So in the chapter where he discusses free will Hume insists that the whole debate has basically been over terms and in actuality we all more or less understand compitibilist views to be true.So to prove this point he goes into human nature and bla bla bla but eventually provides an example that I found really appropriate to his argument: When an artificer goes to the market to sell his clocks, he knows people will be willing to buy them if he offers them at a good price. And he knows that with that money he will be able to find a farmer or butcher or w/e to buy his own necessities. How could he make those assumptions if indeed free will was truly random up to unknowable whims and nothing of human action could be predicted? But at the same time he knows and understands that those people chose their livelihoods and shopping preferences in the same way he does. Thus it is self-evident that human beings have an internalised understanding of compatibilism, that both necessity and liberty guide human action, and that the dispute over this subject is one over terms essentially that has devolved into "a labyrinth of obscure sophistry".
>>24742469Thank you. Even Aquinas agreed
LolIn the 2nd part he goes over another counter-argument people often levy against this stance and that is if all human actions are determinate from previous causes then isn't the chain of causality gonna lead all the way back to big G and that is impossible since He is supposed to be all-good and perfect?Hume's response?A single paragraph where he goes "oof yeah you know this is actually a really solid point but umm you know we can't question divinity and the explanations for such seemingly paradoxical things is beyond philosophy and uhh wow God works in such mysterious ways!"
Lately ive been getting over my German Idealism pedestal putting influence from this board, and wondering if Kant (with all the flaws of his transcendental idealism) ever truly refutes Hume.Considering reading him after im done with Bergson
