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https://www.propublica.org/article/whistleblower-wall-street-has-engaged-in-widespread-manipulation-of-mortgage-funds

https://www.fdic.gov/quarterly-banking-profile/statement-acting-chairman-travis-hill-problem-bank-assets

Basically, the books are cooked by banks not doing due diligence on borrowers falsely reporting income that they didn't actually receive, similar to the mortgage crisis in 2008.

In addition there are additional factors to account for with the new administration that were not present in May 2024. Rising tariff rates while they do raise tax revenue for the government, also have the side effect of de-facto taxing capital inflows into financial asset classes, as well as making further rate cuts by the Fed less likely. In addition (speaking in terms of purely objective scientific consideration of the economy) more vigorous enforcement of deportations if they cause significant reduction of immigrant population within the US, will also result in reduced monetary flows into hotels and multifamily as well.

Thus, I would expect the numbers on a fairly broad cross-section of these CMBS categories to get far worse, not just limited to the office category.

While people are pulling out their hair over their poopcoin crypto coins shitting the bed, things are only going to get far far worse as time goes on and the Fed has to navigate a balancing act between not igniting massive asset-price inflationary spirals by cutting too fast, versus having the CMBS finance sector blow up.

If you're interested in more info I do have some stuff I wrote previously:

https://roths.substack.com/p/the-true-source-of-secular-stagnation
https://roths.substack.com/p/the-coming-crisis

If you guys have any questions feel free to ask away and I'll answer to the best of my ability.

>>61093440
>>61093467
Ok lil burry.
You're a retard and can't understand macroeconomics.
Defaults are high because too late raised the rates at the worst possible time ensuring everybody got fucked.
If you bought during covid your house is now worth a lot less than the inflated price you paid, if you buy now your mortgage rate is fucked.
Couple that with a real dogshit economy once you remove the AI money which doesnt go to any actual working people.

Finally a thread of value. You've obviously done a lot more research here than me but let me just give my basic assessment.
>What has surprised me however, is the relatively sudden increase in the CMBS default rates for multifamily housing. Why and how has there been such an increase in defaults alongside depreciation in condo valuations and declining sales volume for single family homes, if reported vacancy rates for condo housing have stayed consistently low?
For one thing, condo prices might come down, but turnover is (relatively) low. So landlords are still paying the high taxes and high loan rates. At the same time, every indicator affecting the lower-middle class is horrible.
They're suffering, not paying, and forcing landlords into default, if I had to guess.

>Rising tariff rates while they do raise tax revenue for the government, also have the side effect of ... making further rate cuts by the Fed less likely
Unrelated to my point, but why is this?

> Fed has to navigate a balancing act
This has been repeated countlessly since I joined /biz/ in 2016. I don't think it's incorrect but I think everyone here believes it's a hard threshold of either complete crash or complete hyperinflation whereas it must obviously be a more continuous spectrum and thus a much slower burn into the inevitable horror.

Man I miss 2019 when this shit was commonplace on /biz/

>>61093440
Sir, this is a board for shilling shitcoins. Please hand over one third of your CMBS premines to the jannies to be allowed to continue this discussion or face a permaban.

>>61093550
Defaults are high because you can't expect to jack up rents forever and expect people to be able to afford to pay for them when incomes don't keep up. The ultra-low interest rates post-2008 inflated a massive asset bubble and now we're seeing the consequences play out. That's not even regarding the FDIC hiding problem bank data or the lawsuits on faulty reporting of CMBS applications.

>>61093561
As I have mentioned a bunch of landlords got caught cooking the books, which means that real vacancy data is likely a lot higher than is reported.

Places like SF are basically a ghost town compared to how it used to be a decade or so ago, how else do you explain the insanely jacked up rents that still have landlords going into default?

https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/sf-landlord-foreclosure-buildings-21069802.php

>Unrelated to my point, but why is this?
I talk about this a bunch in the secular stagnation article I wrote, but basically all trade surpluses and deficits must eventually balance out to net zero, as we can't all just run a trade surplus without an equal and opposite deficit.

So in order for a country like China to maintain political stability and the economic primary of their party elite that control their domestic mass production industries, they need some financial mechanism to absorb their productive surpluses, as their domestic consumption is inadequate for absorbing their own production. Hence why they and other countries end up buying US bonds, real estate, or stocks. Trying to bolster domestic consumption to reduce this dependency would have the effect of marginalizing the economic and political power of their elite strata, thus a black pact between the bankers of America and the industrialists of China was born.

When Trump got into office in 2024 and started spamming tariffs randomly, this has the effect of disrupting the flow of surplus capital into US financial markets, which has the effect of pushing up yields.

https://www.trepp.com/trepptalk/topic/cmbs-delinquencies

For future reference if you guys want to stay fresh on the default rate numbers trepp is a pretty good free resource to follow along

>>61093627
All makes sense except the premise
>basically all trade surpluses and deficits must eventually balance out to net zero, as we can't all just run a trade surplus without an equal and opposite deficit.
I understand if you mean worldwide surplus/deficit must equal 0, mathematically. But when you talk about it in a country context, I don't see why that *must* be true. I seea country has a surplus and they want to park the surplus wherever else they an for more surplus (externally like China buying US bonds). But that's still technically optional. Not sure why you think them holding their surplus in Chinese currency is just not an option (albeit a bad one).
Also, my apologies but not clicking your links. I would love to read them if you pasted their plaintext here.
I'm going to bed now but I'll be checking this thread in the morning. Keep this going

>>61093669
If they were to hold their surplus in Chinese currency that wouldn't work out unless they printed a massive amount of Chinese yuan and gave it away to the US government to buy Chinese goods/etc with. Where exactly are consumers going to get the currency required to buy the floods of goods that come out of their factories?

The situation where China loans out money to foreign countries who then proceed to use those loans to buy more consumer goods is both massively unsustainable and has ample precedent historically, as a similar thing happened with US loaning money to countries to buy their exports before the Great Depression kicked off.

I'm massively paraphrasing this but you'd have to read Trade Wars are Class Wars for the full gist.

As for why the economically marketable absorption of productive capacity is such a problem, I'll go ahead and paste some pieces from my work as you requested:

>Once upon a time, soon after WW2 ended, there was a construction company in the US called Levitt & Sons. There was a vast untapped market for housing, as much construction activity was limited due to the demands of wartime economic mobilization. With production resources freed up, and ample political support in the form of congressional bills to facilitate soldiers owning homes, the company was able to invest heavily into the mass production of housing, relying on highly capital intensive vertical integration and massive scale of volumes to drive down prices. The houses that they made may not have been mansions, but they were nonetheless perfectly serviceable starter homes built with decent quality in mind. For a couple of decades this model worked very well, to keep up with demand they would even go so far as making their own nails from scratch to keep up with business!

>>61093711
>However, this boom couldn’t last forever. They got *too* good at mass producing houses, and what ended up happening was that everyone who wanted an affordable suburban home had one. Prices were dirt cheap, anyone with extra money to pay wanted fancier custom features that the factories couldn’t churn out, and with a shortfall of demand the high upkeep costs of all the capital expenditure intensive tooling couldn’t be maintained. Eventually the company went bankrupt, and had to be restructured as a less capital intensive low volume construction firm using methods and techniques still commonplace today in the form of stick built wood frame construction.

>Any company that tries to make durable long lasting products via high volume mass production will eventually face the dilemma of what to do once all of their possible customers buy them and continue using them. Unlike Levitt & Sons though, they get around this issue by making their products with planned obsolescence planned from the start, use advertising to drive up demand as much as possible, lobby for subsidies and competition eliminating regulations from the government, or exporting industrial surpluses overseas. The commercial imperative to expand overseas markets and find new customers was so strong historically it drove forth imperialism. Once there were no longer room for new expansion into foreign markets, the global trading system eventually descended into mercantilism and trade wars that helped precipitate WW1 & WW2. Despite these consequences, states will still subsidize and support high capital expenditure centralized production industry because it allows them to leverage much greater control over industry and markets at large, and in turn the firms will help bolster the power of the state.

>>61093714
>The "solution" to problems of prior implementations that we ended up arriving at ultimately post Cold War with the onset of globalization is to have the trade surplus exporting countries continually send goods over to the US on net balance in exchange for financial assets. Every trade surplus must be balanced by an equal and opposite trade deficit. The industrial elite in the other countries benefit from this arrangement by having a continuous source of overseas demand for their products, while the financial power elite in the US get to benefit from marginalization of the US union workforce and cheap access to various consumer goods.

>Of course in theory the trade surplus countries could buy US products and services with the dollars they get, but the need to maintain high industrial utilization rates and competitive firms for domestic employment prevent this from being viable. While in theory they could mitigate this by taking measures to boost domestic consumption, each of the individual corporate enterprises can only sell a consumer so many goods and services even with increased purchasing power until there are diminishing returns, and ultimately the local political elites aren’t willing to compromise their entrenched market power resulting from running high volume production enterprises. After all, even if one were to have a significantly boosted income the odds of them buying 10 cars instead of only 3 is fairly low, while the resulting higher wages for workers compromises international trade competitiveness. So what happens is that in practice when it comes to methods of stockpiling financial resources they have the choice between three different kinds of financial assets: bonds, land, and stocks.

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>>61093723
>In theory this farce can go on forever, but there's several problems with it. US industrial capacity gradually erodes away further and further, eventually undermining the actual material basis for its hegemonic power in the first place, via a process similar to how other historical reserve currency status nations eventually have had too much relative purchasing power to maintain dominant industrial export manufacturing capacity. In addition, the process of land rent extraction creates more and more of a drain on business activity in general. A good analogy for how this process plays out can be seen in the trophic system:

>>61093734
>One could imagine the energy of the sun as analogizing the actual human blood, sweat, and tears put into generating economic value, whereas the heat losses effectively act as land rent value extraction by various financial entities. For example, when you consider the steps it takes for a cheeseburger to get to someone's plate in a McDonalds, there's the land value cost of the pasture land, the butcher's shop to cut up the meat, the warehouse to ship it to the factory, the factory to turn it into patties, the retail real estate to put the restaurant itself on, alongside all the transportation and labor costs associated with the intermediate steps going from start to finish. As a result despite the theoretical efficiency gains from the large scale mass industrial process of burger production here, the land rent and other factors involved in these layers eventually make it totally uneconomic to actually buy a burger from McDonalds compared to just making it yourself and bypassing several layers of trophic rent extraction in doing so, causing a reduction in economic activity and reducing the demand for the land assets themselves. Left unchecked, if land costs grow faster than wages forever, the logical conclusion is for general standards of living to eventually fall below that of a medieval peasant doing subsistence agriculture on his own land. Thus as land costs grow higher and higher, the weight of economic gravity eventually drags them down one way or another as their valuations become increasingly fragile.

>>61093739
>In addition, the politically entrenched and heavily subsidized high volume industries that dominate the economy politically are becoming increasingly fragile as well. It is ultimately an impossibility for any single entity to maintain an indefinite global monopoly, and as other corporate entities in foreign nations vie for marketshare in an increasingly crowded market, prices inevitably end up getting compressed downwards further and further. For many industrial consumer goods the gradual compression of pricing power has become a reality, with competition from overseas and domestic industrial capacity steadily reducing profits. Even with an infusion of consumer stimulus into the economy there’s only so many flat screen TVs or phones someone is willing to buy at a time. Thus companies have attempted to come up with alternative methods of rent extraction on their goods and services.

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>>61093744
Nobel prize winning economist Robert Solow is famous for his model outlining how the vast majority of economic growth and the improved conditions derived from it comes from improvements in productivity. Nevertheless, as he once said, “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.”. This is mainly because as advances in information technology have conquered the former markets formerly held by light consumer goods such as alarm clocks, calculators, movies, and etc there is increasingly less and less to expand into due to the remaining sectors being politically entrenched in such a way as to block any further disruption. Housing is restricted by financially incentives encouraging artificial shortages in supply and thus invites aggressive speculation driving up costs. Transportation cannot be streamlined in the US via public transit systems due to the entrenched model of suburbanization while auto production is managed in such a way as to purge any excess old inventory that might drag down prices via programs such as Cash for Clunkers, planned obsolescence, or simply bailing out companies with even more money. Healthcare in America is a Kafkaesque nightmare with practically zero transparency in pricing or insurance denial rates, massive amounts of overhead added by staffing insurance agencies, predatory monopolies enforced by lobbied for intellectual property choke-holds, and artificial limits on the number of people who can become doctors. Thus counter-intuitively, the most stagnant sectors with the least amount of productivity growth end up dominating consumer expenditures and capture an increasingly large amount of the value generated by developments reducing costs in other fields, as can be seen in the following Bureau of Labor Statistics US consumer expenditure statistics:

>>61093749
>Thus technology companies such as Google or Amazon that were once innovators have no more room to realistically expand into making new goods or services productively as there is simply too little surplus purchasing power to compete for, and the remaining sectors of the economy that sorely need price reductions are dominated by political choke-holds that prevent genuine competition from lowering prices. As a result, the demands of shareholder capitalism end up steering them towards using their entrenched market dominance and lack of competitors to make their own products gradually worse with more ads, predatory data mining, and general disregard for the welfare of the consumer in a bit to juice up revenues from extracting more value away from the general populace. Rather than simply being allowed to buy a product that you own and can use as you see fit, companies promote X as a service in order to extract recurring revenues from the consumer via whatever product they buy whether its a laptop with a cloud storage subscription or infotainment systems in a car, regardless of whether it is genuinely a useful service or not.

>This process is driven by the large volumes of surplus capital flows entering the United States, with investors rewarding and punishing companies depending on how well they effectively they manage to squeeze as much value as they can out of any commercial exchange or trade of goods/services done with their customers, contributing to the creation of speculative boom and bust cycles in the stock market that as time goes on, leave behind less and less productive enterprises as a result despite investors plowing billions of dollars into venture capital chasing the Next Big Thing.

I don't think we can outrun this one, especially with the hilarious thieves we elected this time. They're not even interested in pretending they give a fuck about America at this point.

>>61093858
that's how it always goes. when the scale's close to tipping over, all you need is a few nudges, or, in this case, a few morons who are more than willing to provide those few nudges. you would think they had protectionism figured out eons ago, but lol, lmao

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That huge auto part umbrella corp First Brands just went under and they apparently had billions in off-book debt that's going to ripple through the system in a few months. Auto lender Tricolor also had a ton off-book debt and double pledged collateral. I think the shot's already been fired and the system will feel the effects shortly if this tariff-induced flash crash didn't already accelerate it.

didnt read
2 more weeks

>>61093440
Damn, I’m glad i managed to stack lock and aster now

>>61093751
you lack vision. rethink everything you think you know with the premise th eus was founded not to ever need a working class

>>61094783
Yeah, I’m honestly expecting the giga-fuckening to hit around 2026, maybe 27 or 28. Given the rising auto prices more broadly due to tariffs plus higher rates they may have levered up too much on commercial debt for their acquisitions and then got fucked by parts costs going up. That being said leveraging up on debt and then bailing out with a golden parachute is classic private equity

>>61094908
this is interesting. where can I read more about this?

>>61093440
>I'm honestly surprised there isn't more discussion of the CMBS
The main strategy of preventing panic is to not talk or even think about it.

>>61093467
I can't find info about how property owners are delaying proper value assessments of their assets, but I remember there being some news articles about it happening back in 2022/2023.

This shit isn’t bleeding into other asset markets any time soon and any losses will be hidden and ultimately socialized. Don’t worry about it until it’s too late

>>61100391
Having this blow up in conjunction with the AI bubble is going to be a nightmare

>>61093467
Cool article. The pro publica article says it’s only about 150 billion in CMBS affected, this doesn’t seem large enough to collapse the eurozone even if all 150 was held by EU entities. Is there any more data you have to back up that assertion?

Op clings to historical data the way every person that gets it wrong does because we find new, shittier ways to fuck things up. The. Again
>>61096641 has it right, everyone knows the last year has been retarded and everyone's just waiting for the drop.

>I missed 08 but that's ok cause it will totally happen again, this time 4real

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It's just one sector, all sectors are bubbly and it's called the everything bubble
The mechanic of bubble burst is the stoppage of liquidity that pumps the market, since fed hasn't pumped any liquidity since the rate hike, then where does the liquidity that pump the AI bubble coming from? Is there limit to this liquidity? If so, when will the liquidity be drained or exhausted?
You can ask these questions to chatgpt or grok to expand but they probably won't give you the right answer
Even further, if this liquidity source is exhausted will the fed inject more liquidity? But that would be contrarian to their projection of 3.5% interest rate from 2026 onwards

>>61101243
The 150 billion figure listed was way back in 2020 when the sector overall was far more robust and still had companies aggressively investing/renting CMBS. In reality the losses will be far greater than the 150 billion that cooked their books because real demand for these assets is now far lower than it used to be, especially relative to the sky high rents required to keep the debt liabilities sustained.

What makes the Eurozone in particular uniquely susceptible to financial crisis is that the countries within the EU don't have monetary + fiscal unification the same way that the US/China/etc do. Member countries don't have direct control over the ECB money printer, therefore they can't really print their way out of a banking crisis with the magic money machine if something goes tits up with their fractional reserve banking systems. If one country goes tits up, its financial liabilities have the potential to blow up the entire Euro system as can been during the Greek debt crisis.

Germany in particular has very high exposure to US CRE as can be seen in the following IMF report:
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/selected-issues-papers/Issues/2024/08/01/Financial-Stability-Risks-from-Commercial-Real-Estate-Germany-552880

When considering office CMBS issues in isolation its probably manageable, but when you stack the German energy crisis from the Ukraine war, impacts from US tariffs on German exports, rising competition from Chinese industrial exports, and the broader issues with non-office CMBS default rates going up the potential for severely negative domino effects from the US CMBS bubble popping are pretty hardcore, ala polycrisis.

>>61101261
While we may find unique ways to fuck things up, all too often we consistently fail to learn from history and repeat our mistakes. Similar issues with trade and capital flows played out during with the UK back in the 1900s:

https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/the-end-of-pax-britannica/

>>61093440
Some guy in a Discord chat the other day:
>I work for a prop tech company, and the amount of people defaulting on their multifamily mortgage is absolutely insane. Like 08 GFC levels for residential housing. We are now to the point we are going to offer a rent advance as a credit option due to it.
So it’s legit

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>>61101415
The issue is that cutting rates risks triggering an asset-price spiral, which would have the effect of pushing up inflation and the costs of financing new treasury bond debts. I'll post some excerpts from another article to explain:

https://roths.substack.com/p/burger-economics

>When considering the flows of production through the economy along the lines of a trophic model, I have previously outlined the example of the effect rising rents have on the prices of various consumer goods such as the humble cheeseburger, which I will now proceed to formalize in a greater degree of depth.

>Rents are not simply a matter of the real estate costs of pastures/warehouses/etc, but also other non-material rents such as taxes, permit fees, intellectual property rights licensing, or etc as classical rent seeking behavior. For the purposes of this analysis, rent is essentially any non labor based economic extraction of value derived from property rights enforced by the state. In moderation, rents can be used as an effective method of allocating scarce material resources and the revenues generated from such activities can be applied towards positive and socially necessary ends such as productive investment, stewardship of natural resources, research, or other positive endeavors. Regardless of what ends the rent revenues are put towards, the model applies nonetheless though.

>If one were to assume a generalized worker who gets paid a wage, with 30% of it being extracted via various forms of rent either based on property/tax/etc, a rent value extraction ratio can be derived from the share of final product value that goes to the laborer compared to the recipient of rent revenues.

>>61093440
That's why they're forcing return to office OP

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>>61101652
>To preempt the obvious critiques of this model, in many ways this is dramatically oversimplified and is not a direct one to one representation of the real world economy. For starters there is a great deal of variance of rent and labor prices at various stages of the supply chain based on conditions of supply and demand, most of the time resulting in a real world rent ratio greater or less than 30% for every time working labor is applied. In addition, rather than being strictly vertical only, there can be parallel branches of economic activity that eventually converge horizontally upon synthesis of the final product, such as with the parallel supply chains of burger buns and beef patties. Finally, for every stage of production there is not only labor and rent costs but also the base input, which is in of itself a result of labor, rent, and another base input.

>To and try and extrapolate this to the furthest possible extent you would have to model the rents that the laborer pays, the products that the laborer buys which have their own labor/base input/rent costs, the base input’s labor/rent/upstream base input portions, alongside where the rent is spent in the economy. Boiling this all down to its core fundamentals in a manner that comprehensively demonstrates the full extent of the process by which a consumer buys a cheeseburger with perfect accuracy would not only require outlining the precise details of the modern supply chain required for producing a cheeseburger, but also the historical context by which many of the machines for mass production were made. Eventually a truly faithful and fully comprehensive description of the economy in such a structure would not only have to include a large amount of private company data that is proprietary, but also a great deal of information that is simply impossible to access, including the economic ratios by which Caveman Grug first picked berries for Ug to make him a sharpened wooden spear.

>>61101675
>Obviously such an economic modelling project is outside the scope of this article. We are primarily concerned with the fairly narrow scope of determining rough ballpark numbers of how much of a final product’s productive value is captured by rent extracting power elites within government or business who then proceed to decide how to allocate the resources instead of the common man getting the choice. For this purpose a 30% trophic layer rent ratio is a fairly reasonable approximation, albeit in many cases under the real world value derived from taxes and landlord rents combined.

>Now back to burgers, assuming a production chain along the lines of:

>1. Farming grains for use as cattle feed

>2. Raising cows on pasture and taking care of them

>3. Butchering the cow into raw meat and other products

>4. Processing the raw meat into frozen burger patties

>5. Cooking the patties and serving cheeseburgers to customers

>6. Gig economy worker picking up food and sending it to final customer

>The process of sending a burger to someone’s home would imply a minimum n value 5 (5 additional layers of economic abstraction on top of the basic layer distribution). The real value is probably higher since this probably doesn’t account for the steps associated with shipping and warehousing, but not any lower. Thus when summing up the ratios for each step:

>0.3 + 0.21 + 0.147 + 0.1029 + 0.07203 + 0.050421 = 0.882351, or about 88% rent ratio

I won't bother pasting in the whole article, but as you can see, increases in rent costs for housing/retail/etc end up proliferating throughout the real economy and raise prices by increasing the rent extraction share of all activity.

As for where all this liquidity actually comes from in the first place, its a combination of rentier value extraction along the lines I've outlined alongside foreign current account surpluses generated through exports to the US economy that end up getting reinvested into US financial assets.

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>>61101665
Despite the push for return to office, overall vacancies are still are at about 20%-ish, thus there's still a considerable ways to go for default rates to climb to at least that level. They were already overbuilding to begin with, remote work is still chugging along, and there's just a lot of layoffs/hiring freezes preventing higher utilization.

That's not even taking into account that CMBS bonds are financed in 5-7 year tranches as far as rates go. Once the office bonds financed around 2019-2020 before that sector took a big fat dump have to be refinanced at current higher rates its going to be even more of a bloodbath. Even the buildings that actually still have tenants have had write downs as large as 80% in some cases.

Frankly the banks also already have a ton of unrealized losses from underwater US T-bonds from the SVB crisis era too, so adding even more issues on top of the balance sheet isn't going to help.

Debtors getting fucked makes me cum buckets.

>>61093440
Well done OP. You did the homework. I'll bite and check out the substack.
Thoughts on dedollarized investing, e.g. in hard foreign assets?

>>61101866
Most are probably likely to also get fucked by the economic domino effects when things finally blow in the US. Industrial consumer goods export based stocks and real estate are the most likely to be hosed.

If I had to invest in any foreign assets I'd maybe consider military production firms, as once shit hits the fan there may be decent odds of boosted military spending as a form of keynesian stimulus plus increased global tensions akin to the leadup before WW2. Crypto is fucked imo due to it being driven by similar mechanisms of international capital flows as tech stocks/etc. Any commodity based alternative like gold may stick esp with increased central bank purchases, but its fundamentally unable to absorb productive surpluses the same way the US dollar can so expect things to get spicy ala Great Depression if dedollarization actually happens.

>>61101909
>Most are probably likely to also get fucked by the economic domino effects when things finally blow in the US.
Of course but i think this is where the real trade war lies. If enough countries decide to "cash out" of the US, the system collapses with them receiving minimal losses as opposed to waiting for an implosive collapse and recovering the leftovers. It's tricky for everyone but not an unwinnable scenario. If LATAM, Africa, and Southeast Asia get their shit together, they can ride this out alright. We're entering the time of the global south. Will they? Probably mixed with losers and winners.
I'm parking my cash overseas and investing in land, food, energy independence, business, etc. I don't expect "poorer" countries (at least some areas of some of them) to go tits up as hard because they're working with less. Less to lose in terms of dollars while still sitting on tons of natural resources, human capital, and potential global (or at least international) trade even in the event of HAPPENING scenario. It's not as pretty or as clean of an exit, but I'm not complaining, quite the opposite.
I definitely agree with you on crypto. I made a nice chunk of cash and pulled almost all of it out towards the end of last year.

>>61102150
Southeast Asia is also heavily dependent on manufacturing exports, Latin America on commodity exports, and Africa is just a giant mess in general institutionally. However the future ends up shaping up, it'll require major institutional reforms and new economic development models, of which its a giant dice roll as to whether these entities will actually be successful. (imo unlikely)

If things actually collapse to the point thing goes tits up to that extent, you're better off buying bullets and beans than paper stocks and bonds that'd get turned into toilet paper in such a scenario of global economic collapse.

>the traditional economy is screwed
>dump all blockchain assets!
i understand why you kids think that way. you were in school when bitcoin launched, and in your mental model the whole of crypto is a casino within the trad economy
but at some point you have to step back and think in fundamental terms
btc is garbage yet even i have to recognize the bitcoin boomers are directionally correct
i know, you're somewhat upset girls didn't touch your peepee in highschool, and that even your sexual experiences in college were ultimately unsatisfying romantically. now you have a comfortable but boring life without love. you dream of collapse just to feel something
understand for the last 20 years people peddled the exact same story as you do, when they were at your exact age and circumstances. details change, narratives are the same
the world will go on. in gradual decline for the average firstworlder relative to their childhood. in gradual uptrend for the thirdworlder. no collapse
the doomporner will keep doing better than average due do at least putting some effort, but will also keep missing out on rewards proportional to their efforts precisely due to that doomporn mindset leaving them sidelined
if you want the girl, you have to grow up
growing up means accepting the risk of you missing out on life is much greater than the risk of your fantasized doom
simple as

>>61093440
houses will be fine at least as long as boomers are around. the fed will literally step in to buy if there is a risk of a housing crash

>>61102405
Will the same political will to bail out SFH exist for larger corporate landlords with condos, offices, and retail as well? Much more dubious, especially if the rest of the economy is already on fire.

A substantial amount of urban budgets in the US are dependent on commercial property tax revenue, what happens when that goes poof due to downwards re-valuations? Not to mention the liabilities on insurance provider balance sheets, pension funds, and etc.