Discuss Kantai Kessen naval doctrine.Why was Kantai Kessen the greatest naval doctrine of WWII?Why do PGMs make Kantai Kessen even more unstoppable today?
>>65121060You're not allowed to drop such powerful TRVTH NVKES OP. Most "people" on /k/ don't even know what Kantai Kessen is.
It was viable when Japan's Opponents in the Asia-Pacific were the same as the ones they fought in the Russo-Japanese War or were small fleets who can barely challenge the IJN. But once they US got involved and started outproducing the Japanese, it was only a matter of time until Kantai Kessen turns into the Naval equivalent of a War of Attrition.
>>65121060>we'll attrit the enemy and we'll never be attrited ourselvesOnly works in shitty RTSsWhich, funnily enough, is exactly how they gamed out the strategy>tfw IJN High Command was basically a bunch of larping gaymers
>>65121060What is there to discuss? If you want your threads to survive, you need to bring a question or conversation starter to get anons to bite.As for what I personally think of it, there's a lot to say. The reasoning behind it assumes that the politics of said war are going to be exactly like the circumstances of the Ruso-Japanese War, of which was less than a month or two away from going downhill fast—Russians had nearly a million troops ready for a counter-offensive, ready to push towards a Port Arthur whose combatants were incredibly depleted from General "Dumbfuck" Nogi, of whom kept ordering daily platoon-sized suicide charges up 203-Meter Hill—and during which Japan was given two massive loans from British and American banks to keep up the fighting. Thinking that the other nation would quit after one overwhelmingly crushing tactical defeat is the same as thinking that any other nation's politics would be as dogshit as Russia's was under the dumbfuck Nicholas II, and this is exactly why Japanese were so warcrame and rape happy to anyone they came across: their only "realistic" out was to scare the enemy out of further conflict. This makes far too many assumptions about how the people of a nation would collectively react to "one bad whopping", and forgets that, even if they do achieve that limited tactical success, the enemy nation can just suppress their media just like the IJN did to the IJA, hiding the fact that their carriers got raped at Midway until something like early 1943 IIRC.I think the quote (paraphrasing) from Yamamoto is apt: "I can run amok for 6-8 months, but after that..." Maybe it was just the political structure and make-up of the government that made this eventual (picking up a war they couldn't hope to win, just due to various military heads holding office in cabinet and whatnot), coupled with the almost religious levels of reverance that they held for the Ruso-Japanese War. They wanted another/free reign of Asia.
>>65121106 (me)There's also a lot to say about just how old a lot of Japan's navy was at the time. Sure, their heavy cruisers were all modern (but had 1-inch armor, basically splinter protection, on their turrets, not to mention a critical lack of radar throughout the war, either air, surface, gun-directing), and they had the meme Yamato/Musashi, but if you actually look at a majority of their fleet, it's fucking old.>Kongo-class, built during WW1 (not even really used, the Japanese were massive pussies and afraid of it getting damaged if they lent it to Britain), with (4x2) 14-inchers and fuckall armor that allowed them to get raped by cruisers and Washington around Guadalcanal>Ises, Nagatos and Fusos were also WW1 designs>Their light cruisers mostly being WW1 stock, with open-case deck guns and poor survivability (used pretty much immediately at Guadalcanal, and suffered heavy losses when doing rat runs for the Tokyo Express)>All the old destroyers, while good for their time, were cramped, unable to be upgraded with radars (IIRC) due to weight limitations on an old frame, and never had gun-director radars like Fletchers and beyond, of which forced the IJN to abandon night fighting and resupply as a concept after the Battle of Cape St. George>Their carriers, beyond the obvious Kaga/Hiryu/Zuikaku, were all shitty oceanline converts, and by the time new designs were out, all the pilots were dead and they had no fuel anywaysAll that to say, if they really did want to bet on an all-in gamble, then they would've needed better co-ordination and overall strategic tempo/control than they did. These old ships could and did put in work, yes, but they had a limited time before US admirals figured out how to effectively use radar to counter Japanese tactics, US AA only got exponentially more lethal as the war dragged on, and the hordes of Essexs came in 1943. Kind of like that other anon said: they wanted to play an RTS, like in those rigged wargames they did.
>>65121082They thought the war was going to be Gookclick
>>65121064Everyone knows japan's "for the glory" culture. Die for the... charge the guns for the... ram the enemy with your plane for the... it was their mindbroken disease facing their own huge local dominance suddenly hitting the world stage and not being top dog like they believed."STOP MAKING FUN OF ME I'LL FUCKING DIE FOR THE (insert) AND YOU WILL TOO!"It's just most people don't know there is a name.
>>65121060A less well known advantage of kantai kessen naval doctrine is that it can easily be transformed into kantai collection naval doctrine.
>>65121145>due to weight limitations on an old frameIIRC they were also still paranoid over anything that made their smaller ships top heavy after what happened to the Tomozaru
>>65121060>was Kantai Kessen the greatest naval doctrine of WWII?No.By the dubious virtue of being among the worst faggots known to man, you have retroactively nullified any and all positives of said doctrine.
>>65121164>Kantai Kessen>GookclickIJN were clearly Toss players
>>65121106>>65121145What are you talking about, basically all Japanese destroyers Special Type or newer still around got a Type 22 surface radar and Type 13 air radar. The Akizukis even got a Type 21 radar (usually replaced by a Type 22 and a pair of Type 13s). Niizuki even got radar contact on the American fleet first at Kula Gulf. They all had fire directors too, though the lack of fire control integration was a serious shortcoming.
>>65121060Ok you asked for it:>Admiral Fukyu Niggah was born in 1880 in a fishing village near Nagasaki. He was born into an ancient samurai clan called "Kuru Krux.">From a young age he was determined to serve in the Imperial Navy and was accepted into the naval academy, where his excellent grasp of the tea ceremony and ability to bow much lower than anybody else ensured his fast graduation.>At the age of 17 he served in the Navy during the Russo-Japanese War and distinguished himself during the Battle of Tsushima by sinking the Russian cruiser Vranya with a single torpedo that struck the vodka storage.>His career was mostly uneventful afterwards until the '20s, when he fell in with the hyper-militaristic crowd.>After coups and government restructuring, Adm. Fukyu Niggah was assigned command of the 7th Fleet in the war against China.>He distinguished himself again by his numerous war crimes near Shanghai, including the infamous "Night of 1,000,000 Rapes" for which he was awarded the Order of the Heavenly Katana.>In 1940 as diplomacy with America broke down, he was called to several meetings in Tokyo to discuss the feasibility of war with America. During one of these meetings, after Adm. Yamamoto remarked that Japan had no real chance of victory, Adm. Fukyu Niggah flew into a violent rage.>He dropped his trousers and began furiously masturbating while screeching the Bushido Code, which he had memorized. He then declared: "IF WE DON'T GO TO WAR WITH GAIJIN I WILL KILL EVERYONE IN THIS ROOM AND RAPE THEIR CORPSES, INCLUDING THE EMPEROR!!!">This display of the Yamato Spirit impressed everyone deeply, and Hirohito applauded his dedication.
>>65123459>After the Pearl Harbor attack, Adm. Fukyu Niggah was assigned to the defense of Japan's outer posessions. Here he established his credibility by refusing to properly guard Japanese convoys, ignored air defenses, and disengaged from every battle where he had a decisive advantage.>He developed an intense rivalry with Adm. Desu Sugoi and Gen. Sashimi Sushi, repeatedly refusing to provide proper support to both. When questioned about this by his superiors, Adm. Fukyu Niggah would begin screeching about "samurai honor and pride" while threatening to committ Seppuku and Sudoku. This further display of the Yamato Spirit got him assigned to increasingly important assignments.>During the naval battle at Bungo-Bungo, as his destroyers and cruisers werr being raped by PT boats, he withdrew his battleships to save face, remarking "Ror, rmao!">As the war turned decisively against Japan, Adm. Fukyu Niggah was given command of Suicide Fleet No. 4. His task was to take his fleet into hopeless battle and get everyone killed, in the hope that this would motivate the rest of Japan.>He approved of this plan, remarking that "Those who kill theselves will cause resources and well-trained pilots to appear out of nowhere and ensure victory.">His suicide fleet was jumped by submarines and carrier planes, with every ship destroyed except for the cruiser Chokobo, which picked up the 40 survivors of the whole expedition.>As his flagship, the battleship Senpai was sinking (still being torpedoed in anvill attacks), he committed Seppuku while writing a Haiku:>My life ebbs away>Like the nakadashi flows>From a loli's cun>He is comemmorated in the Tokyo War Shrine and several nationalist groups celebrate his birthday.
>>65121106To know what they were thinking, you'd really have to study their culture, because different humans react differently to the same scenariothat's what a lot of these threads and most "professional analysis" out there, up to the highest echelons of all governments, always missour leaders and their staff and their analysts, they all project that the enemy will do what they themselves would dothe Japs made the same mistake>free reignfree rein>>65121145>their heavy cruisers were all modern (but had 1-inch armor, basically splinter protection, on their turretsbasically they were oversized treaty cruisers, so not actually all that modern>not to mention a critical lack of radar throughout the war, either air, surface, gun-directing)basically they weren't able to research new tech at all, to borrow an RTS termgenerally they were stuck on pre-war tech throughoutthat is why>if you actually look at a majority of their fleet, it's fucking old>>65121207they did overgun their heavy cruisersthey simply couldn't afford to build the kind of massed-6" trade protection light cruiser the RN and USN built>>65123451they were fielding 1st gen (prewar) radars when the Allies were fielding 2nd or 3rd genthe first radar research project in Japan, EVER, was started around the same time Britain and Germany were fielding their first production models
>>65123657>Britain first fielding production model radars: 1938>Japan's first radar research project: 1928They were behind, but not nearly that far, your timeline is way off. They also had the cavity magnetron before the British, but failed to further develop or field it.
Glorious Nippon magnetron! Folded over 1000 times!
>>65124290>1928Maybe I misread a figure but I thought I read that they only began research in 38
