Graphene OS is one of the best when it comes to security on the mobile front, but the one thing that keeps fucking with my head is the simple fact that YOU CAN NOT EDIT NOR REMOVE THE GOOGLE LOGO ON FUCKING BOOT....no one has made any comments to confirm if there is a backdoor either on the chip-level... Like you know intelme exists....SO....it's possible that something similar exist or a zero-day exploit on the chip level. Any discussions around this is always:{bro don't worry about it}{bro if true then you got bigger problems} {bro its needed because its just is #trustme} {bro its actually proof that the device is even more secure...accept the google logo on a degoogled phone} Maybe I am retarded but can anyone even see the boot loader code ?
>>107593942Implement coreboot
>>107593942>EDIT NOR REMOVE THE GOOGLE LOGO ON FUCKING BOOTI believe that's actually written to it's firmware.. like, at the BIOS level for equivial PC architecture... I could be wrong...>a backdoor either on the chip-levelI am of the opinion it does. I have zero evidence.But, that said, you'll find the same backdoors in every other ARM silicon. I recall many moons ago, a couple of generation into the i3/5/7 line, there was big marketing song and dance with a partnership with RealVNC. Thow RealVNC on Core0 and then you can dial into it remotely, outside the OS. Demo vid had realVNC muppet restting a PC 'remotely' and he was in the BIOS *before* the physical screen had displayed the BIOS. This is also when they started packaging in 3G onchip, which suspiciously I've never encountered anyone getting the number, or even the IMEI, to.Very interestingly, information on the onchip 3g, and even the onchipVNC has become thin on the ground... just vanished...>can anyone even see the boot loader code ?Yes. But what I was talking about, re: screwgle logo, is *before* that.
You should be able to compile it for other than Pixel devices I think. I run a self compiled CrDroid.
>>107593942You should be able to flash alt logos in the fastboot environment.
>>107593942I looked through all the transistors on a pixel phone with my electron microscope, don't worry you're safe. No backdoors
Does removing the google logo make it more secure?
>>107593942bro don't worry about it
>>107593942Just use it. Don't ask any questions.
>>107594191no, I should clarify - the core issue is not the logo itself but confirmation that theirs not(or there is) some program running on the chipset which (please someone correct me if im wrong) would be invalid if you can customize the boot loader. There exists no documentation that I am aware of that answers thisAlso since the devs are "anon" that is a little sus but its fine.. this presents a situation in which the OS itself could be a honeypot...because if any data is being leaked at the boot level it could invalidates much of the robust "security & privacy" that is being implemented.
>>107593942You the retard spazzing out on the discord the other day?
>>107593942>YOU CAN NOT EDIT NOR REMOVE THE GOOGLE LOGO ON FUCKING BOOT.It's not part of the OS but of the firmware. The second stage bootloader will load the bitmap off of a separate partition. All the bootloader partitions and the so-called logo partition are guarded by secure boot. Secure boot is implemented in the boot ROM of the SoC and controlled via burning fuses inside the SoC. There is no way to change that. If you want a phone you can edit the boot logo on, get a Xiaomi. They don't protect their logo partition.
>>107593942Yeah you're not replacing the boot firmware with GrapheneOS. Its an OS that uses the security features built in to the firmware and hardware optimally, nothing more.
they are retards for dropping older device support cause muh vendor security patches. nobody is going to hack an up to date aosp with hardened settings from old vendor patches. what we really need is to not have to rely on vendor security patches. what a fucking broken model.
>>107594191As a matter of fact, yes, it does.>>107595006All phones are inherently pozzed. Grow up (take networking 101)
>>107595110Issue is the most insecure part of a smartphone is the GPU drivers because of their shit code, huge complexity and deep integration including direct memory and co-processor access for performance reasons. If Google wasn't retarded they would embrace Mesa but here we are allowing Qualcomm and ARM to write proprietary trash.
>>107595030He is
>>107595045Ultimately my friend all this tells me is that this is Intel me all over again but through google as low level firmware could be potentially operating below the operating system, and this can not be edited or removed....Intel said the same thing about its "s e c u r e b o o t process...."Another thing...I am surprised device spoofing isn't a feature yet. Applications can see on the backend you are a using device identifiers like the fact that you are using a "google pixel" >>107595030>>107595144no you got the wrong guy
>>107595045also don't confuse Secure Boot with Android Verified Boot and "unlocking" the bootloader.Secure Boot verifies the integrity of the bootloader and firmware partitions in the boot ROM. Also called the first stage "bootloader". A tiny piece of code for basic platform initialization built right into the SoC. More hardware will be initialized by the first second stage bootloader, which handles functionality similar to the BIOS/UEFI on PC. In fact, Qualcomm's first second stage bootloader, the XBL, implements UEFI. After that, the second second stage bootloader gets chainloaded. The fastboot. On Qualcomm chips it's an EFI application stored on the ABL partition. Fastboot will load the actual high level OS, usually Android. By default, fastboot verifies the integrity of the boot partitions storing the Linux kernel, device tree blobs and ramdisk, system, vendor and odm images. This is called Android Verified Boot. "Unlocking" the bootloader means you can use more fastboot commands like fastboot flash and fastboot boot. This allows you to disable or (on Pixels only) modify Android Verified Boot via the vbmeta partition. This will not get rid of Secure Boot. The only way to turn off Secure Boot is to desolder the SoC and get one that did not have its fuses blown yet.
>>107595773>of the boot partitions storing the Linux kernel, device tree blobs and ramdisk, system, vendor and odm imagesof the boot partitions storing the Linux kernel, device tree blobs and ramdisk and Android's system, vendor and odm images*
