So /his/? Post results.https://www.necessarybeing.com/
>>18125422"Pegasusi"
Great website, OP. Those were some tough questions. My result (which I suspect is the result everyone gets unless they answer "I can't say" to enough things) is>Your answers (or a subset of them) appear to have an interesting implication: they imply that there is a Necessary Being.The argument is very complicated, but I'm confused by premises 6-8. The definition given by hovering over "includes" is>'X includes Y' = 'Y would be actual or exist, were X actual'.And the note explaining 7. reads>[note] For example, suppose W includes just 4 contingent things. Then if C obtains, those 4 contingent things exist, and no other contingent things exist (or have ever existed). C is the situation of there being (or having been) those particular 4 contingent things and no other contingent things.My problem is, W's being actual does not imply C's being actual. The difference between C and W is that under C there are no contingent things outside W, but the mere existence of W wouldn't rule out such things. So I would have to disagree with step 8, that W includes C. Still a very fascinating exercise. Of course, even though I don't agree with it, the idea of a necessary being or beings is philosophically respectable, however anyone using an argument like this to prop up ancient semitic superstitions deserves ridicule.By the way, I find the two-part definition of Necessary Being odd. Wouldn't a sufficient definition be "a necessary being is a being whose existence is necessary"? Why does it have to be able to cause something else to exist?
This felt like a huge waste of time, but here you go.
>>18125422> Now as a rule of thumb, contingent things generally have a cause, or are more likely than not to have a cause (by your report). Therefore, you have a (prima facie) reason to think that C would have a cause. But since C is among the first contingent things, the only thing that could cause it is something that is not contingent. So, if C has a cause, then its cause is a Necessary Being. Therefore, it appears that you have a (prima facie) reason to think that it is possible for there to be something that would be caused by a Necessary Being. I feel like there's an unjustified leap between c having a cause and said cause being necessary, because neither c nor any other step in the chain is necessary
>>18125792>I didn't read the definitions.Noted.
>>18125801I did read the definitions though. I just don't see how something can be necessary (by your definition) without its consequences being inevitable. But c is never stipulated to be inevitable, only possible.You had a whole page on vacuous truths and then still fell for that shit.
>>18125422Thomistic/Leibnizian
>>18125662I'm not really sure I understand your confusion? Are you confusing possibility with actuality? I mean in principle you are correct but I don't see how that's applicable to the argument in your picture. C is in W by definition, where W is some possible world where SU does not hold (since SU is not necessary).
>>18126399>C is in W by definition, where W is some possible world where SU does not hold (since SU is not necessary)I don't think so. If C were in W it would mean W's being actual or existing implies C's being actual or exist. Notably, W isn't defined as a world but as a "situation" that includes other "situations." Something Uncausable is also a statement about situations. I'm not entirely clear on what a situation is (hovering over "contingent situation" gave a definition of "contingent situation" that leaves "situation" unexplained) so maybe that's the issue, but I assume it can be more limited than a world. On one hand it would make sense if W stood for world, but on the other hand, if every situation was a world then 1) why explicitly make the move from talking about W to talking about C? and 2) why talk (e.g. in the phrasing of Something Uncausable) as if multiple "contingent situations" can obtain? I think in modal logic there's only one actual world.But in that case we can come up with examples where W doesn't include the corresponding C. For example, let W be actual the situation of Earth. C would be a situation where no contingent things exist that aren't "in" that situation. But in fact, there are possibly contingent things way outside the observable universe, or even entire parallel universes that aren't part of W, in which case C does not obtain while W does.
>>18125422>things that ostensibly must be so>an example is objective moralityThrown out
>>18126578To my knowledge alethic modal logic can be modeled through possible world semantics so it seems natural to think of W as denoting a world presumably in the set the non-empty set of worlds under under a Kripke frame. I can't really say much more than that though desu. Perhaps the author here is a little bit inconsistent in the way he uses the word "actual". But again I can't really say.What I can say though is that even if some arbitrary W doesn't contain C, since you are technically correct that just because there is some actual W does not mean C is actual in that W, I don't see how we can take the union of W (treating W as a set whose members are all contingent situations within it) with all other W' and get a world in the same family where C obtains. Possibly such a world could exist, so possibly C could obtain.I don't know though I'm trying my best to bullshit my way through this haha.
>>18125422do you have autism retard? no there is no necessary being and you dont need dozens of questions by ai to answer that.
>>18125422
>>18126197What is the exact distinction between Leibniz and Aquinas's argument anyway?
I have two parts to mine
>>18128109Second part
>>18127583mathematical objects are necessarry beingsmathematical world wasn't invented, but was discovered
>>18128375Mathematical objects are actually constructed. Euclid discovered this literally 2000 years ago.
>>18125422see also - internet searching for "prime mover" and "first mover"
