>It was inflicting the maximum amount of damage on your enemy that you feasibility could do. Overkill means inflicting *less* damage than you could have because you wasted your ammo shooting unimportant things or already dead things. That's why it's bad, not because you heard some karen say war is mean.The 1946 bombing surveys at the end of the war conducted by the AAF demonstrated that dollar for dollar and pound for pound the air war was mostly an inefficient waste that killed a lot of civilians for little practical military purpose. Did it help compared to nothing? Sure. It hurt the Allies compared to what a more targeted approach would have done. The only legitimately rewarding targets were the oil plants. The rest could have been skipped and used more productively as grunts and jeep parts.This is doubly true when you factor in the way bombardment was done. Allied manned bombers were much more effective at damage per unit investment than German ballistic rockets - but they were far less cost effective than German cruise missiles. It's why Hap Arnold was saying missiles and drones were the future of war in 1946!
>Made another threadFaggot
>>64226116https://www.jstor.org/stable/26296200> The application of firepower on the battlefield was an absolute obsession for Van Fleet from the moment he arrived in Korea. He realized that China had an almost limitless supply of manpower that could be fed into the furnace ofbattle, while he was already outnumbered and had been briefed that he could expect to receive no significant reinforcements.> As Van Fleet saw it, the only way to counter the infantry-dense Chinese assault formations was to meet them with powerful artillery fire. Shortly after the first impulse of the Chinese Fifth Phase Offensive was thrown back in April, Van Fleet circulated a directive to all artillery battalion commanders in Korea, stipulating a new rate of fire that would be expected of them during any future enemy attack. Dubbed the Van Fleet Load, this directive called on gunners to achieve a rate of fire five times that utilized during previous operations in the Korean War.> Van Fleet inspected the IX Corps sector of the front just east of Seoul and told the corps commander, General Hoge, that “this line is the best place to kill the Chinamen. It’s better to do it here and now—this month and the next. I want lots more wire and mines expended, not human life.”> "I wouldn’t be a bit surprised if the CCF doesn’t expend a full army attacking in column of divisions against this position and the way the men feel about it is that the Chinks will be piled ten deep before their position is breached. Just for good measure, I am going to give them some engineers to improve the defenses and a little thickening up with 155 millimeter and 8-inch howitzers. I too, want to go back to that spot and see those Chinks piled up like cordwood."> By 28 April 1951, the first wave of the Chinese Fifth Phase Offensive had spent itself and Peng’s battered divisions broke contact and limped northward having suffered an estimated 79,000 casualties for no tangible gain.
>another threadFuck around find out
>>64226116It did however reduce the Axis appetite for war by killing the civilians who are to blame for all wars. In that it was a bargain. Enemy lives don't matter.
also, all that guns, fighters and concrete that was used for strategic AAA purposes could be used to make Atlantic Wall actually viable or to make more tanks and fortifications
