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File: Plato.jpg (66 KB, 412x462)
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How does the Principle of Sufficient Reason inform our understanding of causal relationships?

Does the PSR imply that every causal relationship must have a sufficient reason, or can there be causal chains without ultimate sufficient reasons?
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>>24700686
I think we could put this a couple ways. It might suffice to say that causal laws are the sufficient reason for all causal chains. If there are distinct causal laws, say for different types of causal chains, then we may need a further reason for plurality of laws. If there is only one law, it's less clear to me that it needs a further justification, although I think many people would be bothered by the fact that the law is nomological rather than metaphysical.

In any case, the possibility of general causal laws serving as the principle of sufficient reason for particular causal chains does seem to require something like metaphysical realism or essences. I say this because in order for a law to explain a concrete sequence of events, those events must be characterizable in terms of the general law--that is, there must be general features of the events by which we judge that the law applies to them. If we nominalized those features, then it seems that we necessarily nominalize the laws as well, because the laws presumably describe relationships between exactly those nominalized general features. Thus the laws are not metaphysically real and now play the role of a description, rather than explanation, of the phenomena in question.

In this nominalist case, it could be that there are specific, concrete causal connections between distinct things. To me this seems obscure--how could we identify such a causal relationship? Nevertheless I don't think it's contradictory, and therefore a coherent theory of it could be developed.
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>>24700745
Can you give more examples of casual laws that you are interested in
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>>24700760
I don't know who this man is
If you're objecting to the notion of a causal law, could you explain the objection?
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>>24700769
What are you trying to explain, what kind of laws? Are you talking about the casual laws of physics
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>>24700776
Yes, something like laws of physics, but with the caveat that I am not generally committed specifically to a physicalist reduction. So, for instance, there could be laws of physics, and also laws of emergent higher-order phenomena that are not reducible to physics. There could also be laws governing non-physical substances, if such things exist and admit a theoretical description.
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>>24700686
Basically everything on a cosmic level is explainable via PSR. But explaining beyond the natural/Nature requires more intelligent nuance beyond ideas and concepts of logic and reason. For example, If you wanted to understand the nature of existence itself, you'd have to appeal to either a higher more simple reason or a cause beyond reason. Not necessarily by faith, but a "knowing" or "knowledge" beyond the requirement of rationality, since rationality will always require relative comparison and judgment, arriving at absolutes of the universe require much more intuition than reason. Hence why Socrates implores self-examination rather than utilizing a scientific method to figure out hidden truths.
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>>24700686
>How does the Principle of Sufficient Reason inform our understanding of causal relationships?
Reason of becoming. See pic
>Does the PSR imply that every causal relationship must have a sufficient reason
Yes
>can there be causal chains without ultimate sufficient reasons?
No, there is no ultimate reason of becoming. Causality isn't a ride one can get off from when searching past causes.
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>>24701345
Yes to the second question actually, got mixed up.



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