bow down whitey
https://apnews.com/article/un-africa-map-mercator-equal-earth-projection-b138fe9f76d7ff54cc7d5c9b1ddfa983?utm_source=copy&utm_medium=share
>>542014034so much land and so few accomplishments.impressive!
>>542014034All that land and resources yet Africans are still living in the 3rd world.Why can't Africans utilize their resources effectively?
Anyone know what the gibbering faggot Op is on about?
>>542014034Big Black Continent as it rightfully should’ve been
>>542014034dam, all that land and resources and you still got fucked to death by some mayoskins from a tiny island
>>542014268Frogs being fags yet againhttps://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/09/04/france-adopts-fairer-world-map-ahead-of-un-vote-on-more-balanced-geography_6757168_4.html
>>542014034Imagine how virtuous the white person who proposed this felt doing so
>>542014034does it not embarrass you that such tiny countries managed to forcefully convert you to their language and customs? look at all those resources you had and you still came up short.
>>542014228Keep in mind billions have been given to Africa over the years. And they have nothing to show for it because their own leaders rob the people. African "leaders" will not help their own people.https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/foreign-aid-received-net
BBC — big black continent
>>542014501>https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/09/04/france-adopts-fairer-world-map-ahead-of-un-vote-on-more-balanced-geography_6757168_4.htmlFuck. Stupid Frogs. Who the hell cares? Niggers can't read maps
>>542014034What the actual fuck are you talking about, OP? Useless thread + you're a schizo
>>542014962Israel: No data
>>542015535Reading the posts in this thread should give you enough context.>>542014962Even if Africa wasn't a corrupt shit hole I don't believe they would develop much anyways given their culture. Their culture doesn't promote development and advancements like European/American culture does.
>>542014962The Marshall Plan provided about $13.3 billion in U.S. aid from 1948–1952, equivalent to roughly $150–170 billion in 2026 purchasing power, but its scale was much larger relative to the U.S. economy—about 5% of U.S. GDP and, at its peak, roughly 12% of federal spending. By comparison, the U.S. has appropriated about $195 billion for the broader Ukraine response since 2022, though much of that includes replenishing U.S. weapons stocks and other domestic costs rather than direct aid to Ukraine; cumulative U.S. aid to Israel is about $175 billion nominally (roughly $298 billion in 2024 dollars) over many decades. Thus, the Marshall Plan was an exceptionally large, concentrated economic commitment relative to the size of the U.S. economy at the time. So 12% of today's federal spending ≈ $888 billion. In other words, matching the Marshall Plan's peak share of federal spending would mean spending roughly $0.9 trillion today.
>>542014034>>542014059>>542014107this is a new way to humiliate white males by projection african superiority, specifically referencing the size of african penis which is much larger than a white males
>>542014034JEWS EAT KIDS
So much room in africa, we should send all jews and browns there.
Africa's GDP is roughly $3.5 trillion nominally in 2026, based on aggregating the continent's economies. Real GDP growth is expected to be about 4.2% in 2026, after 4.4% in 2025, with the African Development Bank forecasting 4.4% in 2027.
>>542016439>muh dick>no achievements to show for Africa.At least you tried.
EU agricultural protection/subsidies: The Common Agricultural Policy supports European producers, potentially making it harder for African farmers to compete in some products and markets. Tariff escalation and processing barriers: Higher tariffs or regulatory requirements on some processed goods can discourage Africa from moving from exporting raw commodities toward higher-value processing. This is particularly important because industrialization depends on exporting manufactured and processed products, not just raw materials.EU fisheries policies: European fishing access and fisheries arrangements can create competition for African fishing industries and raise concerns about depletion and local value capture. CFA-franc monetary arrangements: The CFA systems provide monetary stability and convertibility, but critics argue that the fixed exchange-rate structure can constrain monetary policy and, in some circumstances, make exports less competitive. Aid and donor conditionality: European aid can provide valuable infrastructure, health, education and capital, but poorly designed aid can distort local markets, substitute for domestic institutions, or encourage governments to prioritize donor objectives. France's own OECD review has criticized aspects of its aid-for-trade strategy as disproportionately benefiting middle-income countries rather than the poorest countries. Environmental/trade regulations: European environmental, food-safety and sustainability requirements can raise the cost of exporting to Europe. These can produce genuine environmental benefits, but compliance costs can disproportionately burden smaller African producers.Migration/brain drain: Europe attracts skilled African workers. That can reduce human capital in origin countries, although remittances, diaspora investment and knowledge transfers partly offset the effect; whether the net effect is negative varies considerably by profession and country.
French commercial/political influence: Historically, France maintained unusually close political, military and commercial relationships with several former colonies (“Françafrique”). These relationships sometimes protected incumbent regimes or French commercial interests rather than encouraging competitive institutions.
European policies that can impede African development include EU agricultural subsidies and protection that can disadvantage African producers, tariff escalation and regulatory barriers that make it harder to export processed goods rather than raw commodities, European fishing access that can compete with local fisheries, and environmental or food-safety rules that raise African exporters’ compliance costs. In Francophone Africa, critics also point to the CFA-franc system and historically close French political and commercial relationships as constraints on monetary flexibility and institutional development. European aid can also create distortions when poorly designed or donor-driven. However, these effects vary substantially by country, and domestic governance, conflict, infrastructure, institutions, education, and capital formation are generally more important determinants of African development.
There is strong historical evidence that European trading companies used cartels, market-sharing agreements, and monopsony power to suppress prices paid to African commodity producers, particularly in colonial West Africa. For example, British trading firms formed agreements fixing the prices and quantities they would buy, effectively creating a de facto monopsony; the United Africa Company at one point handled roughly half of West African trade. In cocoa, European merchants also faced organized resistance from African farmers, while colonial marketing systems subsequently kept producer prices below export prices. The stronger modern criticism is that concentrated multinational traders/processors can possess substantial bargaining power and capture a large share of the value chain.Monopsony = a market with one or a small number of powerful buyers facing many sellers.In the African commodity context, it means farmers may have many producers competing to sell cocoa, coffee, cotton, etc., but only a few large trading companies willing to buy. That gives the buyers bargaining power to push the price paid to farmers below what a competitive market might produce.Monopoly = seller power.Monopsony = buyer power.
The GATT/WTO rules can constrain a developing country's use of industrial policy. In Indonesia's nickel case, GATT Article XI:1 generally prohibits export bans and quantitative export restrictions. Indonesia used a nickel-ore export ban and domestic-processing requirement specifically to force investment into smelting and downstream industries; the WTO panel ruled those measures inconsistent with Article XI:1. Indonesia argued that the policy was necessary for resource conservation and economic development, but the panel rejected its exceptions arguments. The broader criticism is that rules designed to promote free trade can restrict the policy tools poorer countries historically used to move from exporting raw commodities toward higher-value manufacturing.
Indonesia aimed to capture more value by refining nickel and producing stainless steel/batteries domestically. The EU challenged the export restrictions at the WTO, and the WTO panel ruled in 2022 that Indonesia's export prohibition and domestic-processing requirement violated GATT rules.
Indonesia pursued a downstream industrialization strategy aimed at capturing more value from its large nickel reserves by requiring nickel ore to be processed domestically and restricting its export. The policy supported the development of domestic refining, stainless-steel production, and, increasingly, battery-related industries.
>>542016731>>542016777>>542016887>>542017123>>542017582tl;drHow can we effectively separate?
Indonesia told Europe to fuck off. In Africa, this gets leaders killed and replaced with more compliant (corrupt) puppets. Indonesia was threatened, here were the results:
What happened economically?1. Indonesia moved from exporting ore to exporting processed productsThis was the central success.Before the restrictions, Indonesia was primarily selling relatively low-value nickel ore. After the export ban, companies built smelters and processing facilities inside Indonesia.The result was a dramatic expansion of processed-nickel exports. In the Sulawesi–Maluku region, for example, the value of nickel downstream products rose from essentially an ore-export model to about $26 billion in 2023, compared with total regional exports of only $11.7 billion in 2019. The number of nickel smelters reportedly increased from 2 in 2016 to more than 60 by 2024.
So Indonesia succeeded at the basic objective: more of the processing—and therefore more of the value-added activity—now occurs domestically.2. It attracted enormous foreign investmentThe export restriction effectively forced companies interested in Indonesian nickel to invest inside Indonesia rather than simply buying ore and processing it elsewhere.The IMF says the 2020 ban attracted foreign investment into refining and subsequently into the battery and EV supply chain. Indonesia's share of global nickel production reached roughly 60% in 2024.
Overall Indonesian FDI reached about $55.3 billion in 2024, up 21% from the previous year, with mining and metal refining among the important investment drivers. Much of the investment, however, came from China, which became deeply integrated into Indonesia's nickel-processing industry. 3. Indonesia became a major player in stainless steel—and increasingly batteriesThe policy initially generated a boom in ferronickel and nickel pig iron, which feed stainless-steel production.It subsequently moved further downstream into products such as:nickel mattemixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP)nickel sulfatebattery-related materialseventually EV manufacturingFor 2024, reported exports included roughly $14.1 billion of ferronickel, $8.2 billion of stainless steel, $3.9 billion of MHP, $3.2 billion of nickel matte and $0.5 billion of nickel sulfate. That's a very different export structure from simply shipping nickel ore.
>>542017740Europe would NEVER allow it. They NEED African raw materials. Europe does NOT want Africa to develop either.
4. It strengthened Indonesia's bargaining powerThis may be the most interesting strategic result.Indonesia wasn't just trying to earn more money from nickel. It was trying to change its position in the global value chain.And it worked to a considerable extent.Indonesia now accounts for around 60% of global nickel production, giving Jakarta considerable influence over the international nickel market and making multinational companies dependent on Indonesian processing capacity.In other words:Indonesia turned its natural-resource abundance into leverage over industrial investment.Rather than asking, "Who will buy our nickel?" the government increasingly could say, "If you want access to our nickel, build your industrial capacity here."That's a much more ambitious form of resource nationalism.
Europe reacted strongly to Indonesia’s nickel policy, mainly through WTO litigation and trade pressure. The EU challenged Indonesia’s export restrictions and won the 2022 WTO panel ruling. Indonesia appealed, but the dispute remained unresolved because the WTO Appellate Body was non-functional.The EU also viewed Indonesia’s strategy as a threat to European steel and manufacturing competitiveness. However, Indonesia continued expanding its domestic nickel-processing industry and attracting foreign investment.Bottom line: The EU won the legal argument, but Indonesia largely maintained its industrial policy, illustrating the tension between WTO trade rules and national industrial-development strategies.
There was also a fascinating twistIndonesia eventually became important enough to Europe that the EU had an incentive to compromise.Indonesia controls an enormous share of the world's nickel supply, and nickel is strategically important for stainless steel and some battery technologies. Trying to economically punish Indonesia too aggressively could therefore hurt European manufacturers as well.And Indonesia knew this.That gave Jakarta considerable bargaining power.You can almost think of the confrontation as:EU:“You're violating WTO rules by preventing us from buying your raw nickel.”Indonesia:“Maybe. But if you want nickel, you now have to deal with our industrial strategy.”EU:“Then we'll challenge you at the WTO.”Indonesia:“Fine—we'll appeal.”EU:“Then we'll consider trade countermeasures.”Indonesia:“Meanwhile, Chinese and other investors are building enormous processing capacity here.”That last point is crucial. The EU won the legal argument but didn't succeed in reversing Indonesia's fundamental industrial strategy.Indeed, Indonesia's downstream nickel industry continued expanding.One more wrinkle: Europe has subsequently become more hostile on Indonesian trade
>>542018117Europe can't always get what they want. Or China or Russia for that matter.
African Leaders and Independence Figures killed Ruben Um Nyobè — Cameroon (1958)Killed by French colonial forces during the war against the UPC independence movement.Félix-Roland Moumié — Cameroon (1960)Poisoned in Geneva by a French intelligence operative using thallium.Patrice Lumumba — Congo (1961)Executed by Katangan forces. Belgian officials were deeply involved in the circumstances leading to his death, while the CIA separately developed plans to assassinate him.Maurice Mpolo — Congo (1961)Executed alongside Lumumba in Katanga amid Belgian political and military involvement in the Congo crisis.Joseph Okito — Congo (1961)Executed alongside Lumumba and Mpolo in Katanga under the same Belgian-backed political context.Barthélemy Boganda — Central African Republic (1959)Died in an airplane crash. French involvement has long been suspected, although an assassination has never been conclusively established.Sylvanus Olympio — Togo (1963)Killed during a military coup involving former French colonial soldiers. French geopolitical interests surrounded the coup and his removal.Louis Rwagasore — Burundi (1961)Assassinated shortly before independence. Belgian colonial political interests and actors were implicated in the circumstances.Pierre Ngendandumwe — Burundi (1965)Assassinated amid political struggles involving continuing Belgian influence in Burundi.Mehdi Ben Barka — Morocco (1965)Kidnapped and disappeared in Paris. French security officials and Moroccan authorities were implicated in the operation.
Eduardo Mondlane — Mozambique (1969)Killed by a parcel bomb. Portuguese intelligence involvement has long been alleged because of his leadership of the independence movement.Amílcar Cabral — Guinea-Bissau/Cape Verde (1973)Assassinated by PAIGC dissidents during the independence war against Portugal. Portuguese intelligence involvement has been alleged.Herbert Chitepo — Zimbabwe (1975)Killed by a car bomb. Rhodesian intelligence and other actors were implicated in the assassination.François Tombalbaye — Chad (1975)Killed during a coup. France had extensive military and political involvement in Chad and had a major interest in the country's leadership.Murtala Mohammed — Nigeria (1976)Assassinated during a failed coup. Foreign involvement has been alleged, although direct French responsibility has not been established.Marien Ngouabi — Congo-Brazzaville (1977)Assassinated in a coup-related episode. Foreign and French geopolitical involvement has been alleged.Ali Soilih — Comoros (1978)Overthrown and killed following a coup led by French mercenaries under Bob Denard.Steve Biko — South Africa (1977)Died after being severely beaten and tortured in apartheid police custody. His death was a direct killing by the apartheid state.Pio Gama Pinto — Kenya (1965)Assassinated during Cold War-era political struggles. Foreign intelligence involvement has been alleged.Samora Machel — Mozambique (1986)Died when his presidential aircraft crashed near the South African border. South African involvement was strongly suspected, although responsibility was never conclusively established.
Thomas Sankara — Burkina Faso (1987)Murdered during the coup that brought Blaise Compaoré to power. French and Ivorian involvement has been extensively alleged.Ahmed Abdallah — Comoros (1989)Killed during a coup involving French mercenaries led by Bob Denard.Dulcie September — South Africa (1988)Assassinated in Paris. South African apartheid security services are widely suspected of responsibility.Mohamed Boudiaf — Algeria (1992)Assassinated while serving as president. Various foreign-involvement theories have circulated, although the official explanation centered on domestic actors.Melchior Ndadaye — Burundi (1993)Assassinated during a military coup. The killing occurred amid intense regional and international geopolitical involvement.Juvénal Habyarimana — Rwanda (1994)Killed when his aircraft was shot down. The assassination remains disputed, with competing allegations involving Rwandan and foreign actors.Ibrahim Baré-Maïnassara — Niger (1999)Assassinated by members of his presidential guard. French political influence was significant in Niger, although direct French responsibility for the killing has not been established.Laurent-Désiré Kabila — Democratic Republic of Congo (2001)Assassinated by an insider. Foreign governments and geopolitical interests have been implicated in competing theories surrounding his death.Muammar Gaddafi — Libya (2011)Overthrown during the NATO intervention and subsequently captured and killed by Libyan fighters. France was one of the leading forces behind the intervention.Ken Saro-Wiwa — Nigeria (1995)Executed by Nigeria's military government following his campaign against environmental destruction in the Niger Delta. His case became closely associated with Western oil interests and political pressure.
>>542018680China has yet to answer for this. Will they pay reparations?
Good Africa has a continent. Wowee. Ok! What's the problem? It sounds good. How about Africa for Africans? It's called Africa after all. Now we just need a honky country same to be fair. Nothing wrong with that is there. So called africans would agree with it. Same with so called White people. Jews are their own race now so not white! By law now and by their own say so all the time and whites for damn sure take no responsibility for what they have done and should not ever. It works better if you keep them separated song.
The offspring btw
>>542014121imagine if we had just never interacted with it. no slavery, no colonialism, we just did it all ourselves and produced enough white people to get it all done. we'd be living in paradise right now.
The problem with Africa is it's full of Africans.
I'm glad I made my Lego map in 2021 or else those woke Danes would have fucked it up
>>542021448India has the same problem but it is with Indians. Must be because that country is for indians. Go figure. What's in a name.
>>542014962Sure because your money wenth to prop up leaders who would happily sell out their people's resources for pennies, killing good leaders and destabilizing unity , after you set up boundaries that ensured conflicting tribes would never keep those countries stable. Get to act like the big white hero with you expired crap aid too. I hope China fucks your shit up.
>>542014034Oh, seems big enough it can take care of itself. So we can cut all foreign aid right?I'll wait
>>542014034The first based thing the UN has done in 80 years
