Posclassic mayans are underrated.The posclassic mayan arquitecture is much more sophisticated than the classic one, an example is the posclassic city of uxmal, which was considered in the XIX century as the most beautiful mayan city, even being visited by Maximilian of Habsburg; Uxmal also has the best mayan arcs in all mayan history.The posclassic mayan cities also created a political entity comparable to the aztec empire (since as the aztecs, it was the union/alliance of 3 main cities) called the League of Mayapan (Luub Mayapan) which dominated all the mayan peninsula.This pic is a painting done in the XIX century of the mayan arc in the governor's palace
>>18004197yeah but the narrative of an entire civilization mysteriously disappearing and/or collapsing back into hunter-gatherer tribes for whichever reasons best fit people's personal biases is cool as fuck so everybody ignores that
The US traded extensively with Japan all the way until 1941. In fact, Japan was the third largest trading partner for the US after the UK and Canada, with $230m of exports in 1940. Additionally, the US was the single largest foreign investor in Manchuria post the Japanese invasion in 1931, and supplied Japan throughout the entire first 10 years of the early WW2 period from 1931-1941.Direct US-Japan trade was very obviously dominated by the war effort. Of the $230m in US exports in 1940, $53m was petroleum products, $32m was iron and steel, $30m was machinery, $30m was raw cotton, and $25m was copper. Exports ramped up for these key goods during the war, in 1933, only $11m of petroleum and $7m of steel was imported by Japan. A major part of this was the fact that the UK and France was the first to start embargoing Japan by 1938, and also due to the impacts of the Great Depression. In contrast, 62% of Japanese exports to the US was silk, which accounted for 95% of the US silk supply. The effort to circumvent the Japanese monopoly over silk ultimately led to the creation of the modern nylon and rayon industry.It is no exaggeration to say that American imports were instrumental to the Japanese war economy. 80% of oil, 90% of gasoline, 85% of steel scrap used in Japan were imported from the US. Of the 7 vital war products identified by the Japanese Ministry of War: petroleum, machinery, iron and steel, copper, aircraft, automobile components, and textiles - the US supplied more than 40% of all of them. Automobiles are another interesting case study - Ford and General Motors opened Japanese subsidiaries in the 1920s that accounted for 12% of both company’s revenues and dominated 95% of the Japanese automobile market until 1939. Nissan and Toyota both only launched their first models in 1936.
>>18005574Somewhat interestingly, the US also provided the leading source of foreign investment in Japanese colonies, especially Manchuria. US imports accounted for 7.3% of all Manchurian imports, or $26.5m by 1938. The rest of this was pretty much all Japan itself. When Nissan renamed itself Manchurian Heavy Industries and relocated to Japan in 1938, it initially came with major co-investment from Ford and General Motors.Somewhat interestingly, the US also provided the leading source of foreign investment in Japanese colonies, especially Manchuria. US imports accounted for 7.3% of all Manchurian imports, or $26.5m by 1938. The rest of this was pretty much all Japan itself. When Nissan renamed itself Manchurian Heavy Industries and relocated to Japan in 1938, it initially came with major co-investment from Ford and General Motors.It might be tempting to think that the Japanese were keen to keep the trade flowing, while the Americans did their best to restrict trade and hem in the Japanese war effort. Contemporary accounts point to this being untrue. Instead it appears that the Japanese military in particular were very concerned about reliance on American imports in opposition to the Japanese companies actually doing the imports. Diplomatic records show that American diplomats lodged multiple formal complaints on behalf of companies like Standard-Vacuum Oil and the Texas Oil Company, whose shipments were being impeded well into 1939. American diplomats further protested vehemently against “impediment of equality of opportunity for American trade interests”.Sources:Kim, Dong Jun (2022) Compound Containment: A Reigning Power's Military-Economic Countermeasures against a Challenging PowerHu, Tun-Yuan (1939) Sale of war materials by the United States to JapanBisson, T A (1940) American trade and Japanese aggressionNakagawa, Ryohei (2010) Japan-U.S. Trade and Rethinking the Point of No Return toward the Pearl Harbor
>>18005574>>18005577Akagi, Roy (1940) Future of American Trade with ManchukuoState Department (1938) Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papershttps://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/1ak69g1/is_there_an_instance_american_company_ever_supply/
>>18005580In September, 1939, Standard cabled to the Japanese monopoly, Mitsui, proposing that they prepare the way at once for the reëstablishment of commercial relations “after any interruptions in our trade,” which Standard feared might come. In other words, American industry believes that either the Axis will triumph or there will be a negotiated peace. https://newrepublic.com/article/104346/standard-oil-axis-ally
