The difference between Christian and Pajeet metaphysics is this:While Christians are able to conceive of final causality—that is, a material universe that, empirically speaking, is in a constant state of potentiality, linearly evolving until it becomes pure actuality after the Apocalypse with the establishment of the Kingdom of God, after which it will no longer be in potentiality because it will possess everything—Pajeets, on the other hand, conceive of a cyclical world. The universe is always in potentiality, always material. Pajeet metaphysics prioritizes matter over spirit, so that nothing exists in pure actuality nor in the possibility of being in pure actuality. The universe, from infinity, has been in potentiality, without beginning or end; it is material, as are its beings and deities, and will never cease to be material.The Christian universe is mystical; along with Christians, it is evolving toward sanctification in a perfect and immutable being like its creator. The Pajeet universe is materialistic, as are its beings, who are constantly changing material beings.
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>>18265453>Pajeets, on the other hand, conceive of a cyclical world. The universe is always in potentiality, always material.False, Indian metaphysics recognizes a non-material spiritual component to the universe such as living souls and Brahman.>Pajeet metaphysics prioritizes matter over spirit, so that nothing exists in pure actuality nor in the possibility of being in pure actualityAgain false, Brahman in Advaita and a few other schools is purely actual, its more elegant and refined form of divine simplicity than anything found in Christian theology.
>>18265489Living souls that are always in potential to be placed in another body, ergo, material souls more akin to the universality of matter postulated by Avicebron than to the immutability in act of souls postulated by Scholasticism.>its more elegant and refined form of divine simplicity than anything found in Christian theology.There is nothing divine in that which is constantly materially put into potential, that which is matter in its most basic state; a soul that constantly changes form is as material a being as a piece of stone, and worse, because it has a fictitious material substrate.If Hinduism were so great, names like Buddha and the Randeesh you cite would be more widely taught and known in the world than those of Jesus, Paul, Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas, etc.
>>18265501>Living souls that are always in potential to be placed in another body, ergo, Living souls in Hindu metaphysics have actual and not potential existence, they are beginningless and always existed in a state of actuality. Future possible spiritual development is not the same thing as existing in a state of Aristotelian potency (i.e. lacking actuality), in the same way that you having the potential of learning another language does not mean you lack actuality.>material souls more akin to theThey are explicitly taught to be non-material>its more elegant and refined form of divine simplicity than anything found in Christian theology.>There is nothing divine in that which is constantly materially put into potential,Neither the soul nor God switches from actual to potential existence in most Hindu metaphysics unless you are misrepresenting them with a strawman fallacy>a soul that constantly changes form is as material a being as a piece of stoneThis is strictly speaking a non-sequitur, there is no logical connection between the premise and the deduction, somethings forms and its materiality are two different things.>would be more widely taught and knownWhy cast pearls before swine?
>>18265521>Living souls in Hindu metaphysics have actual and not potential existence, they are beginningless and always existed in a state of actuality. Future possible spiritual development is not the same thing as existing in a state of Aristotelian potency (i.e. lacking actuality), in the same way that you having the potential of learning another language does not mean you lack actuality.This is a contradictory argument, since Aristotle defined the soul as the substantial form of the living body. If a "soul" constantly transmutes from body to body, it is never the potential for anything. The Christian soul is born alongside the body and accidentally dies through capital sin (see St. Thomas Aquinas, Domingo Báñez). God's final reward for the sanctified soul is a new and immortal body glorified like that of Jesus (see 1 Corinthians 15:42–53; Revelation 3:4–5, 18; Philippians 3:10).Again, the soul in Pajeet's metaphysics is more akin to Avicebron's material universality than to the Christian notion, which implies final causality; that is, both men and the cosmos itself will evolve to a final state after which there will be no more changes because God will have sanctified all beings so that there is no potentiality in them, for as Aristotle said, potentiality with respect to something is due to the lack of a good (Nicomachean Ethics 1:1-2; Metaphysics 5:7-10), but in paradise God will be one with his creation, and it will have the supreme good before it (Revelations 21).In Pajeet metaphysics there is no supreme good, God is unattainable, and souls are always in constant potential undergoing metamorphosis from body to body in an infinite cycle without any teleology, without final causality, unlike Christian linearity.
>>18265709>In Pajeet metaphysics there is no supreme good, God is unattainable, and souls are always in constant potential undergoing metamorphosis from body to body in an infinite cycle without any teleology, without final causality, unlike Christian linearity.This is incorrect. The whole point of Hinduism is reuniting the soul with the Absolute, Brahman. Eliminating the illusion separating the soul from Brahman, and merging with God (rather, realizing one is already one with God) is the end goal.You seem discomfited by the idea that the soul is as malleable as the physical world but I don’t see why that’s a problem.
>>18265521>They are explicitly taught to be non-materialYou are redundant in indefinite terms in metaphysics, since matter in classical thought is everything that is subject to change, that is, to exist in potential. Given Aristotle's definition of the soul, which strictly links it to man (since we are not angels, who are ultimately intelligences in pure act in their substantial form), the soul is defined as the substantial form of the living body (De Anima 2:1). For the Christian, the soul is spiritual insofar as it informs a mutable material body, immortal by accident, since man was immortal, in the state of innocence, by the accidental grace of God and not by essence like the angels, through the tree of life, from which Adam and Eve ate (Summa Theologiae 97:1). The detachment of the soul from the body in Christian metaphysics is unnatural (Báñez in Commentaria in D. Thomae (vol. V) art. 4.; St. Augustine at De Genesis ad litteram 10; Robert Holkot at Super Librum Sapientiae, chapter VIII, lectio CXVI, page CVII)As I mentioned earlier, a soul that constantly changes bodies is material, consistent with Avicebron's postulates on the soul.https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02156a.htm
>>18265521>Neither the soul nor God switches from actual to potential existence in most Hindu metaphysics unless you are misrepresenting them with a strawman fallacyGod in Pajeet metaphysics is a being fragmented into a million beings, or lesser gods as they call them; it is contradictory because it is a religion that flagrantly violates the principle of identity.>This is strictly speaking a non-sequitur, there is no logical connection between the premise and the deduction, somethings forms and its materiality are two different things.Rather, you are ignoring the fact that a being that is constantly changing cannot be an act because change itself negates that it is an act.
>>18265737>This is incorrect. The whole point of Hinduism is reuniting the soul with the Absolute, Brahman. Eliminating the illusion of separating the soul from Brahman, and merging with God (rather, realizing one is already one with God) is the ultimate goal.So, Pajeethism denies being by accident, something Parmenides and the Eleatics fell into long ago, and which was refuted millennia ago by Aristotle in his Physics.>You seem discomfited by the idea that the soul is as malleable as the physical world, but I don't see why that's a problem.A soul that changes bodies is in actuality, like a table that becomes cardboard.
>>18265709>This is a contradictory argument, since Aristotle defined the soul as the substantial form of the living body. Hindus don't subscribe to Aristotelian definitions or metaphysics so its not contradictory for them to affirm that. There is no valid reason why they have to use Aristotelian definitions for terms. >If a "soul" constantly transmutes from body to body, it is never the potential for anything.This is a non-sequitur, the conclusion doesn't follow logically from the premise. Simply moving from body to body does not establish anything about the souls final destination. In most Hindu schools the eventual destination of the soul is attaining freedom from the cycle of rebirth and/or union with God. The moving from body to body only continues until the soul attains permanent freedom and release.>In Pajeet metaphysics there is no supreme goodWrong, Brahman or God is the supreme good>God is unattainableWrong, Brahman or God is attainable in most schools of Vedanta, either through strict identify or through becoming similar in attributes/nature.>and souls are always in constant potential undergoing metamorphosis from body to body in an infinite cycle without any teleologyWrong, the final goal for the soul is release from rebirth and/or union with God.>>18265752>You are redundant in indefinite terms in metaphysics, since matter in classical thought is everything that is subject to change, Whatever you say about classical or Aristotelian metaphysics is completely irrelevant here, since Hindus don't subscribe to it. In their view Aristotle is simply wrong on many things even if he is right about other things. End of story. Christians don't even follow Aristotle on everything.Saying "Aristotle defined X as Y, therefore since Hindus accept X its Y" is a question-begging fallacy, it's presuming in a circular and fallacious manner that Aristotle's definitions are correct, and then relying on that as an argument, which is blatantly fallacious.
>>18265761>God in Pajeet metaphysics is a being fragmented into a million beings, or lesser gods as they call themThis is factually untrue, the lesser gods are regarded as contingent creations or emanations like how angels are regarded in Abrahamic faiths. The Supreme God Brahman 'ensouls' these lesser gods and mundane creatures alike but without making the ensouler and the ensouled identical, like how consciousness ensouls the body yet consciousness and the body are two different things.>it is contradictory because it is a religion that flagrantly violates the principle of identity.This is also factually untrue, mainstream Hindu schools don't posit God's nature or identity in any way that would violate the principle of identity.>>18265761>Rather, you are ignoring the fact that a being that is constantly changing cannot be an act because change itself negates that it is an act.In Aristotelian metaphysics, a thing having actual existence as act is only comprised if its essential properties change and not its accidental properties.Hinduism normally defines the soul in such a way that the only things which change about it are either (1) accidental properties, or (2) the changes themselves are illusory and unreal and not instances of genuine change.For example, two mainstream Hindu theological viewpoints are Advaita Vedanta and Vishishtadvaita Vedanta.In Advaita Vedanta, there is just one infinite soul in existence that is God, this is the only thing that truly exists, everything else is unreal. So, there are no actual real changes that occur to the existent soul and it remains actual.In Vishishtadvaita, the soul has the essential nature of knowledge and bliss alone, everything else is an accidental and hence non-essential property.Thus, neither of these two positions involves any commitments that make the soul non-actual, i.e. potential since all the changes connected with the soul are either unreal or pertain only to accidental attributes.
>>18265765>So, Pajeethism denies being by accident, something Parmenides and the Eleatics fell into long ago, and which was refuted millennia ago by Aristotle in his Physics.(1) Aristotle's supposed "refutation" of the Eleatics is extremely weak and full of holes(2) Hindu philosophy accepts the distinction between essential and accidental properties(3) Different Hindus schools have their own metaphysics that are different from other Hindu schools and its not uniform, nevertheless most Hindu schools accept that there are forms of relative and/or dependent being/existence that depend on more fundamental things for their existence.
>>18265804>is only comprised*is only compromised
>>18265793>Hindus don't subscribe to Aristotelian definitions...The definitions of the Aristotelian school weren't intended to be doctrinal but universal. In this respect, the arguments given by Aristotle don't stem from dogmatism and can be used universally. If you're going to disagree with him, you should do so by refuting his ideas, citing the reasoning of other authors (of a phaistos nature), not by simply denying them and withdrawing from the debate without adding anything of value.>This is a non sequitur...The fact is that the pajeets argue that the soul reincarnates, and if this is the case, there is a separation between soul and body, which blatantly contradicts the arguments offered by the authors of the Aristotelian-Thomistic school for reasons given by Aristotle in his Physics and Nicomachean Ethics.Since the soul is the substantial form of the living body, a soul that jumps from body to body is a being that passes from transmutation to transmission. Each soul is born with its respective body, for the proper form of matter exists before matter itself is prepared (see: Aristotle in Metaphysics 12:16-17 and De Caelo 1; Francesco Silvestri da Ferrara in In summa contra gentiles II c.15, c.18; Domingo Báñez in Commentaria in D. Thomae (vol. V) art. 4). If the soul were made before the body,>In most Hindu schools, the ultimate destiny of the soul is...You are implying that perfection can come from imperfection, which is ridiculous unless God causes such perfection. It is impossible for a being in potentiality to attain pure actuality since it requiers from an instrinsically imperfect being to become perfect, that's impossibe for there is an ontological void between God and the creature, a void that only salvation through grace can bridge, .
>>18265804>This is factually untrue, the lesser gods are regarded as contingent creations or emanations...An emanation implies an identity between both beings; this is the Avicennian heresy refuted by Saint Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 1). God creates ex nihilo; he neither generates nor emanates. Therefore, your assertion is erroneous, fallacious, and fails to differentiate between creating and generating. Yes, in Pajeethism there is identity between God and the lesser gods because they substantially derive from Him.>This is also factually untrue; mainstream Hindu schools don't posit God's nature or identity in any way that would violate the principle of identity.If they do, as already demonstrated in the previous point.
>>18265453nigga, don't be dumb. God is the same for all religionsKrishna = FatherIsa = son
>>18265804The assertion that only God is the sole universal soul is as erroneous as Averroes' concept of the common soul. If God were the only universal soul and we were all emanations of Him, that would mean that rape or murder would also be God's doing, since we would all share the same universal soul. This cannot be true because God is good, and there is no evil in Him. From this, we conclude that the Advaita Vedanta assertion is incorrect.
>>18265804>In Vishishtadvaita, the soul has the essential nature of knowledge and bliss alone, everything else is an accidental and hence non-essential property.I disagree with this assertion and will refute them by citing Philosophia prima pars 10: 5 1. To assert that only the soul exists and that the body is merely an accident of it is also incorrect, since knowledge arises from the combined work of the senses (faculties of the body) and common sense (faculty of the rational soul). The body perceives black and white, but the soul differentiates between the two. We see that the body and soul are mutually dependent for knowledge. 2. The body is an intrinsic part of man, as is the soul. If the body were not part of man, he would not be a natural reality composed of matter and form. This is absurd because man would cease to be a natural reality. 3. If the body were a contingent instrument for the soul, something like a shirt (according to proponents of reincarnation), then it would have to be a separate instrument, like a tool, or an integrated instrument (like the hand becoming a tool of the mind). But the relationship between body and soul is neither, for the soul suffers from the body's pain, whether it sees it degraded or violated. 4. Therefore, it is concluded that the soul is not in the body like a pilot in a ship, but rather is its very form, as Aristotle argued; man is a substantial unity of soul and body.
>>18265854>The definitions of the Aristotelian school weren't intended to be doctrinal but universal. Whatever Aristotle and his school intended is completely irrelevant here, since there is no written or unwritten rule in philosophy, logic, theology or metaphysics that one has to first disprove Aristotle before defending or committing oneself to a non-Aristotelian system. To say otherwise is simply engaging in a question-begging fallacy (petitio principii) which refutes anything you say as an argument after that which presupposes that point.>The fact is that the pajeets argue that the soul reincarnates, and if this is the case, there is a separation between soul and body, which blatantly contradicts the arguments offered by the authors of the Aristotelian-Thomistic school for reasons given by Aristotle in his Physics and Nicomachean Ethics.That's again irrelevant since Aristotle's views cannot be assumed to be a priori true without engaging in the sort of fallacy that precludes that from having any sort of argumentative validity. Hinduism simply starts from a differing conception of the soul than Aristotle does, Aristotle never proves logically why any contrary non-Aristotelian conception of the soul is wrong so there is no point even bringing him up here.>In this respect, the arguments given by Aristotle don't stem from dogmatism and can be used universally. Except that he never proves logically that the soul is the form of the body in the special sense he means and that any contrary conception of the soul is wrong, so there is no "argument" to address because for an argument which presupposes this to be logically valid (i.e. not fallacious) it would have to first prove that its particular conception of the soul is correct, but Aristotle never does this, you are welcome to cite the argument if you think otherwise (there is none).
>>18265854>If you're going to disagree with him, you should do so by refuting his ideas,You are the one critiquing Hinduism and its metaphysics/theology here, all I'm doing is pointing out that your critiques involve mistakes and/or fallacies and are not logically valid. Aristotle is irrelevant to this. >You are implying that perfection can come from imperfection, which is ridiculous unless God causes such perfection. In neither the Advaita model nor the Vishishtadvaita model is perfection coming from imperfection, in both models perfection is essentially caused or manifested by God. In both models the soul is intrinsically a non-agent and never actually acts and the souls attaining of perfection or the revealing of its perfection are brought about by processes dependent on God.
>>18265854In Advaita imperfection has no real existence and all that exists is the existence of God which is wholly actual, and the whole schemata of bound souls has no real existence but is merely a false display brought about as an energy or cosmic illusion by God, nothing ever attains perfection that was not already perfect and nor is there anything non-perfect actually existing that could become perfect in theory. The apparent false display that brings about the false impression that imperfection and plurality in general exists is just a way of perceiving in action the operations or phenomenal effects of God the solely existent that is the One without a second. Thus, perfection is actual, immutable and non-dual, without any contrary or opposition in existence. It neither comes nor goes anywhere but abides as the undecaying and inexhaustible Infinite. And in Vishishtadvaita, the soul only has the essential attributes of knowledge and bliss, and the process of it becoming liberated, perfect and sharing in God's omniscience occurs through actions undertaken by the intellect and not the soul, and that intellect's actions that result by the souls perfection are enabled by God's will and they depend on God's grace being granted for this perfection to occur, so the perfection comes from God ultimately. There is a process of perfection or salvation through grace even though it involves other steps too like realization and meditating on God.
>>18265956Bare assertion fallacies.If you are going to deny the authority of Aristotle, you should do so by giving a counter-argumentative definition instead of running around like a headless chicken.
>>18265868>An emanation implies an identity between both beings; this is the Avicennian heresy refuted by Saint Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 1).I wasn't using emanation in its technical sense but in a loose sense. In neither Advaita nor Vishishtadvaita is there strict identity between the created world and God.In Advaita the universe is a beginningless false appearance that doesn't ultimately exist like God does. It's phenomenal presence despite not being ultimately real is sustained as such by God though so it's not just something one mind is imagining. The appearance is not an emanation of God because the immutable Infinite admits of no change or parts that literal emanation would involve. It's a false manifestation brought about as a consequences of God existing in the manner that God does that is comparable to a beginningless false image, an image does not 'emanate' from the prototype of the image but the prototype remains in itself without changing. In Vishishtadvaita all that exists is God and his dependent body or modes that He ensouls, so everything is existentially continuous as one entity, but there is a infinite qualitative different between the autonomous Godhead and the dependent modes which are dependent in every way on the Godhead and are under His control. The existence of the dependent bodies/modes are without beginning as an eternal part of God's totality and thus never emanate from the Godhead's nature.So, neither of these involves a kind of emanation where God loses or ejects of part of himself which then remains identical with God's nature while also making up some lower emanation.>If they do, as already demonstrated in the previous point.which I just refuted
>>18265950>The assertion that only God is the sole universal soul is as erroneous as Averroes' concept of the common soul. If God were the only universal soul and we were all emanations of Him, that would mean that rape or murder would also be God's doing, since we would all share the same universal soul.(1) This presupposes that it is the soul which acts, which Advaita rejects and says that agency inheres in the intellect which is non-Self, i.e. not the actual soul. The intellect is comprised of subtle elements and is a kind of extremely subtle body, that is comparatively more 'inward' than the physical body in relation to our Self of Awareness despite not being the Self i.e. the actual genuine soul.(2) Because the Self or the soul is a non-agent, non-volitional and never commits creaturely actions, none of the actions performed by that intellect stain the Self or soul in any way. The intellect's actions don't belong to the Self of every creature any more than the actions of a animal situated in space belong to the space that it inhabits when it commits that action, that is to say not at all.(3) Each intellect is different from every other intellect and each intellect experiences the karmic results of the actions that it commits and not the actions of other intellects. In other words, the doings of any one intellect are not the doings of any other intellect.(4) Furthermore, as imperfection has no real existence and is only an a part of the universal illusion, any specific instances of it like rape and murder don't actually exist and so their hypothetical existence cannot contradict the actual perfection of God's existence. This takes the same route as the Augustian solution to the problem of evil of privatio boni but in a more all-encompassing and consistent way without any special exceptions and equivocating.
>>18265953For starters, Vishishtadvaita admits that there are many cases where certain things act like substances in relation to other things while at the same time acting like properties or qualities of other things at the same time, with their example being how the soul being the substance in relation to which the physical body depends but at the same time the individual soul depending on the substance of God and being more like a qualifying mode in relation to that substance.>1. To assert that only the soul exists and that the body is merely an accident of it is also incorrect since knowledge arises from the combined work of the senses (faculties of the body) and common sense (faculty of the rational soul). The body perceives black and white, but the soul differentiates between the two. We see that the body and soul are mutually dependent for knowledge. According to Vishishtadvaita the cognitive faculty of differentiation belongs to the intellect and not the Self/soul which is a not an agent or thinker, so all Aristotle is doing here is just highlight the interplay of two different bodies (one gross the other subtle) neither of which is the Self or soul, so that's not a sound foundation for making conclusions about the soul.Vishishtadvaita also rejects that the soul or body are mutually dependent for knowledge, since they say that the soul has a kind of primitive simple self-awareness in the state of dreamless sleep that remains throughout and isn't dependent on the body
>>18265953>3. If the body were a contingent instrument for the soul, something like a shirt (according to proponents of reincarnation), then it would have to be a separate instrument, like a tool, or an integrated instrument (like the hand becoming a tool of the mind). But the relationship between body and soul is neither, for the soul suffers from the body's pain, whether it sees it degraded or violated.Strictly speaking this is the logical fallacy known as a non-sequitur, since the body being a tool for the soul doesn't logically preclude the soul from having knowledge of the body's experiences, but this quote frames the reasoning as if this type of relation is logically precluded, but there is actually no valid a priori reason why that would be the case. Any reasoning while relies on an implicit solution being assumed to be logically precluded when it's not in fact logically precluding is engaging in a non-sequitur fallacy. Vishishtadvaita affirms this very type of relation, that the soul is intrinsically independent of any particular body and is only temporarily connected with any particular body. The reason the soul can have knowledge of the body's experiences is because it is endowed with the essential property of knowledge and possesses a kind of relational-consciousness called a dharma-bhuta-jnana that allows it to witness and know whatever experience the intellect is having like pain or pleasure, this accounts for why the soul seems to suffers from the body's pain, because it has immediate knowledge of the intellect experiencing that pain.
>>18265979>If you are going to deny the authority of Aristotle, you should do so by giving a counter-argumentative definition instead of running around like a headless chicken.My refutation of your arguments does depend on that, since I've identified the where they are fallacious and thus logically invalid already without having to provide any counter-arguments to Aristotle. I don't care about arguing about Aristotle, my only aim was to debunk your argument which I achieved. If your critiques are logically invalid then that's all that matters at the end of the day.
>>18266069You're a funny little dude.
>>18266069*My refutation of your arguments does NOT depend on that>>18266125I accept your concession. Better step your game up next time chump—it was really too easy to refute your sophism in this thread.
