In Ride the Tiger and related writings, Evola treats Heidegger as a revealing but ultimately fatal symptom of modernity rather than as a genuine metaphysical thinker. He concedes Heidegger’s acuity in diagnosing the nihilistic condition of the modern West, including alienation, the loss of Being, and the collapse of meaning into historicity, but argues that Heidegger never escapes the very horizon he critiques. By reducing Being to a problem disclosed within Dasein’s finite, thrown existence, Heidegger, in Evola’s view, absolutizes contingency and temporality. The celebrated “return to Being” thus remains trapped within existential anxiety, authenticity, and historical destiny, none of which transcends the human condition. Evola reads Heidegger’s thought as a terminal philosophy, lucid in its negations and powerless in affirmation, capable only of describing the breakdown of metaphysics and not of reestablishing a superior principle. Heidegger’s rejection of traditional metaphysics therefore does not overcome it but merely abolishes it, leaving nothing in its place but a more refined nihilism.Against this, Evola frames the traditional metaphysical perspective, shared in different idioms by Eastern doctrines and by thinkers like Guénon, as categorically superior. Tradition begins not from finitude or anxiety but from the unconditioned, an absolute and supra-individual principle that is known not discursively but through intellectual intuition and realization. From this standpoint, Heidegger’s insistence on historicity, becoming, and openness to Being is not profundity but regression, mistaking a late and dissolved consciousness for the measure of reality itself. Where Heidegger can only gesture toward a post-metaphysical event of Being that may or may not arrive, Tradition affirms a timeless order that can be actualized here and now by those capable of transcending the human condition. For Evola, this contrast is decisive. Heidegger’s philosophy marks the last sophisticated expression of Western decadence, whereas the traditional metaphysical view, Eastern and perennial, stands as an already complete refutation, demonstrating that Heidegger’s entire project operates on an inferior plane that has forgotten not merely God or Being but transcendence itself.
They call my dick the Tiger
>>24959925Based E takes another scalp.
Evola doesn't escape Heidegger's critique of presencing. Traditional metaphysics just assumes a bunch of shit it has no authentic ground to assume, like transcendence or the absolute. It is egomania turned into a philosophy.
>>24959966>Evola doesn't escape Heidegger's critique of presencing.Evola’s way of escaping and effectively neutralizing Heidegger’s critique of presencing rests on a prior metaphysical reversal. Heidegger criticizes the Western metaphysical tradition for interpreting Being as presence (Anwesenheit), meaning as something available, stable, and representable to a subject, which in his view culminates in technological enframing and nihilism. Evola’s response is not to refine presencing but to deny that traditional metaphysics ever truly rested on presencing in Heidegger’s sense. For Evola, authentic Tradition does not construe the absolute as something that “shows up” within time or disclosure at all. The supreme principle is not Being-as-present but the unconditioned, supra-ontological, which precedes and exceeds both presence and absence. As a result, Heidegger’s critique simply does not reach Evola’s target. Heidegger dismantles a degenerated, late metaphysics already fallen into ontological objectification, whereas Evola situates himself in a metaphysical horizon that was never subject-centered, representational, or grounded in temporal disclosure to begin with.More concretely, Evola rejects the idea that truth is something that occurs through aletheia as historical unconcealment. For him, this makes Being dependent on human openness and finitude, which is precisely the inversion that marks modernity. Traditional metaphysics, as Evola understands it in both Indo-European and Eastern forms, grounds knowledge in intellectual intuition (intellectus, jñāna, buddhi), which is not a mode of presencing but a participatory identity with the principle itself. Truth here is not something that comes into presence; it is something one is or actualizes. Because of this, Heidegger’s charge that metaphysics forgets Being by reifying it into presence collapses. Evola’s metaphysical absolute is not reified, disclosed, or temporally given. It is timelessly real, and access to it is vertical and initiatory, not horizontal and historical. Heidegger’s entire analytic remains bound to Dasein’s thrownness and temporality, while Evola operates from a standpoint that denies temporality any ultimate status at all.
>>24959998Finally, Evola defeats Heidegger’s position by exposing its negative dependence on what it claims to overcome. Heidegger abolishes metaphysical presence only to replace it with an enigmatic “event” of Being that still requires human receptivity, historical destiny, and waiting. Evola sees this as a confession of impotence. Tradition does not wait for Being to happen; it affirms a transcendent actuality that can be realized through discipline, hierarchy, and inner sovereignty. Where Heidegger radicalizes finitude and turns metaphysics into an endless vigilance toward what may arrive, Evola restores transcendence as mastery, not openness. Thus Heidegger’s critique of presencing fails to touch Evola’s vision, because Evola’s metaphysics neither seeks presence nor depends on disclosure. It stands on a higher plane altogether, one in which Heidegger’s entire problematic appears as a late, inverted, and already defeated stage of Western decline.
>>24959998>>24960002Well at least you understand Heidegger well, but what Evola's system affirms lacks proper grounding. The intellect cannot act as a ground of anything, because it is downstream from experience. Actually going through mystical experiences supports this - they widen one's horizon and overcome the previous assumptions of intellect. This is why one should never treat the products of intellect as anything more than tentative.Evola says otherwise, but he has no way to prove it, he just appeals to a certain reading of various religious traditions. One that, incidentally, absolutely no serious scholar outside of the traditionalist school supports. And then the whole thing turns into a dead end of definitions and circular reasoning. To call it higher and superior is just meaningless glazing.
>>24959998>Evola’s response is not to refine presencing but to deny that traditional metaphysics ever truly rested on presencing in Heidegger’s sense. For Evola, authentic Tradition does not construe the absolute as something that “shows up” within time or disclosure at all.Unless he's doing so by in fact rejecting the tradition of metaphysics himself, I don't understand how this otherwise stands as a response. He would have to mean something entirely different than what's going on in the ancient Greeks carried through to Descartes and his successors.
>>24959998Obliterated.
>>24960084>He would have to mean something entirely different than what's going on in the ancient Greeks carried through to Descartes and his successors.Evola situates authentic Western traditional metaphysics in a supra-ontological current that Heidegger largely overlooks or misreads, stretching from early Indo-European spiritual traditions through Plato, Neoplatonism, and certain esoteric currents of the medieval and Renaissance West. He regards Heidegger as focused almost entirely on the late, degenerated forms of metaphysics, those that reify Being as presence and tie it to human finitude and historical disclosure, while ignoring the deeper currents in which the absolute is conceived as beyond Being, timeless, and accessible through intellectual intuition rather than phenomenological presencing. For Evola, the early Platonic vision represents a critical juncture that Heidegger misunderstands. While Heidegger interprets Greek metaphysics as prefiguring presence-oriented ontology, Plato explicitly situates the Good beyond Being (epekeina tēs ousias) and characterizes the highest knowledge as immediate identity with a principle that transcends temporal and phenomenal manifestation.This correct understanding of Plato, Evola argues, directly refutes Heidegger’s critique of presencing, because the highest reality is not something that “shows up” or discloses itself to Dasein. It is already supra-ontological, beyond the horizon of presence, finitude, or temporality. Plato’s dialectical ascent is vertical and participatory rather than horizontal and historical. One does not wait for the Good to emerge, one rises to it through inner realization. In this sense, Heidegger’s insistence that traditional metaphysics collapses into a nihilistic focus on presence misses the point entirely, as he mistakes Plato’s transcendence for an early form of ontological objectification. The critique is therefore impotent against a metaphysical current that never rested on presence or disclosure to begin with.
>>24960163Neoplatonism, for Evola, represents the apex of clarity in Western metaphysical thought and exemplifies a doctrine entirely immune to Heidegger’s critique. Plotinus’ One, Proclus’ hierarchy of principles, and the later theurgical systems articulate a vision in which the absolute is beyond Being, beyond intellect, and beyond any temporal unfolding. Knowledge of the absolute is not a matter of historical presencing but of participatory realization, in which the individual aligns with a supra-ontological principle. Through this lens, all of Heidegger’s analysis of presencing, Dasein, and historical disclosure appears as a sophisticated treatment of a late, decayed stage of Western metaphysics, incapable of grasping the enduring and timeless dimension of the metaphysical tradition. Evola therefore presents a lineage from Plato to Neoplatonism that affirms a truly transcendent absolute, showing that Heidegger’s critique, however insightful regarding modernity, leaves the core of authentic traditional metaphysics entirely untouched.
>>24960048>but what Evola's system affirms lacks proper grounding. The intellect cannot act as a ground of anything, because it is downstream from experience.From the Traditionalist point of view, the critique that metaphysical doctrines lack proper grounding or proof is rooted in a modern epistemological framework that privileges empirical observation and discursive reasoning above all other forms of knowledge. Modern skepticism measures truth by standards appropriate only to contingent, phenomenal realities, and thus cannot meaningfully assess metaphysical claims, which belong to a higher order of being. Intellectual intuition, the faculty by which metaphysical truths are apprehended, is not subject to ordinary reasoning or sensory evidence. It is self-evident to the purified intellect or to one properly initiated, and its validity is grounded in direct realization rather than argumentation or experiment. From this standpoint, questioning metaphysical knowledge on the basis of ordinary proof is analogous to criticizing a painter for failing to demonstrate the existence of color to someone who has never seen.Because metaphysical cognition depends on a supra-rational faculty, denying the possibility of intellectual intuition and then insisting on conventional proof constitutes a category error. The objection does not point to any deficiency within the Traditionalist system itself, but rather reflects the limitations of the modern intellect, which has been cut off from the means of accessing higher truths. Traditionalists see such critiques as pseudo-problems. They arise not from genuine flaws in metaphysical doctrine, but from evaluating it with a framework that by definition cannot reach the domain it seeks to describe. The grounding for Traditional metaphysics exists entirely within the sphere of disciplined intuition and initiation, and once that faculty is recognized, the supposed lack of proof ceases to be a meaningful issue.
>>24959925OP seems well read. I'm enjoyed reading this thread. It is sad that not many persons in /lit/ can contribute something (me included)
>>24960451it reads like its ai generated
>>24960451It's quite clearly made with AI
>>24960270TRVTH NVKE
>>24959925fuck he looks so good in that photo
Martin Hylicnigger fans on suicide watch
>>24959998>>24959925Might as well say Evola lives on a different planet than Heidegger then.This is a totally mute “rebuttal” and serves no purpose but make semites ad jeets feel good about their simple existence
>>24960163>While Heidegger interprets Greek metaphysics as prefiguring presence-oriented ontology, Plato explicitly situates the Good beyond Being...how does that not confirm Heidegger's suspicion? That takes being as understood by presence. Again, that sounds not even agreeing with the ancients, and working by a meaning of "metaphysics" departing from what it was coined to mean.
>>24961032>...how does that not confirm Heidegger's suspicion? That takes being as understood by presence.Heidegger’s claim that Plato inaugurates a metaphysics of presencing collapses once one attends carefully to Plato’s own explicit distinctions, above all the insistence that the Good is epekeina tēs ousias, beyond being and beyond essence, as stated in Republic VI 509b. To say that the Good is beyond being is not to posit a highest being that is maximally present, but to deny that the ultimate principle falls under the horizon of being as such, whether understood as presence, objectivity, or availability to thought. Plato consistently differentiates between that which is knowable as an object of dianoia or noēsis and that which is the condition of the intelligibility and being of such objects without itself becoming one more intelligible object. The Sun analogy, the Divided Line, and the Cave all emphasize asymmetry rather than continuity. The Good gives being and intelligibility without itself being reducible to what it gives. Heidegger’s reading quietly reintroduces what Plato explicitly excludes, namely that to be beyond being still means to be in a superlative mode of presence. This conflation ignores Plato’s own language of transcendence, excess, and causal priority, which is not a theory of supreme presence but a metaphysics of principiation that resists objectification.The textual evidence across the dialogues reinforces this point. In the Parmenides, Plato deliberately dismantles any naïve conception of Forms as present entities that can be straightforwardly predicated or grasped. The aporetic critiques of the One show that ultimate principles cannot be thought under the same conditions as beings. In the Sophist, Plato carefully distinguishes being from presence by allowing non being to be thinkable without collapsing into nothingness, thereby rejecting the idea that intelligibility requires παρουσια in the sense Heidegger presupposes. In the Timaeus, the demiurgic intellect contemplates an intelligible paradigm that is explicitly not located in time, space, or appearing presence, while the Receptacle is introduced precisely to explain how appearing differs from intelligible being. Finally, the Seventh Letter stresses that the highest realities are not expressible as logoi or παρουσιαζόμενα at all, but are approached through a sudden illumination after long dialectical purification. These passages together show that Plato is acutely aware of the dangers of reifying principles as present entities and actively works against such an interpretation.
>>24961232Heidegger’s misunderstanding arises partly from his methodological decision to read the entire history of metaphysics through the lens of his own Seinsgeschichte, which predisposes him to locate an origin of the forgetfulness of Being in Plato regardless of the textual evidence. His selective emphasis on ousia while bracketing Plato’s apophatic and causal language leads to a flattening of Platonic transcendence into a proto scholastic ontology of presence. When this distorted reading entered mainstream twentieth century philosophy, it produced lasting confusion by encouraging scholars to treat Plato as the source of precisely the metaphysical naïveté he himself criticizes. The later Neoplatonists saw this with exceptional clarity. Plotinus insists that the One is neither being nor present, not even to itself, but the cause of presence and being. Proclus systematically distinguishes between participation and the unparticipated, making it impossible to construe the first principle as present in any Heideggerian sense. Christian Neoplatonists such as Dionysius the Areopagite radicalize the same insight by denying all names, including being, to the first principle. Far from betraying Plato, these thinkers are unpacking what is already implicit in his dialogues. Heidegger’s failure to recognize this continuity results not in a profound critique of Plato, but in the projection of his own problem of presence onto a metaphysics that was designed from the outset to escape it entirely.Ultimately, once Plato is read on his own terms rather than as a prologue to modern ontology, Heidegger’s critique is revealed as a category mistake with wide philosophical fallout. Plato is not asking how beings are present to a representing subject, but how intelligibility, measure, and normativity are possible at all. The Good, precisely because it is beyond being, cannot be assimilated to any structure of παρουσια, whether temporal, cognitive, or phenomenological. By collapsing principiation into presence, Heidegger obscures the Platonic insight that what is most real is least objectifiable, and that genuine metaphysics culminates not in mastery or disclosure but in conversion of the soul toward what exceeds disclosure altogether. The uncritical adoption of Heidegger’s reading has therefore diverted generations of interpreters away from Plato’s own self understood project and from the Neoplatonic tradition that preserves its inner logic. A careful recovery of Plato’s metaphysics shows not the origin of the forgetfulness of being, but a rigorous attempt to think what grounds both being and its appearing without ever being reduced to either.
>first thread where OP seems to actually understand Evola in like a year>first Evola thread effortpost in like a year>it's AI
>>24961232>>24961233Your AI isn't very good at this. "Metaphysics" as a term has its origin in describing what Aristotle's book after the Physics is up to, which it describes as pertaining to what makes being beings as such. Heidegger focuses his critique of Plato on the Forms, which are treated as both the only real beings, and as having presence by being participated in by sensible beings. Now, you could criticize Heidegger for doing little with the Good, but that passage from the Republic implies that Being, which is again the subject of traditional metaphysics, is presence. That element of his critique is untouched. This AI rejoinder is just "oh, traditional metaphysics isn't about Being," it's just skirting by a redefinition.
>>24961451>filteredNta but that bad faith interpretation of platonic forms as the only "real" is almost as bad as AI slop
>>24961470That's the whole shtick of the dialogues, arguing that the Forms, in being eternal and unchanging, are the true beings. Whether that's only an apparent teaching of Plato or not, that's still the thrust of how the Forms are presented, always in distinction from the visible beings on account of the latter undergoing becoming.
>>24961476>filtered
>>24961451Your reply commits a question-begging fallacy in assuming precisely what is at issue and then treats that assumption as decisive. The claim that metaphysics is essentially about “what makes beings beings as such” is Aristotelian, not Platonic, and Heidegger’s procedure illegitimately retrojects that Aristotelian framing back onto Plato. Plato does not thematize being qua being in Aristotle’s sense, nor does he identify the Forms as “the only real beings” in a univocal ontological register. In the Republic, Sophist, and Parmenides, the Forms are intelligible causes and measures, not self sufficient beings whose primary trait is presence. To say that Forms are participated in is not to say that they are present in the Heideggerian sense of Anwesenheit, but that sensibles depend on them asymmetrically for intelligibility and determinacy. Participation names a relation of dependence and derivation, not a mode of appearing. Heidegger’s critique only goes through if one smuggles in an Aristotelian ontology of substance and presence and then attributes it to Plato, which is exactly the historical and conceptual error at stake.The appeal to the Republic’s doctrine of the Good actually weakens the rejoinder rather than strengthening it. The Good is not a marginal add on that leaves the ontology of Forms intact, but the principle that reorders the entire intelligible domain. When Plato says that the Good gives being to the Forms while being itself is beyond being, he is explicitly denying that being, even intelligible being, is ultimate. This is not a redefinition of metaphysics after the fact, but an internal Platonic distinction between what is knowable as an object of noēsis and what grounds that knowability without itself becoming an object. Heidegger’s claim that being is presence is therefore not “untouched,” because Plato is denying that the highest explanatory principle falls under being at all. If being were identical with presence in Plato’s framework, the Good could not be said to exceed it without contradiction. The fact that Plato can coherently make this claim shows that he is not operating within the horizon Heidegger attributes to him.
>>24961451>>24961574Finally, the insistence that Heidegger’s focus on Forms suffices misses the decisive point that Plato himself subjects the Forms to dialectical destabilization. In the Parmenides, Forms are shown to generate contradictions if treated as beings in the strong, self identical sense required by a metaphysics of presence. In the Sophist, being is rethought as power and relationality rather than static presence, undermining the very ontological assumptions Heidegger imputes to Plato. Later Neoplatonists recognized this clearly and treated Forms as participated, derivative, and ordered principles, not as present entities, with the One or the Good standing beyond being and beyond presence altogether. What Heidegger critiques under the name of Platonic metaphysics is therefore a hybrid construction shaped by Aristotle and scholastic ontology, not Plato’s own position. The charge that the rebuttal merely redefines metaphysics fails because Plato himself is already contesting what it would mean for being to be primary, present, and self explanatory, which places him outside the target Heidegger claims to have identified.
