Things we can look at as civilians to investigate Russian Nuclear status and stockpile:What the scrapped agreement is & what the news says:The PMDA was signed in 2000 between Russia and the United States. It committed both sides to each dispose of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium that was “no longer needed” for military purposes. https://tass.com/politics/2035531https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2016-10/news/russia-suspends-plutonium-agreementRussia claims the reason: “fundamental change in circumstances"Why this doesn’t strongly indicate they’re out of weapons-usable plutonium:The numbers: the agreement applied to “excess” weapons-grade plutonium, not the full stockpile. According to sources, Russia had on the order of ~128 tons of weapons-capable plutonium at one point. (yeah though it's wiki I'm sorry so "sources")They committed to dispose of only 34 tons under the PMDA — and never did.“Scrambling for material” would show other indicatorsIf Russia were short of war-usable material, you’d expect more signs: new production announcements, export efforts, signals of urgency in weapons manufacturing, etc. I haven’t seen a credible open-source analysis that says “Russia is almost out of plutonium for weapons and thus desperate.”The termination does not mean they’re about to commercialize or openly repurpose what was designated “excess” into weapons — at least not overtly according to public reporting.Why the move does raise concernsWith the agreement gone, one side of a major nuclear arms-control regime is cut. The “excess plutonium” is some increased proliferation risk.Russia’s justification referencing changes in strategic balance suggests they may feel freer to re-use, repurpose, or retain materials — even if they don’t publicly declare so.My verdictSo, mixing the traditional viewpoint with my read:If I were you I’d see this as a geostrategic red-flag.
1) Warheads do need regular maintenance — but “7–10 years” is an oversimplificationWarheads require surveillance, periodic refurbishment (life-extension work), and parts replacement because plastics, electronics and high-explosive components age. That’s well understood for all nuclear states. The U.S. keeps weapons in service decades and runs big life-extension programs; the average U.S. warhead was produced/refurbished decades ago and is sustained by active maintenance programs. https://apnews.com/article/nuclear-warheads-military-bomb-plutonium-6b86198def4516cebe496c9f5fbfbb752) Russia still has a lot of warheads and delivery systems on paperAuthoritative open-source tallies (FAS, SIPRI, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists) put Russia’s total warhead inventory in the thousands and deployed warheads in the low thousands — not tens or hundreds. That’s not trivial. Even if a fraction are degraded, the raw numbers are large. Federation of American Scientistshttps://fas.org/publication/nuclear-notebook-russia-2025/3) Maintenance problems can reduce readiness — and there are signs of aging systemsIndependent analysts note some Russian delivery systems and components are older and that sustaining them is becoming harder. If key factories, test facilities, or logistics chains are degraded (by sanctions, loss of technicians, or budget cuts), that will reduce the number of ready-to-fire warheads and missiles. But reduced readiness ≠ no capability. (nantes university but the ads on the article are unreal)4) Why “functionally non-nuclear” is a stretchReserve and storage: A lot of warheads sit in central storage and can be refurbished or re-assigned if needed — that elasticity matters. https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forcesIndustrial base: Russia still runs facilities for warhead production, testing, and refurbishment. They’ve modernized SOME systems. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2025.2507510
(useful indicators to watch)official/tight-leaked US or allied intelligence assessments about Russian warhead readiness (Congressional or DoD summaries);signs of production/rush refurbishment at Russian facilities (sat imagery, supply-chain reporting);sudden public admission by Russia of decertifying types or withdrawing systems;increases in visible exercises that demonstrate operational readiness (or, conversely, cancelled launches/tests).Watch for any of these in open sources or leaks — they’d be red flags that covert material movement is underway:spikes in guarded rail/air movements to/from Mayak or other nuclear sites (sat imagery analysts report this);unusual cargo manifests or sudden rerouting of shipments to third-party ports;credible leaks/insider testimony about “unaccounted-for” plutonium loads;detection of undeclared radiological signatures at border crossings or ports;unexplained requests by Russian entities to buy special nuclear-grade shipping containers, chemicals for conversion, or exotic machining equipment.
Key findings (each with a short read & source)Visible site activity and upgrades at multiple Russian nuclear and missile facilities.Satellite imagery analysts (Planet/Maxar coverage aggregated by outlets) have reported new construction, hardened bunkers, roadworks and other activity at sites tied to Russia’s nuclear forces.Russia’s formal termination steps for the plutonium-disposal agreement removes transparency constraints..Maritime behavior patterns that enable covert transfers are increasingly documented (AIS manipulation, “going dark”).Multiple maritime-analytics firms and NGOs have documented patterns of AIS spoofing, vessels “going dark,” sudden route changes.. That’s the exact toolkit you’d expect to see if someone wanted to move sensitive cargo covertly by sea.https://sanctionssos.com/expert-guidance/f/sanctions-at-sea-ais-manipulationSatellite work has previously exposed clandestine arms transfers between Russia and partners , but recent reporting shows a lull.Open-source satellite analysts have documented Russia–North Korea maritime transfer patterns in the past. Analysts can and do find discrete transfer events when they look; the fact there’s a lull now doesn’t mean capability is gone. It means covert transfer activity is cyclical and detectable if you have the right imagery/timestamps. https://www.nknews.org/pro/satellite-imagery-points-to-lull-in-north-korea-russia-arms-smuggling-operation/Mayak and other nuclear industrial sites remain active and are complex operational centers — yet production of weapons-grade material ceased decades ago; plutonium stocks exist in storage and processing pools.Mayak historically produced plutonium and today still handles many strategic radiological activities (tritium, Pu-238). The facility and the broader industrial base are plausible origin points for movement of “excess” materials — but moving weapons-usable plutonium is logistically, legally, and detectably hard.
Ok kids I wrote this huge thing and had to chop it to shit to make it fit and gloss over my repetitions.But I just want to talk about gang stalking russian nukes and jerking off to a nuclear free russia.Fuel my obsession? Gimmeh fap materials?
>>64448730COCK... ok there was sources but I decided it can be googled by a mongoloid. Sorry, man this got hacked for the character limit!
>>64448695kill ai sloppers
>>64448734We'll just buy up their nukes for pennies after they collapse.
>>64448738Ok YOU edit down 7 and a half pages. This does it fast. And no, I wrote it.
>>64448741Why not run nuke plants for 3rd world? We just own all the shit? It's still usable material if degraded some.
It's enough to piss off the pope; /k is actually doing something diggin up this ussr/russia/nuke material and getting attention for it and I take a shortcut because I'm a terrible writer and autist, and this TOURIST comes along bitching.Try finding intel for us.
https://map.safecast.org/https://www.gmcmap.com/https://radmon.org/index.phphttps://nucleus.iaea.org/sites/diif/Pages/interactive-map.aspxNuclear detection maps are limited; russia seems "unforthcoming" with data
https://desuarchive.org/k/thread/64312521/I believe the last submarine thread (great work by other anons)
https://www-libozersk-ru.translate.goog/pbd/Mayak60/link/260.htm?_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wappMayak material, likely sources and storage of weapon materials related.
more soviet sub disasters becauseRUSSIA + WATER = DISASTER
>>64448846FARK forgot link:https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000078940.pdf
https://www.proatom.ru/modules.php?name=TopicsRusian sourced material, leaky as shit. Occasionally you'll find shit like "Oh I tell: whole of accident because Sergei drunk AGAIN and valve #4454 is his job ok and he fall alseep!" and realize this motherfucker is talking about the cause of a major incident lol.
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB430/Chernyaev%201973%20final%20PDF%20version.pdfThis guy was a huge policy guy but also he oversaw a LOT of weapons productions facilities modernized and opened.
>>64448738here is another one to ruin your faggot day
>>64448874Makes me wish for a fallout ripoff with mutated Russian orcs riding around in coal powered lada tanks covered in spikes as they worship camp putinnna (destroyerer of all roes) and camp Prigzhino (man of a thousand faces)You roam the apocalyptic world of foes, once a great empire but now walled off by big steel walls on all sides.Behind the walls it is even worse the orcs tell each other, behind the walls are the lands of the evil HATOR!
>>64449043Warhammer will do it or a fan will.I like this crowd source thing like during San Burnadino, 4chan was tracking both the feds AND the suspects when nobody knew anything about either. There is still power here and nuke hunting is a total thrill.
>>64449043On another note, check out Blood Bowl games lol I have pt 2 the video game online but there is even tabletop.Why isn't /k wargaming the current things with 40k?
Shit re-reading it looks like some links got dropped and I deleted the original.I am a cert tard.Oh well there is enough. DeepL is my translator btw so if I fucked something on that end I completely avoid blame and point to them.
anti-AI faggot can stick this up his ass too; it's on topic and I rather like it. Guesses on the pistol as well?
>>64449043>Makes me wish for a fallout ripoff with mutated Russian orcs riding around in coal powered lada tanks covered in spikes as they worship camp putinnna (destroyerer of all roes) and camp Prigzhino (man of a thousand faces)>You roam the apocalyptic world of foes, once a great empire but now walled off by big steel walls on all sides.>Behind the walls it is even worse the orcs tell each other, behind the walls are the lands of the evil HATOR!Just reskin Gorkamorka or Gaslands. Unless you're lazy and want vidya.
>>64448719>unexplained requests by Russian entities to buy special nuclear-grade shipping containers,You mean like a nuclear flask? Can Russia not manufacture those domestically? I know their industry was a mess even before the sanctions but as I understand it the typical nuclear flash is basically just an insanely stout metal crate lined with a few inches of lead. That seems like a 19th century engineering challenge to me even if it wouldn't be as stylish as a magnox flask or something.
>>64450360Look at the state of them. Honestly it's the moderator/booster mechanism of hydrogen bombs, the fission primer.That and the pure fission cores being suspect after much longer periods, fuck they leak like a seive as is when new.
And 10 year even spotty Google Earth is ok for spotting active and latent facilities
>>64449175>Why isn't /k wargaming the current things with 40k?because we're doing it with SPECTRE and Asymmetric Warfare. Although the way things are going AK-47 Republic seems more and more likely.
>>64450605I don't see much WARNO or CMNO sims posted when people talk about like an AA scenario, that used to be common.Hey happy halloween week anon!
>>64450605As Rule The Waves would be about fuckin pointless wouldn't it lol?Well here is more shit...https://www.scribd.com/document/767930019/Medical-Management-of-Radiation-Accidents-CRC-Press-Igor-a-Gusev-A-K-Gus%CA%B9kova-Fred-a-Mettler-2001I didn't think it'd be this slow, hope night /k is into this! Interesting to me.
they have so many failed tests recently that i have to wonder if they've been trying to repurpose old warheads or manufacture new. either way, i think their true 'deployed' number isn't even enough to actually attempt a counter-value at this point.
>>64451257Counter force. With few nukes against a larger opponent, terrorism is the only way, so you hit cities and population centers.Counter force is for nations that have counter value on an even keel or at the advantage, nations with some kind of parity will attack each other's military much more exclusively.
>>64448695How'd they make so much plutonium?
>>64454363Mayak and Seversk and City (number something I forgot 322?) did most of it from secondary reactors or so they say, there is a level of bullshit but it comes down to this isn't an unbelievable number.
>>64454363https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16096501/Some is kept in Strategic Rivers.
faggot AI slop thread top to bottom
>>64451257I'm guessing its to skirt import regulations from having to be brought in as a sporter. With that said though, if its being brought in as a pistol, then it's legally a pistol and a stock cannot be affixed. Who knows if that would actually be enforced though. I contacted Atlantic last may asking about the legality of putting a stock on it. They never responded, which is a shame because I likely would have bought it by now.
>>64448714>4) Why “functionally non-nuclear” is a stretchI think the more logical question than "Does Russia have working nukes at all?" is "Does Russia have enough nukes and the right kind of delivery devices to withstand a US/NATO conventional first strike with MAD intact?" and the answer is anybody's guess.Warheads in known stockpiles don't necessarily mean a lot if all their launch capable aircraft and silos are wrecked in the opening volley. Just because Tu-95s can still fly doesn't make them a viable counter attack vector when NATO is flying Desert Storm tier tempos.
>>64448714Wow a voice of reason on /k/?
>>64458168How many Russian nuclear submarines are there ?
>>64448695why a re hoholitas such huge whores?
>>64458765In ideal conditions, 16. So roughly 8 would be out at sea while the other 8 would be docked up.But bare in mind that US submarine doctrine for the past 45 years has been about being able to tail them with at least 1 hunter sub at all times. A conventional attack against Russia's nuclear triad would almost assuredly begin with every Russian SSBN at sea being sunk.
