as it is a defense of the rights of a people to engage in practices crucial to their culture.”

They claim that if a specific tribe or culture has integrated the consumption of human remains into their rituals, then they are in their own moral right to do so. Of course, if facts about moral values are relative to privileged agents, then of course cannibalism is right in an agent-relative way. But so could Jeffrey Dahmer, or Vlad the Impaler. So, the focus of our discussion today will be if cannibalism is objectively wrong.

So, is rejecting cannibalism just another form of ethnocentrism, racial prejudice, or intolerance? I would say no. Ethnocentrism, is roughly the view that whatever accords with my culture is right simply because it is mine, or that I am more inclined to believe value judgements coming from my culture, simply because it’s my culture. But our objections to cannibalism don’t usually follow those patterns. Most would appeal to more general considerations: the dignity of persons, the moral status of human remains, the symbolic meaning of treating bodies as food, etc. So to claim we are viewing/ arguing ethnocentrically is just false.

>>537286275
He’s cute. I would trade 6 million goys for his big jew cock.

>>537286620
But what about the claim of prejudice and racism? I also don’t see how this is true at all. Indeed, if cross-cultural moral criticism is automatically racist, then no one could criticize slavery in ancient Greece, foot-binding in imperial China, or caste discrimination in India without being racist/intolerant/or whatever else. That implication is ridiculous. When somebody is telling you cannibalism is wrong they are just reporting the moral belief they hold. Also, even if our beliefs in the wrongness of cannibalism stemmed purely from the Western revulsion toward cannibalism being historically entangled with colonial propaganda, then, still, it does not follow that the moral judgment is false. Many true moral beliefs have ignoble histories. That Spanish colonizers weaponized the image of the “savage cannibal” tells us something about colonial rhetoric; it does not tell us whether consuming human flesh is morally permissible.

>>537286226
Kuru is clearly a sign from God that it is wrong. Of course, if you see something that even Epstein and his friends would try to keep secret that would be a hint that it probably is a bad idea as well. yes, clearly immoral and shit thread

>>537286714
1.2 The Utilitarian Butcher

To see how ethics struggles with cannibalism, we should look at the strange case of Joshua Milton Blahyi, notoriously known as “General Butt Naked” for sending himself and others into battle without clothes on, because it made them ‘bulletproof.’ In our world, Blahyi was a Liberian warlord who claimed (he really just claimed to do it, i think he was just trying to sound scary) to commit ritualistic cannibalism during the civil war before undergoing a radical Christian conversion and repenting for his past. But imagine an alternate universe: one where Blahyi still lays down his weapons and seeks a moral path, but instead of finding the Church, he finds a copy of John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism. “General Butt Naked” doesn’t stop eating people. He simply stops warlording around.

On utilitarianism, actions, laws, policies, etc. are determined good or bad by their results, specifically the degree to which they increase good things (pleasure, preference, desire) and decrease bad things (pain, unhappiness). Utilitarianism is a very popular normative theory, so examining cannibalism through its lens might be rewarding. The following will be mostly based on Wisniewski and Shand’s analysis of cannibalism on utilitarianism.

The first utilitarian hurdle a pro-cannibal might face is the question of bad done to the deceased. That is, the corpse facing a reduction in well-being, or an increase in ill-being.
>>537286731
People get atherosclerosis from eating too many eggs or pork and seeing pigs throats get cut makes people sad plus slaughterhouse workers get ptsd so go vegan
Also the animal agriculture industries bribe politicians to pass ag gag laws making filming what happens to animals in slaughterhouses or factory farms illegal

>>537286971
But a corpse isn’t a conscious entity. It can’t feel pain, and it can’t complain about the method it was cooked, the rituals it was used in, etc. According to standard theories of well-being, such as hedonism a corpse cannot suffer because it lacks consciousness and the capacity for sensation. Some philosophers (like Aristotle) argued that you can harm a person after they’ve died. But then that would mean, if harming the body harms the person, then the natural process of decomposition would be a moral atrocity. If you aren’t mourning the “harm” of a body rotting in a grave, then you can’t be objecting to it being eaten based on “harm to the dead.”

But that only goes for physical or emotional harms, possibly posthumous harm can happen according to desire-satisfaction and object-list accounts of well-being. Philosophers like Joel Feinberg have famously argued that a person’s interests can be defeated postmortem if their lifelong desires (such as the desire for a dignified burial) are frustrated after they die. Yet, even if we accept Feinberg’s premise that postmortem desire-frustration constitutes a harm, a utilitarian could still find circumstances where cannibalism remains permissible. This occurs in a situation where the deceased explicitly consented to be consumed or held no specific desires regarding the treatment of their remains. If an individual died with the active desire that their body be used for “medicinal” purposes or to provide sustenance for others, then consuming the body would actually fulfill their postmortem interests rather than thwarting them. In such a case, there is no “victim” even under a Feinbergian framework, in fact there’s only good happening in such a situation.

>>537286326
If nobody is being killed, then you're eating diseased unhealthy meat
If somebody is being killed, you're predating on your own species, any implications about murder aside, and nurturing a drive to feed and hunt, a strong drive, and modulating it towards other humans, likely reinforcing the drive to do so again. Both are evolutionarily bad, tactics and it makes sense that there would be some "inherent" barrier inbuilt intrinsically.

Even discounting those concerns it's also a potential prion vector, giving another reason why the inherent revulsion may have emerged

It still fucking cracks me up that those wacky victorians were all going around fucking gobbling up mummies though, I always think of that Futurama bit (and never realised that was a "real" thing)

>>537287025
But possibly cannibalism would be wrong because it upsets the family of the eaten. But that’s not what’s going on with most passive cannibalism: in Papua New Guinea, or in the Amazon it’s happening for ritualistic and religious reasons, sometimes with the permission of the family. Indeed, in some cultures the families themselves eat their own deceased relatives. If cannibalism is only wrong because it makes the family sad, then it becomes perfectly permissible under two conditions:

1 The deceased had no family or friends.

2 The family and friends don’t care (or perhaps they want to join in).

>>537287073
not always theres cases of non murder fresh human meat and animal agriculture is responsible for more serious pandemics than cannibalism

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>>537287025
Unbelievable faggotry. Go dig up a fresh corpse and eat it you fucking piece of shit.

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>>537287083
But of course, not only the eaten and their family are being considered under utilitarianism. We have to look at everyone affected by the act, including the rest of society. Society shrieks at the thought of cannibalism, causing sadness, fear, and the overall reduction of goods. It’s important to note this is a false empirical claim. History shows that societies practicing ritual cannibalism weren’t unhappy. This doesn’t really matter though, more importantly, if we only find it wrong because it’s a taboo, then the morality of the act is just a matter of convention. It’s no different than saying “wearing socks with sandals is immoral” because it makes people around you uncomfortable. But our intuition tells us that eating a person is fundamentally different from fashion mishaps.

To see this in practice, imagine our Utilitarian Butcher going through his checklist: he finds a subject who is already dead (eliminating physical harm), who had no post-mortem desires for burial or perhaps even consented to being used (satisfying their interest), and whose family is either absent or fully supportive of the act. He then confirms that his local community doesn’t suffer from a “taboo” shock, a condition actually met in various cultures, such as the Wari’ people of the Amazon or the Fore of Papua New Guinea, where “mortuary cannibalism” was historically a standard, respectful way to honor the deceased and help the community process grief. In these specific societies, the utilitarian calculus, in fact, actively marks it as a moral good. Because the net well-being of the living is increased while the harm to the dead remains at zero, the theory finds no grounds for protest, effectively labeling the Butcher’s work as the “best” possible outcome.

>“General Butt Naked”.

>>537287240
At the end of the day, both Wisnewski and Shand’s analysis of Utilitarianism doesn’t show us anything that wasn’t already obvious. The fact cannibalism can be permissible, in fact encouraged on utilitarianism is just a feature of the theory. The only intrinsic value and disvalue on Utilitarianism is well-being and ill-being. So any normal action x when compared to y, as Lu says, will end up permissible, and is the best option, as long as it increases well-being better than y. Lu says, “Of course, he is correct in saying that there is nothing in utilitarianism that can show that cannibalism is wrong per se, but that is less a feature of cannibalism itself and more simply a consequence of the fact that utilitarianism cannot show that any normal type of act is wrong per se.” In cannibalistic cultures where a society satisfies its religious desires or gains pleasure through cannibalism, then it would be a good option, especially when considering the dead can’t be harmed. Indeed, as long as the net good trumps the net bad, even murderous cannibalism could be permissible. Shand agrees with Lu here, noting that bad acts are “contingent on changeable circumstances.” If the circumstances change (e.g., you find a lonely corpse and a hungry crowd), the utilitarian objections don’t fare well.

1.3 Kant the Cannibal

The case of the Utilitarian Butcher really just emphasized the fact that, on utilitarianism, nothing is per se good except well-being. In a sense it doesn’t really disconfirm our intuition that cannibalism is wrong, because we don’t believe cannibalism’s wrongness is contingent on its consequences, most of us believe it’s intrinsically wrong. Kantian ethics is built on the Formula of Humanity: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end” (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals).

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>>537286226
>You can’t say cannibalism is immoral
CANNIBALISM IS IMMORAL.
Ever wonder what else you might be wrong about?

>>537287296
If I eat you to satisfy my hunger, I am clearly using you as a tool. Case closed. Cannibalism is wrong.

I’m kidding, the case is back open. Wisnewski breaks down four arguments (three Kantian and one “quasi-Kantian”) to show why even duty-based systems struggle to make human-eaters put the fork down.

The first and simplest argument is that cannibalism violates human dignity, treating them as a mere means to end (a meal). But according to Kant, dignity comes from autonomy, the ability to think, choose, and act. A corpse has no autonomy. It can’t make choices, it can’t author laws, and it can’t disagree with you. As Wisnewski and Lu point out, in Kant’s moral distinction between persons and things, the corpse isn’t a person; it’s a thing. Persons are rational, autonomous beings with inherent, infinite worth (ends-in-themselves), whereas things are non-rational objects with only conditional, exchangeable value (means to an end). You can’t violate the dignity of a thing any more than you can violate the dignity of a rubber ducky or a discarded sandwich. And a corpse is not a human person, or even really a human being in a sense, since it is not alive.

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>>537286226
What are these things

>>537287299
but mutilating baby boys genitals, tribal genocide, animal sacrifice, killing pigs by putting suicidal demons in them and millions of years of wild animal suffering before humans existed is not immoral?

Ever wonder if you might be wrong about the bible? 27% of the New Testament is about demons and people interacting with them and I see zero around today

>>537287334
A Kantian might try to salvage their theory by saying it does actually account for dead bodies morally, perhaps by arguing that they should still be classified as persons. However, as Muzainy Shahiefisally argues, this attempt to “personify” the corpse fails. Shahiefisally notes that for Kant, the distinguishing feature of humanity is the capacity for moral perfection and practical reason. We are elevated above nature because we can legislate moral laws and abide by them. Since Kant limited the ascription of personhood strictly to living human beings who possess these desiderata, death, which obliterates reason and freedom, effectively terminates personhood. In fact, Kant’s view on suicide reinforces this: he saw the act of killing oneself as the “annihilation of the subject of morality” and a renunciation of one’s personality. Shahiefisally further clarifies that while Kant inconsistently seems to grant personhood to infants or the mentally incompetent (arguing they belong to the “class” of humans whose capacities are simply not yet operationalized), he does not extend this courtesy to the dead. A child is a being “endowed with freedom” in development; a corpse is a being whose freedom has been “rooted out” of the world. Ultimately, if a corpse is a thing, it can be analogized to an animal. Kant permitted the consumption of animals as long as they were killed without pain, because they lack the capacity for morality. Following this logic, Shahiefisally reaches the staggering conclusion that consuming a naturally occurring corpse might actually be more moral than industrial farming, as it involves no cruelty to a living subject and no destruction of an active locus of freedom.

>>537286731
Kuru is mostly in a small subset of people in Africa (or wherever it is) that ate brains due to ritualistic cannibalism. that said, eating human meat is probably fine just long as you avoid the brain or spinal areas. that is where the bad prions would be and can cause some fucked up neurodegenerative diseases that are uncurable. Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease is also one that will cause the "shakes" (like Kuru) and eventually causes death within a year or so. the misfolded proteins basically go around killing brain nerve cells until your bodily functions cease. it's kinda like a sped up Alzheimer's disease.

Im hungry.

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>>537287494
The 2nd and 3rd Kantian arguments rely on how Kant saw the concept of respect. Common interpretations of Kant suggest respect is a sort of ultimate good, owed to persons and not things. Agents have the capacity to set ends, and respect is allowing agents to form their own morally permissible ends and supporting them in reaching such ends.

The second argument suggests a broader notion: respecting a person requires respecting their body, even after death. The intentional degradation of a corpse is seen as a slap in the face to the person who used to inhabit it. Wisnewski notes two main objections to this. First, a critic might argue that you cannot disrespect the dead because respect requires an “other” to be present. If there is no longer an agent, there is no object of respect. Wisnewski dismisses this objection; he, and most ethicists, think we can show respect to people who aren’t there (like following a friend’s secret wishes). His second objection is that It is not clear why consuming a body counts as disrespect. Like showing the bottoms of your feet or belching, ‘respect’ is socially defined. In the West, we show respect through burial; in other cultures, like the Wari’, respect is shown through consumption. If there is nothing intrinsic to cannibalism that signals disrespect, then it isn’t a moral wrong, it’s just “bad etiquette” as he says.


>>537287502
this. also if you’ve ever donated blood you’d know they asked if you were in Europe during mad cow if so you can’t donate because of cows having that problem too
>>537287534

>>537287625
The third Kantian argument suggests that our obligations to people don’t end at the grave. If a living person sets an end, like wanting to be buried or wanting their organs donated, we have a duty to respect that choice even after they are gone. This makes the wrongness of cannibalism contingent. If I explicitly say, “Please don’t eat me,” then eating me violates my autonomy. But what if I don’t care? Or what if, like Wisnewski himself, I explicitly state that I have no objection to being served for dinner? Also, a Kantian could make arguments that cannibalism disrespects the family of the deceased, or their social group, etc. but they all fall victim to the same problems of utilitarianism, it makes cannibalism contingently wrong. But our goal is to show cannibalism is wrong because it’s wrong in itself, and that our disgust at the people-eating in tribal cultures is justified despite the great benefits they experience from it. The last argument is a sort of quasi-kantian “religious” argument. That the human body is sacred. It has an intrinsic “holiness” that is violated by consumption. Wisnewski dismisses this for being circular (begging the question). To say the body is “sacred” is just another way of saying “you shouldn’t eat it.” You’re using the conclusion to prove the premise. Furthermore, if the body is so sacred that it can’t be “defiled,” then surgery, tattoos, piercings, and even cremation should be immoral.

One might object that the distinction between persons and things is flawed and not necessary.

>>537287655
In essence, as Lu concludes, deontology fails here because it can’t find a person to protect, and when it comes to our duty to the dead, avoiding eating them isn’t always respectful. Because a corpse is not a moral person with rights or autonomy, the Kantian imperatives don’t apply. If our two most powerful moral machines, one focused on Happiness and the other on Duty, both give the Utilitarian Butcher a green light, we have to ask: Is our “intuition” just false? Are these theories missing something? Wisnewski concludes: If we are wrong about the “obvious” evil of cannibalism, what else are we wrong about?

1.4 We owe nothing to the dead

Some philosophers have denied we have any obligation to the dead, that the dead can’t be harmed, and that things can’t be objects of respect. This section will cover that. If we can establish people post-mortem are objects of respect then we can create a good argument against cannibalism.

One time Aristotle said: “A dead man is popularly believed to be capable of having both good and ill fortune, honour and dishonour and prosperity and the loss of it among his children and descendants generally, in exactly the same way as if he were alive but unaware or unobservant of what was happening (Nicomachean Ethics 1.10).” Thomas Nagel agrees. Breaking a deathbed promise, he says, is “an injury to the dead man.” Many people find this intuitive. Many philosophers do not.

>>537286226
tl;dr
Cannibals deserve the bullet.
No, I won't listen to you grovel, face the wall.

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>>537287689
I will touch on three main objections.

The first objection is that after death, nothing can alter a moment of your life. As Ernest Partridge puts it, once you are dead, no later event can change what has already happened. To say that something occurring in 2030 harms someone who died in 2020 appears to require causal arrows pointing backward in time. This objection often takes a sharper form: harm requires an existing subject. Epicurus’ thought is simple and devastatingly tidy. When we are, death is not; when death is, we are not. Extend this reasoning: when posthumous events occur, we are not. No subject, no harm. This is sometimes formalized as the Existence Requirement: an event can be intrinsically bad for a person only if the person exists at the time it occurs. If we accept that we cease to exist at death, then nothing occurring afterward can be intrinsically bad for us. The case seems closed (unless you disagree with annihilation and agree with the afterlife.)

A second objection appeals to what is sometimes called the Experience Requirement: something can be good or bad for you only if it affects your experience. If this is true, posthumous harm is impossible by inspection. The dead have no experiences. Therefore nothing can be good or bad for them. Hedonism, in its standard form, endorses this requirement. A related third objection holds that what is good or bad for a person must reduce to their intrinsic, non-relational properties. After death, none of your intrinsic properties change. Your life’s pleasures and pains are already complete. Later events do not modify them. Therefore later events cannot make your life worse. On comparativist accounts of harm, an event is bad for you if it makes your life worse than it otherwise would have been. But once your life is finished, nothing can reduce its stock of goods.
>>537287704
>tl:dr
>all meat eaters of human or non human animal flesh deserve the bullet.
>no. Face the wall now

>>537287781
The problem with these is that, firstly, no backwards causation is required. The defender of posthumous harm need not claim that later events causally alter earlier states. The key move is this: later events can determine truths about your life. Suppose you die believing your novel will be published. It is not. That fact, its non-publication, was not true while you lived. But once it becomes true, it affects whether your projects succeeded. It alters the evaluation of your life as a whole. Nothing in this requires backward causation. The later event does not reach into the past and rearrange facts about your experience. It just changes what is true about your life now. That is enough. Harm need not be a time-indexed event. It can be a feature of a life considered as a whole. On what is sometimes called an atemporalist view, an event occurring in 2030 can make your life worse overall, even though there is no time at which you are “made worse off.” The badness attaches to the life as a completed narrative. We already think this way about ordinary cases. Suppose someone spends years on a scientific theory that is later decisively refuted. That refutation can diminish the value of their life’s work, even though it occurs after the relevant efforts are complete. Evaluation of a life is holistic, not confined to temporal slices.

>>537287179
I "get" the endogenous and even the exogenous cannibalism (even from the bizarre argument that it's a weird "respect" rather than humiliation, a vanquished foe being worthy enough to give you strength) and even the "just cut a little piece off me bro" consensual live cannibalism but the fact of the matter is that you're still inherently "tainting" the human food and prey drive to be "attuned" to other humans and it's an incredibly strong and primal drive, there is 100% a reason for the taboo

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>>537287810
Regarding the Experience Requirement, I also think it’s obviously false. Consider the deceived spouse who never discovers the betrayal. Or the businessman whose colleagues mock him behind his back. If he never finds out, does that mean nothing bad has happened to him? Most people resist that conclusion. I take these to be immediate counter examples to the experience condition. And on the last argument, again the same counterexamples work. Imagine Jim’s wife cheated behind his back several times. Jim never found out, and his adulterous wife carried the secret to the time of his death. No non-relational properties were changed, yet who wouldn’t say something bad had happened to Jim?

Lets construct a simple argument:

P1) Unfelt harms are possible.
P2) If unfelt harms are possible, then harms need not affect experience.
P3) If harms need not affect experience, then events occurring after death can harm.

C) Therefore, posthumous harm is possible.

If betrayal, deception, or reputational destruction can harm you without your existence, experience, or changing your intrinsic properties, then there isn’t going to appear, all of a sudden, a magic boundary of death that suddenly renders such harms inert.

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>>537287835
that just sounds like slippery slope with extra steps but you could say that about so many other things like how for so many decades people said cannabis was a “gateway drug”

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>>537287865
The desire-satisfaction and objective-list accounts of well-being also give us leverage here, it’s an arguably more plausible account of well-being than hedonism. I’m sure you can even think of goods and bads in life that have nothing to do with experience or sensation. I already gave examples earlier, but for another one, just think of a person who got a botched lobotomy. Even if they lost the brain-parts to feel pain and pleasure, it is no doubt they would have a decrease in well-being after the surgery. Anyway, if it is bad for you when your desires are frustrated, and many of your desires concern what happens after you die, then posthumous events can frustrate your desires and thereby harm you. If Zed wants to be cremated and is buried instead, his desire is frustrated. That frustration does not require him to be around to observe it. The harm lies in the fact that what he wanted did not occur. This also further affirms the fact we have duties to the dead, and that the dead can be objects of respect.

There’s more to be said, but I’ll leave it at that.

2) Verdict: “Shooting Fish in a Philosophical Barrel”

>>537286226
Most women smear baby flesh all over their faces everyday. All the best selling women's makeup is now infused with "stem cells" to slow the aging process and rejuvenate the skin, they get this genetic material from aborted babies as well as from the foreskins from male sexual mutilation and dismemberment. 25% of white women fuck niggers. About 66% of white women have murdered multiple babies (including birth control which is an abortion by definition and the dead baby is partially absorbed into her body leaving traces of her dead babies' DNA in her brain and eggs forever via telegonics). The average woman literally practices human sacrifice and cannibalism to look better so that she can continue to perform human sacrifice and cannibalism and engage in sex with nigger demons and dogs until her eggs are completely tainted and will never produce a human child, at best she can birth a cambrion. Its a never ending circle of jewish lilith demon worship and ritual, even at the most basic level of your typical sorrority girl.

>>537288034
If you’ve followed this far, you likely can’t point it out exactly, but you still think eating a human being is a grotesque violation of... something. On the other hand, it looks like the two most prestigious moral machines in history run the numbers and give the act a shrug.

Jeremy Wisnewski, who essentially did the heavy lifting for us, summarizes standard academic strategy:

>“Consider how the best ethical theories handle a case, and look for convergence. >If none of the dominant theories can demonstrate that a thing is wrong, we have reason to think it isn’t wrong.”

>>537288046
theres the human hair and wig industry in which women buy wigs made from hair from women in third world countries who got paid only a few dollars for all the hair on their head also the Jew who was caught eating foreskins

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>>537286226
Japan does it better

>>537288330
unfortunately you could never do that in the united states do to a mix of liberal feminism, conservative Puritanism and Jewish litigiousness

>>537288213
The argument goes something along the lines of this:

1 If there were a rational basis to judge cannibalism as wrong, our best moral theories would show it.

2 Our best moral theories (Utilitarianism/Deontology) do not show it to be wrong.

3 Therefore, we have no rational basis to judge cannibalism as wrong.

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>>537288598
But as Wisnewski admits, proving this was essentially “shooting fish in a philosophical barrel.” Utilitarianism, by its very definition, is an accounting system for consequences, of course no act is intrinsically wrong. The deontological fish are just as easy to pick off. Kantians care about intentions and persons. But a corpse isn’t a person; it’s a thing, meaning it doesn’t have dignity, and won’t be the bearer of respect. Regarding intentions, Wisnewski notes, “Behavior, considered in isolation from the intentions that direct it, is morally neutral (Wertlos).”

At this point, we have two choices. We can conclude that our revulsion is just a colonial taboo, or we can conclude that the theories are missing something. It may just be that our major moral theories aren’t that good at accounting for the wrongness of certain things- think about ethicists that use them to argue for “victimless” incest, polygamy, or Peter Singer with infanticide- and that is a problem with the theories, not our intuition. As Leon Kass argued: “Can anyone really give an argument fully adequate to the horror which is father-daughter incest (even with consent), or having sex with animals, or mutilating a corpse, or eating human flesh, or even just (just!) raping or murdering another human being? Would anybody’s failure to give full rational justification for his or her revulsion at these practices make that revulsion ethically suspect? Not at all.” Indeed, it seems cannibalism is the type of thing an opponent of an ethical theory would hope it implies. Many would take the obvious wrongness of cannibalism to be a reductio ad absurdum for theories which allow for it, or fail to account for its wrongness. Kass is actually famous as a bioethicist for his idea of the “The Wisdom of Repugnance.” The idea is that “repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason’s power fully to articulate.” But I won’t defend that here.

>>537288632
If you are a believer in the power of ethical intuitions, then you probably think we should treat our strongest moral intuitions as data points. If a theory (like Utilitarianism) contradicts a massive, clear data point (like “don’t eat people”), the theory is the thing that needs to be discarded or modified, not the data. Perhaps this is why religious moral frameworks often feel more human than secular ones. Religious theories often have built-in categories for the “sacred” that secular theories don’t have. When it comes to things like cannibalism, incest, or bestiality, the “victimless” crimes that secular ethics struggles to explain, religious and intuition-based theories might actually be the only ones standing on solid ground.

Whether the theory be religious or not, we are currently in need of a middle ground. We have a category of objects, works of art, features of nature, and human corpses, things that generate serious moral demands despite not being “persons.” I believe this merits a reexamination of the nature of respect, involving reconsidering what things count as objects of respect.

>>537288657
3) Respect beyond the Person Club

As we’ve seen, respect is a club where you need to be a person to get in. This creates a massive problem for the things we intuitively care about but which don’t have personhood. Think about:

The Environment: Is the Grand Canyon only valuable because tourists like looking at it?

Great Art: If I bought the Mona Lisa and used it as a floor mat in my private basement where no one could see it, am I doing something wrong?

The Dead: We’ve already seen that the dead can’t be harmed in the traditional sense.

When we try to explain why destroying these things is wrong, we usually fall into the person shift (named by yours truly). We say, “You shouldn’t key that car because it’s John’s car,” or “You shouldn’t burn that flag because it offends patriots.” We move the moral wrongness away from the object and back onto a living person who might get their interests hurt. But, what if there are no people left?

In Lu’s paper, he invites us to imagine the following:

>>537288686
Imagine a last man on earth scenario. A global plague has wiped everyone out. This man finds the Uffizi Gallery in Florence. Out of pure boredom or a weird flex of will, he decides to burn the entire museum to the ground. The Utilitarian says no one is around to be affected. The Kantian says no one’s property rights were violated. No problem. But some of us might still feel like something is ethically off.

At first, I thought the wrongness of violating these things may be explained by the fact that such things are “quasi-persons,” moral patients with interests, but just no rationality. I even thought of fetuses to be a great example of this. I found two problems with this approach. First, I looked at some environmentalists who have tried to solve this by upgrading Nature to a quasi-person. They argue that a rainforest or an ecosystem has interests. A forest wants to grow; it has a telos to flourish. If you dump toxic waste in it, you are thwarting its interests in the same way you thwart a person’s interests by breaking their leg. It can’t be rational but it can flourish, or wither away. Even if you were the last man on earth, many conservationists would argue it would be a good thing to try and secure Nature’s health. I thought, humans have beautiful and complex natural systems. Just like Nature is in conservationist arguments, maybe they are quasi-persons that deserve respect. However, even if we accept that a forest is a “quasi-person” because it’s alive and trying to flourish, a human corpse doesn’t fit that mold. A corpse isn’t trying to do anything. It has no biological interests. It can’t flourish; it’s decaying.

>>537288705
But then I thought, “maybe corpses are relevantly similar enough to fetuses that the wrongness of harming a fetus suggests the wrongness of harming a corpse.” They are both non-persons, and many think of them intuitively as moral patients. The problem is that most arguments in favor of fetuses as moral patients don’t work with the dead. Most pro-life arguments (like Don Marquis’s “Future Like Ours”) rely on the idea that a fetus is a potential person with future interests. A corpse is the opposite. It has no future. It is a former-person.

So we are stuck. But then out of the philosophical wilderness comes Matthew Lu with a Virtue Ethics approach that gives us a good account of respect for non-person objects, things, such as dead bodies.

3.1.1 Virtue Ethics and Justice

The idea that nature has interests that can be violated is already debated, and the same goes for the idea of a quasi-person. But even given that non-persons do have interests deserving of respect, we have seen that a corpse wouldn’t qualify. We need to have a theory of respect for objects. However, as Lu says, the notion of “interests” is completely at home in the conceptual universe of virtue ethics. Under its Aristotelian framework, virtue is explicitly linked to flourishing. In this view, moral value is best understood as the actualization of potentialities intrinsic to a thing’s nature. This explains why a committed environmentalist doesn’t just care about the rainforest’s utility to humans, but about the ecosystem’s own health or integrity. So, virtue ethics doesn’t need to play the Person Shift game where we pretend the dead (or the art) have rights, or that harming them harms people, and that’s what makes it wrong. Instead, it recognizes that objects can possess objective value that generates an obligation for moral agents to act with respect.

>>537288733
By focusing on the character of the agent and their responsiveness to value, virtue ethics allows us to say that the person who sees a corpse and wants to eat it, is manifesting a vice. They are failing to recognize a “vulnerable” object that, while no longer a person, still demands a specific kind of moral attention. Let me explain.

Most of the time, legal philosophers see justice as basically a legal contract. It’s a deal between two people: “I won’t do x if you don’t do x.” Because the dead can’t sign a contract or hit back, they are effectively kicked out of the justice system. To get around this, most lawmakers usually rely on the Person Shift from earlier; they say it’s wrong to desecrate a body because it might upset the living relatives, not because of the body deserving justice and respect in itself. But Matthew Lu argues that justice is owed directly to the object, using John Hacker-Wright’s theory.

Hacker-Wright proposes a much older, more intuitive conception of justice. Instead of a deal between equals, justice is a non-reciprocal obligation that the strong have toward the vulnerable. Vulnerability here also doesn’t need to do with sentience. You don’t need a central nervous system to be vulnerable. As Hacker-Wright explains:

>“Rare natural formations, an endangered plant, or a work of art can be properly called vulnerable even though they can be damaged and wronged, but not harmed... To be wronged, no damage need accrue to a thing; rather, being wronged need involve only being the target of a vicious action.”

>>537288569
we have nyotaimori here retard

>>537288757
A corpse is the ultimate definition of vulnerable. It is “powerless and in the thrall” of the living. It cannot object, it cannot feel pain, and it cannot sue you. But because it possesses intrinsic value, not just value derived from what the living think of it, it makes a claim on the virtuous individual. Lu argues that justice is a virtue, a “perfection of a properly ordered soul.” This soul possesses what Iris Murdoch called Moral Attention. A trained musician hears a complex chord progression where a casual listener just hears a good song. A pro hitter sees a curveball’s rotation where a fan just sees a white blur. A virtuous person sees the objective moral value in a human corpse where the cannibal just sees a body. So, if you fail to recognize the value you are doing something wrong, and cultivating moral defect, or vice. The Butcher’s willingness to eat his neighbor is evidence of a vicious disposition. He is exploiting powerlessness for his own benefit, and that is the very definition of Injustice. For more check out Lu’s paper.

>>537288789
>Because the practice faces strict regulatory hurdles and public stigma, it operates almost entirely through specialized catering companies, private event bookings, and adult entertainment venues rather than traditional dine-in establishments.

>Hygiene Barriers: To comply with local health department regulations, sushi is almost never placed directly onto the model's bare skin. Instead, it is artfully arranged on sanitized banana leaves, bamboo leaves, or plastic wrap laid across the model

>Strict Rules of Etiquette: Guests are strictly forbidden from touching the models. Diners must use chopsticks to pick up the food, and inappropriate comments, gestures, or photography are generally not tolerated. Security or an on-site sushi chef is typically present to enforce these rules

>While it is legal in most of the US as a private catering service, local city licensing and health departments thoroughly inspect these operations. In the past, attempts to introduce it to mainstream public restaurants (such as past attempts in Seattle and Minneapolis) faced intense local backlash, protests, or tight regulatory scrutiny regarding public nudity and food safety laws

>>537288792
It seems that virtue ethics does a better job at accounting for evil acts done to things, and I take this to be good evidence that virtue ethics is just a better moral theory than the other two big ones. Keep in mind, I am offering virtue ethics as a possible way to account for the wrongness of cannibalism, given that other theories can’t.

3.1.2 Virtue Ethics argument

3.2 Every argument for cannibalism implies necrophilia

In ethics, we often use a strategy called reflective equilibrium. This is essentially a stress test for your principles: you take a line of reasoning you’re using to justify one act and see if it accidentally justifies something else that we know is undeniably wrong. A classic example is the debate over abortion. If someone argues that a fetus lacks self-awareness and therefore isn’t a person, a critic might point out that a newborn infant also lacks self-awareness. To remain logically consistent, the advocate must either:

1 Reject their original premise (admitting the lack of self-awareness isn’t enough to deny personhood).

2 Accept the horrifying conclusion that infanticide is also permissible.

>>537286362
You lost me here, I don't care about some jungle subhumans

>>537288994
For a long time, cannibalism was the infanticide of moral philosophy, it was the act everyone agreed was wrong, used to prove that a theory had gone off the rails. But as the super smart prestige academics have begun to normalize cannibalism as a victimless cultural preference, we need a new floor. If the experts can’t find a reason to stop the cannibal we have to show them where their logic ends: in the arms of the necrophile.

Here is how pro-cannibal arguments imply the permissibility of necrophilia:

Take the argument that pro-cannibals use:

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>>537289009
we were all once “jungle subhumans”

>>537289050
1 If there were a rational basis to judge cannibalism as wrong, our best moral theories would show it.

2 Our best moral theories (Utilitarianism/Deontology) do not show it to be wrong.

3 Therefore, we have no rational basis to judge cannibalism as wrong

Just add the additional premises:

4 If we have no rational basis to judge cannibalism as wrong, and cannibalism and necrophilia have no morally relevant differences, then we have no rational basis to judge necrophilia as wrong

5 We have no rational basis to judge cannibalism as wrong

6 Cannibalism and necrophilia have no morally relevant differences

7 Therefore, we have no rational basis to judge necrophilia as wrong

>>537289140
In our talk of utilitarianism, we saw that the Utilitarian Butcher argues that a corpse cannot feel pain, so there is no victim. The necrophile can use the exact same math: if the act is done in private (there is no family or friends dissenting) and the corpse can’t suffer, the pleasure gained by the living agent creates a net increase in world happiness. The same can be said for society and taboos. Just picture a society where instead of funerary cannibal rites, they have funerary necrophilic rites. Someone might argue that necrophilia is worse because of the specific health risks associated with it, as cannibalism has much less. Of course this doesn’t change things, for you can imagine the act done in a sterile environment with no risk of spreading disease to the living. More importantly, if the only reason necrophilia is wrong is because it’s unsanitary, then a necrophile who uses protection would be acting morally. Our intuition tells us the act is wrong even if it is perfectly sterile.

>>537289165
Arguing that we need not show respect to Kantian things also has the same problem. Kantians traditionally reserve respect for autonomous persons. If a corpse is just a thing, then using that “thing” for sexual gratification is no more a violation of dignity than using a mannequin or a piece of furniture. In Kant’s framework, everything has either a Dignity or a Price. Persons have Dignity because they are ends; things have Price because they are tools used to serve an end. If you recall, the third Kantian argument says we must respect the “ends” (wishes) people set while they were alive. If I say, “Eat me when I die,” then eating me actually fulfills my autonomy. The wrongness is contingent: it’s only wrong if I didn’t want it. That means that, if a person writes in their will, “I consent to necrophilia after my death,” a Kantian who relies on this logic should call this a good act, beneficial to the dead person’s pre-mortem will. Recently, based on Kantianism, and the distinction between persons and things, Shahiefisally has made a positive case on behalf of the pro-cannibalism view. This conclusion would be a defeater for such a view.

>>537289186
One might argue that ritual cannibalism (like that of the Wari’) is intended to honor the dead, whereas necrophilia is inherently degrading. This falls straight back into the whole thing about etiquette. If respect is socially defined, as the pro-cannibal must argue to justify eating the dead, then degradation is also defined in such a manner. A culture could claim that their sexual use of a body is their way of “communing” with or “valuing” the deceased.

Just like with the case of cannibalism, if we take Wisnewski’s principle: “Consider how the best ethical theories handle a case, and look for convergence. If none of the dominant theories can demonstrate that a thing is wrong, we have reason to think it isn’t wrong.”

Then we have reason to think necrophilia isn’t wrong as well…Think about that. If a mother mourning her baby can involve eating it, then what else can be done to it?

The same goes for people who deny bodies posthumous harm, or say we have no obligations to the dead. Many say “Where death is, we are not.” As we saw, some argue that if the person no longer exists to be harmed, then they are immune to all physical acts. The same goes for the Experience Requirement argument. If a “wrong” only occurs when someone feels it, then a “victimless” sexual act with a corpse is morally neutral. Since the deceased cannot perceive the act, no harm has technically occurred according to this logic.

>>537289201
I take it to be the case that if the same arguments that show cannibalism to be permissible also show necrophilia to be permissible, then we have evidence that those arguments go wrong somewhere. Because necrophilia is obviously wrong.

A critic might attempt to rescue the permissibility of cannibalism by arguing that it is not, in fact, a companion-in-guilt with necrophilia. They might claim that there are morally relevant differences between eating a corpse and sexualizing one, such that the rightness of the former does not logically imply the rightness of the latter. But as seen above, there isn’t much wiggle room. If one believes cannibalism is permissible, they must accept that necrophilia is too.

3.3 Objections to my arguments

I have been faced with a few concerns related to my arguments in this post. I decided to revamp the article as well as add this section.

3.3.1 Lab grown human meat

The most direct challenge to the cannibalism implies necrophilia argument is the absence of a corpse. The argument for the wrongness of cannibalism often rests on the status of the dead body. If human meat is grown in a lab from a small cell sample, there is no deceased person to respect or defile. Therefore, a critic would argue that one could endorse the consumption of lab-grown human meat without being logically committed to the permissibility of necrophilia, as the latter strictly requires a dead human body.

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>>537286226
Cannibalism is how you spread fucking Kuru, which is basically Mad Cow disease for humans. Just like cows get Mad Cow due to eating other cows humans get Kuru for eating other humans.

Diseases like Mad Cow and Kuru show you how cannibalism is completely unnatural and are consequences of what happens when you do cannibalism.

>>537289220
However, while the lab-grown scenario removes the corpse, it does not remove the underlying bad of commodification. If one argues that human tissue is morally neutral matter simply because it was grown in a vat, they are logically forced to accept other applications of that same logic. For instance, it would be equally permissible to grow human skin for high-end upholstery or, more poignantly, to grow realistic human sexual organs for the purpose of sexual gratification. If we find the idea of a “human-skin handbag” or a “lab-grown human sex toy” abhorrent, we are admitting that the human form and matter possess a symbolic or intrinsic value that remains even when decoupled from a specific deceased individual. The wrongness lies in the act of treating the human form as a consumer product.

3.3.2 Survival necrophilia'

One concern is raised from survival cannibalism. If I am right in arguing that all the arguments for cannibalism fail because they imply necrophilia, wouldn’t even survival cannibalism be impermissible?

Someone might ask: "If we agree the Andes plane crash survivors were right to eat the dead to stay alive, are you going to tell a starving person they are evil for choosing a meal over dying?"

>>537288945
So it’s legal and exists commonly in 22 states thanks for admitting defeat cuckboy

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>>537288945
Many, if not all of those requirements are the same in modern Japan unless the customer wants to stretch the rules a bit. Which could be said of the US of course.

>>537289240
just stick to muscle meat

>>537289243
First, we need to stop pretending that every act done to stay alive is morally good. In extreme survival scenarios, people often do things that are wrong but biologically inevitable. It might just be the case a perfectly morally person lets themself die of hunger if they were apart of the Andes plane crash. Possibly, if I am starving and I steal a loaf of bread from your table, the act of theft is still a violation of your property rights. It remains wrong in an important sense. However, we excuse the actor because they are under a state of necessity. It may be the case someone does something objectively wrong yet they are excused of the wrong given the moral state of affairs at play. Wrongness of an act does not necessarily imply moral condemnation of said act.

Many may say it is a “real tragedy, the Andes plane crash; they had to eat people.” However we don't look at those survivors as "vicious" or "corrupt." It may not be permissible, but it is definitely understandable.

Second, the arguments for cannibalism that imply necrophilia might not be the same for survival cannibalism anyway. Why? because survival cannibalism has an extra condition, namely that is has something to do with the human’s physiological needs. If the drive for self-preservation is a morally relevant difference between survival and passive cannibalism, then arguments for passive cannibalism wouldn’t also imply survival cannibalism, and thus the fact that passive cannibalism implies necrophilia wouldn’t mean survival cannibalism implies necrophilia.

>>537289311
However, In passive cannibalism (like the European “mummy medicine” or ritual consumption), the agent is making a discretionary choice. They are hungry for “experience,” “medicine,” or “tradition.” Their survival is not on the line. Because the act is discretionary, the only way to justify it is to devalue the corpse, and you have seen ways pro-cannibals argue that if you’ve read this far. Of course the problem I raise is that once you say that, you have no logical way to stop the necrophile from saying the same. But in survival cannibalism, the agent is not operating under "discretionary ends." They are operating under the non-discretionary end of self-preservation. This is a physiological “must." When, like in the Andes case, either everyone dies or someone gets eaten, the question is not "What is the most respectful thing to do?" to "What is the only way to get the most good out of this?” So the act of survival cannibalism is not justified in the same way as passive cannibalism.

Notice, we can affirm the following without issue:

Life priority: Cannibalism is wrong except in the case of survival cannibalism because, in a tragic conflict where one must be sacrificed for the other, the right to life takes priority over respect for corpses.

Notice that this justifcation for survival cannibalism requires a life to be at risk. This is not the same for passive cannibalism. Therefore, you can permit survival cannibalism in extreme situations while still condemning other cannibalism as an absolute, unmitigated wrong. I argued that the justification for cannibalism implies necrophilia, but, given that necrophilia does not fulfill a physiological need and does not prevent the death of the survivor, it can never trigger this life priority clause, thus survival cannibalism does not imply necrophilia.

>>537289338
3.3.3 The Eucharist

According to the doctrine of Transubstantiation, the Eucharist involves the consumption of the Living Christ, the Resurrected and Glorified Body. From the perspective of my Virtue Ethics account, specifically the arguments regarding moral attention and justice toward the vulnerable, cannibalism is usually a failure to respect the human form. Justice requires us to protect the remains of those who can no longer protect themselves. However, the Body of Christ is defined as impassible and indefectible; it cannot be diminished, harmed, or degraded by the act of consumption. Because Christ is not a vulnerable object being exploited but a Divine Subject who remains whole, the act does not constitute a violation of justice.

Conclusion

Thanks for reading!

From this analysis we learned a few things.

Moral theories aren’t good at demonstrating the wrongness of cannibalism
This isn’t something good about cannibalism, but something bad about the theories
Theorizing about moral respect towards non-person objects is important for moral theories, and virtue ethics does this better than the others.
Finally, that two good arguments can be made against cannibalism that do not appeal to religious theories of morality: virtue ethics, and the necrophilic reductio

Original article here https://conceptualanalysis.substack.com/p/why-are-ethicists-defending-cannibalism?

To paraphrase someone from /d/
>when you die you become worm poop, I simply with to become girl poop.
If someone wants to be eaten, and someone wants to eat someone, I fail to see any ethical concerns. You have the right to choose how you die.

>>537289375
What llm is this bot using?

>>537289451
what in the simp incel shit is that lol
if anyone said that in my presence I'd know they are a fucking virgin

bunp

Ethicists are useless eaters. You can not prove what ought to be. It is not possible if you are not God. You can not even call for “logically consistent ethics” because you have no true ethics to be consistent with.
ALL ETHICS ARE OPINIONS BY DEFINITION

You can however prove effects. Such as cannibalism correlating with kuru and human rights abuses. You can prove that people who harm dogs and cats are likely to harm people, but this does not apply to deer/cow. You can prove industrial pig slaughter causes violent behavior in slaughterhouse workers but traditional farm slaughter does not. You can prove homosexuals are more prone to promiscuity, child rape, bestiality, and unsafe sexual acts. And you can then ask, if my goal in life is to survive and live in peace, why would I opt for that effect in society? Why would i support it?

You will find any reasonable person will be in gross agreement with the HOLY BIBLE.

>>537289451
There is no such thing as a good cannibal with “logical ethical limits”. They all inevitably do worse because cannibalism is opposed to the innate and conditioned behaviors that prevent you from harming people. Effectively morals are extrapolated feelings and if you manipulate those feelings you manipulate those morals.
Also see: military veterans are 3x more likely to commit violent crime. Why? They were conditioned to kill people and many have, stupid.

>>537290564
atheists absolutely can be moral realists and mathematical Platonists

>>537286226
you freak democrats are evil and everyone knows it.

>>537290768
morals are personal decisions relative to your configuration and experience. If your morals are “wrong” there is no higher fact to it, no way to prove that they are universally objectively wrong, not without God to create universal value. You will die or someone will find themselves obligated to kill you in service of their emotions that make them attached to their own or others safety. And that will be it. Your suffering and death will be as meaningless as your decision to be a piece of shit relative to normal people.

This is actual moral relativism. You can not run from it or argue it away. It’s happening to you whether you think it’s right or not.
It’s not logical truth that you should live and your life should be good. But I have a feeling you’ll chose every option that supports that goal. If you didn’t you’d be selected out of the population along with your ideas.

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>>537291046
someone can believe that 2+2=5 and that could make them win more money gambling and live longer and reproduce but they would still be incorrect I already argued for this here https://desuarchive.org/an/thread/5131413/#5131839

All you are describing is might makes right it is hardly philosophy and certainly doesn’t prove moral realism is false

>>537290730
What would be conditioned here, someone manipulating others into wanting to be eaten? Grooming for cannibal culture? I could see it but I’d view it the same way I view trannies, the groomed is mentally weak and the groomer is evil for manipulating others.
Rape doesn’t mean sex is evil, it all comes down to social contracts and the right of the individual.

>>537286226
I can say whatever I please, and I dont think you have any impact on that.

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>>537286226

>>537291046
I have disdain for people like you, not because of your stance, but because your smug purple prose is predicated on the fact you do not understand the concept of intersubjectivity at all. It's like you took phil 100 and two electives then decided to be a retard in public, but not just a retard, an arrogant loudwrong dumbass who I know is going to criticize me insulting you over the fact you didnt understand a single mildly contemporary philosophical term that immediately invalidates your entire retarded rant.

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>>537286226
I mean I haven't tasted a human yet so I have no idea how it is, but it surely can't be that much better than chicken or beef, no? What gives?

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>>537290730
I believe all cannibals are hypocrites
>>537291372
Let's be real mate, if you let someone convince you to be eaten, you probably shouldn't be alive

>>537291925
i will eat you

>>537286226
>You can’t say cannibalism is immoral
>proceeds to talk nonsense and cope
retard. just point out that the eucharist is basically cannibalism and that many have died because of it
kill yourself, kike

>>537291283
False equivalence. 2+2 is math, not morals. Math is objective. Morals are not. Morals are always relative to the individual. There is no external moral truth without God - in fact, without any divinity morality is redefined entirely.

Ideal behavior can guide morality but is not morality itself. It has no emotional component. Moral behavior does. This emotional component enables the generational transmission of an opinion regardless of whether or not the education is available to arise at it. Otherwise morality would just be called planning.

Ethics is the useless version of morality where idiots make shit up to arrive at their desired conclusions and manipulate others.

>>537291372
Your empathy for your fellow man is visceral. Once weakened by activities like this you are more dangerous to the rest of us and have less emotion controlling you. Cannibalism is historically tied to warrior cults for a reason. It associates dead people with satiation.

>>537286226
>corpse desecration
It's almost as if you don't understand words and what they mean.

>>537292690
Nah, you just a charlatan until proven otherwise; the slop meister gorging on the trough of ignorance while doing a little dance in front of a crowd about a subject you do not understand.

>>537286226
Eating jews is ok since they are reptiles.

>>537292676
that is mentioned here >>537289375

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>>537292690
Most philosophers are moral realists and there’s plenty of theists who believe morality can be objective under atheism too.
The argument for mathematical Platonism and the argument for moral realism are very similar which is intuition like the intuition humans are discovering math and morals not merely inventing them

>>537286226
Do atheists really try and justify morality based on “muh government” and “muh laws”?

How about we still live in a society that agrees “that’s disgusting”

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>>537293583
Animal agriculture is disgusting and not just factory farming either

If an animal is living a mostly bad life, suffering massively in a factory farm and experiencing little wellbeing then it’s wrong to breed them into existence.

If an animal is living a mostly good life, perhaps on a pasture then it’s wrong to cut their mostly good life short by executing them when they’re a healthy teenager.

>>537293767
Nah. Existence is better than nonexistence. Only those with stewardship are responsible for the conditions of their subjects by virtue of the felecity of their perpetuation. Without intervention they would cease to exist. And even if those conditions have caveats, some good is better than no good, even if it's not the best.