woulda worked if they called it do big raid

made the Nips realize they could be hit at home

it got an absolute shitload of chinks killed

>>64878817
not enough

>>64878734
Sent the japs into an almighty panic.
It forced them to keep a greater portion of their aircraft and AAA on the main islands, which they could ill afford to do.
Kind of a bargain really.

>>64878863
>>64878775

This. Was a hell of a morale booster at home too.

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>>64878734
>damaged the light carrier Ryūhō while it was undergoing conversion and prevented its commissioning until the end of the year
>damaged a number of steel works and power plants in Tokyo and Yokohama
>killed ~50 people

I mean, it wasn't nothing, but in purely material terms, it probably wasn't worth risking two fleet carriers and a half-dozen destroyers. The most important outcome of the raid, the fateful attack on Midway and the equally ill-fated invasion of the Aleutians, was more a fortunate accident (as in there was no way that could have been foreseen by the planners).

>>64878817
>it got an absolute shitload of chinks killed

Always a plus!

>>64878863
>Sent the japs into an almighty panic.

This. The raid was mostly symbolic but was a huge morale boost at home and caused the Japs to panic and recall ships, effectively stopping the expansion of the Japanese empire into the Indian ocean. It also motivated the attack on Midway, turning the tide of the war.

>>64878734
God.
>>64878817
>Chinks?
Eat shit, casual retard.

Japan's second phase of operations, which involved rejecting plans to capture Ceylon or advance into Australia and instead carrying out the Midway operation, had been decided before the Doolittle Raid.

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>>64879007

My impression was that while they had already settled on a Southern (Pacific) strategy, the Japanese leadership was still debating whether or not to launch a second attack on Pearl Harbor (there was actually attempted follow-up attack in March using flying boats where the pilots wound up bombing a high school thinking that it was CINCPAC Headquarters) up until the Doolittle Raid, after which Midway was chosen.

>>64878962
china is stronger than your shithole

>>64879069
implessive

>>64878967
What are you talking about

>>64878734
>Do a little raid
>Make a little love
>Get down tonight!
>Get down tonight!

>>64878863
^This^

Japanese organizations (all of them) had face to consider. Loss of face in serious face culture is disastrous, especially for whoever is designated scapegoat.

Upon dolittling a bit of reading, apparently the raid is what gave Yamato the political support to launch his plan to take Midway and the Aleutian Islands. Otherwise the Imperial Army was arguing to brace for an impending American counter attack.

>>64879069
Very implessive, please to purchase XRN-4627 HUGE FLAME (fireprofessor not included)

>>64879308
>face
the word nowadays is "optics"

Attacks by US aircraft carrier task forces on Japanese military bases and convoy in the central Pacific and eastern New Guinea had been repeated since around February 1942, causing concern for the Japanese naval leadership.

>>64879350
Not the same degree of consequences. Having bad optics may get you fired or canceled. Having loss face can force you to commit sudoku.

>>64878962
pedo pajeet picture

>>64879647
the only good south asian is a dead south asian.

>>64878734
it was a moral thing. showed the nips we could hit them and gave us propaganda about bombing Tokyo

>>64879069
yuro time
yuro post

>>64878967
hes talking about the japanese reprisal campaign in response to the doolittle raid that killed somewhere around a quarter million chinks, ya idjit

>>64879069
I

>>64879307
underrated

>>64879660
>the only good south asian is a dead south asian.
The only good [Asian] is a dead Asian.

>>64879069
Objectively true if you live in india

>>64878734
Operation MO: invade Port MOrsby
Operation AL: invade the ALeutian
Operation MI: invade MIdway
Had me rolling my fucking eyes at that one I tell ya

>>64878967
>Doesn't remember the retaliatory attacks to the Chinese who protected Dolittle
Well most people wouldn't even notice, who even counts them at this point?

>>64878739
This man should lead all future efforts where army planes take of from navy ships

>>64878817
Yeah dude all those chinks were gonna get blowjobs and free sushi if it weren’t for white dudes in a couple of bombers…

>>64879007
>>64879058
Can anyone educate me as to the real potential japs had to invade Australia. Like I could absolutely see them pillaging northern coastal shit but that would be very ineffective. Were they actually thinking of invading population centers!? Who the fuck came up with such a retarded idea while they were bogged down in China? I’d say IJA wouldn’t want to pour manpower into something like that but then again some of the choices both the IJA and IJN made boggle my fucking mind.

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>>64881813
You mean morale buddy. It was for our morale. Now, when we nuked those gooks TWICE it was for moral reasons.

>>64882202
are there any resources in north ausfalia? Japan was oil and mineral, especially iron, starved

Before MacArthur decided to push the defense line to Port Moresby, the abandonment of areas outside of Australia's eastern metropolitan areas was also considered.
The Japanese Army, which was planning a major operation in China after the Pacific front had stabilized, rejected the Australian operation plan, which would have required a force of more than 10 divisions.

After much discussion, the Japanese Army and Navy leadership agreed on a plan to cut off communication between Australia and the United States, and after the completion of the Midway operation, they planned to invade Fiji and Samoa.
The advance on Guadalcanal and the construction of an airfield were part of this plan.

>>64882300
Damn imagine having this much hopium in your senior military leadership.

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>>64878734
>dolittle raid
>no talking animals

>>64882613
But anon there were plenty of japs involved.

>>64879573
most of the time, samurai committed sudoku because they're fired or cancelled, i.e. because the alternative (which applies to both cases) would be losing their career and wealth, and going back to being a 9to5 rice-farming wagie

>>64878734
his name was Thach and he invented "The Weave".

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thach_Weave

>>64878863
This. It stalled out Japanese momentum and let the US get the initiative. About a month later, Japan would suffer their first real loss, the Battle of the Coral Sea.

>>64883345
>real loss, the Battle of the Coral Sea
if the Americans traded an escort carrier and seventy planes for a fleet carrier and seventy planes, they would call it a draw or find some way to call it a win

calling it a "strategic loss" for Japan is American cope, and furthermore denudes the term "Pyrrhic victory" of its meaning. in most cases, battle outcomes are not assessed based on how easily or otherwise an army can regenerate those losses. doing so would be absurd, as it would for example recast Cannae as a "strategic loss" for Hannibal.

>>64885233
But anon it was their first real loss in terms of personnel, airframes, and vessels. And more importantly the first time the USN was able to inflict anything like that.

>>64885652
I understand the sentiment, but it's not so much a loss as either a "Pyrrhic victory", or more prosaically, a "victory with heavy casualties"

>>64885233
I don't believe it is a sound idea to decide if it was a strategic loss or victory purely based on attrition.

>>64885698
whether a battle is
>strategic
or
>tactical
and which is more important in the general description of its outcome is itself debatable.
Take Pearl Harbor for instance. Tactically an overwhelming victory. But strategically, was Japan bringing America into the war a good move?

>but that's "grand" strategy, not strategy
so is force generation, which is the main argument that Coral Sea ought to be described as a so-called "strategic victory"

confining ourselves to battle objectives, both sides were actually trying to deplete the strength of each other's navies. Japan was hoping to shape the battlefield for a Kantai Kessen, and America was hoping to knock out Japanese carriers and capital ships. the Pacific naval war was in that stage of war in which depleting the other side's fleet battle units is the primary objective.
in which case, Coral Sea was still a Japanese strategic victory; took out 1 out of only 4 American fleet carriers in exchange for an obsolete escort carrier mainly used for delivering aircraft

if the Americans had traded Langley for Akagi you bet they would have called it a victory, strategic or otherwise

>>64882202
They could have landed but not held ground. Australia got up to a peak strenght of 476k men by mid-1942. It took close to 2 weeks to send anything from Japan to Northern Australia, where no sizeable port existed then.
Anyone landing there would be left alone by the australian army because it would just be a drain for Japan's logistics while being unable to reach the East Coast.

>>64885785
>confining ourselves to battle objectives, both sides were actually trying to deplete the strength of each other's navies.
You only stated one objective.

>if the Americans had traded Langley for Akagi you bet they would have called it a victory, strategic or otherwise
Not if the Japanese took Hawaii as a result.

>>64882202
Japan couldnt take Guadalcanal against US marines with a 3:1 advantage. No way they are landing 2 million soldiers to take Australia.

>>64885233
>calling it a "strategic loss" for Japan is American cope
The entire point of their operation was to achieve a major strategic objective and they were forced to abandon that objective, aborting an invasion. How can you not see that as a strategic loss?
>they would call it a draw or find some way to call it a win
Perhaps calling it a tactical victory?

>>64887267
>How can you not
As explained in the post

>>64886568
>You only stated one objective.
That is ESL-tier parsing
>Hawaii
None of the objectives there approached Hawaii in importance

>>64887339
>As explained in the post
It wasn't.

>That is ESL-tier parsing
No its pointing out you were only looking at one objective.

>None of the objectives there approached Hawaii in importance
It was a relatively extreme example taking advantage of the hypothetical to point out you were ignoring everything but attrition. Once again you use objectives, but only mentioned attrition rather than averting the invasion which was probably what >>64883345 was referring to.

>>64888064
>It wasn't.
It was.

>No its pointing out you were only looking at one objective.
Really, ESL? You really need me to spell this one out?

>It was a relatively extreme example
Oh so now you're allowed to use hypotheticals and not be called out on it, but I'm not.

>Once again you use objectives, but only mentioned attrition rather than averting the invasion
For reasons explained in the post.
Go back and read.

>>64879307
>get down ignite!

>>64888148
>Oh so now you're allowed to use hypotheticals and not be called out on it, but I'm not.
You weren't called out for using hypotheticals. Expanding the vague hypothetical to point something out isn't maligning the use of hypotheticals. Its calling you myopic.

>For reasons explained in the post.
You ranted about Kantai Kessen, importance of strategic vs tactical, and Pyrrhic victories. Only thing that could be considered a reason was your rant on Kantai Kessen, which only covered one belligerent. You didn't explain how it implemented Kantai Kessen(iirc carriers were supposed to take part in the decisive battle not focus on attrition before the battle) and invoked the term to back your point. On the American side it was just vague idea of the sole importance of sinking capital ships which reads as an attempt to avoid looking at the situation. Its not hard to find opinions that the invasion was more important than the relative losses, so its not a given that attrition was the only priority.

War Plan Orange - Miller
>Since the beginning of the war the navy’s second-priority assignment (after holding the U.S.-Hawaii-Midway line) had been to maintain sea and air links with Australia by erecting a chain of island bases and patrolling and raiding along the line. The mission had culminated in the May 1942 Battle of the Coral Sea, which thwarted Japanese penetration toward Australia and guaranteed that the communications line would be held.
Kaigun - Parshall
>After its strategic successes in Southeast Asia, the navy turned, for the balance of 1942, to the second phase of its plans: the elimination or neutralization of those strategic points from which the Allies could launch counteroffensives against the periphery of the Japanese conquests. Here, for the first time, the Japanese navy met with serious reverses, first at the Coral Sea, when Japan was forced to abandon its effort to isolate Australia (though tactically, the battle was a draw).

>>64889421
mistake -Kaigun was Peattie

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the real damage was in the mind

>>64882193
get a job