>>539797651
1. Exempt neutral infrastructure from AML/KYC
Non-custodial wallets, websites, RPC providers and transaction-building services should not be subject to AML/KYC where they do not control user keys, hold funds or exercise discretion over transfers. Users should also be free to change the endpoints, validators and services through which they access a blockchain.
Fixed or action-based software fees should be distinguished from percentage-based fees taken from the value transferred. Charging the same fee to construct or broadcast a transaction, regardless of its value, is a software service rather than financial intermediation.
This is necessary because imposing institutional compliance burdens on neutral infrastructure would exclude individuals and smaller developers, concentrate blockchain access in established corporations and undermine community-created infrastructure.
AML/KYC obligations should follow custody, discretionary control and participation in transferred value—not neutral software.

>>539797660
2. Define decentralisation through freedom of access and exit
A system should be considered decentralised where users are not forced through one platform, provider, blockchain or token and can freely migrate their assets, data and activity elsewhere.
This is necessary because blockchains and service providers can become centralised or captured over time. Users must retain the ability to leave without requiring permission from approved intermediaries.
Decentralisation requires multiple access pathways and a practical right to exit.

3. Protect permissionless token creation
Individuals, developers and communities should be free to create and deploy tokens without prior licensing or registration. The law should regulate fraud, custody and misleading claims rather than the mere creation of a token.
The contract code, governance rules and control powers should be publicly available and machine-readable. Users should be able to determine who can mint, freeze, seize, upgrade or otherwise alter the token.
This is necessary because token creation is a form of software development. Requiring approval before deployment would place programmable assets under the control of incumbent institutions and suppress open experimentation.
Token creation should remain permissionless, while control and risk must be transparently disclosed.

>>539797679
4. Create clear legal classifications for tokens
The Act should distinguish between immutable tokens, administratively controlled tokens, governance tokens, utility tokens, redeemable tokens, asset-referenced tokens and other materially different structures.
A token may fall within more than one category, but its operative characteristics should be clearly disclosed to users and interfaces.
This is necessary because applying one regulatory category to every token ignores substantial differences in control, redemption rights, supply rules and economic purpose.
Legal classification should follow the token’s actual rights, controls and obligations.
5. Distinguish fiat-backed stablecoins from decentralised stable-value tokens
Fiat-backed stablecoins should be treated separately from crypto-collateralised, liquidity-backed, algorithmic or market-referenced tokens.
A fiat-backed stablecoin creates an enforceable connection to sovereign currency and may therefore justify reserve, redemption and AML/KYC requirements at the issuer and fiat gateway level. A decentralised stable-value token that makes no fiat redemption promise should not automatically fall under the same framework.
This is necessary because these instruments create different risks. Treating all stable-value tokens as bank-like products would prevent communities from developing decentralised liquidity and exchange mechanisms.
Stablecoin regulation should follow the source of value and the nature of the redemption promise.

>>539797705
6. Exempt genuinely decentralised exchanges from AML/KYC
DEX protocols and interfaces should remain outside AML/KYC where users retain custody, independently sign transactions and can choose between alternative protocols, interfaces and endpoints.
The contract code should be publicly visible, auditable, reproducible and capable of being redeployed by other communities. A closed or compulsory exchange controlled through one mandatory gateway may instead be treated as a regulated intermediary.
This is necessary because imposing centralised exchange obligations on open protocols would eliminate permissionless markets and consolidate liquidity into approved institutional venues.
AML/KYC should follow custody and compulsory control, not open-source exchange software.

7. Protect bridges, atomic swaps and cross-chain messaging
Bridges, atomic-swap systems and cross-chain messaging services should not be subject to AML/KYC merely because they allow assets, data or application state to move between public blockchains.
Where an arbiter or validator set is used, its identity, authority and actions should be publicly disclosed, and the movement of funds should remain visible on auditable ledgers.
This is necessary because users must be able to leave networks that become centralised, captured or unsuitable. Regulating cross-chain movement as financial intermediation would lock communities into existing systems.
Cross-chain mobility is a safeguard against network capture and should remain permissionless.

>>539797721
8. Distinguish public pseudonymity from transaction privacy
A public blockchain should not be classified as private merely because public addresses are not automatically linked to legal identities.
Where balances and transaction histories are publicly visible, the ledger remains auditable even though users operate pseudonymously. Individuals should not be required to attach their civil or tax identity to every public key.
This is necessary because mandatory identity attachment would transform public blockchains into permissioned databases and undermine the ability to transact directly through cryptographic keys.
A publicly auditable address is not private merely because its owner is not publicly identified.
9. Apply different rules to fully opaque privacy systems
Privacy-focused chains that conceal balances, transaction amounts and counterparties should be distinguished from public chains that merely provide optional privacy features.
Centralised exchanges providing custody and fiat access to fully opaque systems may be subject to AML/KYC. Those obligations should not automatically extend to open-source developers, non-custodial wallets or protocol publishers.
This is necessary because the regulatory concern arises from opaque custodial access, not from the publication or use of privacy-preserving software itself.
AML/KYC should attach to custodial gateways into opaque systems, not neutral privacy technology.

>>539797749
10. Protect developers, validators and infrastructure operators from third-party liability
Developers, validators, block producers, node operators, RPC providers and repository maintainers should not be liable merely because third parties use their infrastructure unlawfully.
Liability should require direct custody, practical control, specific knowledge and material participation in a defined offence.
This is necessary because general awareness that technology may be misused is not equivalent to criminal intent. Without a clear safe harbour, neutral infrastructure providers would be forced to monitor and censor all users.
Liability should follow specific intent and active participation—not the maintenance of neutral infrastructure.
11. Prohibit wallet blacklisting based solely on transaction history
Wallets and users should not be denied access merely because an address previously interacted with a flagged or suspicious address.
Blockchain analytics may assist investigations, but restrictions should require evidence connecting an identifiable person or specific funds to an offence. Proprietary risk scores should not operate as automatic financial exclusion.
This is necessary because public blockchain funds routinely pass through exchanges, pools, bridges and unrelated users. Guilt by association would produce false positives and contaminate ordinary assets indefinitely.
Enforcement should target identifiable offenders, not blacklist wallets through inherited suspicion.

Digital currencies will be used to enslave us completely. They are the final piece in the puzzle of the global surveillance prison planet that both the left and the right all over the West have been moving us toward in lockstep for decades now.

>>539797773
12. Prohibit protocol-level transaction censorship
Validators, wallets, DEXs, bridges and cross-chain protocols should not be compelled to block, reverse or delay technically valid transactions.
Court orders and sanctions should be directed at identifiable individuals, custodians and entities that actually control the relevant assets.
This is necessary because forcing decentralised infrastructure to enforce transaction restrictions would create central points of control that could be expanded or abused.
Legal enforcement should target people and custodians, not convert protocols into censorship mechanisms.
13. Allocate responsibility when moving between public and private chains
A bridge should remain outside AML/KYC where the cross-chain transfer is publicly visible and auditable, even if the destination chain provides optional privacy features.
Where a gateway transfers funds directly into a fully opaque system that does not disclose balances or transaction history, additional obligations may apply at that gateway.
This is necessary because the bridge should be responsible only for the transparency of the transfer it facilitates, not for privacy choices made later within another network.
Responsibility should follow the transparency of the gateway transaction and the architecture of the destination chain.

>>539797792
14. Keep tax compliance with the individual user
Tax obligations should remain the responsibility of the person or entity that owns, receives or disposes of the assets.
Non-custodial wallets, DEXs, bridges, RPC providers and transaction builders should not be required to identify users or determine their cost basis, tax residence or purpose for each transaction. They may voluntarily provide exportable records and accounting tools.
This is necessary because neutral infrastructure generally lacks the information required to determine whether a transfer is taxable, internal, commercial, personal or conducted on behalf of another entity.
Tax liability should follow ownership and economic benefit, not neutral transaction infrastructure.
15. Limit licensing and capital requirements to custodial or promise-making entities
Licensing, minimum capital, insurance and institutional compliance requirements should apply only where an entity holds customer assets, controls withdrawals, operates pooled reserves, guarantees redemption or makes enforceable financial promises.
Non-custodial developers, communities and protocol operators should be free to launch without prior approval.
This is necessary because bank-like requirements are disproportionate where no customer assets or counterparty promises are involved. They would function primarily as barriers to entry.
Prudential regulation should follow custody, guarantees and counterparty risk.

>>539797814
16. Prevent agency scope creep
The Act should define custody, control, intermediation, decentralisation, facilitation and related terms through objective statutory tests.
Agencies should not be permitted to expand these definitions through informal guidance, enforcement settlements or retroactive interpretation. Material expansions should require express statutory authority and formal rulemaking.
This is necessary because vague definitions allow regulatory obligations to grow beyond what lawmakers approved, creating uncertainty and enabling regulation by enforcement.
Agencies should administer clearly defined law, not continuously redefine its boundaries.
17. Limit non-custodial consumer duties to objective disclosures
Non-custodial platforms should be required only to disclose objectively verifiable risks, including admin keys, upgrade powers, minting authority, seizure controls, transfer restrictions, collateral terms and redemption promises.
They should not be required to decide whether a transaction or asset is suitable for a particular user or collect personal financial information for that purpose.
This is necessary because suitability obligations would turn neutral software into a financial adviser and permissioned gatekeeper.
Non-custodial platforms should disclose what a contract can do, not decide what a user should do.

18. Keep audits voluntary for non-custodial software
Audits and formal code certification should remain voluntary for open-source wallets, protocols, DEXs, bridges and non-custodial token systems.
Mandatory audits may be justified for custodial entities, reserve-backed products and services that guarantee redemption or protection of customer funds. Unaudited software should be clearly identified but should not be unlawful.
This is necessary because mandatory certification would create an approved-code regime that favours large incumbents and restricts open-source publication and experimentation.
Mandatory audits should follow custody and financial guarantees, not software deployment.
19. Treat DAO responsibility on a case-by-case basis
The Act should not impose automatic liability or automatic immunity on DAO members, voters, delegates, developers, proposal authors or treasury signers.
Courts should assess responsibility according to actual control, knowledge, intent, participation, causation and direct benefit. Mere token ownership or ordinary voting should not by itself establish liability.
This is necessary because DAO structures vary widely, and formal labels do not reliably show who exercised practical authority or knowingly participated in misconduct.
DAO liability should follow proven conduct and practical control, assessed on the facts of each case.

20. Protect permissionless airdrops and community distributions
Communities should be free to distribute tokens through airdrops, grants, rewards, liquidity incentives, governance participation and network activity without treating every distribution as a securities offering.
The regulatory threshold should arise where a project raises fiat currency or fiat-backed, redeemable stablecoins, particularly where it makes promises of returns, redemption or managerial profit.
This is necessary because secondary-market value or an expectation of appreciation should not retroactively convert every community distribution into regulated fundraising.
Token distribution should remain permissionless unless it raises fiat-backed value or creates enforceable financial promises.
21. Preserve state autonomy instead of imposing broad federal pre-emption
The Act should not prevent individual states from developing their own digital-asset frameworks.
States should remain free to compete through different approaches to licensing, consumer protection, token businesses and decentralised infrastructure, while being prevented from imposing their rules extraterritorially on infrastructure located elsewhere.
This is necessary because one federal framework creates a single point of regulatory capture. State-level variation allows legal experimentation, democratic correction and freedom of jurisdictional exit.
Regulatory decentralisation should preserve competing state frameworks rather than impose one compulsory national model.

>>539797910
22. Require three warnings before penalties for good-faith violations
Developers and non-custodial operators should receive three formal warnings and meaningful opportunities to correct the same specific alleged violation before penalties or enforcement proceedings are imposed.
Each warning should identify the statutory basis, evidence, requested correction and cure period. Separate violations should require separate warning processes. Immediate enforcement may remain available for deliberate fraud, theft, concealed custody or serious intentional misconduct.
This is necessary because rapidly evolving technical systems can create genuine interpretive and implementation errors. Regulation should prioritise correction rather than punishing good-faith development.
Good-faith violations should receive three specific warnings and opportunities to cure before penalties apply.

If the United States wants to become the home of the next industrial age, it will require a new model of financial governance.

That is why state autonomy should be preserved rather than overridden through broad federal pre-emption.

Each state should be free to adopt its own laws and regulatory frameworks, allowing businesses and individuals to establish themselves in jurisdictions that provide clear legal protection for particular forms of economic activity. This would introduce competition between regulatory systems and apply the principles of game theory to American governance, with states competing to attract capital, talent, innovation and industry.

This approach reflects the constitutional vision of the Founding Fathers by dispersing power across multiple jurisdictions rather than concentrating it within a single federal authority. It would create a practical mechanism for decentralising financial governance and preserving freedom of choice.

A single state can be captured, corrupted or influenced by entrenched interests. A decentralised federal system, however, allows other states to develop alternative legal frameworks and offer businesses and individuals a viable path elsewhere.

Most people may remain within the dominant institutional framework, but those who reject it should retain the freedom to relocate, reorganise and operate under a different system. That freedom of exit is essential. Without it, regulatory uniformity risks becoming a form of economic confinement rather than governance by consent.

Thank you for reading my blog post.
I will be around to answer any questions for the next few hours.

You have posted quite a bit here. Give me a bit to prepare myself to give it the time it deserves for a proper response. You definitely deserve this feedback now, at the very least, because of your high quality contribution.

>>539797660
I disagree with you on point 1. Unregulated crypto has been a disaster for the United States. KYC/AML is absolutely necessary for both the interest of the United States and that of the banking industry. If you seriously disagree with AT LEAST KYC/AML for the main on-ramps, you are financially suicidal. You can have decentralized exchanges, i.e, DEX, but you're crazy if you want to do away with KYC and especially AML. That's cartel behavior.

On this post, nothing else really stands out to me otherwise, moving on.

>>539797679
I agree with you here

>>539797705
Definitely need clear, plain language definitions.

>>539797721
Agree with you already on 6. Nice on 6.
7, Absolutely.
8, Yes
9, Protect Monero.
10. No. Someone has to take responsibility in finance.
11. Yes, and the signals need to be clearly defined in a transparent way. Look to SWIFT for some ideas on how governance could work here, I would say.
12. "Censorship" - We are moving money around. There should be no censoring. I can say that much.
13. I really do think KYC is reasonable here.
14. Fuck No. You're crazy here.
15. Is this corpo dick sucking?
16. Really, is this corpo dick sucking?
17. Yep, it's corpo dick sucking to me.
18. And you have no ethics, it looks like.
19. Corruption galore!
20. Should? You ever wrote an RFC before?
21. Okay now you're making a little more sense.
22. Who decides good faith?

I wait for your feedback. Thanks again for the quality posts.

>>539798283
>high quality contribution.
You're literally talking to an LLM

>>539798752
Makes no difference.

>>539797784
>Digital currencies will be used to enslave us completely
You are about 25 years too late.
You have already been using digital currency whenever you pay by debit or credit card, PayPal, or any other electronic payment system.

We are now entering a new era—one in which individuals can reimagine financial governance and choose the systems under which they wish to operate.

>>539798752
The governance of the future will be described by humanity, stress tested by machines and LLMs you technophobe.

>>539798647
>I disagree with you on point 1. Unregulated crypto has been a disaster for the United States. KYC/AML is absolutely necessary for both the interest of the United States and that of the banking industry.

That is not my argument, I agree with you for AML/KYC for the on ramps and off ramps where sovereign currency is used to exchange for cryptocurrency.
I am not arguing against this.

I am arguing that neutral infrastructure.
Non-custodial wallets, websites, RPC providers and transaction-building services should not be subject to AML/KYC.

Not the on ramps or off ramps, if a platform does not operate on ramps or off ramps, then there should be no need for AML/KYC for that business or website or platform.

>>539799177
>Non-custodial wallets, websites, RPC providers and transaction-building services should not be subject to AML/KYC.
Non-custodial wallet: Not your keys, not your crypto; Meaning: You should not need KYC to have your own offline crypto wallet. I agree here.
>RPC providers
They need to be KYC'd/AML'd, nice try.
>transaction-building services
Yes, they need to be fucking KYC'd/AML'd to prevent fraud you fuck.

>>539799282
>>RPC providers
>They need to be KYC'd/AML'd, nice try.
> Yes, they need to be fucking KYC'd/AML'd to prevent fraud you fuck.
Applying KYC/AML obligations to RPC providers would have consequences far beyond a few commercial services. It could mean that node operators, wallet providers and other forms of neutral blockchain infrastructure would all need to identify their users and comply with costly financial regulations.

That would centralise access around companies that are already well capitalised and capable of obtaining licences, hiring compliance teams and absorbing substantial legal costs. Individuals, open-source developers and smaller communities would be effectively excluded from building and operating their own infrastructure.

Consider a developer creating a non-custodial Monero wallet. If the wallet, RPC service or transaction-broadcasting layer were treated as a regulated financial intermediary, the developer could be required to identify users merely for providing software that helps construct or relay transactions. This would create gatekeepers around who is permitted to access and validate activity on an otherwise open network.

That is the fundamental problem. When code is open-source, freely available and non-custodial, why should those who publish or operate it face a regulatory burden costing millions of pounds each year?

The result would not be meaningful oversight of financial intermediaries. It would be the concentration of blockchain infrastructure in the hands of a small number of centrally controlled and heavily capitalised institutions.

That is the distinction I am making: AML/KYC may be appropriate for custodial services and fiat on-ramps or off-ramps, but it should not automatically apply to neutral, non-custodial infrastructure.

AI overview so far:

>The Pro-Friction Argument (Runit's Stance): Because the fiat borders leak via P2P cash, the only way to effectively enforce Anti-Money Laundering (AML) laws is to put KYC tollbooths on the core infrastructure. If the RPC provider and the transaction builder require ID, it doesn't matter how the user got the crypto—they are blocked from using the DEX. The friction is a necessary security feature to prevent unchecked illicit finance.

>The Anti-Friction Argument (OP's Stance): OP argues that the "cure is worse than the disease." To stop the guy doing P2P cash deals in an alley, you are forcing every piece of neutral, open-source routing software to operate like a heavily regulated bank. This friction doesn't just stop the bad actors; it makes it legally impossible for small developers to build infrastructure, ultimately handing control of the entire network over to massive, centralized corporations.

>Runit is correctly identifying that without RPC-level KYC, the network remains fully open to anyone who can get their hands on tokens. The question is simply what price society is willing to pay to close that loophole.

If you want the debugging/reasoning on this response, as provided by Gemini, feel free to ask.

>>539799535
> prevent fraud you fuck.
I believe we should punish fraud not, make laws around pre crime.

Currently, the "status quo" in the U.S. means that fiat-to-crypto gateways are regulated. If you run Coinbase, Kraken, or a Bitcoin ATM, you are a Money Services Business (MSB). You must do KYC, file SARs, and segregate user funds.

Since crypto wants to play in the big leagues, they should have to play by big league rules. You wanna act like a bank, you should get fucking taxed like one. That's all I'm saying.

To clarify my point around bridges.

If the blockchains are open and transparent, and capital is moving between public networks, the movement of funds can still be monitored, recorded and audited.

For that reason, bridge operators transferring tokens between transparent blockchains should not be subject to AML obligations merely for facilitating cross-chain movement. The origin, destination and transaction history remain publicly visible, and the funds can still be traced when they later move through a regulated off-ramp into sovereign currency.

The regulatory concern arises when funds move from a transparent blockchain into a private or opaque network where balances, counterparties or transaction histories are concealed. This may include privacy-focused chains such as Monero or systems that use zero-knowledge technology to prevent public auditing.

The law should therefore distinguish between bridges connecting publicly auditable blockchains and gateways into networks that materially obscure the movement of funds.

>>539799764
Which is the antithesis of what was outlined in the btc whitepaper and why this whole thing is one massive grift/trap. Satoshi wanted crypto to save us from the banks not chain us to them even more.

>>539799764
We are not banks. We are building financial-governance infrastructure: systems that define how real word and digital resources are accessed, allocated and constrained through software.

Banks perform a different function. They custody assets, intermediate capital, manage credit and operate within established monetary systems. That distinction matters, and there should be a clear separation of powers between the banking sector and the blockchain software ecosystem.

Just as modern states distinguish between central banks, governments and private institutions, regulation should recognise the difference between financial intermediaries and neutral technological infrastructure.

This is not about “playing in the big leagues.” It is about enabling the fourth industrial revolution without suffocating it under compliance burdens designed for institutions that perform fundamentally different activities.

Applying banking regulation indiscriminately to open-source developers, non-custodial software and decentralised infrastructure would not create responsible oversight. It would suppress genuine innovation, entrench incumbent institutions and prevent new financial-governance models from developing.

>>539799851
That's fair enough but I don't treat the BTC whitepaper or it's mission as my own. I prioritize people over technology. It's not a grift, and Satoshi is not some magical entity. He (or she, or they) are a person(s?) who wrote a paper.

>>539799930
You have everything in common with banks. You should get treated like banks. When you carry that much money around, banking treatment is normal. You owe society, not the other way around, just like banks. Banks owe society. Society owes banks. It's a mutual relationship.

>>539799930
You realize this planet is run by psychopaths, right? Your rosy picture of how this is all going to play out sounds naïve. Combining digital currencies with AI and full-scale surveillance, all controlled by our current crop of subhuman "leaders", sounds like a shitshow I really would want no part of.

>>539800043
Thank you

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>>539797651
Crypto currency's use case was always "buying drugs/illegal pron without getting busted".
It turns out that it was shitty for that when the Feds and International authorities took notice of it.
There is no other use case for it other than avoiding central banking sanctions.
Now the usual banking/investment types are playing around in it because it has a very limited/shitty set of rules and regulations, so they can fleece idiots a bit more effectively.

Legitimate currency has been digital for decades. You and I both buy shit digitally all the fucking time, and crypto isn't used for it.

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>>539799977
If blockchain systems are to be regulated like banks because their tokens hold real economic value, they should be allowed to meet regulatory costs using those same tokens.

Otherwise, the system creates an unfair barrier: new financial networks must first obtain substantial amounts of incumbent fiat currency before they are permitted to operate.

If regulators recognise a token’s value when imposing obligations, they should also recognise that value when accepting payment for compliance, licensing and supervision.

This would allow blockchain systems to contribute to regulatory oversight and meet their obligations to society without being forced to depend entirely on a centrally controlled fiat regime.

Requiring payment only in fiat entrenches the existing banking system and ensures that only already-capitalised institutions can participate. Regulation should address conduct and risk, not force every new financial system to rely on the currency of the system it is trying to compete with.

Surely this principle is difficult to dispute. If the concern is compliance and reciprocal obligation to society, then payment in the network’s own economically valuable token should satisfy that requirement.

Rejecting that possibility would suggest that the objective is not merely compliance, but gatekeeping access in favour of incumbent and already-capitalised institutions.

>>539799977
Suppose I mint $10 million in stablecoins within my own infrastructure.

If your argument is that I must contribute to society by paying an annual portion toward regulatory oversight, I am willing to do that. The government and the public could benefit directly from the infrastructure, economic activity and monetary value that I and others have created to provide a public service.

However, requiring those obligations to be paid exclusively in a specific privately issued fiat currency does not follow from your argument.

If the concern is genuinely about contributing value to society and funding regulatory compliance, then payment in the economically valuable tokens produced by the system should be acceptable. Otherwise, the requirement is not simply about compliance or social contribution; it is about forcing new systems to depend on the incumbent monetary regime.

>>539800176
>No one will accept my jeetcoin as legitimate payment
No shit.
The government doesn't accept Pokemon cards as tender either, and when you pay taxes on your Poke transactions, it will need to be in currency.

>>539800402
No one wants to deal with the hassle of dealing with 10,000 different monopoly money "currencies", even if they can be exchanged for $.
Why would they want to do that work for you? They didn't invent your Bullshit coin, YOU did. YOU turn it back to $.

>>539800411
Then you cannot consistently claim that these systems are banks.

You cannot insist that blockchain networks assume the obligations imposed on banks while denying them the corresponding legal privileges—particularly access to the regulated credit-creation framework within which commercial banks operate.

The comparison with Pokémon cards misses the point. Nobody is arguing that every privately created asset must be accepted as legal tender. The issue is whether a token can simultaneously be treated as economically significant enough to trigger banking-style regulation, yet treated as economically meaningless when the issuer seeks to use it to satisfy those obligations.

You cannot have it both ways. Either these networks are sufficiently bank-like to justify banking regulation, in which case the corresponding rights and institutional privileges must also be considered, or they are merely issuers of private digital assets, in which case banking regulation is the wrong framework.

That is where your argument falls apart: you are demanding the burdens of banking without extending any of its benefits.

>>539800496
The friction is necessary. Without what little friction exists, I believe that the United States would be even worse off.

>>539800496
The same argument can be applied in reverse.

We do not want to be forced into a financial system imposed by a quasi-state-backed private monetary structure, so why should we automatically be subject to regulations designed around that system?

Blockchain networks can operate through transparent, auditable code, with publicly visible contracts and rules that participants voluntarily choose to use. That is fundamentally different from an opaque financial intermediary controlling access to money and credit.

The real question is whether value should be determined by individuals and markets, or imposed by incumbent institutions with an interest in preserving the existing system.

If people voluntarily assign value to a token and use it within a transparent network, regulators should not dismiss it as “monopoly money” while simultaneously treating it as economically significant whenever they want to impose compliance obligations.

You cannot disregard the value when it is inconvenient, then recognise it when regulation or taxation is involved.

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>>539800508
>yet treated as economically meaningless when the issuer seeks to use it to satisfy those obligations.
Your turning US $ into Petoria Bucks so everyone can have a fun larp banking with Petoria Bux. Swell. That still makes you a banker, and the Government you live under uses a banking system that accepts its own currency. They have currency exchanges when you need to exchange Marks for Dollars to pay your expenses. They may not want to set one up for every imaginary Jeet currency tho.
That's tough breaks.

>>539800508
Right. You have your little forced disclosure on the bottom of your advertising, that forces your concession.

> Industry Standard Implementation Text
> Because the regulation specifies what must be communicated rather than dictating a singular line of dialogue, the industry has standardized specific boilerplate text to satisfy the FDIC and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). If you check the footer or account opening screens of major fintech platforms, you will see versions of the following exact legal disclosures:

> "[Company Name] is a financial technology platform, not a bank. Banking services provided by [Partner Bank Name], Member FDIC."

> "Accounts are opened through our partner bank, [Partner Bank Name], Member FDIC. [Fintech Name] is not a bank. FDIC insurance coverage is available on a 'pass-through' basis up to applicable limits if specific eligibility requirements are met."

You will never be a real bank. Bitch.

>>539800732
This. It's playing Pretend Jew Banker. With a lot more room for shenanigans.

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And to make myself absolutely clear, Shenanigans were always the main point of it all.

>>539800730
That is not a substantive rebuttal.

The US dollar operates through a monetary system in which significant authority is delegated to the Federal Reserve—a structure that is insulated from direct democratic control and grants regulated banking institutions privileges that ordinary token issuers do not possess.

If blockchain networks are to be classified and regulated as banks, then the discussion cannot stop at imposing banking obligations. It must also address the corresponding privileges granted to banks, including access to payment infrastructure, liquidity facilities and the regulated creation of credit.

You cannot reasonably impose the burdens of banking while denying every institutional advantage associated with being a bank.

You are also dismissing tokenomics as though privately issued tokens have no practical function beyond imitation currency. In reality, tokens can coordinate access to resources, allocate computational capacity, incentivise network participation, govern shared infrastructure and regulate scarcity across both digital and real-world systems.

Calling every token “imaginary currency” does not engage with those applications. It simply assumes that value and legitimacy can only originate from the incumbent monetary system—the very assumption under dispute.

>>539800839
>>539800811
I suspect you are projecting the failures of the existing financial system onto the entire cryptocurrency community.

It is true that much of the crypto market has operated like a casino. However, many of those speculative practices were amplified by institutional capital reproducing the same leverage, financial engineering and extractive behaviour already present in traditional finance.

Regulations designed in response to those abuses do not necessarily fit decentralised, community-governed systems. In many cases, they simply insert another intermediary between people and the assets or networks they already control—much as banks traditionally stand between individuals and their money.

You appear to treat misconduct as something inherent to cryptocurrency, while overlooking how often the same conduct originates from, or is modelled on, the incumbent monetary order.

That is why your accusation of “shenanigans” sounds less like an analysis of decentralised systems and more like a projection of the existing system’s own failures onto a competing community—one that threatens its monopoly over monetary control.

>>539801334
I had a VERY literal projection onto my apartment window recently. My neighbour has a projector, I went out on my balcony. I saw him there. It was a very awkward scenario. He awkwardly lowered his curtains down. I wonder if that's you.

>>539801612
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LlAyL5ZUeps

>>539801658
Society...

>>539803167
You wouldn't get it.