Does Aristotle ever talk about how the four causes interact with each other within a framework of an explanation, i.e., a chain of causes from a major to a minor through a middle? Is there a meaning of cause in a primary sense the way that being is substance in a primary sense, or perhaps a genus of cause where the "four" causes fall under as species? I was thinking about what a cause was after thinking about why the first cause had to be a final cause and not an efficient cause. And then I thought, why couldn't it be multiple causes at once, the same way that going for a walk for it's own sake (e.g. a leisurely stroll in the park) is both an efficient and a final cause in itself. And then I realized that I didn't understand causes as well as I thought I did.
>>24957697Have you read Aristotle or just the wikipedia page?Because Aristotle uses the word "causes" pretty liberally. It is framework to help you understand something. And this framework is built around four questions, each of which in some way "causes" the thing we are looking to analyze.
>>24957763>Have you read Aristotle or just the wikipedia page?Did you even read my post? >Because Aristotle uses the word "causes" pretty liberallyNo shit. That's why I have questions. Surely, there is some focal meaning to it. And if we are talking about a structured framework of interlinked causes, then surely there are some rules to it. Is that a crazy question to ask? >which in some way "causes" the thing we are looking to analyzeYou are thinking of causes as if they're all efficient causes. It's better to think of them as types of explanations.
>>24957697Yeah in Post An 2 he does talk about this. An efficient cause could be taken on its own, or as subordinate to a final cause. The formal cause is just the definition, so it occurs in any syllogism implicitly, but taken on its own (the horse is an animal because it is a mammal) it doesn’t combine and isn’t even a real apodeixis, as he discusses. The role of the material cause is explored more in Metaphysics, DA and Physics than in Post An but in a “reason why” or propter quid apodeixis the premises are all material in mathematical apodeixeis because they’re in simple potency to form. It’s a mistake to say he thought mathematical demonstrations were formal. In the second paragraph you’re thinking of the contradictions in what Hegel calls “real ground”. For Aristotle this doesn’t matter much because the concrete situations that fall into these contradictions are not scientifically knowable anyway, so they can be shunted to doxa and phronesis. In the Analytics Aristotle is mostly concerned with scientific knowledge. The theory of syllogism applies there too ofc but the externally determined ground-relation isn’t a challenge to his theory, he actually accounts for it.
>>24957854How can a mathematical demonstration take a material premise? Matter seems like the antithesis of mathematics, which seems more closely related to form.
>>24957854>An efficient cause could be taken on its ownIf an efficient cause could be taken on its own, then can't it serve as a first cause, then? >The formal cause is just the definition, so it occurs in any syllogism implicitly, but taken on its own (the horse is an animal because it is a mammal) it doesn’t combine and isn’t even a real apodeixis, as he discusses. The formal cause is just the definition, so it occurs in any syllogism implicitly, but taken on its own (the horse is an animal because it is a mammal) it doesn’t combine and isn’t even a real apodeixis, as he discusses. It seems like formal causes are like the skeletal framework for an explanation, but not what causes "movement" from premise to premise or premise to conclusion. Like, the fact that a horse is a mammal has to do with the being of a horse and that it includes mammal. A syllogism in this way seems to be an "unpacking" of what we already know. Mechanistic explanations, like the kind that Aristotle engages in when he talks about the movement of the moon being the "middle" for an eclipse seem much different than a formal unpacking, and brings more food for thought for the idea that causes and the syllogisms they are contained in are more complex than we give them credit for. I'm almost reminded of the analytic-synthetic distinction here. Formal cause syllogisms are the former, mechanistic explanations are the latter. >In the second paragraph you’re thinking of the contradictions in what Hegel calls “real ground”. For Aristotle this doesn’t matter much because the concrete situations that fall into these contradictions are not scientifically knowable anyway, so they can be shunted to doxa and phronesis. In the Analytics Aristotle is mostly concerned with scientific knowledge. The theory of syllogism applies there too ofc but the externally determined ground-relation isn’t a challenge to his theory, he actually accounts for it.I'm confused by the direction that you took this in. Aristotle talks about several kinds of action depending on what the ends are and how the action is completed. Kinesis have ends outside of themselves, but energeia have ends in themselves. I'm not sure how the "real ground" has anything to do with this, but I'm not familiar with Hegel desu.
>>24958530The premises are material because they are as it were the “parts” that make up the form. It’s intelligible matter. See Post An 2.11, and even more importantly the discussion of hypothetical necessity in Physics 2. >>24958627> If an efficient cause could be taken on its own, then can't it serve as a first cause, then?Yes it could be taken as a first cause, of course it can. He gives examples of this. But big picture there is a final cause there somewhere even if for inanimate substance the final cause is in the heavens. As to your second point this is what the first part of post an 2 is about, the difference between definition and demonstration.
>>24958627> I'm confused by the direction that you took this in. Aristotle talks about several kinds of action depending on what the ends are and how the action is completed. Kinesis have ends outside of themselves, but energeia have ends in themselves. I'm not sure how the "real ground" has anything to do with this, but I'm not familiar with Hegel desu.I’m talking about the difference between doxa and episteme as he discusses in post an 1, ne, etc. Your scenario of multiple potential causes falls into the realm of doxa, not episteme. Real ground is exactly what you’re talking about, multiple potential explanations that the thinker can select arbitrarily.
>>24958653>But big picture there is a final cause there somewhere even if for inanimate substance the final cause is in the heavens.I wonder if multiple causes can be reduced to something simple. Because an efficient cause which is its own end is both an efficient cause and a final cause. So if we need a final cause, then perhaps it's a single cause that is both efficient and final that can serve the purpose, rather than merely a final cause. I'm not sure if I'm getting lost in the weeds here. >I’m talking about the difference between doxa and episteme as he discusses in post an 1, ne, etc. Your scenario of multiple potential causes falls into the realm of doxa, not episteme. Real ground is exactly what you’re talking about, multiple potential explanations that the thinker can select arbitrarily.I'm still a bit confused here. Maybe I should clarify. When I said multiple causes, I don't mean multiple separate causes, like A, B, C, D, etc., but rather one cause fulfilling multiple functions, like A being both efficient and final.
