The 6th one. Talk about Russian submarines, the nuclear military, all that shit. Someone probably has a link to the first 5.
>For speeds above about eight knots, the BOREY Class hybrid propulsion system uses a single-shaft steam turbine plant, the GTZA-9VM, rated at 50,000 shaft horsepower, the same system installed on all AKULA Class (Russian submarine Project 971) SSNs. The acronym GTZA abbreviates - and is translated as - "main turbine gear assembly" which indicates BOREY and AKULA Class submarines have the same design two-stage planetary reduction gear. >For patrol mode and for low-speed transits, the BOREY uses a 5,500 horsepower (hp) dc motor, exactly the same hp rating as the PG-141 dc propulsion motor installed on all KILO Class Russian diesel submarines. Use of this turbo-electric mode eliminates the acoustic vulnerability that planetary reduction gear associated noise represents at low speeds. https://pub10.bravenet.com/forum/static/show.php?usernum=774301397&frmid=32&msgid=1356633
> the BOREY – and probably the YASEN - have two ATUs (Automated Turbo-Generator Units), the Russian term for Ship's Service Turbo-Generators: (SSTGs) rated at 3500 kW (4700 hp) each, it is probable that during TE mode operations, the rectified electrical output of only one ATU will power the PG-141 while the other ATU will provide the submarine's electrical requirements; hence, no more than 4700 hp will be available for electrical propulsion.> the maximum submerged speed capability of the BOREY Class Russian SSBN in the TE propulsion mode with power provided by a single, fully-loaded ATU will be about 15 knots while the YASEN Class Russian SSN – operating in the TE mode with similar power restrictions – will be about 16 knots. A more probable maximum speed in the TE mode - which would require only half-loading of one 3500 kW (4700 hp) ATU would be 11 knots for the BOREY (2300 hp) and 12 knots for the YASEN (2500 hp).https://www.iusscaa.org/articles/brucerule/capabilities_of_the_russian_nuclear_submarine_hybrid_propulsion_system.htm
> Project 885/885M YASEN Class Russian SSGN secondary propulsion system – not to be confused with the PG-141 dc motor component of the hybrid (turbo-electric - turbine-reduction)) main propulsion system - will employ ring-motor technology to reduce the acoustic detectability of the secondary system which has a maximum speed capability of 4.5 knots. >Back-up power for operation of this system can be provided by an ADH-1000B 1000 kW diesel generator, a design based on the 8DM-21 system produced by the Ural Diesel Motor Plant. The ADH-1000B also is used by BOREY Class Russian SSBNs.https://www.iusscaa.org/articles/brucerule/acoustic_detectability_of_project_885885m_class_russian_ssgn_secondary_propulsion_system.htm
nuclear power is hard
>>64625001https://desuarchive.org/k/thread/63053811/https://desuarchive.org/k/thread/63104003/https://desuarchive.org/k/thread/63235460/https://desuarchive.org/k/thread/64284335/https://desuarchive.org/k/thread/64312521/Prior threads. Also there was nearly a K-431 incident (to my understanding, which is admittedly mostly based on these threads) on the USS Ohio, I'll dig up the info if the thread gets some traction. Grain of salt warning, it comes from wikipedia talk pages of retired submariners, but if anything I think it makes it more genuine.
>>64625395>nearly a K-431 incident (to my understanding, which is admittedly mostly based on these threads) on the USS OhioPost it. Knowers tend to frequent these threads. I don't recall anything like that, but I'm genuinely curious what you heard.>t. knower
>>64625393Only the fission part, the power generation part is easy.
>>64625406Here we go. Also I was mistaken, it was the Florida, not the Ohio.
There's probably a lot of stories like that that aren't written down. Someone in the first thread talked about Dresdan-1 being a piece of shit chronically fuel damaged reactor. The difference is we know when America shat over the fence line. Russia had a whole Siberia to fuck up
>>64625446Plausible, although even if the RO hadn't been paying attention I'm pretty sure that the reactor would have scrammed itself before anything got too fucked up. Scramming obviously wasn't an option for K-431.
>>64625406>>t. knowerObvious Bechtel shill o b v i o u s.
>>64625001didn't bongistan say they need to cancel their nuclear sub program because they are too dumb and poor to operate nuclear subs even though missile subs are their only way to launch nukes?
I'm gonna translate some reports on Mayak from Zhores Medvedev. He's the same guy who reported the Kyshytym Disaster to the west.Wikipedia(or whoever they and everyone else mentioning that source) say his reports of how bad Kyshtym 1957 was were exaggerated compared to what actually happened. Increasingly after everything we've dug up I'm starting to think his reports on that were accurate and it was the declassified shit that was downplaying the fuckup. I've heard some a couple insiders the INES keeps considering moving Kyshtym to a Level 7 as more info comes to light. But I don't have THAT book on hand so I'm doing the other one where he talks about what happened in 1948 and 1949
>>64625393No. It's just very detailed. Russians struggle with being thorough.
>>64625428Nonense comrade, Andreev Bay make many fission without even ask, using scraps and wastes, is of great success
>>64628564Tomorrow
>>64625001I'm curious about what that white stuff is running down the conning tower in o/p's pic.
Russian nuclear submarine design is frankly a history of cope. Rather than producing ridiculously efficiency minmaxxed designs like the US was doing they were always trying to upend the meta doing things like VERY FAST SUBMARINE GOING AT INCREDIBLE HIGH SPEED and those ridiculous liquid bismuth cooled reactors that needed to be cycled at all times so that the liquid fucking metal doesn't go solid fucking up the entire thing. In the end the benefits were never worth it or the whole idea was just fucking retarded. And the list goes on, in other engineering projects besides submarines too. Third worlders often gloat about these as if they were some lost wonders of engineering but they were simply not good and the Russians just wasted money on this shit where in the West these things were also considered but eventually just thrown into trash at pre design stage. The Soviet Union was simply never as technologically and intellectually advanced as their supposed "peers".
>>64628496Looks cozy, can i swim there?
>>64631251>white stuff is running down the conning towerIt's the navysub is full of seamen
>>64628496That's Norilisk. Which funnily enough was the city Mayak workers were allowed to spend their off-time in.
>The construction of Chelyabinsk-40 began long before a sufficient quantity of uranium had been accumulated for its work. In the industrial zone of this centre it was necessary to build underground a one hundred thousand kilowatt reactor, a large radiochemical plant for the separation of plutonium and the generation of uranium, a plant to produce plutonium metal in half spheres, and the waste disposal facilities for products with high and medium radioactivity and many other subsidiary manufactures. A settlement for, at that time, 25 to 30,000 inhabitants, a thermal electricity power station and other facilities were planned to be built about 10 kilometres from the industrial zone. A camp for the prisoners and barracks for the soldiers were planned to be built almost next to the industrial zone. The prisoners and military-construction units, together with the MVD troops guarding the convoys, were the first to arrive in this region. Under the MVD system, Chelyabinsk-40 had the code name ‘Construction 859’, but the reactor and radiochemical plant, which were built at the same time, were knownas ‘Combine No.817’.>The nearest reserves of prisoners and special deportees were to be found in the industrial areas of Chelyabinsk. It was precisely from here, on the order of Beria, that the first 10,000 prisoners were transferred to Kyshtym, in July 1946.14 In October 1946, the prison camp at Chelyabinsk-40 was given its own status. By the end of 1947 it already held 20,376 prisoners under the command of a general in the MVD engineers, M.M. Tsarevsky.15 In 1948, in order to speed up the building work, the overall number of builders, prisoners and soldiers of the MVD engineering regiments reached 45,000 people. Tsarevsky, the head of the camp, which was divided into 11 sections, was at the same time in charge of all the construction of the industrial complex.
>>64633387>There was no real difference between the prisoners and the military-construction units. They both came under one MVD department – Industrial Construction. Both contingents were formed from former Soviet prisoners of warand repatriated workers with experience of mining and construction work in German camps. One of those who helped build Combine No.817, AnatolyVyshimirsky, testified 40 years later>‘I served in the army in Sverdlovsk in the tank training regiment . . . In 1946, a battalion was formed from the soldiers and sent to the city of Kyshtym in Chelyabinsk region. Basically, it was formed from those who lived in occupied territory during the war. Among them were participants in the war. To be precise, we were all people of the second class, so to speak, because the irremovable stain of German occupation lay upon us. . . When we arrived at Kyshtym we found other battalions of military-construction workers already there. They were also former prisoners of war who had not been allowed to go home after they were freed from German camps.>Many of them were no longer young; they had fought in the Military actions in Khasan, Khalkingol (Far East and Mongolia in 1938-1939), in the Finnish campaign, and even in the Civil War. One thing brought them all together – they had passed through all the circles of the fascist hell. All their guilt consisted in this. . . there werealso many ordinary prisoners there . . . But our conditions differed little from the labour camps. It was as though we were all in one big camp. . .’ .
>>64633396>This picture was confirmed by another witness, Anatoly Semenovich Osipov of the Kalinin region:>‘On 13th May 1946 our military unit (346 OPAB) was formed, and we youngsters, born in 1925-26, were sent in an echelon to the Urals to Kyshtym station. There, companies and battalions were formed from the many echelons. All the military units were codified. Our regiment was called V/Unit 05/08. . . We military-construction workers were the first to begin digging the vast pit for the foundation of “establishment No.1” under the building of then unknown construction. Then theprisoners built the walls and inside of this building. . . Frontline soldiers who had earlier been freed from German camps were immediately sorted on the basis of who they had been liberated by. There were four categories: those liberated by theAmericans, by the English, or by Soviet troops, and those who had not formerly been under occupation. Those liberated by the Americans were considered most unfortunate, followed by those liberated by the English, then by the Russians, and finally there were the “clean” ones. Conditions in the barracks and food and clothing corresponded to these categories. . .’
>The testimony of prisoners who worked on the ‘establishment’ during this period paints a similar picture. I.P. Samokhvalov testified:>‘I lived and studied in Chelyabinsk. I was arrested when I was in the 8th class, and still not 16 years old. I was tried under Article 58 paragraph 10, and given five years for so-called anti-Sovietism. To begin with I was sent to the “death colony” in Karabash. At the end of 1946, we were sent to the Kyshtym zone. . . I was allocated to camp No.9 in the working zone, where units A, B and C were being built. When the buildingswere finished, vast circular capacities were installed in them. . . .I was freed there . . .but, in September 1949, they began to discharge us freed ones, both family men and singles, in cattle wagons, equipped with searchlights and in convoy. And we set off towards the East. . . We arrived at port Nakhodka. There, the whole echelon boarded the steamer Soviet Latvia, and sailed across the Sea of Okhotsk for Magadan. We were distributed amongst the different mines. I went to the mine called “Longed-for One”, 600 kilometres from Susumon. . .’>Other camps in the atomic gulag were also established on this basis, in 1946. KB-11, the first camp of prisoners, was established in May 1946 on land near the little town and monastery of Sarovo (the local population was evicted during the war to make way for a factory producing shells for Katyusha rockets). The prisoners were chosen from nearby Mordvinian camps. Here the most secret of the atomic cities, later known as Arzamas-16, was built. By the end of 1947 there were more than 10,000 prisoners in the camp.>VerkhNyevinsky atomic town Sverdlovsk-44, started in 1946, began the industrial separation of uranium isotopes 235 and 238 only after the first Soviet a bomb had been successfully tested in August 1949. At that time the camp held 10000 prisoners. During the period of active work on this centre, in 1950-51, the number of prisoners exceeded 18000.
>>64633407>Every reactor has a tall ventilation stack to disperse into the atmosphere the gaseous products of nuclear fission. Some of these, such as iodine-131, are successfully reduced by the filters. But it is impossible actually to fix inert gases such as kripton-85 and xenon-133 with absorbents of any kind precisely because they are ‘inert’. They are simply dispersed over a wide area via the high ventilation stacks, and, thanks to the short periods of disintegration, they do not accumulate in the atmosphere. In Chelyabinsk-40 the tallest ventilation stack, 151 metres high, was at the radiochemical plant. It emitted into the atmosphere gases and dust from many other long-life radio nuclids, including uranium and plutonium. This chimney almost always emitted yellow smoke containing nitric acid, which is used during the first stage of the processing of ‘burnt’ uranium blocks from the reactor which are dissolved in nitric acid. The yellow smoke killed the trees for many kilometres around the industrial zone. Only prison labourers were used to build what was then the highest chimney in the Soviet Union, 11 metres in diameter at the bottom, and six metres at the top. One person, mentioned earlier, who worked in Chelyabinsk-40, A. S. Osipov, explained why:>‘. . . only “condemned prisoners” with sentences of 10 to 15 years were sent there. Why “condemned men”? They had no insurance. The chimney rocked two to three metres, and there were frequent accidents as workers crashed to their death every day. . .’
>>64633419(This is one of the best sources I've found on this and it's supported by older sources from prior threads)>But the main dangers throughout Chelyabinsk-40 were due to radiation. At that time, the harmful effects of radiation were heavily underestimated, and almost nothing was known of its genetic and carcinogenic effects. The long term effect of radiation was also unknown. Measurement and control of dosages were practically non existent during the first months of operation of the industrial reactor and the radiochemical plant. ‘Nobody knew what kind of irradiation was suffered by the workers and engineers. . .’ In later years, they began to use photo dosimeters – the dose of radiation was fixed by the degree of darkening of the photographic film. The precision of such dosimeters was not high, and the extent of the dose was determined after the event, at the end of the working day, or even once a week. Only high energy external gamma radiation was monitored. Respirator ‘petals’ to protect the lungs from radioactive dust appeared only in 1952. Special ‘Regulations’ on the control of conditions affecting workers’ health in the combine were introduced only in 1949, following several instances of lethal irradiation. Even in 1951, workers in the radiochemical plant were exposed to average doses of 113 ber (biological equivalent of Roentgen) a year. This was 30 times higher than the current maximum permitted dose. Everyone suffered irradiation; prisoners, state workers and senior personnel. According to one of the first doctors to work at the combine, A.K. Guskova, the museum at Chelyabinsk-40 contains I.V. Kurchatov’s photo-casette ‘with a single-day dosage of radiation of 42 r’.(I unfortunately know from a different source the policy in those years was to swap your badge multiple times a day to keep your dose artificially low, and in Kurchatov's case he intentionally did this to take on as much burden away from his boys as possible)
>>64633442>A dosage of 100 Roentgens could cause radiation sickness.>The contamination of all the land around the radiochemical combine was so bad that even the workers who worked outside were in danger. According to Guskova, ‘. . . in 1951, I, together with Dr. G.D. Baisogolov, treated 13 prisoners who had been irradiated, despite having remained in the camp barracks. Three of them were suffering from acute radiation sickness, and one of them had suffered a fatal dose. These people suffered their exposures whilst digging a trench next to the building containing the radiochemical plant. The basic active factor was external gamma-beta-radiation from soil contaminated with nuclides’.(Remember what we found last thread. 4000 deaths from radiation from 1947-1987 at Mayak. That's the Soviet number).>There were many small mishaps and problems during the starting-up period and early weeks of operation of the reactor. The elimination of these problems meant that workers were deliberately exposed to fatal doses of radiation. Personnel suffered a very large number of instances of exposure to radiation during the separation of plutonium in the radiochemical plant. According to the official data ‘. . . 2,089 workers were diagnosed with radiation sickness during the period of establishing plutonium production in the Combine’. The reasons for a good number of these cases of irradiation of workers at the Combine were established in a recent article by Vladislav Larin.(JESUS FUCKING CHRIST THAT'S JUST 1948)
>>64633474>The liquidators of the first catastrophe>The first really serious failure at Chelyabinsk-40 took place in January 1949. It was a failure which developed into a radioactive catastrophe only as a result of a decision taken by the leadership of the Soviet atomic project. The character of the catastrophe, and the reasons for it, remained secret until 1995, and the number of victims remains unknown to this day. But the number of victims among those who fought to contain this disaster was, undoubtedly, higher than at Chernobyl.(If fucking Zhores Medvedev says it, it's probably true. Albeit he contradicts the first statement in a moment)>About 150 tonnes of uranium had been loaded into the first industrial reactor. On 8th June 1948, it was reaching critical mass, and was projected to generate 100,000 kilowatts by 22nd June. These reactors were for making plutonium. They were simpler in construction than the reactors of the next generation, which were built for the generation of electricity. In energy reactors it is essential to generate steam under high pressure. In military reactors water is necessary only for cooling the uranium blocks. The small, cylindrical uranium blocks, 37 mm in diameter and 102.5 mm high, were covered by a thin aluminium casing. They were installed inside aluminium tubes with an external diameter of a little over 40 mm and about 10 metres in height. In turn, these aluminium tubes were placed inside a graphite cladding. The graphite slowed the neutrons during the chain reaction, but did this only in dry conditions. The chain reaction of the fission of uranium-235 begins when the reactor has been loaded with about 150 tonnes of natural uranium.
>However, any statistics for radiation problems affecting prisoners or soldier builders, rather than state personnel, are missing. Prisoners were not given dosimeters and, in this case, there simply were no norms for controlling the total doses of radiation. Nor was there any dosimeter control amongst the inhabitants living along the Techa river, into which poured the fluid emissions from the radiochemical plant. The population living around the industrial zone of Chelyabinsk-40 had no idea what was going on there. This problem came to their attention only after a massive outbreak of disease through radiation sickness amongst the inhabitants of the villages closest to the plant. As recent official reports state: ‘. . . Some 124,000 people living in the floodlands of the Techa river in Chelyabinsk and Kurgansky regions suffered from the radioactive pollution of the river and its banks. 28,000 people suffered from high doses of radiation (up to 170 ber). 935 cases of radiation sickness were recorded. About 8,000 inhabitants from 21 locations were resettled’. This resettlement, however, took place only in 1955. Because the 'establishment’ was top secret, and its secrecy considered the priority during the years from 1948 to 1953, this meant that tens of thousands of inhabitants of the flood plain of the Techa river continued using the river water for everyday purposes, for food, for livestock, for kitchen gardens and other necessities. The Health of the local population was sacrificed for the sake of secrecy.
>>64633486>>64633488Read these two the other way, blame the stupid deletion limit. Second one comes first
>>64633419>a chimney that just fucking spews acid and radioactive gas into the airjesus christ
>Overheating of the uranium blocks, arising from the chain reaction and the accumulation of the fission radionuclides in the blocks, is prevented by water which circulates inside the aluminium tubes. There were 1,124 such tubes in the first reactor, and it contained about 40,000 uranium blocks. During the process of the chain reaction of the fission of uranium-235, the neutrons slowed by the graphite generate plutonium-239 from uranium-238.>The process of accumulating plutonium can go on for more than a year because of the work regime of the reactor. The reactor is constructed in such a way that it is ‘unloaded’ by means of the uranium blocks falling from the bottoms of the tube-canals into the reservoir beneath the reactor. After immersion in water for several weeks in order to disintegrate the short-lived nuclides, the blocks were transferred to the radiochemical plant.>The behaviour of metals and, especially, of aluminium in conditions of high temperatures and powerful neutron irradiation had not, at that time, been subject to long-term experimentation. Therefore, the wetting of the graphite from the leaking aluminium tubes was completely unexpected. Aluminium undergoes severe corrosion in conditions of powerful irradiation, whilst in constant contact with water and graphite at high temperatures. This became obvious after the reactor had been running for five months, so that it was impossible for it to continue working. This was not a local, but a general failure. On 20th January 1949, the reactor was stopped. Stalin was informed about this. For those in charge of the atomic project there were two ways out of the situation: one was safe; the other demanded great human sacrifice. The safe option was simple. They ought to have unloaded the uranium blocks from the reactor, transferring them along the technical canal into the water basin, and then gradually moved them to the radiochemical plant for separation of the already accumulated plutonium.
>>64633504>one was safe; the other demanded great human sacrificeGolly gee I wonder which one the russians picked?
>>64633504>During the breaking of all the blocks, sometimes with the use of active ‘cast-offs’, the thin aluminium cover could become damaged, and such blocks were not fit for secondary use. Nobody could calculate precisely whether enough plutonium had been accumulated in the uranium load in order to prepare at least one bomb. It was important to have some reserves of plutonium. But there were not enough stocks of fresh uranium for a second new load for the reactor. Besides, a complete replacement of all the aluminium tubes was essential. It was proposed to prepare the new tubes with a strong, anodal, anti-corrosive covering, in one of the aircraft factories.>The second, ‘dangerous’ option was to carefully extract all the uranium blocks with special ‘suckers’ from the top of the tubes, or together with the tubes upward into the central operating hall of the reactor. After this it was necessary to extract and sort by hand the undamaged blocks for possible secondary use. The graphite columns, which consisted of big graphite bricks, ought to have been dismantled by hand, dried out, and used again. After the new aluminium pipes with the anti-corrosive covering had arrived it was possible to load the reactor again and bring it up to projected power.
>>64633387>A settlement for, at that time, 25 to 30,000 inhabitantsWhere did they even find the people for these places?Did people just get dragged out of Physics School #17 and sent packing, or did you have some kind of application process?
>>64633513>After five months of operation of the reactor, the uranium blocks were already highly radioactive, equivalent to millions of curies. A large number of radionuclides had already accumulated, which made the blocks hot, with temperatures over 100 degrees centigrade. The isotopes of caesium, iodine, barium and many others were the main sources of gamma radiation. A. K. Kruglov, who was working at Chelyabinsk-40 at the time, noted that ‘it was impossible to extract the blocks without irradiating those doing the work’.30 Kurchatov also understood this. A choice was in prospect: ‘whether to save the people, or to save the uranium load and avoid losses in the production of plutonium. . . As a result of the influence of the top levels of the PGU and of the scientific leaders, it was the second course that was chosen’.31 This decision was taken jointly by Beria, B.L. Vannikov, head of the PGU, his deputy, A.P. Zavenyagin, and I.V. Kurchatov. Vannikov, Zavenyagin and Kurchatov, who were present almost constantly at the site, supervised all the work. Beria received regular reports, and ensured that new aluminium tubes were prepared to time through the aviation industry ministry. It took 39 days for all the work to extract 39,000 uranium blocks – containing 150 tonnes of uranium stuffing – from the reactor. Each block had to be examined visually.
>>64633515lot of veterans and prisoners and suspected traitors because they ended up pows
>>64633522>Efim Pavlovich Slavsky who, in 1949, was the chief engineer of the faulty reactor, and later led the whole Soviet atomic industry for many years, recorded these events in his memoirs. These were published in part in 1997, several years after Slavsky’s death in 1991. He said:>‘. . . it was decided that the task of saving the uranium load (and the production of plutonium) was of the utmost value – by means of the inevitable irradiation of the personnel. From this time, all the male personnel of the establishment, including thousands of prisoners, took part in the operation to remove the channels, and extract the damaged elements from them; 39,000 uranium elements were extracted and transferred by hand. . .’(most of my previous findings on this were sourced to EP Slavsky)>Kurchatov personally took part in this operation. At this time, only he had some knowledge of what was necessary to sort out the defective elements. Only he had experience of the work on the experimental reactor in Laboratory No.2 in Moscow. Slavsky wrote:>‘At that moment, no words of any kind could alter the force of his personal example. Kurchatov was the first to step into the nuclear hell, into the central hall of the failed reactor full of gasified radionuclids. He supervised the dismantling of the damaged channels, and personally examined the damage to the unloaded uranium elements piece by piece. Nobody thought about the dangers then: we simply didn’t know anything. But Igor Vasilevich knew, but he did not surrender to the terrible force of the atom. . .For him, the liquidation of the failure was fatal. He paid a cruel price for our atomic bomb. . .It was fortunate he did not take part to the finish in the sorting out of the elements; if he’d stayed in the hall till the end, we would have lost him then. . .’
>>64633531>It remains unclear from Slavsky’s evidence how long Kurchatov worked in the central hall of the reactor, sorting the uranium elements. The work went on round the clock, in six hour shifts. The dosimeter readings in various parts of the central hall, which was located over the reactor, are not available, possibly because in general they did not work, at least, not regularly. I think that Kurchatov worked no more than two or three shifts. The radioactive danger was too great. But, as Slavsky says, this work turned out to be ‘fatal’ for him. Kurchatov suffered radiation exposure of medium intensity. Radiation exposure does not automatically lead to the development of cancer. It damages all the organism and causes injured ‘radiation ageing’. In the first weeks after such a sub-lethal dose, the basic immune system (the bone marrow) and intestinal functions are damaged. It is difficult to say how long Kurchatov was ill after his courageous, even desperate, action. The events of the beginning of 1949 are, in general, not discussed in all the biographies of Kurchatov. The failures of the industrial reactor are communicated in code: ‘Everything did not always go smoothly, as often happens with something new’.(as I've said, other sources suggest they mucked with radiation badges even on the guys who had them, covering them or replacing them multiple times to get a lower total. I'll finish doing this tomorrow i've got to sleep)
>>64633527Yeah i can imagine them being put to stir the toxic wat and shit, but not as real engineers set to run this hivecity-hortor show?
>>64633203>Norilisk>the city Mayak workers were allowed to spend their off-time in.Christ, did they ever have anything nice happen to them?
>>64633571They probably got to die at some point?
>>64625001One still wonders how the RN got around planning permission for the JASON reactor under Greenwich college>>64628533No, it was one retired Rear Admiral who suggested pulling out of AUKUS and instead fill the resultant capability gap by buying, drumroll please... SSKs and underwater drones.
>monitoring this thread
>>64633203>That's NoriliskNah, that's Karachay, you can see the Mayak site in the background, the "blood" river in Norilsk is also often red but due to Nickel/Copper waste not the unholy sludge that was dumped into the lake>during an unrelated 20k tons oil spill in one of the rivers near Norilsk, a scientist reported that they didn't detect changes in the microbial fauna of the riverbed because there were many accidents in the past and the situation was dire anyway
>>64633571>did they ever have anything nice happen to them?Why should they? Living in Russia is a direct result of bad karma.
>>64633783>somewhere in heaven there's an angel tabulating deeds vs. rads
