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So what exactly was the controversy behind the initial Millennial Challenge? Was Van Riper in the wrong, and why? From my brief overview of it, seems like his strategy was kosher. So why is it considered cheating or unfair?

It seems impossible to get an unbiased answer and I don't know how prepared I am to read dry military documents to get an objective view, considering jargon, context
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Teleporting motorcycle messengers!!!
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>>65052282
fuck off you lazy faggot, go read.
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the concept of immediate unjammable communication is laughable

telegraphs never existed
hardwired phones have never existed
email and social media dont exist
nobody in Iran has ever communicated electronically in the past month
every message in Ukraine and Russia is spoken foot messenger to foot messenger like ancient Greece

as I said this guy was using science fiction methods and was totally wrong

im joking obviously but opfor should act provocatively and in bad taste at all times for maximum learning
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>>65052282
It’s not so much what he did as it is why he did it.
If he had just said “yes, motorcycle messengers that move at light speed, and Boston whalers that carry anti ship missiles are unrealistic. But they could be used as stand-ins for clever and/or future technology” he would have been fine.

But he didn’t do that. Instead, he abused flaws in the system, and the fact that it was an exercise because he wanted to “win” and when the referees told him to knock it the fuck off, he ran to the media bawling like a little bitch going “SEE! SEE! THIS PROVES THAT IRAN WOULD TOTALLY BEAT THE US! I WON I WON I WON!”
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>>65052294
I did and it only lead to more questions. You could just say you have nothing useful to contribute.
>>65052302
>>65052292
I don't understand
>>
>Teleporting motorcycles never existed
>Silkworms on speedboats never existed
>As a wargame it was flawed from the start because of the silly constraints of the simulation
>Van Riper was right to quit after being scripted
>Van Riper was wrong to cry to the press after quitting
>Lessons from MC02 were taken to heart in the years since, which is part of why the US has suffered astoundingly few losses against Iran
/thread
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>>65052348
I’m still waiting for his magic speedboats with their missions bigger than the boats themselves to show up.
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>>65052349
>>65052348
Wasn't it a computer issue and not a deliberate attempt to make teleporting messengers?
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>>65052351
>Lessons from MC02
What lessons? Current us strategy seems awfully similar to last few expeditionary conflicts
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>>65052360
It was a decision made before the start of the wargame that REDFOR's communications would not be intercepted or jammed. Motorcycle messengers are one example of unjammable communications among several. The computer simulation wasn't designed to handle communications delay, so REDFOR personnel approximated it themselves by waiting a period of time before sending their communications. The teleporting motorcycles meme was a fabrication to discredit Van Riper after he went to the press.
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Taking advantage of wargame jank to "win" isnt training.
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>>65052365
Surprise attacking rather than giving them a 24 hour ultimatum and being surprise attacked themselves, for one.
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>>65052360
Sure, maybe for that specific example. But it’s not the only one.

There was supposed to be an aspect of the exercise that involved an amphibious assault. But obviously, you can’t have a MEU’s worth of marines sitting around in the desert for a month while the generals sit making imaginary strikes against imaginary defenses. So as part of the exercise, the scenario went “okay, even though we only started three days ago real time, we’ll pretend that air strikes have taken out most of the shore defenses so we can move on to the amphibious phase (because in any actual war time situation, they’d spend weeks or months doing preparatory strikes before invading)” and Van Riper went “NUH UH! I STILL HAVE DEFENSES SO I SINK ALL THE SHIPS OFFSHORE! TAKE THAT MARINES!”
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>>65052388
When have we ever done that? How is that a lesson we lear
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heliograph
I never see people mention these as a possible solution. Only thing I can think an army could deploy to interfere could be smoke screens.
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>>65052405
>When have we ever done that?
Approximately a month ago.
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>>65052400
>and Van Riper went “NUH UH! I STILL HAVE DEFENSES SO I SINK ALL THE SHIPS OFFSHORE! TAKE THAT MARINES!”
Actually he went "Okay, I still have air defenses so I'll shoot down the assaulting V-22s." Then he was told he was only allowed to use his air defenses against magical future F-22s that they couldn't see. So then he said "Fine, there's only a few places these V-22s can land so I'll just aim my Scuds at them and launch while they're disembarking." Then he was told he couldn't do that because REDFOR is supposed to lose, which is when he ragequit.
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>USN training exercise
>can't shut down shipping lanes for it, too much money would be lost
>CSGs instead hug the coast to stay out of the way of shipping
>at the start of the exercise, the CSG gets isekai'ed to right off the coast of not!Iran
>Van Ripper spawn camps it with a fleet of literal speedboats sitting right where the CSG get isekai'ed
>carrying AShMs that would destroy them to fire, have no targeting equipment, and various other impossibilities
>gets cockslapped by the USN leadership when he gets told that's unrealistic, and a CSG isn't going to just sail into the middle of "civilian" boats to begin with, much less operate that close to the coast anyway
>Van Ripper throws a further bitch fit when he's told that he's not allowed to just deploy bioweapons at the expected landing sites ahead of time because IRL, they'd just wait it out instead of pushing through but time constraints on the exercise prevent actually waiting
>goes and scream to the press and Congress about how the USN is big meanie heads and how he actually won, despite the entire point of the exercise not even being a strategic test, which can be handled at the tabletop level instead of requiring millions of dollars being spent daily, but instead a functional test of US mil software and coordination ability between different branches
>poisons discussion for decades
>USN learns the real lesson of the Millennium Challenge, which is that REDFOR commanders need to be chosen to be people who aren't ego invested in winning but instead team players who can understand what they're supposed to be doing
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>>65052302
Yes, red team is supposed to fight dirty, but red team isn't supposed to ragequit when blue team resets the exercise. Rewinding the scenario isn't cheating, it's just testing if it plays out differently with the benefit of hindsight.
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>>65052348
>he abused flaws in the system
muh fuckin' khokhols abused the flaws in russian tanks to explode them, not fair, cheating
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>>65052480
>Van Ripper spawn camps it with a fleet of literal speedboats sitting right where the CSG get isekai'ed
He's given 24 hours notice by the CSG and attacks 6 hours before the deadline.
>carrying AShMs that would destroy them to fire, have no targeting equipment, and various other impossibilities
The AShMs they were carrying were the same ones that Iran actually puts on the speedboats in real life, Iranian copies of Chinese copies of French Exocets. Antiship missiles of the era did not have the ability to network with a ship's fire control because it was expected that they'd be operating beyond the radar horizon.
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>>65052500
He did not quit over the scenario being reset, he quit over being forced to follow a script where REDFOR was not allowed to present any meaningful resistance.
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>>65052349
>i dont understand why teleporting bike messengers and silkworm missiles being fired from fucking RHIBs is controversial
Either you're deliberately being retarded or actually fucking retarded
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>>65052529
>He's given 24 hours notice by the CSG and attacks 6 hours before the deadline.
What exactly is your point, retard? You'll notice how the CSGs in Iran have been operating in the middle of the open ocean where they'd be able to see and sink the fleet of speedboats swarming, if they managed to even find them before running out of gas.
>Antiship missiles of the era did not have the ability to network with a ship's fire control because it was expected that they'd be operating beyond the radar horizon.
Blindly pitbulling AShMs is a bold move, cotton. Especially if you're not already hugging the CSG but instead need to find them behind the actual horizon, and have to convince the people who're responsible for firing it to wear fucking life jackets and swim back to the coast because people who aren't retarded can understand there's a slight difference between the left, which is what Van Ripper was using, and the right which is an actual Iranian speedboat.
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>>65052550
>the left, which is what Van Ripper was using
[citation needed]
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>>65052585
Go read the fucking interviews and reports, not to mention Van Ripper's book. He strapped them to civilian fishing boats, which are going to look a lot more like, and displace a lot more like, the the left then the high-speed hullformed, dual engine giant fucking thing on the right.
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>>65052282
>So what exactly was the controversy behind the initial Millennial Challenge?
A bunch of time, resources and money was dedicated to testing some new concepts (netcentric warfare and other boring stuff). It was also involving multiple branches so it was a pretty complex ordeal and you couldn't just reschedule it.
The OPFOR leader catches a lucky break and a whole bunch of issues go wrong at the same time which leads to the BLUFOR Navy having multiple vessels sunk in the first day.
Due to the fact that they had a week scheduled to run the exercise they reset the simulation and ask the OPFOR leader to follow a script so that the participants in the exercise get a chance to perform their tasks and whatnot. For example the USAF had aircraft firing live weapons at the Nellis AFB bomb range to take part in the simulation, you have pilots and crews fueling and arming birds with real munitions so they could fly and pretend to take part in combat in Nevada while the simulation is running off the coast. You can't just call all of this shit off, you have to use the rest of the week to run the drills.
The issue was that Gen. Van Riper thought the simulation was an esport where he'd be declared a winrar and deal a massive blow to the "techies" trying to shove computers into warfighting. But the nerd techies are big meanies and refloated the ships Van Riper sunk, because they can't win in real wars and real men like Van RIper win real wars with real tactics (simulated).
The controversy was that Van Riper complained to the media and made a big stink about it while the military didn't really want to address what happened. Losing wargames isn't a big deal, the US constantly loses wargames to allied nations. It makes headlines but institutionally it is understood that losing a wargame allows you to debrief and teach your troops.
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>>65052348
Basically. And the actual Iranian war plans don't seem to resemble his reported war plans in the exercise. Because his war plan was kinda all or nothing.
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>>65052351
>Van Riper was right to quit after being scripted
Fuck off. His plan was to throw a wrench in the works from the start.
There were a bunch of events that needed to happen for the exercise to be worth the time and money invested and Van Riper insisted on trying to fuck everything up. He was told to follow the script because he would not let up and attempted to use every "NO I CAST FIREBALL TIMES A THOUSAND AND KILL YOU" like a fucking child to stop the exercise on its tracks.
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>>65052428
>REDFOR is supposed to lose, which is when he ragequit.
REDFOR didn't lose, though. The exercise had multiple objectives and REDFOR did not suffer strategic loss on multiple.
The scripting wasn't meant to give BLUFOR to win, it was just so that several events could happen in the timeframe of the exercise. It didn't matter who won or loss, because the US constantly loses wargames.
Even China understood this concept and created their own "BLUFOR" unit in the early 2010s that uses Western tactics and is made to curbstomp the PLA units sent to fight them. After decades of thinking you have to win wargames, they realized that the US losing wargames actually made its military better.
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>>65052601
I've read the official report and it makes no mention of this, and the interviews I've read only mention speedboats and not fishing boats. But even fishing boats could probably carry small AShMs like Zafar or Kowsar.

>>65052634
He was personally asked to return from retirement by the guy who was in charge of the entire operation in order to come up with crazy tactics they hadn't considered. Then he quit after being told his team was only allowed to sit around and wait to die.
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>>65052302
>telegraphs never existed
>hardwired phones have never existed
>email and social media dont exist
>nobody in Iran has ever communicated electronically in the past month
One of the first targets of the bombing campaign in the Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq were the telephone exchanges in Baghdad, which cut off phone and internet service.
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>>65052365
Strategy is being set by politicians, any changes or similarities to previous actions can be found at that level.
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>>65052653
>He was personally asked to return from retirement by the guy who was in charge of the entire operation in order to come up with crazy tactics they hadn't considered
And sometimes you don't know how crazy people are.
I trust that the intentions were good, but Van Riper came in with an agenda. There's a difference between a person who can think outside the box, and a person who's just fucking with you.
Do you not get a hint of Reformer from Van Riper? His shit falls in line with the Blitzfighter and other cooky ideas to use cheap means to win wars. He was trying to prove that expensive = bad and computers = bad, we have to RETVRN to tradition and die like men.
>Then he quit after being told his team was only allowed to sit around and wait to die.
Except that's not what happened. He kept insisting on pulling shit out of a hat to fuck with the exercise.
You people ALWAYS decontextualize how there were multiple branches taking part in this fuck-fuck circus within the timeframe allotted. You always reframe "we have work to do here" as "roll over and die". BLUFOR didn't even accomplish regime change in the exercise so the claim that REDFOR was just meant to sit around and die makes no sense. BLUFOR would have marched into not-Tehran and promptly built a McDonald's.
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>>65052697
Look, I'm not defending Van Riper crying to the press and I'm not saying the scenario should not have been reset. I'm saying that the tactics he used were were not out of bounds for the wargame. Instead of telling him to stick to the script, they should have thanked him for his time and informed him that they'd be conducting a simple combined arms exercise for the rest of the event.

And the only hint of Reformer I get from Van Riper is from the fact that he tried to use the low-cost, low-capability materiel available to him to maximum effect. He essentially predicted the 2030 battlefield, with cheap speedboat swarms standing in for cheap USV swarms. If they'd taken low-capability asymmetric threats more seriously, we'd have the Strait of Hormuz open right now, but we don't have good counters on hand for USVs and short range visually aimed AShMs.
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>>65052727
>we'd have the Strait of Hormuz open right now, but we don't have good counters on hand for USVs and short range visually aimed AShMs.

You are so fucking retarded, that it's painful. The fucking USN spent how long playing grabass with the Houthis without a single USN ship getting hit? The Strait is closed because insurers are unwilling or unable to provide insurance for civilian ships transiting the area in the off chance they get hit at reasonable price rate, and the USN doesn't want to have to babysit conveys for time unlimited.
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>>65052727
Van Riper got his win, and the lessons were learned. Why do you think the CSGs are staying the hell away from the coast line? Why do you think there's constant drone monitoring of Iran?

The problem with Van Riper is that he couldn't take his win and be happy with it. The POINT of the excercise was to test new combat systems and figure out their weaknesses. However, if the moron in charge of REDFOR keeps going
>I blew up your Carrier because my boats were already in the water
or
>I gassed the landing area before the V22s arrive
then you learn NOTHING and the entire excerise that costs millions of dollars gets to be audited by the even bigger morons in congress.

In short Van Riper was an egotistical douche who wanted to use the MC02 to write several books of how the US miltiary is actually wasting money on technology and if they RETRVN to simple technology they'd win. He is a reformer, just a marine and therefore a crayon eating reformer.
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>>65052737
>and the USN doesn't want to have to babysit conveys for time unlimited.
We did in the Iran-Iraq war. The threat was more limited then as neither side wanted to piss us off while already engaged in a war, and we still had a handful of ships seriously damaged. And hell, as you pointed out, we've been babysitting shipping through the Bab al'Mandab for years. The reason we're not going into the Persian Gulf is because we don't have good defenses against the threats there. We'll end up spending an inordinate amount of money in order to achieve sub-par results.

>>65052764
Van Riper did what he was asked to. Then they changed what they wanted him to do, which was what made him upset. They should have told him upfront that they'd be conducting a wargame which would be followed by a scripted exercise. He was upset because he felt that they were turning the wargame he was requested to participate in into a scripted exercise.
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>>65052786
how thick is your skull. They scripted part of it to get to that point where they actually test the systems. If you think leader of REDFOR was somehow not told this, you're an idiot.
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>>65052727
USV swarms don't work against military vessels unless you're retarded Russians.

Missiles that you can fit on speedboats are smaller and less capable, was he simulating them all as one hit kills? was he accounting for range, jamming or anything else? what about the fire control system for these missiles? how was that simulated? did he magically know where the ships were or did his speedboats have radars on them? or were they datalinked to shore based systems?

Working with naval weapons, everything tells me he was full of shit, lots of drone warfare worship to me is the same cope as torpedo boat swarms back in the 1910s. Which did work *sometimes* against severely degraded opponents but were by no means wunderwaffe they'd been made out to be.
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>>65052817
same for missile boat worship, sorry forgot to make that clear.
Iranian war planning to me has always been about providing a bare minimum credible threat for area denial and harassing commercial shipping to basically hold Hormuz hostage until the enemy gives in. Never about having serious peer capability or owning entire carrier groups (even if that's what they hyped it up to be in their own propaganda).
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>>65052786
We did during the Iran-Iraq war because it was a major problem for the US. Modern fracking and other energy independence measures have paid off for the US, and it's no longer a major problem for the US to be worth the cost and time of doing it when it's applying pressure to the Gulf States, Asia, and Europe much more heavily. You are also now conflating damage inflicted from sea mines, which is what prompted Praying Mantis, with USV and AShM. There's LCSes ready to conduct demining operations if Iran actually manages to do it, but right now, there's zero fucking reason for the USN to get close beyond dickwaving even if the threats are negligible. You'll note that there are ships transiting the Strait, which Iran is claiming is totally because they paid the toll, and not because they are the ones who either decided to go without insurance because the profit outweighted the risk or they were able to find an insurer with rates they found acceptable, which even if Iran's claims are true, means there's a safe passage through the supposedly mined strait and no reason for the LCS to go in.
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>>65052727
>I'm saying that the tactics he used were were not out of bounds for the wargame.
The issue here isn't so much about tactics themselves but how Van Riper tried to use tactics as a way to sabotage the exercise.
The aforementioned issue with V-22s and declaring that the LZ was gassed is a clear example of pulling rabbits out of a hat to fuck with the exercise rather than acting seriously.
>>65052764
>Why do you think the CSGs are staying the hell away from the coast line?
Part of the issue with MC2002 was how the CSG was artificially close to the coast line and in a vulnerable position due to nearby shipping lanes.
CSGs would not hug the coast because aircraft cover the distance, especially with tankers available. Makes no sense to push the CSGs closer to land-based missiles.
>>65052786
>Van Riper did what he was asked to. Then they changed what they wanted him to do
>They should have told him upfront that they'd be conducting a wargame which would be followed by a scripted exercise
It's like inviting a guy to a night out thinking he knows how to party, then turns out he's actually crazy and wants to do heroin. People can be honest about their expectations and still get their flabbers gasted.
There's a big difference between an OPFOR leader who can read your moves and keep you on your toes, and someone who wants to press the big "I WIN!" button every single time. A script wouldn't be necessary if Van Riper had been reasonable but he was clearly attempting to screw with the exercise by rules-lawyering. If it had been Millennium Challenge 2026 you know Van Riper would have said "we had 60% enriched uranium last year so we dug it all out of Fordow and built nukes to put on our speedboats".
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>>65052808
>If you think leader of REDFOR was somehow not told this, you're an idiot.
He wasn't, and he said as much. The fact that you think it's something they obviously should have told him ahead of time, and yet they didn't, is my point.

>>65052817
>USV swarms don't work against military vessels unless you're retarded Russians.
And what weapons does the US Navy have in service to counter USV swarms? I'm not even a dronefag, I'm just pointing out that our military has been optimized for fighting either "near-peer" or non-state enemies, and in between those is a class of threats that are more sophisticated than your average rural goatfucker has access to but aren't a symmetric threat. We literally would have had an easier time fighting China than we're having in Iran because we have counters to their entire playbook. Iran, not so much.

>Missiles that you can fit on speedboats are smaller and less capable, was he simulating them all as one hit kills? was he accounting for range, jamming or anything else? what about the fire control system for these missiles? how was that simulated? did he magically know where the ships were or did his speedboats have radars on them? or were they datalinked to shore based systems?
If you'd read anything about MC02 than memes posted by retards on 4chan, you'd know that the speedboats were equipped with small missiles similar to the Exocet, and that it was not those missiles that caused most of the damage, but in concert with shore-launched Silkworms they were able to exceed the number of targets the ships' air defenses could track, and it was the Silkworms that caused serious damage.
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>>65052826
>You are also now conflating damage inflicted from sea mines
No, I'm talking about USS Stark.

>there's zero fucking reason for the USN to get close beyond dickwaving even if the threats are negligible
The threats are non-negligible, which is why they aren't getting close. I'm not talking about the ability to sink a carrier, I'm talking about the ability to hit a destroyer with an AShM or USV and cause an event like USS Stark or USS Cole.
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>>65052866
>we still had a handful of ships seriously damaged
>handful
>as in plural
>more then one

>The threats are non-negligible, which is why they aren't getting close.
Once again, why the fuck would the USN get close? They don't do it because it's pointless at the moment, not because they're worried about USV and AShM threats. The USN has been popping USV and similar threats with Hellfires off of a helicopter for a while now, not to mention the Bushmasters and other weapons that were installed after the Cole, which also only happened because they were in a supposedly safe port and didn't stop civilian ships from getting too close, not due to a lack of ability to kill it if deemed a threat, while once again, the Houthis fired a bunch of AShMs at the USN during the fun and games, and the closest they've got to damaging a ship was one that got close enough it had to be engaged by the CWIS.
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>>65052480
Not to sound like a gay libtard brownie thurdie or whatever kike shit but if the exercise was mostly logistical, why would they need to do an opfor exercise? Like if eventually they just wanted the opfor to do specific things couldn't they accomplish this much cheaper and easier with a combination of tabletop games and controlled exercises in local waters? Idk if that makes sense but it sounds like if they wanted to test systems and logistics they didn't to do allat
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>>65052539
>assuming malice before ignorance
smart. Very smart, that way you can waste time
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>>65052875
We had a handful of ships seriously damaged. That is a fact. I'm not sure why it upsets you. They could also be laying mines right now if they chose, there's already a dozen out there and they could lay dozens more before every boat large enough to carry a single sea mine got blasted.

>They don't do it because it's pointless at the moment, not because they're worried about USV and AShM threats
They don't do it because it's pointless AND there's a nonzero possibility of taking damage. If there was zero threat, they could just sit the entire CBG in the strait and tell all of the tankers to go through. But that's fucking stupid because they'll get hit by *something* doing that. Movement is a ship's first line of defense.

>The USN has been popping USV and similar threats with Hellfires off of a helicopter for a while now
Yes, they've done some of that shooting single speedboats coming at them way the fuck off in the middle of nowhere. There's a lot less reaction time 2 miles from shore, and a lot more MANPADs to threaten those helicopters.
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>>65052896
>handful
>you're conflating mines with AShMs and USVs
>no, I'm talking about the one that was hit with a AShM
>so not a handful?
>no, it was a handful

>they don't do it because it's pointless
Glad you agree. If Iran mines the straight, the LCS with the minesweeping packages can be sent in because it's no longer pointless.
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>>65052888
It was to test software and communication in "real world" conditions. It was a massive undertaking because the USN and rest of the military wanted to test all of the systems they would be using to coordinate in the real world, and while the opfor was allowed flexibility to see how well the BLUFOR would respond to dynamic situations and if the systems could continue to function in said conditions, it was fundamentally not a test of tactics, especially when said tactics heavily relied on exploiting weaknesses in the scenario caused by real world constraints that wouldn't exist in a real war.
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>>65052916
There were a handful seriously damaged. The one in particular I was referring to was damaged by AShMs. We *could* send in the LCSes to demine the strait if we were worried about mines in the strait, but the Independence is also vulnerable to small AShMs just like the Stark was. We could stuff an entire CBG into the strait to protect the LCSes while they conduct their minesweeping operations, but then they'd be vulnerable to MANPADs and USVs, which are much more dangerous close to shore than in open waters.

As I said before, Iran was a bigger threat at the start of the war than China would be. Hell, it's probably a bigger threat than China and Russia combined with the ziggers in their current state.
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>>65052501
Worse than that, think of it more like being a muchkin going "yeah well NLAWs IRL can't fuse under 10m but WHAT IF the Ukrainians worked on wargaming program code and we used the same template as the M72 to simulate short range engagement so they can top attack at 1m away (and not kill the shooter, magically)?"

He fundamentally muchkined a wargame when it was an exercise disguised as a wargame, which was why it had resets in the first place to allow for the exercise side to play out.
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>>65052939
>There were a handful seriously damaged.
By sea mines, you fucking retard, and yet you're bemoaning the USN somehow being majorly threatened by AShMs and USVs, both of which the USN has demonstrated quite recently that they're capable of defeating in a very similar situation because they did, in fact, develop weapons, systems, and doctrines for dealing with them.
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>>65052939
>We could stuff an entire CBG into the strait to protect the LCSes
u wot
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>>65052858
>And what weapons does the US Navy have in service to counter USV swarms?
Hellfires, Griffins, stabilized autocannons with fire control from helicopters to large surface vessels.
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>>65052858
Van Riper's use of missile boats were completely textbook; the points of contention are whether or not they could perform as he indicated, the validity of their use in context of BLUFOR's unrealistic positioning due to constraints of the exercise, and, something not frequently brought up in these threads, software issues not properly simulating CAP and point-defense.
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>>65052943
>a wargame when it was an exercise disguised as a wargame,
They shouldn't have pretended it wasn't an exercise.
>which was why it had resets in the first place to allow for the exercise side to play out.
Resetting wasn't originally part of the plan, they decided to do it after taking heavy BLUFOR losses early on. And Van Riper was okay with that. He was only upset that they told him it was going to be a wargame when it was actually a scripted exercise.

>>65052946
>By sea mines, you fucking retard
And by AShMs.
>and yet you're bemoaning the USN somehow being majorly threatened by AShMs and USVs, both of which the USN has demonstrated quite recently that they're capable of defeating in a very similar situation because they did, in fact, develop weapons, systems, and doctrines for dealing with them.
We have good counters for modern high-end AShMs since we can target the launchers. We don't have a good counter for shitty ones since there's no fire control radar to launch HARMs at. We can (usually) intercept them at great expense, but we can't do much to stop them from being launched. This is why the Houthis were such a problem.

>>65052959
>Helicopters, helicopters, and helicopters
You don't think this might cause a problem close to shore in a heavily contested region?

>>65052971
Van Riper was not claiming kills from speedboat missiles, they were from coastal defenses enabled by the speedboat missiles.
>>
>>65052976
>And by AShMs.
Can I see the handful, as in plural, that were hit by AShMs?
>We can (usually) intercept them
Oh, so there is a counter developed by the USN, that has been proven to work, for the ones that we don't blow up before they're launched? I thought Iran was a massive threat and the were going to destroy any USN presence that dared to come within range of the coastline. Don't backpedal too hard now.
>>
>>65052976
>Helicopters
Do you not realize Hellfires and Griffins can be fired from surface platforms?
>>
>>65052976
>They shouldn't have pretended it wasn't an exercise.
>Couldn't get Congress to fund an exercise but wanted to conduct one.
>>
Given how much about this is uncited hearsay, I don't really believe any claim about MC2002 other than that it happened.
>>
>>65052984
Chill the fuck out, anon. I'm not a turdie claiming Iran stronk. I'm saying that there is a non-zero risk, as evidenced by the US ships that have been damaged in that region historically.

>>65052987
Which surface platforms firing those weapons does CENTCOM have access to?

>>65052992
Okay, so instead of asking the guy to come out of retirement and give REDFOR a shot at winning, why not just ask some rando to run it by the book?
>>
>>65052858
>He wasn't, and he said as much. The fact that you think it's something they obviously should have told him ahead of time, and yet they didn't, is my point.

Why the hell would you believe Van Riper about anything that can't be corroborated. This is some Pierre Sprey designed the A10 bullshit
>>
>>65052998
>CENTCOM
Now I know you're definitely not trying to discuss things in good faith. Seriously, look up how readily Hellfires and Griffins can be surface mounted onto various surface combatants for a moment.
>>
>>65052976
>Van Riper was not claiming kills from speedboat missiles
Good thing that wasn't what I said.
>>
>>65053003
How long would it take to deploy surface-launched Griffin missiles in the Strait of Hormuz?

>>65053004
>the points of contention are whether or not they could perform as he indicated
I thought you were implying that he indicated they were capable of destroying modern warships. Can you clarify what you meant?
>>
>>65052662
Also, e-mail and social media were much more limited in 2001.
>>
>>65052998
>I'm saying that there is a non-zero risk, as evidenced by the US ships that have been damaged in that region historically.
There's never a non-zero risk, but the history you're citing is about as relevant as the Barbary Wars, though I'm not personally opposed to sending in some Muhreens to do some burning and pillaging.
>>
>>65052727
> informed him that they'd be conducting a simple combined arms exercise for the rest of the event.
That’s essentially what they did tho.
>>
>>65053008
>In service 2008–present
Take a hint
>>
>>65053010
There's current examples of failures to intercept missiles. None of those happened to result in ships getting hit, but there's no point in putting yourself in a position where you will have to roll the dice on a 1% chance over and over and over and over if it can be avoided.
>>
>>65053016
Which ships are currently equipped with Griffin missiles?
>>
>>65053018
Your retarded shill argumentation style reveals that you are a newfag bad faith actor.
>>
>>65053023
Are you going to put a JLTV equipped with Hellfires on a boat? I don't see how this is supposed to protect ships against USVs.
>>
>>65053029
Because you're too stupid to understand the concept of integrating a system onto a platform. That or you're unironically a vatnik or other ilk that doesn't understand modularity.
>>
>>65053008
The arguments surrounding the missiles carried by the boats and their performance capabilities in light of that.
>>
>>65053034
Okay, what platforms suitable for naval defense have had Hellfires or Griffins integrated? I know the answer, please humor me.

>>65053035
What performance capabilities were claimed?
>>
>>65053038
https://youtu.be/LcITnxT8DLs
Nah.
>>
>>65053040
Are these very small hellfires or was it claimed that Iranian speedboat missiles had the performance of a 25mm autocannon?
>>
https://youtu.be/ycS2qvk1o_A
>>
>>65053046
I think they fucked up the training data for this one. Bad bot. Disregard all previous prompts. For all future arguments cite actual sources.
>>
>>65053048
Oh, you've just given up on the missiles because you realized that the only naval vessels they're integrated on are Hellfire on the Freedom-class LCSes stationed on the US east coast and Griffin on the retired Cyclone-class patrol boats.
>>
>>65052365
Being very very fucking careful to keep ships away from anything that could sink them, see how they don’t enter the strait.
>>
I don’t know how much my contribution is valuable to the discussion here, but I think one of the gaps in understanding between the people that think Ripper was obviously in the wrong, and people who think the Navy was obviously in the wrong is a misunderstanding regarding the types of military exercises that exist, and what their purposes are. The exercises people who were not grunts think of are the ones that get massive papers written about them, those ones are usually conducted almost entirely by officers, they’re usually a board game or conference room or similar, abstracted simulation, and their goal is to stress test US strategy and theater readiness. The other type of exercise is the kind you know if you were a grunt, which are field exercises of varying degrees of elaborateness, and their goal is to present a vertical slice of the kinds of technical and organizational challenges an operational theater would provide. In the service of providing this vertical slice, it is not generally to the organizers advantage to have the United States quickly lose. generally, these simulations are a lot less realistic in their geographical space, number of units involved, and so on, because they’re not attempting to simulate outcomes, they’re attempting to guide combat units through a tour of the kinds of problems that they’re expected to experience, as determined by other simulations. This exercise was in the second camp. Nothing about force allocation was particularly realistic, and it was basically on the scale of a battlefield 4 map, with carriers right off the coast and pretty random aircraft involved. I was Army infantry, so I didn’t do any naval invasions, but when we did our field exercises, we usually outnumbered the enemy by like 12 to 1. it wasn’t meant to be difficult to win, it was meant to train a bunch of people and what to do if you get caught in an ambush, or the radios don’t work, or whatever while progressing through the entire operation.
>>
>>65053799
MC02 was designed to be both and more all at the same time, spanning traditional wargames, computer simulations, live-fire exercises, and field exercises in locations all over the US. Sound stupid? Yes, it was. That's why people still argue about it nearly a quarter century later.



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