I use QubesOS with detached boot partition on 2 duplicated USB drives with any data that rests on the SSD/HDDs being encrypted with LUKS2. Whonix gateway is proxied through a VPN qube to hide Tor IPs (can't hide communication patterns) without bridges since bridge IPs can be farmed. Sometimes I2P outproxy through Tor through a VPN or similar setups with different anonymizing network overlays. Clients used for browsing are only opened in ephemeral disposable qubes whose one-time random 256-bit encyption keys reside on a tmpfs, with no unencrypted access to a permanent storage; or in entirely on-RAM disposable qubes to hide storage device wear statistics and other side channels. Attack surface is quite minimum since no extra things added like USB keyboard and no PV qubes (aside from sys-usb and sys-net) are used for launching HVM qubes with qemu stub domains unless very necessary and every other qube on the system gets shut down first to keep information leakage minimum. A veracrypt volume with hidden storage on a permanent qube for data storage and plausible deniability. Screws are painted with nail polish to ensure physical tamper evidence.what's your setup like?
All meaningless because your CPU has a hardware backdoor that can easily override any encryption.
>lust provoking image
organic thread, bro
>>107883710you trust systemd?also datamining thread
>>107883710>Screws are painted with nail polish to ensure physical tamper evidence.why don't you just install an airbag inside the case so it explodes when somebody is opening it?
>>107886469https://github.com/maqp/tfc>>107887389where did systemd come up?>>107887522ram killer is enough, I dont want to carry a bomb
