>>18220844
>we could postulate a being that isn't all-powerful but whose powers are rather capped at creating a world which starts at N+1 goodness
Remember that God is the best possible being - both "best" and "possible" equally vital here. You can posit all sorts of better beings, but they aren't possible beings.

In this scenario, what causes it to be N+1 rather than N+2?

If the answer is "nothing", then you need an effect with no cause which is logically impossible. So The N+1 Being is logically impossible.

If the answer is "a law of logic", then it means starting with the world of N+1 goodness is the best logically possible option...so it's what the best possible being would have done.

Remember: whatever quantity of goodness it's logically possible to start a world with, that's the amount the best possible being would start with.

>>18221682
>In this scenario, what causes it to be N+1 rather than N+2?
It's an inherent trait of the entity in question.
Btw I think you're getting confused about the entity I proposed. It's very specifically NOT the greatest possible being, so there's no reason why it should be able to create a world with N+2, N+3, N+4 etc. goodness.

>>18221687
>It's an inherent trait of the entity in question.
Is this trait the result of nothing, a law of logic, or something contingent?

If it's nothing, the being is inherently logically impossible since it needs an effect without a cause.
If it's a law of logic, then we run into that problem again with a starting point of N+1 being logically possible...so it's what the best possible being would do.

If it's something contingent, you run into an identical problem since that means a starting point of N+1 goodness is logically possible.

There's no way to escape making The N+1 Being either:
A) logically impossible, or
B) itself the best possible being

>It's very specifically NOT the greatest possible being, so there's no reason why it should be able to create a world with N+2, N+3, N+4 etc. goodness.
Here's something wild: any being that started the world ("the world" here defined as the total collection of contingent things and facts) must be the best possible being.

It must be omnipotent, since it must have been able to make something out of nothing.

And it must have maximum drive to increase whatever value it was seeking to increase by making the world. Since everything about the world-starter must have been a result of the laws of logic, this would include its drive to increase that value. Meaning that no matter what, the laws of logic would dictate that it seeks to increase that value: no matter how much that value has been increased or how much time has passed.

Whatever that value specifically is (and, sadly, I don't know its exact identity, despite that being my deepest wish) is what "good" is. Getting more of this value would, after all, be the meaning of life.

>>18221706
>If it's nothing, the being is inherently logically impossible since it needs an effect without a cause.
Incorrect. It's not an effect.
>Here's something wild: any being that started the world ("the world" here defined as the total collection of contingent things and facts) must be the best possible being.
>It must be omnipotent, since it must have been able to make something out of nothing.
Sadly for you, it's not omnipotent because it can only make an N+1 world rather than an N+2 world. The N+2 entity can do that because it's more potent than the N+1 entity (though not omnipotent of course).

>>18221718
>Incorrect. It's not an effect.
Is it made to be true by anything, whether that's a law of logic or something contingent?

>it's not omnipotent because it can only make an N+1 world rather than an N+2 world
You're beginning to see exactly the issue. It can't be +1 because +2 is better, can't be +2 because +3 is better, can't be +3 because...

This goes on infinitely. This is why the only logically possible option is N.

>>18221739
>Is it made to be true by anything, whether that's a law of logic or something contingent?
No, it's just an inherent property of the entity.
>You're beginning to see exactly the issue. It can't be +1 because +2 is better, can't be +2 because +3 is better, can't be +3 because...
That's only a problem if you claim the being in question is the best possible being. The N+1 being is decidedly NOT the best possible being, it cannot create an N+2 world due to a trait that limits it to creating an N+1 world.

>>18221754
> it's just
Ah see here's where the issues come. "It's just" means "this trait is the result of nothing". Like how something coming into existence causelessly from nothing is often described as "it just pops into existence".

No thing can exist and no truth can be true as a result of "it's just". This leads to logical contradictions: if one thing can be true or can exist without a cause, then anything must be. Take a quick look at https://www.youtube.com/shorts/F7bcjGArkrA

>That's only a problem if you claim the being in question is the best possible being. The N+1 being is decidedly NOT the best possible being, it cannot create an N+2 world
In this scenario where an N+1 world is logically possible, and you can have The N+1 Being and The N+2 Being, The N Being wouldn't be the best possible being either, and so would not be "finitismcuck's God" either.

If we define N as "the quantity of goodness that the best possible being would begin the world with", then N is by definition the maximum logically possible quantity of goodness for the world to begin with. The world beginning with N+1 becomes a logical contradiction, like saying "S+1 is a square with one more side than this one: []"

>>18220844
What the fuck does "good" even mean here? I hate this autism.

>>18221770
>Ah see here's where the issues come.
They really don't. The entity is timeless, spaceless and immaterial. Nothing is "popping" anywhere.
>In this scenario where an N+1 world is logically possible, and you can have The N+1 Being and The N+2 Being, The N Being wouldn't be the best possible being either, and so would not be "finitismcuck's God" either.
I never claimed that either entity would be your God. Wtf?
Your God is a logical contradiction because it's said to be greater than the N+x entities due to its omnipotence, but at the same time it's necessarily lesser because the entities can create better worlds.

>>18221786
>The entity is timeless, spaceless and immaterial. Nothing is "popping" anywhere.
It doesn't need to. If anything is the result of an "it's just", then everything must be. Think about it: if any one thing is an "it's just"/comes from nowhere/comes from nothing/has no reason/etc. then what would limit that to one case but not another? Clearly, nothing could, since this "it's just" comes from nothing and nowhere for no reason there isn't anything *to* limit. Instead it would have to be the result of a general fact of reality: things don't need causes or reasons, they can "it's just" into truth or existence.

And if that's a general fact of reality, then it applies to everything. You would have everything everywhere always as an "it's just". Which of course would be an infinite number of things, which isn't logically possible.

>I never claimed that either entity would be your God. Wtf?
Perhaps for clarity we can use *slightly* more formal terminology than "finitismcuck's God"? P:

>Your God is a logical contradiction because it's said to be greater than the N+x entities due to its omnipotence
Not exactly, I would posit that N+x entities are all logically impossible.

N+0 (i.e. my God) is the result of logical laws: omnipotence, maximum drive to increase goodness, and no infinities. Put those three things together and you get a world starting with N goodness.

> it's necessarily lesser because the entities can create better worlds.
Since these worlds are logically impossible (they're defined as better than the best possible) they actually can't create them at all.

>>18221811
>It doesn't need to. If anything is the result of an "it's just", then everything must be.
What causes this?
>Perhaps for clarity we can use *slightly* more formal terminology than "finitismcuck's God"? P:
That's beside the point - you straight up imagined some argument in your head that I never made, and it has nothing to do with whether I say "finitismcuck's God" or "the triune God of Christianity".
>Not exactly, I would posit that N+x entities are all logically impossible.
Prove it.
>N+0 (i.e. my God) is the result of logical laws: omnipotence, maximum drive to increase goodness, and no infinities. Put those three things together and you get a world starting with N goodness.
Show me a logical law which states there must be an omnipotent entity, and then show me what causes that law to pop into existence.
>Since these worlds are logically impossible (they're defined as better than the best possible)
Who defined them that way? You? That would be funny considering that even on your view, N+x worlds actually do exist at different points in time (just not at t=1).

>>18221836
>What causes this?
Isn't that what I explained right after?

>it has nothing to do with whether I say "finitismcuck's God" or "the triune God of Christianity".
For clarity, something like The N+0 Entity might work best for our discussion

>Prove it.
For the reasons explained earlier: If we define N as "the quantity of goodness that the best possible being would begin the world with", then N is by definition the maximum logically possible quantity of goodness for the world to begin with. The world beginning with N+1 becomes a logical contradiction, like saying "S+1 is a square with one more side than this one: []"

>Show me a logical law which states there must be an omnipotent entity
We don't know the specific contradiction that yields the best possible being's existence (yet!), but we can easily see that an omnipotent being must exist if any change exists.

At the very very beginning, before there was anything contingent, the only things that would exist or be true would be things required to exist or be true by the laws of logic. Things and truths like that cannot be changed. So when the first contingent thing came into existence, this can't have been the result of something else changing. It must have been brought fully into existence, wholecloth, without something else being transformed.

Something that can do that is omnipotent. Unlike us, who can only transform, something that can do this isn't in any way influenced by the thing that is being made. It couldn't, say, make a three-pound object but a five-pound object would be too heavy, since something has no weight and hence no heaviness at all unless and until it already exists.

So it could make anything regardless of that thing's parts and qualities. Even entire world-states. Being able to do or to make anything, it would be omnipotent.

>Who defined them that way?
Well you did - you're defining them as starting points that are better than the best possible starting point.

>>18222927
>Isn't that what I explained right after?
No, it actually wasn't. The question is what causes the explanation right after that to be the case in our world, or for our world to be a world that works like that.
>For clarity, something like The N+0 Entity might work best for our discussion
Completely unnecessary. You didn't misunderstand my terms, you misunderstood my argument.
>For the reasons explained earlier: If we define N as "the quantity of goodness that the best possible being would begin the world with", then N is by definition the maximum logically possible quantity of goodness for the world to begin with. The world beginning with N+1 becomes a logical contradiction, like saying "S+1 is a square with one more side than this one: []"
This just proves that the concept of the best possible being is incoherent, at least under your metaphysical paradigm. There's no actual causal mechanism preventing the N+x entities from existing. You're just saying that if they did, it wouldn't make any sense for your fuck God to exist and that would make you upset.
>Things and truths like that cannot be changed.
Does this trait of theirs depend on something else, or did it pop into existence out of a literal nothing?
>Something that can do that is omnipotent. Unlike us, who can only transform, something that can do this isn't in any way influenced by the thing that is being made. It couldn't, say, make a three-pound object but a five-pound object would be too heavy, since something has no weight and hence no heaviness at all unless and until it already exists.
Nonsense. The entity creating things can simply have an internal trait that prevents it from creating XYZ.
>Well you did - you're defining them as starting points that are better than the best possible starting point.
Best possible starting point for the God of cuckoldry, not best possible starting point period.

>>18222956
>what causes the explanation right after that to be the case in our world
Oh now I see. Well nothing: our world doesn't work that way, that's why we have causality and don't have an infinite amount of everything everywhere always. Without causality, if there could be "it's just" without causes or reasons, then it would work that way. But there are not, so it does not.

>There's no actual causal mechanism preventing the N+x entities from existing.

Let's look at this a different way since I get the feeling we might be about to go in a circle. Let's examine the actual math and logic here.

Absent Finitism, the best possible being would simply make the following true:
N=∞

If Finitism is true (and it very provably is), then that's not a logically possible option.

The most we get in a finitist world are potential infinities. So instead God has to transform that to be about potential infinities. This gets us the notion that God must introduce something else: something that allows for the value to grow from the starting point of 0 and yet not be actually infinite. He needs to create time and add it to the equation. Let's use t to represent time, as is standard practice. So instead of N=∞, the following equation would be utilized:

lim(t -> ∞) N(t) = ∞
(Sorry for the unusual format, 4chan doesn't like limits outside of /sci/)

This is the minimum that ensures it is a guaranteed potential infinity.

Now suppose we want to add more to this, let's use X for the eXtra good:

lim(t -> ∞) [N(t)+X] = ∞

Well now we have an issue. What's the value of X going to be?

X has to be infinite. If the BPB is omnipotent, it can set X to any value. And it cannot set it to a lower value when a higher value is possible.

So since X must be infinity, but infinity must not exist, X must not exist. No extra is logically possible.

>>18223018
>Well nothing: our world doesn't work that way
Our world doesn't work the way that if anything were the result of an "it just is", everything would have to be? Thanks for the concession!
>Let's look at this a different way since I get the feeling we might be about to go in a circle. Let's examine the actual math and logic here.
Your analysis completely fails because it fails to consider that the best possible being might just be completely incoherent under your paradigm. The N+x entities are a simple reductio. The actual problem is that your "greatest possible being" is an attempt to smuggle an actual infinite into a finitist framework. That's why it outputs absurdities such as lesser beings being greater.

>>18223047
>Our world doesn't work the way that if anything were the result of an "it just is", everything would have to be?
Well it does, because if things don't need anything to exist or to happen then the requirements for everything existing or happening are always met and so everything always exists and happens. If things are coming from nowhere for no reason, there's nothing about that thing in particular that could mean that specific thing gets excluded from causality. There isn't anything for anything about the thing to matter *to*. You can't say "something one meter long can just exist, but something three meters long is too long to just exist" because things have no length unless and until they exist, so their length can't have any influence on the fact of their "just is" 'ing. That's the same for any all properties.

>the best possible being might just be completely incoherent under your paradigm
Not so! For the reasons explained earlier, we can prove two things about it:
1) It is omnipotent
2) It is driven to increase some value as much as that value can possibly be increased

All of the math simply flows naturally from this. The part that's hard to understand is what this value is; hopefully someone can crack the case on that someday. We call it "good" but that's not much better than N or X; just a vague placeholder instead of a true identity.

>The N+x entities are a simple reductio.
That X is where you get the problem, as we saw. If Finitism is true then that X cannot exist here.

>The actual problem is that your "greatest possible being" is an attempt to smuggle an actual infinite into a finitist framework.

Not so; infinity is so contradictory that you can actually mathematically prove that a world with actually infinite good is worse than a world with finite good. Instead limitless, guaranteed, constant increase (what's called a potential infinity) is what's best and what's possible.

>>18223148
>Well it does,
You just said it can't in a previous comment. Make up your mind.
>If things are coming from nowhere for no reason
We aren't talking about things that are subject to becoming, or "coming" from somewhere. Stay on topic.
>You can't say "something one meter long can just exist, but something three meters long is too long to just exist"
I am not saying that. I am simply saying that if something just is, it does not mean there is also some universal factory called "nothing" that must necessarily churn out everything. That would be your claim, and it's one you've yet to prove.
>That X is where you get the problem, as we saw. If Finitism is true then that X cannot exist here.
It totally can, the X just can't be infinity. That's the whole point.
>Not so
You've got it backwards. We can work from looking at the worlds themselves and rank them depending on how good they are. Then we can correspondingly rank the goodness of the entities that would create them by the quality of the worlds they produced.
Cuck God obviously cannot be the best possible being because he jobs to N+1 entity. Thus the claim that he is the best possible being is just a simple contradiction.

Anyway. Let's focus on the important things - let me sketch a view that works better than your cuck view, all within the finitist constraints that I'll adopt for the sake of the discussion.
When you say "best possible being", you mean that whatever other possible being you pit against it, it will be better. It will create better worlds, cook better dinner, give better backrubs etc. The problem is that the number of increasingly good entities actually isn't finite, so for cuck God to be better than all of them, he has to be infinitely good. That's the reason for the absurd results when comparing him to N+x entities. The problem isn't the entities themselves, it's the cuck. He's the "infinitely good" entity cloaked behind "best of all" language.

>>18223226
>You just said it can't in a previous comment. Make up your mind.
I think we're having a disconnect. Let's zoom out. My position: causality is necessary for anything that is not a direct result of the laws of logic. Would you agree?

>We aren't talking about things that are subject to becoming, or "coming" from somewhere
Whether these things happen in time or are eternal isn't of relevance, what I'm saying applies equally whether they're eternally true for no reason whatsoever or they become true at some point in time for no reason whatsoever.

>It totally can, the X just can't be infinity
What is X's best possible value?

>The problem is that the number of increasingly good entities actually isn't finite
You're leaving out the possible element here, mistaking the best *possible* being with the best *proposable* being.

Let's look at the math again. Your argument boils down to saying the equation can be:

lim(t -> ∞) [N(t)+X] = ∞

With that X added. You're quite rightly observing that we run into a problem that
lim(t -> ∞) [N(t)+1] = ∞ isn't as good as lim(t -> ∞) [N(t)+2] = ∞ which isn't as good as lim(t -> ∞) [N(t)+3] = ∞, and so on. But you're misinterpreting the results. This doesn't mean the best possible being can't exist, it just means that this extra X variable can't exist. The laws of logic, Finitism being one of them, prevent it. Any being that has maximum drive and ability to increase good must have the standard of ensuring lim(t -> ∞) N(t) = ∞ is true: no more, and no less.

This is simply the basic result of modeling "thing that wants to maximize a value and has limitless ability to do so. No infinities though".

Let me ask this. How would you model the behavior of such a thing? Not fishing for anything here, genuinely interested in your answer!

>>18223511
Let's zoom out even further, otherwise this isn't going anywhere.
You are claiming that finitism is true, and you are claiming that because of this, an infinitely great entity must exist, but finitely great entities must not exist. You justify this by showing that it cannot be true that both an infinitely great entity and the finitely great entities are possible under a finitist regime.
Let me repeat, instead of concluding from this that it is the infinitely great entity that cannot exist under a finitist regime, it is the finitely great entities that cannot exist.

>>18223639
>you are claiming that because of this, an infinitely great entity must exist
Not at all, nothing about God is infinite, in the sense of an actual infinity. It's often maximal, but not actually infinite. He isn't infinitely old for example: he's as old as a thing can possibly be at any given time since he was the original thing to exist, but he hasn't existed for an infinite number of years.

>>18223852
No, your cuck God is by necessity infinitely great because he is claimed to be greater than an infinite number of entities that are each greater than one another. That's why you run into issues, you're trying to smuggle in infinity under a cloak of "maximally great" rhetoric.
If you dispense with that, all the need for sophistry disappears. But you don't like that because then you don't have an argument for God anymore and that is emotionally distressing to you.

>>18223947
Is it possible to have something better than an omnipotent being with maximum drive to increase good?

>>18224122
Invalid question. It's not possible to have an infinitely great being under a finitist paradigm in the first place.

>>18224143
Well the question is very valid. We can prove a being with both of those qualities does exist. The rest is just relatively simply math to see how it would act.

You keep saying "no, there could be something better that adds more good". But we looked at the math. It isn't possible. Whatever way you attempt to get such a being, you're going to run into a problem with a law of logic.

>>18224160
>We can prove a being with both of those qualities does exist.
We actually can't though.
>You keep saying "no, there could be something better that adds more good". But we looked at the math. It isn't possible.
No, it's very possible to plug in some X value. You just can't plug in infinity. You're only running into absurdities because you're trying to assert there is an infinitely great being. If you assert that there is NOT an infinitely great being, you get no absurdities. It's as simple as that.

>>18220844
There’s a simple way out of this.
God also created the best possible world.
However, he also created every world where it’s better to be alive than not on average. This way he ensures to create the most happy beings

>>18224294
>We actually can't though.
This would sort of change the line of discussion, so I'd like to ask: what if we grant, for the moment, that such a thing does exist, or at least grant that we're examining a possible world where it does? I think then we can see why proposing better beings doesn't gel with the model that results. This discussion is way more interesting than basically just talking about if God exists or not

>it's very possible to plug in some X value
What will cause something to select that value, and not a higher one? The crux of the issue is that for the best possible being the answer is "nothing", so it can take no value and so cannot be an actual variable. You can prove that all possible answers for X= are not what the best possible being would select. The model requires the absence of such a variable.

It's akin to how an object in motion will always remain in motion. There is nothing to cause it to stop one place instead of another. So a model of an object in motion with no obstacles ever on its path where you insert a stopping point variable doesn't work. Someone could say "it can just stop. It stops here. It just does. What's the issue?", but causality prevents this.

You can propose objects that just stop after fifteen nautical miles, but causality is going to prevent those from actually existing in the world.

>>18224551
This doesn't work. The best possible being, if it could, would instantly improve all worlds to an infinite amount of goodness. It would not leave any world unimproved if it could directly improve them.

Like take a world where most people endure famine every other year but otherwise life is worth living. Assume all else being equal it would be a strict improvement for there to not be famine in this world. Under your model there is no reason for God to not provide manna from heaven every other year and prevent the famines.

The Finitist model, on the other hands, demonstrates mathematically why God does not do this

>>18224750
>This would sort of change the line of discussion, so I'd like to ask: what if we grant, for the moment, that such a thing does exist, or at least grant that we're examining a possible world where it does?
You're asking me what if I grant you an actual infinity within a finitist paradigm. It's nonsense.
>What will cause something to select that value, and not a higher one?
Some property of the creator in question. It's really as simple as that.
>The crux of the issue is that for the best possible being the answer is "nothing", so it can take no value and so cannot be an actual variable. You can prove that all possible answers for X= are not what the best possible being would select. The model requires the absence of such a variable.
You're getting stuck in circles. Your "best possible being" is just a rhetorical trick, in reality it's an infinitely great being and hence an impossibility within finitism.
Beings that ARE possible (unlike the infinitely great being) can obviously select an X value hat isn't infinite because they aren't infinitely great. Your problem is once again resolved by simply not forcing an actual infinity into finitism, but again, you don't want that because you're emotionally attached to the God stuff.
I recommend you find a more defensive theodicy. Why would you base your entire theology on some random youtube videos? Or are those yours?

>>18224920
*defensible theodicy

>>18224920
>what if I grant you an actual infinity
What specifically is actually infinite? You said this a few times here, but don't identify what specifically it is that's actually infinite.

>Some property of the creator in question
That property can't be a maximum drive to increase goodness, since then it would always select higher values when possible. It also can't be maximum ability to increase goodness, for obvious reasons.

But those two things together are what makes a best possible being: nothing better than that is possible.

So it must lack one or the other of these, making it not the best possible being.

>Beings that ARE possible (unlike the infinitely great being) can obviously select an X value hat isn't infinite
Why do they select a lower value when they could choose a higher one? Choosing higher values is better by definition, so they are inferior to beings who would select their choice +1. None of them can have maximum drive to increase goodness when they are choosing lower amounts instead of higher amounts.

>>18225000
>What specifically is actually infinite?
It's infinitely great.
>So it must lack one or the other of these, making it not the best possible being.
The creator in question is not the "best possible being" because "best possible being" is just an "infinitely great being" that is being snuggled in via sophistry. How do you still not get this point?
>None of them can have maximum drive to increase goodness when they are choosing lower amounts instead of higher amounts.
Exactly. None of them are the (actually impossible) infinitely great being. That's he entire point!

>>18225014
>It's infinitely great.
Clarifying question: are you using "great" as a synonym for good, or do you mean something else by it?

And either way, could you be specific about how this greatness represents an actual infinity?

>>18225023
No, I'm using greatness the way it's generally used in philosophy of religion arguments, i.e. relating to all great-making properties.
>And either way, could you be specific about how this greatness represents an actual infinity?
The infinigod is greater than an infinite series of possible entities, each of which is more great than the previous one.

>>18225030
>No, I'm using greatness the way it's generally used in philosophy of religion arguments, i.e. relating to all great-making properties.
That's quite vague and nebulous honestly. I'm simply talking about an omnipotent being with maximum drive to increase some value. There's no actual infinity involved in this.

>The infinigod is greater than an infinite series of possible entities, each of which is more great than the previous one.
Isn't this like saying that your healthiness is an actual infinity because you are healthier than someone with one extra pound of fat, and he's healthier than one with two, in an infinite series of increasingly obese men?

Or your wealth is infinite because you're richer than an infinite series of increasingly poor men, each poorer than the last, some vingtillions of dollars in debt.

>>18225082
>That's quite vague and nebulous honestly. I'm simply talking about an omnipotent being with maximum drive to increase some value. There's no actual infinity involved in this.
There is, as I've already explained. Your infinigod is stated to be greater than an infinite number of increasingly great beings. That's the entire reason why he leads to absurdities.
>Isn't this like saying that your healthiness is an actual infinity because you are healthier than someone with one extra pound of fat, and he's healthier than one with two, in an infinite series of increasingly obese men?
No, there is someone who is healthier than me.
>Or your wealth is infinite because you're richer than an infinite series of increasingly poor men, each poorer than the last, some vingtillions of dollars in debt.
No, there is someone wealthier than me.

>>18225097
>stated to be greater than an infinite number of increasingly great beings.
This only involves an actual infinity if those beings actually exist. Otherwise it's no different than, say, a number line where 2 is greater than an infinite quantity of numbers (1.9, 1.98, 1.987...).

>there is someone who is healthier than me...there is someone wealthier than me.
This doesn't change the quantity of increasingly unhealthy possible people that you are healthier than, or the quantity of increasingly poor possible people you are richer than.

>>18225121
>This only involves an actual infinity if those beings actually exist.
Nonsense. The modality only effectively puts a power level to a trait. Like if you've got two kids arguing who superhero X could beat and a kid is like "could he beat Y?" and the other kid is like "yeah he's stronger than him, and he has hotter eye lasers too!", the fact that Y doesn't actually exist doesn't change the fact that we've put a power level to superhero X.
You're effectively saying "imagine this infinite line of increasingly OP villains - superhero X could beat ALL OF THEM!".
>This doesn't change the quantity of increasingly unhealthy possible people that you are healthier than, or the quantity of increasingly poor possible people you are richer than.
Well with that you sketched a line that approaches minus infinity and ends at let's say 100. Obviously you can't actually have a guy who is infinitely unhealthy (minus infinity) but you can have me at a solid 70.

By the way, you still didn't answer my question. Why are you so attached to those youtube shorts? Did you make them? I'm thinking of no longer engaging with you until you answer this because at this point it's more interesting than the debate itself.

>>18225134
>You're effectively saying "imagine this infinite line of increasingly OP villains - superhero X could beat ALL OF THEM!".
Imagine that infinite line of increasingly fat men. You could beat all of them in a race.

There's nothing that's actually infinite here, you are simply illustrating a potential infinity: we could keep coming up with things that meet some description all day long.

>Well with that you sketched a line that approaches minus infinity and ends at let's say 100. Obviously you can't actually have a guy who is infinitely unhealthy (minus infinity) but you can have me at a solid 70.
Sure, we could look at it that way. But this doesn't mean your health represents some actual infinity, does it? It just means "we could keep coming up with hypothetical less healthy people than you and never run out".

>Why are you so attached to those youtube shorts?
Isn't it nice to be able to skip ahead in discussions past the basics with a well put-together explainer? But look for Finitist content on YouTube. It's very limited, sadly, despite how useful the idea is.

>>18225184
Alright, I see how I worded that wrong. The problem arises when you've got a property and for each subject that has this property, there is a subject that has it to a greater degree, and then you claim that there is a subject that has the property to a greater degree than all other subjects.
>Isn't it nice to be able to skip ahead in discussions past the basics with a well put-together explainer? But look for Finitist content on YouTube. It's very limited, sadly, despite how useful the idea is.
So did you make those or not?

>>18225206
>The problem arises when you've got a property and for each subject that has this property, there is a subject that has it to a greater degree, and then you claim that there is a subject that has the property to a greater degree than all other subjects.
I think we see this all the time with properties that have maximums. Think about depth, for example. Depth is defined as how close you are to the center of the Earth, and height is how far you are from it. The very very center of the Earth is maximally deep, and an infinite number of things can be proposed, all not as deep as it is. But nothing can be proposed that's deeper.

Does that make it infinitely deep? Of course not, its depth is finite.

Or think about age. Something present since the beginning of time can have an infinite number of things less old than it. But it never becomes infinitely old; a finite number of years have passed since the beginning.

The only other place I know of to find solid Finitist content is https://www.youtube.com/@njwildberger/videos but he only makes long-form videos that nobody would watch

>>18225290
You did not properly read what I wrote. I'm getting seriously tired of having to repeat each of my points at least twice to you before you actually respond to it rather than to something else. I won't put in the effort to reword it. Just read
>The problem arises when you've got a property and for each subject that has this property, there is a subject that has it to a greater degree, and then you claim that there is a subject that has the property to a greater degree than all other subjects.
again.
The Earth example does not fulfill those conditions, therefore there is no issue with infinities.
>The only other place I know of to find solid Finitist content is https://www.youtube.com/@njwildberger/videos but he only makes long-form videos that nobody would watch
Did you make those?

>>18225311
>The Earth example does not fulfill those conditions
Well sure it does. The farther up you go you find more and more things. The center of the Earth will always surpass them all in depth. Similarly, the age of something present at the very beginning of time is older than an infinite number of of possible things, but none can be older than it is.

This is why maximums often avoid actual infinities. At some point, it's like trying to go north of the North Pole

>Did you make those?
If I had made those there they would be much clearer and get to an interesting point right away instead of meandering P:

>>18225358
Oh no... You didn't reread it.
Try again.
>The problem arises when you've got a property and for each subject that has this property, there is a subject that has it to a greater degree, and then you claim that there is a subject that has the property to a greater degree than all other subjects.
>If I had made those there they would be much clearer and get to an interesting point right away instead of meandering P:
Did you make the other videos? You never answered that.

>>18225376
There seems to be a disconnect. Is there perhaps some sort of alternate way you could phrase your point, or maybe point me to a similar example?

Or, perhaps, make the argument in a slightly formal way like I did above with those limits?

>>18225394
If you look at the depth of the Earth, it is NOT the case that for every subject (in this case, place within the Earth), there is a place that is deeper.
You also didn't answer my question, and I know why. Many Christians think it's wrong to lie but it's fine to not answer questions. When they repeatedly refuse to answer a question, you know that they're doing it because they'd otherwise want to lie.
In other words, you did make those videos, and that is why you're so fixated on this specific theodicy.

>>18225405
Now I understand where you're coming from. But I don't think we have this issue with the best possible being. If you have maximum ability to increase good, and you're guaranteed to always use that to the maximum possible extent, then there's no scenario in which something produces more good than you do.

There is a maximum to "good-producingness": maximum ability and guaranteed use of that ability to its maximum extent. No single being can ever be more good-producing than that.

>>18225436
This works under most common theologies. Theologians and philosophers of religion generally work under a model where goodness cannot increase infinitely but rather at a certain point reaches a hard cap, a state of full goodness, the best of all possible worlds. It can't increase after that.
Under this framework, there's no weird paradoxes, but it also doesn't allow you to shill your youtube channel with your weird arguments.q

>>18220844
Christopher Hitchens chewing out that rabbit for the abominable practice of circumcision was amazing to watch.

>>18225484
I almost never hear such a position taken. That's called Optimism and it's relatively niche. Personally I think such a notion can be definitively refuted. If goodness were to have a maximum, then the best possible being would create that and only that. Change never would have been created since change could only either make such a state worse or not make in better. So there would have been no reason to create change.

Nor can good inherently involve change - it's something defined by logic itself; "good" is the value that the logically necessary being seeks to increase, and every core fact like this about a logically necessary being is itself logically necessary. Since the laws of logic don't change, neither can the identity of good.

So under this, we would just have an unchanging and perfect world. Change only makes sense to add if good can increase without limit.

>>18225738
Wtf kind of philosophy are you engaging with? It's literally the default position within Christian philosophy. The reasoning for God creating a changing world is generally something like he's loving, wants a relationship, but that requires the Other, plus free will, yada yada, eventual Triumph, beatific vision/theosis as the final state of maximal possible goodness. Classic stuff, very touching.
There's a reason why you can't find any of your weird shit online aside from your own youtube channel and some mathematician who talks about finitism in general and not in connection to theology. Try messaging random people in random philosophy of religion or theology departments across the world, they'll tell you the same thing.

>>18224754
That’s what’s happening.
Now I admit this is tied to one presumption:
Personal first person identity beeing tied to first person expirience.
What this means is that you are you because of the expirience you’ve had. A different timeline version of you would be ackin to a twin.
Now God , beeing a perfect beeing, DOES want to create every possible world and then turn it perfect.
However if he created you and immediately turned on the bliss maxxing. He would only get 1 version of you in bliss.
Thus.
God lets every version of the world play out that isn’t worse than not ever having lived.
And then AFTERWARD he gives you perfect bliss.
Thus you get both.
A maximum ammount of people enjoying a perfect world forever

>>18226530
There's no level on which this works: observation, scripture, and logic are all against it. Starting with observation:

>Personal first person identity beeing tied to first person expirience. What this means is that you are you because of the expirience you’ve had. A different timeline version of you would be ackin to a twin.

Which goes against basic observation. Circumstances are things that happen to my consciousness, and it's the same *center of awareness* going from circumstance to circumstance.
Not only that, but this would mean that every change destroys a person. Just like "A different timeline version of you would be ackin to a twin.", this means the """you""" an hour from now will just be a twin. People actually come into existence and then are permanently annihilated on a moment-by-moment basis.

Scripturally this view makes no sense either. By this logic, Jesus isn't eternal, instead a new Jesus was being formed every time something happened to him, and what's more there are millions of Jesuses that could have existed but never did.

And scripturally this model makes a notion of sin incoherent. According to you, anything that looks like evil is actually necessary in order to bring a particular person into existence. If I stab someone it is not and cannot be murder, it's the opposite and was necessary in order to make the man exist who had to exist. Sin is something that ought to not be done, but according to your model, there can be nothing that ought not be done since anything you do is necessary to make the right people exist.

>>18226530
And logically this is a whole host of problems:
>God lets every version of the world play out that isn’t worse than not ever having lived.
Firstly this is a non-starter since that would be an infinite number of worlds, and actual infinities are logical impossibilities.

But what's perhaps more fundamental, according to you, God is the one who built the world such that specific consciousnesses are tied to specific circumstances. He's the one who built the need for suboptimal worlds into existence. Being omnipotent, he could have made it so that all consciousnesses/people/individuals/etc. were tied to a perfect world with only perfect and absolute positives. He would have had to deliberately rig it so that certain consciousnesses/people have to be generated by negatives.

We could keep going with more issues, but this really doesn't work.

>>18225762
>beatific vision/theosis as the final state of maximal possible goodness.
Even if we grant that, the goodness of that world would be increased by having more people in that state. That would be the point of evangelism. This wouldn't entail "the best of all possible worlds" since you can keep making it better by adding more people in that state.

>>18226610
Again, cuck, theologians and philosophers of religion generally do not think goodness within Christianity is basically just a renamed "utility" that can be increased forever simply by shoving in more people. That is why they don't run into these weird paradoxes that you're getting btfo by.
You created two blades of a scissor (1.There is no best possible world. 2. Finitism is true.) and put them up to your neck, I just closed them. Congratulations for making a theodicy so bad that God actually cannot exist if all its premises are true.

>>18226606
>he could have
Should he have?

God is the creation of very imperfect human powers of imagination and judgement. Which is why we'll be arguing about it forever.

>>18227577
>Again, cuck
Why such hostility? I'm actually massively enjoying this discussion, minus that aspect

>theologians and philosophers of religion generally do not think goodness within Christianity is basically just a renamed "utility" that can be increased forever simply by shoving in more people
I sure do. I'd find this view very strange since, Biblically, it seems absolutely indisputable that God prefers more people to be saved than not, and that the quantity of people saved is not something He is neutral towards. (Unless you're talking to a deranged Calvinist, lol)

>You created two blades of a scissor (1.There is no best possible world. 2. Finitism is true.) and put them up to your neck, I just closed them.
It's more akin to a bottle, and once you cut it open what comes pouring out is:

"Therefore the best possible being is one that guarantees the truth of the following:
lim(t -> ∞) N(t) = ∞"

That is, one that guarantees goodness always increases and never stagnates or decreases. Makes sure there's no goodness level the world will ever fail to hit.

>God actually cannot exist if all its premises are true
Honestly I'm not quite understanding what you're referring to with this. It seems like there a simple and almost self-evident mathematical model that flows naturally out of it, God effectively just sets the goodness quantity to a limit instead of a specific amount and calls it a day. The math and the logic work and flow perfectly and elegantly.

>>18227586
Definitely not, there is no perfect world so then there would be no people! Anon however seems to accept infinities and therefore perfect worlds, so under his model doing this would have been a possibility

>>18227596
>Why such hostility?
Because I'm immature and think it's funny.
>I sure do. I'd find this view very strange since, Biblically, it seems absolutely indisputable that God prefers more people to be saved than not, and that the quantity of people saved is not something He is neutral towards. (Unless you're talking to a deranged Calvinist, lol)
I'm not a theologian so this aspect doesn't really interest me. When it comes to that specific topic, I'm just reporting on other people's views.
>It's more akin to a bottle, and once you cut it open what comes pouring out is:
What comes pouring out is a paradox (i.e. lesser beings are greater than the greatest being), one that other theologies do not have to deal with.
>Honestly I'm not quite understanding what you're referring to with this.
At this point it seems like you're being deliberately obtuse. I keep hammering in on one single paradox this whole thread and then you say you don't know what I have in mind when I say your view entails that God can't exist? It's one thing to say you disagree, but this is a bit much.
I'm not interested in continuing under these conditions. If you want to stick to a framework that debunks God if all its premises hold, be my guest. Otherwise I recommend messaging academic philosophers of religion, telling them your view and my objection and asking for their thoughts on the matter. Though I doubt you can actually do that since every time I've brought up a point, you seem to have misunderstood it.

>>18227692
>i.e. lesser beings are greater than the greatest being
As we've seen that's simply not a result that you actually get. This line of reasoning reminds me of proposed perpetual motion machines: some of them can look plausible to the untrained eye if explained quickly but there will always be some law that prevents them from actually existing.

You said that these would simply be beings that added one extra unit of goodness to a starting world and otherwise acted identical. But this runs afoul of basic causality: there is going to be nothing that makes them actually able to do this.

So it's like describing a perpetual motion machine and saying "so then it uses the energy it generates to turn itself, and then the flywheel-". Dig into this and you'll see that there's no possible way for energy to do this.

You responded by saying it could be some arbitrary, inherent, "just is" part of the being. But that's like saying "say we had a machine that just does generate enough power to power itself and then some". Where's the extra energy actually coming from? There is no possible source, so basic causality prevents it.

You're basically describing a machine with 110% energy conservation each time is turns, but there is not and can never be a source for that extra energy because of the laws of causality.

Does that make sense what I'm getting at?

>>18227762
I won't answer you until you tell me whether you were pretending to not understand what I was referring to or whether you genuinely had no clue.

>>18227787
I really did need clarification; your original argument was more like "God would not be the best possible being" than "God's existence is self-contradictory", so it wasn't immediately apparent that you were referring to it there.

>>18227792
No, you simply did not understand the argument. I've been very clear about the fact that your argument leads to an absurdity, i.e. the greatest possible being being lesser than lesser beings. This is obviously not a state of affairs that actually obtains, it's self-contradictory (hence "finitismcuck's theology leads to contradiction").
If after all this time you did not understand even that, then talking to you has been a complete and utter waste of time. Talk it out with a philosopher of religion if you want to continue, I won't waste any more time talking to someone who didn't even understand my basic point up until now.

>>18227815
>the greatest possible being being lesser than lesser beings
This is as if we were talking about, say, the most efficient possible machine and I said it is one with 100% efficiency (well, more realistically, 99.9999...% to however many decimals is one single unit of energy) and you simply replied "Nope. There can be more efficient machines infinitely. It could have 101% efficiency, 102% efficiency, 103% efficiency...".

Then when I point out that that violates laws of causality because there's no possible source for that extra energy, you just say "they just have 102% efficiency, it's an inherent property of the machine".

This is what your N+1 hypothetical beings are like.