>>24701680
1. Dewey's Relationship with Marxism
>(Not in the text) John Dewey developed a flavor of Pragmatism that oriented epistemology towards "Problems" - something to be solved through Social Constructivism and Dialogue. All actions are driven by problem-solving, and all goals are instrumental in nature (we solve problems to solve more problems even if we're still in the middle of formulating our "final" goal (temporary title)). In that sense, all knowledge and actions are instrumental to resolving "Problems." Problems are social in nature, and so the analysis of problems require the synthesis of sociology (of the issue) and psychology (of the people solving it). Just as problems are contextualized by their social conditions, knowledge must then be contextualized by its social conditions (i.e. it's not a rejection of Old World ideas, but a demand to recontextualize things within a New World environment; The conversation of abortion "as a social problem" should not be simplified by universal principles of pro-life and pro-choice, but should be reinterpreted with modern technology in mind rather than recycling ideas from millennia ago). Through this idea of pragmatism, people such as Sidney Hook emerged in an attempt to develop Marxist-Pragmatism (although Hook in particular eventually became critical of Marxist-Leninism)
>(Mentioned in the text, expanded by me) John Dewey attempted to provide a language of Socialism without Marxist Reasoning. He was the American alternative for social progressivism, emphasizing liberal thought in a way that rejecting certain interpretations of Hegel (such as Social Progress being a matter of Functionalism, instead Dewey sees progress as the result of Deliberation and Conflict - thus creating the demand for democratic systems to engage in Problem-Solving). As such, the paper views Dewey as "an alternative" to Marx rather than an opponent

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>>24701682
1. Dewey's Relationship with Marxism
>(Mentioned in the text) He was initially a supporter of Marxism, believing that it had a lot of value especially if it were re-interpreted within a modern context. These include (1) Science as the new means of production and (2) that history has reached a point wherein the Revolution is better understood through social conditions, not just material conditions. Decades later, this support eventually transforms into "conflicting methods of arriving at the same goal" as he develops a frustration with the applications of Marxist methodology
>(Mentioned in the text) He led the Investigative Commission for Trotsky's innocence, giving him direct insight to Marxism as a set of interpretations sharing the same epistemological foundation rather than one unified movement
>(Not in the text) He taught in China for a couple years, even being called the American Confucius for teaching "Democracy through Science." This led to him directly influencing Mao and Chinese Marxism, although this indirect relationship eventually decayed as Dewey became anti-Marxist whilst Marxist-China became Anti-West. Dewey's teachings were eventually adopted by Neo-Confucians in Hong Kong and Taiwan


2. Marxism as Interpreted in the Paper
>(Not exactly in the text) My friend and I agreed that the way the paper portrays Marxism is reminiscent of Hegelian Functionalist interpretations of Social Change. It somewhat implies the concept of Inevitability, although unlike Functionalism this was applied in a prospective manner (e.g. Evolutionary Rules of Nature) rather than a retrospective rationalization of how existing institutions came to be

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>>24701684
2. Marxism as Interpreted in the Paper
>(Mentioned in the text) Trotsky's portrayal of Marxism reflected the call for social change as an international pursuit, (Not mentioned in the text) although I see this as a non-contextual application of Marxism that rejects historical contingencies and contexts. This mirrors the criticisms that some Subaltern and Indigenous nationalist historiographers have of Marxist Historiography - that it promotes a logical positivist view of history which denies self-interpretation among colonized communities. Not entirely relevant, but this interpretation by Trotsky conflicts with Dewey's view that progress should be determined by history and context (which I know that some Marxists agree with)
>The paper looks at the works of Allen Wood (1972), Allen Buchanan (1982), and Steven Lukes (1982) to interpret Marxism's "call to action for a revolution;" These three papers suggest that Marxism's criticisms of Capitalism is due to "Justice" being formalistic. Rather than pointing towards Justice as the basis of society, Marx sees the concrete and empirical realities of Justice as something that "gives life to" the formalistic idea of Justice. For example, the realities of Class Inequality creates the idea of Justice through Wealth Distribution. Therefore, an ideal society should be developed such that Justice is never "strived for" because the demand for justice would be eliminated altogether (by which all conflict result from class distinctions). These authors disagree on whether Capitalism can be considered "just" under Marxist terms, or whether the call to action for a revolution is rational or irrational. Wood seems to suggest that the Call to Action is a matter of Depleting Patience (in that the revolution is an inevitable passionate response from an unhappy working class); for Buchanan it seems to be a matter of Reason (in that the revolution will be driven by the rational preference of the people - people will simply wake up one day and decide they think Communism might be the better choice regardless of their class status); Lukes sees this as a matter of Historical Darwinism (in that the revolution is an inevitabile evolution - the present responds to the contradictions of the past and overtakes it. Although note that Lukes didn't explicitly use the word "Darwinism," it was just an interpretation me and my friend arrived at based on how it was phrased)

>>24701687
3. Dewey's Critiques (Mostly drawn from the paper, although rephrased and expanded by me)
>(1A) If everything historically converges into this ideal communal society (an End - as a result of Prospective Functionalism), then the Means become a conversation of feasibility and not of appropriateness. The Is will ALWAYS justify The Ought. Under Marxist Epistemology, there are no axioms that suggest that Stalinism is an invalid application of Marxism. Furthermore, Marxist Epistemology actively rejects axioms that could prevent Stalinism as a Means of achieving this End, even if Marx himself had personally rejected prolonged authoritarianism as an approach to Communism
>(1B) Dewey sidesteps this problem altogether by challenging the differentiation of Ends and Means under Constructivism. If Ends and Means are determined by the momentary perspective (the instrumental End now will be an instrumental Means later on), then the Call to Action cannot revolve around moving "towards" a fundamental End such as a Communist society. Rather, we already operate in a way that responds to the world's problems one step at a time; It's just part of how we Act and Experience the world. Some people consider this a "naturalized" understanding of Hegelianism and Scientific Inquiry (although some people also recognize that phrasing it this way can be a reductive or a misleading understanding of Dewey)

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>>24701690
3. Dewey's Critiques (Mostly drawn from the paper, although rephrased and expanded by me)
>(2A) Even if Marxism is understood in a purely descriptive manner, the concept of an ideal communal society (as an inevitable point of human history) relies on a formalistic understanding of Justice EVEN if the formalistic claim is that Justice as a concept will no longer exist. It assumes that societal ideal for Justice will be "the lack of the demand for Justice" despite the absence of any empirical reality to arrive at that conclusion. If the problem of institutional justice is that it relies on empirical injustices to justify its formalistic ideals, is Marx not using the empirical injustices today to give life to his baseless (as in it has not yet mapped onto reality) formalistic ideals? Assuming that this is a misinterpretation, is Marx really suggesting that an ideal system of justice should have no empirical basis to justify his own proposed formalistic idea of Justice (i.e. X isn't being acknowledged and therefore it must be true)? Consider this analogy instead: The rituals we have concerning God gives life to the idea of God; The idea can only exist because there are empirical precedents to it. Therefore if we were to create a societal structure that removes the idea of God from our vocabulary, then it MUST follow that the rituals themselves will disappear altogether (despite lacking any empirical precedents to make this claim)
>(2B) Dewey sidesteps this problem altogether by challenging the differentiation of description and prescription under Constructivism. If descriptions are fundamentally prescriptions given our limited understanding of the world, then the actual Call to Action for Social Progress revolves around developing the environment for dialogue and democracy. Change comes from the negotiation of social constructs, not from a bloody Revolution

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>>24701694
3. Dewey's Critiques (Mostly drawn from the paper, although rephrased and expanded by me)
>(3A) If Marxist Epistemology is a conversation of group dynamics and historical inevitability, then a moral dimension is necessarily overlooked at the individual level. This isn't necessarily neglect with the case of Marxism given that its attention is directed elsewhere, but it creates situations wherein the End and the Description allows for harm to happen without providing the language to recognize this harm (as is the case of a Society without Justice). Furthermore, it creates an epistemological base which actively rationalizes and justifies harm at an individual level in favor of an End that cannot be challenged and a Description that cannot be proven until after all of the harm is done. Alternatively, any failure to meet this End becomes rationalized by the Description as a failure of method and never a failure of conceptualization (not very different from religious rationalization)
>(3B) Dewey emphasizes that we should look at how social movements affect people at an individual level. His critique of capitalism is an ethical one, one that alienates the individual rather than a conflict between groups (in which victory is determined by having the least amount of contradictions). This leads to Dewey's premise of Social Liberalism (not necessarily as a foundation for capitalism, although many people seem to view it as such; Rather, Dewey views this as a foundation for re-interpreting socialism)

Wait I fucked up
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He was woke, what more do you need to know?

>>24701763
Who was his chud equivalent?