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>>24964948
Likewise, this dude had philosopher parents and is one of those galaxy brained dudes who seems to have consumed an unreal amount of thought because he has well received non-polemical work on everything from Plato to the German Idealists, to post-modern phenomenological thought. But then his more polemical stuff also seems to center on nominalism being diabolical.

>>24964948
>Is nominalism really that bad?
This sentence would not make sense under nominalism.
>Is
Indicates being or existence. If there are no universals there is no such thing as being, since being is a universal category descriptive of many things, not an individual. My car is and my laptop is. Isness, or being, is the universal property belonging to my laptop and car.
>nominalism
Nominalism would not exist under nominalism. It is a description of a thought, a theory, which exists in the minds of many individuals. Nominalism is not an individual, it is a universal.
>bad
Badness and goodness are universals.

>>24964952
>Badness and goodness are universals.
Or they're relational qualities. Which is how we most often use those terms.

>>24964958
Relationship is a universal. The relation between me and you is not the same individual relation between my cat and me. Yet they are both relations.

>>24964968
In which case badness and goodness are one single universal. Which would be crazy.
If you try to conclude universals/ideas/logoi from semantics alone, you're bound to fail.

>>24964973
>semantics
Lmao what? This is not a semantic argument. We stand in a relation to each other as debaters, and my cat and I stand in a relation to each other as pet and owner. These individual relations are not the same, yet they are relations. Or, if another anon joins in the debate, then he and I will also stand in a relation to each other as debaters, and though it is the same type of relation that attains between you and I (that is, the relationship of debaters), it is not the same individual relation, as it is instantiated between me and him and not me and you.
> In which case badness and goodness are one single universal
That's a whole different debate, you're muddying the waters.

>>24964952
So is that why guys like Rorty, Nietzsche, and Deleuze seem so relativistic in many ways?

But then how do they say anything at all. For instance, for Nietzsche, overcoming is clearly good and slave morality is not good (or substitute good with some other term, but the point is obviously normative). Likewise, Deleuze obviously values creativity and freedom. Rorty holds up preventing cruelty as a sort of good. If these measures didn't exist, I don't think their philosophy would make much sense. So is that the problem then, both the relativism (which the latter see as a perk, it supports freedom) but also the self-contrdiction (which is presumably bad)?

But couldn't they just say that self-refutation and performative contradiction are only arbitrarily "bad" and that leaving this standard behind makes us more free because we can think is more ways, even contradictory ones?

And then the naturalists seem like hardcore nominalists too and have somewhat similar problems but guys like Alex Rosenberg seem to have solved this by arguing that we don't really exist and that nothing really means anything (neurons cannot be "about" anything because they are just atoms and atoms are not about anything, so truth and meaning are just illusions, and so is consciousness).

I guess these are unsatisfactory because they contradict themselves too, because they say that naturalism is true. However, since they say good and bad don't exist, doesn't it not matter that "contradicting yourself is bad?"

>>24964980
>This is not a semantic argument.
"Yet they are both relations." is an assertion about semantics. You did not refer to a quality shared between the two instances, you referred to a word being used for them.
>That's a whole different debate, you're muddying the waters.
It is this debate. You said badness and goodness are universalS. To my description of goodness and badness as mere relationships you replied that relationships are a universal, singular. Your goalpost is not met.

>>24964982
Hmm, having written that all out, I now realize that contradicting oneself in this way is often what people mean by "abject sophistry," so maybe that isn't a great comeback. But they can just ask, "why is it bad to be an abject sophist?"

>>24964984
The quality is relationality, which you must have heard of given you said the sentence:
>Or they're relational qualities
If you did not know the meaning of this, why did you say it?
> To my description of goodness and badness as mere relationships you replied that relationships are a universal, singular
I said that Relationship (capital R, no s) is a universal. Relationships are instances of relationality, they are individual.
> Your goalpost is not met.
The question of whether goodness and badness are reducible to 'one single universal' is not relevant to the question of whether nominalism is true.

>>24964988
>The quality is relationality
This contains no information, you're re-iterating your conclusion.
>I said that Relationship (capital R, no s) is a universal.
In a response to good and bad being relations. If your universal capital R Relationship didn't provide a reason to think badness and goodness are universals, why did you say it?

I'll cut to the chase: Do you have anything to offer besides "every word applicable to multiple things is a universal, so goodness and badness gotta be too"?

>>24965006
lmao, you called them relational, and now you're saying that word 'contains no information'. nominalists reduced to admitting they talk nonsense as usual.

>>24964984
If "relations" is just a word for a particular set of instances that are called this, in virtue of what is a relation a relation?

No doubt, we can explain language in nominalist terms, in terms of use, etc. I think this is a very common confusion. Nominalists tend to think that what is at stake with universals, essences, natures, and quiddites is language use and reference (particularly if they are part of the linguistic turn, which makes philosophy of language into a defacto first philosophy). However, the realist tends to advocate for them because they explain how anything can be anything at all. The intersection with language is more oblique. It's probably more important for the causes of language. For instance, if we appeal to use, the next obvious question is why one way of speaking is more useful than any other. If it's use all the way down, that seems like a sort of democratized voluntarism where the language community creates the world, like God speaking the world into existence in Genesis 1.

>>24965010
>you're saying that word 'contains no information'
The word does. Your answer doesn't. Because, you just re-iterated your conclusion without actually providing any additional insight. Relationality is the quality of being relational. Yeah. We kinda knew that already.

I'll take it as a no.

>>24964985
>>24964982
This is precisely why Dante has it that the sins that involve twisting the intellect are the worst sort, occupying the deepest layers of Hell. With a twisted intellect, one can no longer even tell up from down. The sophist can no longer even explain why sophistry and contradiction are bad.

>>24965012
>For instance, if we appeal to use, the next obvious question is why one way of speaking is more useful than any other.
Because it delivers on uses that matter more to us. Cognitive science is doing a whole lot of progress in this sense.
>If it's use all the way down
I wouldn't say so. But my question isn't about what is going on all the way down there, I was mostly just trying to figure out if I'm being presented with the naive trimmed version of universals which are in a circular licensing relationship with words and phrases or if I'm being presented some kind of more experiential or tangible essences and logoi.

>>24964948
I can't steelman it and its proponents sound like idiots.
Each cup derived and enacted the rules of how to hold water completely independently? What the fuck are we even talking about?

>>24965042
"Water" doesn't even exist for them, it's nonsense.

>>24965014
Crazy how dishonest you are

>>24965042
All similarity is different. That's the claim of the ontologies of difference. One can never step into the same river twice. Being is univocal. There is no transcendent realm where things stay same. Attempts to deny this are authoritarian identity thinking, which limit freedom. The same moment, the same experience, is never identical. There is only similarities emerging from a sea of differences.

That's the idea.

Of course, presenting it requires a bunch of seemingly universal statements. Yet this is normally handled by saying that such statements mean something different, are different, in each and every instance, and so are not static absolutes as they might seem, but are themselves always different.

Of course, we might object that either such statements are always the same in some key way, and that this sameness is what is indicated by realism, or else that such theories are guilty of a fallacy of equivocation because their terms mean something wholly different in every instance.

But they might say that cries of "fallacy" are just absolutizing static values. This is just authoritarian identity thinking!

But we might still ask, if everything is contingent and ungrounded in this way, why is being one way and not any other, and why does it appear to have a logos. And they would reply that it just is, seeking absolute grounds and causes is more authoritarian identity thinking! And then appearances of logos is just identity thinking delusions, a failure to grasp difference.

And if we object that the "freedom" they are defending here isn't worth defending, because "free action" has no reason to be one way rather than any other, and so reduces to arbitrariness, to random action, which is hardly "freedom" or else is action determined by some pre-rational desire we just so happen to have," they would reply "that's authoritarian. Now would you like to sign my petition in favor of legalizing sex with children or not?"

>>24965026
Well, use explains something. I don't think it explains everything. Augustine had a notion of meaning is use, but he didn't absolutize it like Wittgenstein. He also had his semiotics, etc. I think that broader approach works better.

>>24965081
It always amazes me how these intellectuals (mostly French) could be so concerned about power relations and freedom in this way and then also advocate and do some of the things they did. For example:

>Wilde took a key out of his pocket and showed me into a tiny apartment of two rooms...The youths followed him, each of them wrapped in a burnous that hid his face. Then the guide left us and Wilde sent me into the further room with little Mohammed and shut himself up in the other with the [other boy]. Every time since then that I have sought after pleasure, it is the memory of that night I have pursued...My joy was unbounded, and I cannot imagine it greater, even if love had been added. How should there have been any question of love? How should I have allowed desire to dispose of my heart? No scruple clouded my pleasure and no remorse followed it. But what name then am I to give the rapture I felt as I clasped in my naked arms that perfect little body, so wild, so ardent, so sombrely lascivious? For a long time after Mohammed had left me, I remained in a state of passionate jubilation, and though I had already achieved pleasure five times with him, I renewed my ecstasy again and again, and when I got back to my room in the hotel, I prolonged its echoes until morning

>>24964948
It seems to me everything is ultimately fundamentally "unique", but that certain things are more related to each other than others, humans interpret this as categories. No two tigers are absolutely alike, but they share a closer relation than to an elephant. Where would this fit in the nominalism vs realism debate?

>>24965203
Trope theory.

>>24965203
Is everything fundementally unique in the same way, or in fundementally unique ways, so that everything is unique in a different way, and unique in new ways each moment? What is similarity if similarity is always unique?

>>24964948
Nominalism in the sense that Aristotle, Ockham, or certain Scholastics practiced it? No. Even those philosophers believed that particulars were things and had essential unity. They simply doubted the concrete, separate existence of higher-order predicates. This did not mean that those universals are not real, not grounded, not evolving, etc., but rather that they are subordinate to what they are grounded in, which would be particulars. It's also worth pointing out that Charles Sanders Peirce has his own headcanon of what nominalism is and what realism is, but I'm getting ahead of myself right now.

Nowadays, nominalism is mixed with bundle theory, materialism, nihilism, moral and epistemic, relativism, and a litany of other practices which are employed for the purposes of cultural critique and subversion. These modernisms give nominalism a bad name. But it's worth pointing out that one can be a realist and also politically partisan, i.e. "my body is that of a man, but my soul, which is what is real, is that of a woman." So, you should not think these metaphysical positions have any innate political biases. You can use any position to argue for any position if you're creative enough as a shill.

>>24965235
Aristotle didn’t practice nominalism.

Which philosophers best describe the net of being, of one is all and all is one?

>>24965265
Aristotle takes a crack at realism in virtually every major work of his corpus. He doesn't think forms are separate, full stop. He repeatedly iterates that particular substances are the bedrock of reality. This is what he says from Categories to Metaphysics. There is no beating the bush around it.

>>24965235
>they are subordinate to what they are grounded in, which would be particulars
Whatever everything we know is grounded in is effectively universal and given the particulars of that thing you have all the information needed to extract all the forms from the data.
There's an omniscient thing that caused everything and contained all the forms before time. This is a third realm, beyond the physical realm and the realm of the mind.

>>24965275
Nominalism versus realism isn't the position that forms subsist separately from particulars. It's the position that there are no substantial forms, essences, natures, etc. There are simply similar particulars which are *said* to share a nature because they share similarities, etc.

This is why Aristotle is virtually never categorized as a nominalist. Note also that the term "universal" in the modern definition of the distinction is not the same thing as a "universal" in Aristotle.

A key difference between the two shows up in final causality. With real natures, final causality is really causal, as opposed to being a label applied to things.

>>24965235
Or if you're not >>24965275, you need to hear this (>>24965374) too, because it is fundementally misunderstanding the debate to think that realism is exclusively the position predicates have a separate existence. Actually, I think we can safely call that a strawman (intentional or not) because not even the most extreme realists claim that every predicate exists as some sort of separate being (even the ones who seem to affirm that some do, e.g., abstract objects).

>>24965214
Tropes are just natures and forms for people who are afraid to admit they are realists.

>>24965083
Same. Augustine (and Christians in general) had the luxury of entertaining mystical experiences where logoi are directly visible. Wittgenstein, like most secular philosophers, have to do without it and so they either go the honest route of admitting meaning is use-driven or they cosplay logoi by pretending that words kinda sorta mirror essences like we saw itt.

>>24965377
Okay this just confused me even more than (>>24965275) already did. Why are you using “position predicate” instead of universals? It seems heavily anachronistic. Is that just the terminology you’re familiar with?
>… not even the most extreme realists claim that every predicate exists as some sort of separate being
Plato ostensibly does, that’s what Aristotle rejects, but Aristotle remains a realist, just of a different kind. When Plato talks about the Form of Justice, he’s positing an independently existing being, a universal.

>>24965389
Why are you making this already confusing thread more confusing. You’re conflating the Tractatus Witty and the PI Witty and it’s clear you’re reading a lot of him because you actually import the strawman he does of St Augustine (read Anscombe). Early Wittgenstein also admits his position undermines itself with the ladder passage and the caricature of Augustine as a mystic just isn’t helpful. Augustine holds meanings as acts of intellect, whereby the mind abstracts intelligible forms from the senses.

>>24965392
Sorry, that should read "the position that predicates."

And no, Plato doesn't think there is a form for any possible predicate. The forms are not primarily about language. If we make up nonsense terms, like flouts, the discontinuous halves of foxes and trout, that does not mean there is a Form of Floutness. Likewise, the predicate "Asian" doesn't mean there is a form of Asianess, or a form for as many distinct types of human as there are terms created to subdivide them. That would be insane.

>>24965403
I have no idea what you think you're responding to. And if I did, appealing to an opinion timeline of a particular philosopher as a clarification method would likely not be too helpful.

>>24965316
Everything that we know is grounded in the particulars that we derived knowledge from. You don't need universals to be self-subsistent to have objective knowledge, to believe in a first cause, or to reject materialism. This is just an irrelevant ideological prison you've placed yourself in.

>>24965374
>It's the position that there are no substantial forms, essences, natures, etc. There are simply similar particulars which are *said* to share a nature because they share similarities, etc.
Aristotle doesn't believe in substantial natures. He argues for substantial forms which are particular and tied to those particulars. The devil is in the details which he disambiguates in Metaphysics, especially in Metaphysics Zeta. The problem is when you extend "form" to encompass "universals", and Aristotle is clear that such "universal forms" are NOT substantial, are NOT self-subsistent, and are ULTIMATELY derived from the particulars themselves, which are first and fundamental. You can't have a game where you argue that Aristotle is a realist (within the "rules" of the problem of universals) and then argue that Aristotle somehow reifies natures when he argues ad nauseum that natures are not things. You also don't need final causes to be universals, either. A great example: Aristotle's unmoved mover. A particular and a final cause and the first principle of everything.

>>24965443
The nominalist innovation was not that substantial forms only exist in particulars, it's that they don't exist period. When we speak of substantial forms, we are merely speaking to a sort of inductive pattern recognition that has resulted in us applying the same names to things. This is why the rise of nominalism is also where final causality is simply removed.

This is why it is a different position. In its original iteration, this is because everything springs from the inscrutable divine will. There are no natures. Not separate, but not in things either. There is the divine will making things act, and we call them by names to the extent we want to group them together.

The way this shakes out as God recedes is that representationalism and the hard objective/subjective divide takes its place. Causality, anything being a cat or ant or rock, values, etc? Those are only in the mind. All terms are creations of the mind. Form itself is just a creation of the mind (this much stays the same; it never has metaphysical efficacy).

And then it develops from there. So, after people get burnt out on the individual mind generating all distinctions, we move to the language community. Are cats similar because they each individually instantiate the same substantial form? No. They are cats because the language community has found it useful to call them cats. Why is this useful? Stop doing metaphysics; we're doing therapy now.

>>24965421
You’re just not very clear and seem to muddy the waters.

>>24965443
>You don't need universals to be self-subsistent to have objective knowledge, to believe in a first cause, or to reject materialism. This is just an irrelevant ideological prison you've placed yourself in.
It has nothing to do with any ideology. You're the one who keeps bringing up your retarded burger culture shit and the point stands in a video game world. The particulars that are foundational to the code of the game are effectively "universal" to that world. That they're not fundamentally universal to every possible world is irrelevant but I'm pretty sure that type of true universal also exist.

>>24965464
Perhaps I'm not being clear enough but rest assured that I was neither characterizing Witty nor Augustine so your response was a complete miss.
That Christian (and even ancient pre-Christian) understanding of "meaning" builds on mystical vision is a relatively uncontroversial fact, many important texts on logoi directly refer to this way of knowing from St. Maximos to Plato and Augustine was 100% aware of this epistemological channel. That secular philosophers don't entertain this idea is, to me, also fairly uncontroversial but if you have an case to make here, I'll be happy to hear it.

>>24965026
>Because it delivers on uses that matter more to us. Cognitive science is doing a whole lot of progress in this sense.
That means words are referencing real things. You're describing people revealing an underlying territory and mapping it with words based on usefulness. The territory existed before the words. Cups fucking exist you fucking retards.

>>24965488
>Cups fucking exist you fucking retards.
Things exist that we use as cups. The same goes for tables, hats and weapons. The territory is cognitive and relational, we're not penetrating some profound ontological field, we are systematizing the systematic types of affordances our environment grants us.

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>>24964948
Aquinas also saw the individual/substance as fundamental, in order to understand them we do make use of and understand more abstract things however they don't actually exist.
Individuals are fundamentally all unique, the form and matter are not separable and there is no "human form" people share. The move Aquinas makes to establish the unity among the multiplicity through analogical participation in God. All things ultimately depend on God for their causality and it's his power working through them, however he creates them as particular kinds/natures. These natures are not particular things they share, they just are "instances" of the essence applied to particular matter.

The way I think of it is you have the human essence, the abstract idea of a human abstracted from matter, not sexed but something able-to-be-sexed, it does not actually exist in a real way it's a analogical way of talking about something that exists in God, which is absolutely simple.

When something is created/brought into existence, it's form actualizes some parcel of matter in accord with it's essence. Essence is just like the rule of "for x matter you need y form and this completes the essence of what a human is".

Then the human exists with their own individual form, and matter. There is no shared form this form is fundamentally unique and tied to this person.
However using our intellect we can abstract out the sort of plan of what unites the form and matter and what unity/harmony it expresses. We abstract out the essence and this is the general class of thing, which again does not actually exist anywhere.
We can say analogically it exists in God, and that God creates things in groups, and that things that are able through efficient causality able to bring about other things are able to bring about additional instances of this essence however this is only possible because of God's maintaining their existence as it is.

So in a sense there are no abstract categories and only individuals. But in another sense there is only God and everything just participates in him. But then God is absolutely simple, unrestricted existence as such, so there is nothing actually identifiable with the abstract concept since he has no parts.
These restricted particular beings are restricted in a common way which is also tied to their matter, so there is in some sense we have to permit group categories but the lines are foggy since the only way to actually understand the absolute difference between these types and how they participate in God is basically the beatific vision.

I think both are true, even though connecting them and isolating the mechanics of how the interrelate is quite subtle.

I quite like this bit heidegger talks about in the parmenides, his description of that idea in general describes the reality quite well. You need both the appearing in it's appearances, and the stability which shines through everything.

>>24965552
Also re the cup thing those are artifacts they don't exist as such, they are artifical combinations of things like porcealin, enamel, paint (pigment suspended in a medium) and whatever actual substances they are made up of. They participate in the mind of people rather in God and are basically "social constructs" properly speaking however they do have a sense of internal causation due to just what the fundamental relationship of the natures of the involved substances are and the effects they express.

>>24965491
Did whales or oaks not exist as organic wholes before people decided to systematize them as such?

But then why do people systematize these affordances in one way and not

>>24965265
He planted the seed, though

>>24965552
This seems too nominalist to be true to Saint Thomas. While it's true that universality as universality only exists in the mind, Thomas makes a number of distinctions that allow him to chart more of a via media here.

For instance, he absolutely thinks all men share a form as species. They are one in species, many in number. Numerical identity is not shared. Formal identity is. We have one ratio, quiddity, and nature.

There is some debate about the individuating principle in Thomas, whether it is the act of existence or matter, but that is sort of beside the point here.

Essence is an intrinsic principle, so I am not sure if I would use "rule" here, but it might fit. But what is important is that it exists in individuals (as individuated by matter), in the mind (as a universal), and in God (as the exemplar cause). Yet with the absolute unity of God we must recall that what is one in God can be many in effect. God is the cause of immanent natures. We "live and move and have our being" in God (Acts 17:28) but Aquinas creates separation for secondary causality here.

Personally, Aquinas is not my favorite here. I think the Wester notion of act leaves him with some issues he struggles to resolve. I'd rather speak of Logoi that are part of the divine energies, as opposed to being "in" the divine essence. I think the essence/energies distinction nicely answers the concerns that sent Ockham off the deep end.

>>24965586
That depends on who you ask. Someone might say God has created a separate logos for whales than for oaks, I wouldn't really know, but the example of cups is completely affordance-driven.
>why do people systematize these affordances in one way and not
Because humans participate with their environment in generally similar ways. We usually want to survive, have sex, experience beauty, transcend individuality etc. and our words serve these motivations. The moment a group of people's participation differs from the average human experience (such as scientists or mystics), their language starts taking a different direction and might even completely transform, as has happened to math and formal logic.

It's the insight that haunts Aquinasbros in their sleep, the same one that everyone from Wittgenstein to relativists repeat ad nauseam - our words are tools we shaped for particular usages, they aren't objective mirrors of reality.

Most people think nominalism means “you can say whatever you want, it’s all in your head.” But Aristotelian nominalism denies that universals subsist, which is a very different claim. They do not think our thoughts are arbitrary, but that thoughts aren’t “things” or even thing-like. I’ve learned over the years that most people here are straight up not smart enough to understand the actual medieval debate so I won’t bother trying to explain it to you further.

>>24965642
>Most people think nominalism means “you can say whatever you want, it’s all in your head.”
No one ITT has said that.

>But Aristotelian nominalism
No one calls it this because it is a miscategorization. This has also been explained ITT. You're free to use your own idiosyncratic labels, but it's a little rich to claim that "no one here understands the medieval debate" (implying you do) when you keep misusing its terms.

>universals subsist
This is not what defines realism. If it did, Aquinas would be a nominalist. Maximos the Confessor would be a nominalist. Most of the Patristics and Scholastics would be nominalists, and the whole notion of a late-medieval nominalist revolution would make no sense.

>>24965443
>>24965443
Wow here’s the one guy itt who has apparently actually read Aristotle’s Metaphysics. It is sad but predictable that most here show no awareness of how this all got started and what “the philosopher” said about it. No one seems to understand the problems with realism that Aristotle identified.
>>24965458
>nominalists think substantial forms exist in particulars
No they like Aristotle do not think they exist at all.
“But then… how can it be a cup without a cupness something-or-other that makes it a cup? How absurd!” It’s hopeless lol. The problem is picture-thinking, in many cases it is incurable.

>>24965615
There is nothing nominalist about what I said, the essence only exists in the intellect and in God analogically it does not actually exist independently or "in" something somehow unless you want to say God is something which things are "in".

>human nature exists in the intellect in abstraction from all that individuates; and this is why it has a content which is the same in relation to all individual men outside the soul; it is equally the likeness of all of them, and leads to a knowledge of all insofar as they are men. And it is from the fact that the nature has such a relation to all individuals that the intellect discovers and attributes the notion of the species to it. Whence the Commentator says in his considerations on the first book of On the Soul that “it is the intellect which causes universality in things.” Ibn-Sînâ, too, says this in his Metaphysics.

This is the whole point of the distinction between essence and existence, essence as such is undesignated and not particular, it does not make sense to say essence is an intrinsic principle to thing because then it would be designated to this specific thing. It is not causing each human to be human in the same way. Essence is the restriction of their existence to be this kind of thing in some designated matter such that they have form actualizing it as that essence. The essence is that through which the existence actualizes the thing, but it is not "in" the thing.

A thing is actualized by existence, essence is the principle that restricts the actualization to be "this sort of thing" it is a principle of limitation on the act of existence not somehow an internal "cause" in the substance itself.

> In singular things it has a multiple existence in accord with the diversity of these singular things; yet the existence of none of these things belongs to the nature considered in itself, i.e., absolutely. For it is false to say that the nature of man, as such, has existence in this singular thing; because if existence in this singular thing belonged to man as man, man would never exist outside this singular thing. Similarly, if it belonged to man as man not to exist in this singular thing, man would never exist in it. But it is true to say that it does not belong to man as man to exist in this or that singular thing, or in the soul. It is clear, therefore, that the nature of man, absolutely considered, abstracts from any of these existences, but in a way such that it excludes no one of them.

You seem to be mixing up essence and form and somehow making an argument that people all share the same form which more indicates you don't even have a vauge understanding of what an individual even is somehow.

>>24965683
>No one ITT has said that.
Yes they have. Not in those exact words but I guess to you that means it hasn’t been said at all.
> No one calls it this because it is a miscategorization
It is not. A nominalist denies that universals exist. Aristotle denies that universals exist - full stop not with a non-universal non-particular “essence” as middle. Aristotle is a nominalist. You clearly have not even read him.
> This is not what defines realism.
Incorrect, the entire issue is that Thomist realism reifies universals by the back door. So I can tell you’re retarded and we can’t have a conversation. You’ll just keep fishing for retarded “gotcha!”s, as in this post, ignoring the substance of the debate because, ignorant of Aristotle, you don’t know a thing about it.

arguing about what specific people thought and is fake philosophy that academics do because they can't actually think, it's gay as fuck just argue for what you think is real. its okay to bring up people you think you agree with but the second people start arguing about what X really thought or actually Y thought more this like nigger say what you think is real no one gives a fuck about your interpretation of a book!!!

>>24964952
>if there are no universals
No one denies that there ARE universals the question is how they are related to particulars and what they are in themselves (thoughts). “If Aristotle was right then there’s no language because there are no universals lol”. Retarded argument, misses the entire point. Certainly “this”, “cup”, etc are thoughts we have but could they be things? No, things are not universal. Well could the things be, like, made of them somehow? No, that doesn’t make sense, because things aren’t universal. “But, but, if the universals aren’t real, how do they refer to objects?” They stand in a relation of potency to them. “But, but, then why on earth ARE things intelligible if universals are thoughts?” God. Things are intelligible but they are what they are as they are, they’re not composed of or “participating in” (whatever that means) universals. “But then like maybe universals/essences are thoughts in God’s brain?” No, God is simple. There’s the Metaphysics in micro form for you. The world is genuinely intelligible; in that sense universals are ‘real’ and no one disputes that. But they’re not things. You for example are not a composite of humanity itself and matter, that’s picture-thinking, as if metaphysics is like baking a cake.

>>24965718
Yes we should quit reading and philosophize from the gut like you. It really is quite disgusting to read this swill. “How could a man be a man if he didn’t HAVE this substantial form?” Where does he keep it, in his wallet? Seriously Aristotle discusses these issues at great length and you should read him.

If the realists are right, why/how do I hate Mennonites? Is there a substantial form of Mennonite-ness? Are Mennonites not human or what? How do I form this judgement if the Mennonite is humanity+matter? What if I decide I only really hate the female Mennonites because they sell those expensive cookies at the Farmer’s market? Do women form a separate species now? How can I more or less at will carve reality in this way if we live in a Fisher Price universe where any person is humanity+matter? How would language function if it’s limited by metaphysical categories that rigidly delimit what the object “really is”? But no language and thought are fluid, they can be fluid because they are “just” thoughts - though thoughts grounded in real particulars.

>>24965742
it's taking out a position on your own I didn't say you can't reference or be informed by actual thinkers, but the thinkers are trying to describe reality and basicalyl everyone shifted their views over their lives. It's just a way for you to avoid confrontation and accountability, you have some specific view now and masking it in someone elses name is just avoiding actually having to articulate it.

>>24965704
You're interpreting those incorrectly. Essence considered absolutely is a technical distinction. It is one way to consider essence. Thomas presents three. In the mind (universal), in particulars (individual), and absolutely (neither).

And the idea of a limiting essence is sound, but the essence isn't some extrinsic thing sitting between creatures and God, nor is it simply a mode of primary divine causality.

Essence considered absolutely isn't a principle, correct, but that's one distinction of three. Essence in itself is undesignated. Essence in individuals is designated by matter. Essence in intellect is universalized.

The spatial metaphor "in" can be quibbled about, but it is metaphorical for the intellect, and in God as well.

>>24965768
>thinking is bad
>reading philosophy is bad
>talking about philosophy is bad
>I’m the real philosopher here because I hate thinking
I do not care what happens to people like you.

>>24965788
its not metaphorical, it's analogical lol. It's through the effects we can infer the cause, the cause of this particular configuration of being is in part through the essence so we can abstract it out, any actual description of HOW the essence is in the being is basically just absurd and this is a way of making it sound way more like platonic then it actually is. no species do not have some "species-making principle" in them we pull out, this also points to why our sort of ability to abstract out is so sort of error prone.

Yes you can say in some sense because the being of the thing is an effect of it so the cause is in some sense "in" the being but this is basically just lying it is not the essence in any real sense which properly speaking is abstract.

You accused me of being a nominalist but you are just saying it's "metaphorically" (are you esl?) in the being, in the same sense it's metahorically in the intellect and divine intellect, which again is just hand wavey and deceptive.

It is in the mind, it is used as a part of it being made to be what it is as a limiting principle as part of God's act of creation such that we can describe as it being in him in the sense of he is able to cause things with that effect, however in what sense specifically is it in his body? Like specifically what is it? The form of form, just a general vibe the thing has?

>something that is by definition undesignated is in particular things designated
so then it's no longer essence? Like you can say I misread those quotes but he seems to be saying exactly what I am while you are just playing loosey goosey with the idea it is somehow in the thing, which I agree with in an extremely remote sense, but essence by definition is undesignated which it can only be in the intellect.
>it is false to say that the nature of man, as such, has existence in this singular thing
Really not sure how this can be any clearer, if you want to talk about how the cause is in some sense presence in the effect, as God is present in and to all people yes sure it is there in that sense but I do not think that is what anyone means when they are saying "essences are in things". Like I said it's basically people not knowing the difference between form and essence.

>>24965805
>your only way of thinking is by arguing about what other people said
cattle

>>24965788
Please tell us all how an absolute essence, neither particular nor universal, actually could be or what it could be.

>>24965808
>I’m so smart I don’t need to read geniuses like Aristotle!
Swine.

>>24965821
You cant even read short 4chan posts and understand them dude if I were you I wouldn't bother with aristotle you just don't have what it takes

>>24965806
He's accusing you of butchering Aquinas because you are.

>>24965947
whatever youtuber you learned from it butchered it that's not my fault

>>24965958
No, you're butchering it.

>7. And because that by which a real thing is constituted in its proper genus or species is what is signified by the definition expressing what the real thing is, philosophers sometimes use the word “quiddity” for the word “essence.” This is what the Philosopher often calls what something was to be, i.e., that by which it belongs to something to be what it is.

That is, as ens reale, not ens rationis (a strictly mental entity).

>12. Because the word “being” is used absolutely and with priority of substances, and only posteriorly and with qualification of accidents, essence is in substances truly and properly, in accidents only in some way with qualification.

>13. Further, some substances are simple and some are composed, and essence is in each. But essence is in simple substances in a truer and more noble way, according to which they also have a more noble existence; for they ─ at least that simple substance which is first, and which is God ─ are the cause of those which are composed. But because the essences of the simple substances are more hidden from us, we ought to begin with the essences of composed substances, so that we may progress more suitably in learning from what is easier.

14. In composed substances there are form and matter, for example, in man soul and body.

15. But we cannot say that either one of them alone may be said to be the essence. That matter alone is not the essence of a real thing is clear, since through its essence a real thing is knowable and assigned to a species or to a genus. But matter alone is neither a principle of knowledge, nor is it that by which something is assigned to a genus or to a species; rather a thing is so assigned by reason of its being something actual.

16. Neither can the form alone of a composed substance be said to be its essence, although some try to assert this. For it is evident from what has been said that essence is what is signified by the definition of a real thing. And the definition of natural substances contains not only form, but matter as well; otherwise natural definitions and mathematical ones would not differ.

17. Neither can it be said that matter is placed in the definition of a natural substance as something added to its essence or as something outside its essence, because this mode of definition is proper to accidents, which do not have a perfect essence. This is why accidents must include in their definition a subject which is outside their genus. It is clear therefore that essence includes matter and form.

>>24966015
18. Further, neither can it be said that essence signifies some relation between matter and form or something added to them, because this would of necessity be an accident or something extraneous to the real thing, and the real thing would not be known through it. And these are traits of essence. For through the form, which is the actuality of matter, matter becomes something actual and something individual. Whence what supervenes does not confer on matter actual existence simply, but such an actual existence; as accidents in fact do. Whiteness, for example, makes something actually white. Whence the acquisition of such a form is not called generation simply, but generation in a certain respect. It remains, therefore, that the word “essence” in composed substances signifies that which is composed of matter and form.

https://isidore.co/aquinas/english/DeEnte&Essentia.htm

>>24966019
And this is probably more relevant for your error

> in what sense specifically is it in his body? Like specifically what is it? The form of form, just a general vibe the thing has?

>56. This nature has a twofold existence, one in singular things, the other in the soul; and accidents follow upon the nature according to either existence. In singular things it has a multiple existence in accord with the diversity of these singular things; yet the existence of none of these things belongs to the nature considered in itself, i.e., absolutely. For it is false to say that the nature of man, as such, has existence in this singular thing; because if existence in this singular thing belonged to man as man, man would never exist outside this singular thing. Similarly, if it belonged to man as man not to exist in this singular thing, man would never exist in it. But it is true to say that it does not belong to man as man to exist in this or that singular thing, or in the soul. It is clear, therefore, that the nature of man, absolutely considered, abstracts from any of these existences, but in a way such that it excludes no one of them.

>>24966015
>>24966019
>>24966038 (this one is just agreeing with me lol)
>He is unable to articulate a position just quote from the thing I already quoted from but he doesn't know that because he only skimmed the beginning until he found something that seemed relevant which was 7 paragraphs in
please in your own words if essence is in particular existing things what is it doing that is distinct from what the form is doing? I described my understanding of essence in pretty specific detail already, you have only succeeded in acting gay and quoting something at me I already cited. Where is this essence specifically, how is it related to other instances of it's kind? Do people just share the same "essence" and whatever it's doing? Or does everything have an individual essence that we abstract out what's undetermined about it, but then how is it distinct from form?

In your own words please show me you have an actually functioning brain. It was cool in real time to see you skim that essay for anything relevant though

>>24966044
>This nature has a twofold existence, one in singular things, the other in the soul; and accidents follow upon the nature according to either existence.

This is exactly what you denied. If you don't know the difference between ens reale and ens rationis it is no wonder you are confusing Aquinas. I have already explained that Aquinas makes a three part distinction:

In the mind (universal), in particulars (individual), and absolutely (neither).

You cited a passage on the essence considered absolutely (which is a technical distinction explained in detail in the work you are citing, which you either didn't read or didn't understand). You then claimed that because the essence considered absolutely is not in individuals, essence is not in individuals. This is nonsense. It's not even a sort of questionable distinction that could be argued, the source you are citing speaks of essences and natures in individuals (indeed, as that which is known, see §18), as ens reale not ens rationis. Being is prior to being known.

>>24965491
>The territory is cognitive and relational
A cup doesn't stop carrying water if your mind changes.
The category fucking exists externally to minds and "relations".
You can't think or begin to pretend to think about any subject.

>>24965635
>they aren't objective mirrors of reality.
Nobody is saying they are retard.
>we want to survive
Cups exist if you want to survive or not. The property of being able to carry water becomes more relevant to someone who values carrying water but the category existed before the mind mapped the category as useful.

>>24965704
>There is nothing nominalist about what I said, the essence only exists in the intellect and in God analogically it does not actually exist independently or "in" something somehow unless you want to say God is something which things are "in".

You quoted a direct contradiction of this.

>In singular things [essence] has a multiple existence in accord with the diversity of these singular things

>essence as such is undesignated and not particular,

Essence considered absolutely is a type of mental abstraction, it does not mean "essence itself" or "essence most purely." The point is that it is individual in creatures, universal in the mind, and can be considered as neither.

>The essence is that through which the existence actualizes the thing, but it is not "in" the thing.

Aquinas speaks of essences and natures being "in" real beings (i.e. not mental) over and over throughout the entirety of the work you are citing.

>>24966681
>>24966683
>A cup doesn't stop carrying water if your mind changes.
Neither does a cloud. And yet, only one of them will be a cup due to the relation to embodied human cognition. The category is not defined objectively, it is defined by relation to embodied human engagement. Which is by definition subjective.

I am inclined to believe that there do exist "objective" essences/logoi that aren't defined by human cognition. But cups, tables, games etc. aren't even close. They are so cognition-driven they don't even have precise definitions, any one you can make will have thousands of false exclusions or false inclusions, and we will spot all of them by ... remembering engagement.

If you will reply to this, I will appreciate you telling me what exactly triggers the emotional response. Someone disagrees with you, says something that seems stupid yeah, yeah, but this happens daily and you don't melt down like this. What is it about some categories having no independent essence that makes you afraid?

>>24966683
>the category existed before the mind mapped the category as useful
Where?

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>>24966864
I would tend to agree that artefacts lack essences, at least in the sense that beings do. However, I feel like the categories of objective versus subjective are basically just doing the work of the old reality versus appearances distinction, only the distinction has been calcified into an absolute dichotomy (so that appearances are no longer "real," no longer real properties of things). The subjective/objective distinction tends to have all sorts of extra unhelpful conceptual baggage layered onto it as well, such as assumptions of representationalism, or metaphysical assumptions about the metaphysics of appearances. For example, often 'objective' is often taken to be something like a synonym for noumenal, so that it turns out that absolutely no knowledge could ever be objective.

Whereas, when we speak of news stories being more or less objective, the difference between news and propaganda, etc. this is not what we mean.

There is an obvious sense in which a sign on a store's door that says: "closed" is objectively means that the store is not open for business. Every competent speaker of the language knows this. Facts do not cease to be facts or objectives because they involve mind. Such an account only makes sense on certain (bad) assumptions.

But in terms of being a true being, obviously a principle of unity is essential, as Aristotle lays out in the Physics. So organisms are most properly beings and most properly have essences, just as those who are more psychologically, noetically, and spiritually unified are more fully persons (hypostasis). Whereas the unity of a cup is imposed from without and is less intelligible in itself.

But unity, like truth and goodness, is a case of contrary not contradictory opposition. So being, and possession of an essence, is a matter of degree. We can speak of the essence of accidents and properties in a derivative and subordinate ways (whiteness, roundness, etc.).

I would like to say that things are beings with essences that are more or less intelligible in themselves according to their logoi (according to their causes as unified in the divine energies) and that being is a matter of reflecting the divine energies more or less (of participation). To be a creature is simply to reflect this light while not being the light.

>>24966894
>The subjective/objective distinction tends to have all sorts of extra unhelpful conceptual baggage
Completely agreed. Which is why I tend to use "relational" wherever possible, as it steps outside this old dichotomy.
>noumenal, so that it turns out that absolutely no knowledge could ever be objective.
Besides revelation, self-reflection etc., perhaps.
>a store's door that says: "closed" is objectively means that the store is not open for business
We can create propositions about any "subjective" event and then make "objective" statements about that proposition and its handling. This doesn't make the aforementioned event objective.
What a sign is intended to communicate is completely subjective, I can sell drugs and "closed" will be a sign that you need to knock 8 times and I'll sell you some meth. You are right that there is a statistical mode of these intended communications, and that is an objective statement, but this doesn't necessarily characterize how the events go. It characterizes how we aggregate the events.
>things are beings with essences that are more or less intelligible in themselves according to their logoi
Thos that do have a logos, definitely. I don't see that human-centric categories have a logos besides extending the human one, which I think is what the other posters disagreed with. To them, it seems "the category existed before the mind mapped the category as useful", which in cases of cups makes no sense.

>>24965815
No one can answer this? I’m sincerely asking the realists a simple question. Is the essence, prior to the particular and universal, a substance or a quality or what? And how is it neither particular nor universal? How is humanity or caninity not a universal itself?

In Aristotle a thing has an essence but it is unified with matter. It’s not some separate “being” or near-being. The thing is genuinely intelligible but not because of an intelligibility-causing-something-or-other. These threads are very frustrating because it seems like people simply have not read Aristotle.

>>24965815
>>24966986
The "essence considered absolutely" abstracts away from all existence. It doesn't exist anywhere. To consider an essence absolutely is to look at it according to its proper definition alone, stripping away any specific mode of existence it might have. What is said of "essence absolutely " is not what is true of essence tout court, it is a particular mode of consideration. This mode of consideration is important because it leads us to the conclusion that for finite, contingent creatures essence/quiddity does not imply/contain existence.

>>24966997
Also, it is neither universal nor particular. Essences exist in the mind universally, as a one over many, and in real beings (ens reale) as many (as a multiply realized principle)

>>24966997
Right, I understand that. But the essence is meant to mediate the particular and the universal. The standard nominalist line here is that the essence is itself in fact a universal, not neither universal nor particular, not prior to universality and particularity. So the third man applies to it as do all the standard Aristotelian objections to universal substance.
> because it leads us to the conclusion that for finite, contingent creatures essence/quiddity does not imply/contain existence.
You don’t need to be a realist to understand that the thought of a thing (of a phoenix to use Aquinas’ example) is not the same as its existence or to account for this distinction.

>>24967009
Essence considered absolutely isn't a substance. It is a conceptual abstraction. It doesn't have independent existence; that's sort of the whole point of the exercise. It doesn't mediate between anything ontologically, it mediates epistemically and semantically. It's about how/what terms like "humanity" signify.

Aquinas is attempting to reduce confusion and overcome common conflations by making careful distinctions (which are themselves confusing no doubt, but better than simply assuming that one signifies unambiguously).

Nominalists didn't really have any problem with essence considered absolutely precisely because they could interpret it as ens rationis. They deflated it though. For Aquinas, it is not a thing but a way of considering something real, for the nominalists it is purely mental (because they deny real natures).

>>24967076
>Essence considered absolutely isn't a substance. It is a conceptual abstraction. It
NTA but it seems to me that is how secular scholars understand essences. Because conceptual abstraction is all they have. On the other hand, Platonists and Christians use conceptual abstraction to arrive at essences, but they are aware that this method is just a substitute for direct perception of essences. It is explicitly discussed in Timaeus.

>>24967078
Right, but as Aquinas points out in ST I, q. 85, a.2, if essences were exclusively in the mind then science and understanding would only be of the mind itself. He is here correctly forcasting the problems that would be wrought in Berkeley, Locke, Hume, Kant, etc., which have dominated modern thought. We end up locked inside our heads, only knowing our own minds or our own ideas.

https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1085.htm

>>24967099
I have always found it charming how Aquinas picks up the issue that would shipwreck philosophy and says: "but that would be retarded."

One of the lesser known Neoplatonists does this with the Empiricists too. He bodies them with basically every argument that would later become the cutting edge crisis of early 20th century empiricism, including that the premises of empiricism are unverifiable empirically. BTFO, empiricism (and its attendant nominalism) disappeared for over 1,000 years before being resurrected only to collapse under the same problems. Although the second time around it successfully conflated itself with the scientific method and was able to hang around longer.

>>24965642
>>24965702
>>24965713
>>24965739
>>24965757
You always accuse others of making Aristotle more of a realist than he actually is but you treat Aquinas the same way. The point of ‘essence’ is just as it is often used in Aristotle, it is the thing’s intelligibility as such. No one is suggesting that this intelligibility is some sort of being or that the thing is ‘made of’ it in a crude sense, merely that it *is* a genuine element of being. By separating the mere universal from the essence, Aquinas admits the freedom of thought that we have, but also affirms what Aristotle says many times, that nature and natural substances *are* intelligible in themselves. Amusingly, when you say, as you have in the past, that it is ‘essential to the thing that it be thought of as the universal’, while denying that the universal as such exists, you are affirming the Thomist position. I don’t know what is wrong with you to make you so caustic and hostile. It’s wonderful that you know Aristotle well but if you want to contribute to these discussions you should at least read Aquinas’ Commentary on the Metaphysics. At best your posts over the years have served to push back on a crudely Platonist understanding of Aristotle and Aquinas on the problem of universals. But your ignorance (dare I say, arrogant ignorance?) of Aquinas just make you look like an idiot to anyone who has studied the relevant texts.

>>24966829
I never said they aren't in it in any sense, just analogically as effect related to cause, the form is the thing actually shaping the thing and making be what it is to be, I keep asking you to distinguish essence from form and what it's actually doing "in" the thing if it is an active principle of the thing as you say but you are just ignoring that.
as
>>24966986
says, what is the specific essence, what is it actually doing in things if it is in things.
>>24967076
If something is a "divine idea" by which God creates things I do not think it's actually fair to call that "purely mental" or to say that position is in any actual way nominalist. To me it is more than adequate to just say natural kinds are an effect of essences but the essences are not actually in the thing but that the thing, except speaking analogically as cause to effect.

You can keep saying it's "in" things but you haven't even attempted to say how or why it is in things.

There is 3 things we are talking about
>Essence as divine idea (not actually a thing) expressed as a limiting principle of the act of existence of some thing
>Essence as that idea is expressed in the thing
>Essence as abstracted out of that thing and properly universal

The first two are obvious "what people call essence" the middle one is an effect of essence, which allows us to abstract out the essence from the thing, but the thing itself is a form/matter composite essence is not a part of it, it's a part of how it is caused through the act of existence, and it in some sense depends on it but the actual causes in the thing, the formal cause, is not a universal "humanity" it is the form as related to make "this particular" matter be human it is different between every human it is about how this matter is made to come close to the exemplar humanness as an idea we can abstract out, which is used as a principle of it's creation.

I'm not sure how I can be any more specific than this. To say the essence is in the thing basically seems to be equivocating 2 very different things just because they have an analogical relationship but essence as principle is not the same as essence as effect. When we abstract out an idea we pull out the essence as principle through the effects, we don't pull the essence out of the thing itself.

>>24966864
>>24966894
re: artfiacts I do think there is something spookier going on with them Marshall Mcluhan's work on formal cause points to it well (he was very engaged and friends with all the big thomists of his day some of which like frederick wilhelmsen wrote essays on mcluhan's ideas and got started studying the medieval trivium) . There is some sort of inherent "compatibility" of the involved natural kinds that is expressed over and about the "idea" of the artifact and why it was put together. If you are putting an artifact together you naturally disregard the physical traits of the involved natural kinds except to the extent which it brings about your desired structure, but those ignored traits are still there and expressing their being. There is the sort of intentional artifactual quality and then the actual artifact structure of what is the net effect of all it's constituent parts expressing their natures which is a somewhat mysterious and unclear thing, especially if you are speaking of artifacts which could be made with an array of natural kinds. His whole concept of media is about this "artifical" formal cause impacting and structuring people who engage with them, through the obscured natural kinds people have forgotten and whose being has withdrawn from the being of their priority of the idea of the thing in human minds. I'd really like if people went more into this idea it's getting at something but would be nice if it was developed a bit more.

>>24967099
>He is here correctly forcasting the problems that would be wrought in Berkeley, Locke, Hume, Kant, etc
This is a common misunderstanding among people who study premodern philosophy. But Kant was overcoming the dualism of mind and nature even as his language makes it sound as if he's digging it deeper. Then in the other idealists it is completely overcome, in different ways. While Kant is often understood as an anti-metaphysician, he was really only opposed to early modern metaphysics (your Berkeley, Locke, Hume etc). By affirming, more or less, that the intelligibility of the world is prior to its being - even as he calls this being 'mere appearance' - and that consciousness and self-consciousness are that in terms of which everything else must be understood, he's really going back, in a weird way, to classical metaphysics. Kant preserves this empiricist skepticism about theology and so on but even that comes in through practical reason. In the other idealists this division between theory and practice disappears and they become even closer to premodern thought.

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>>24967190
Well, the irony about Alchy Aristotle Boomer Anon is that he often opines that he understands Aquinas quite well, as well as his failings, unlike the tradcath pseuds who only watch YouTube. But as demonstrated in the thread, and so many threads, he does not even understand Aquinas' basic distinctions, the vague outlines even. It would be one thing to have a criticism of of Aquinas, it's another to have no clue what he says and to start throwing out short excerpts that are badly misread out of context.

But really, I think he just wants to troll, or is in too much of an alcoholic stupor to ever learn anything new in these threads. Because he has been corrected over and over in the fact that the term "universal" is used in a different sense in defining nominalism and realism in contemporary thought than it is in Aristotle. He has been told over and over that realism versus nominalism is not about subsistent forms/essences as beings. He refuses to learn the terms of the debate he wants to engage in, probably because it is more effective trolling to state that Aristotle (and Aquinas, he's made that claim too) are nominalists.

I wouldn't even say his understanding of Aristotle is particularly good, since he seems to conflate his own position, that natures must be only in the mind, with Aristotle's. On this he could benefit from pic related.

>>24967213
Wait, is Ariholic the same guy as the "Aristotle was a representationalist" Anon?

>>24967213
>that natures must be only in the mind,
It's not that nature must be "only" in the mind but that universals are only in the mind and any attempt to reify the essence is equivalent to reifying a universal. Someone who doesn't recognize where I'm coming from here, or why I'm saying it, really doesn't understand Aristotle and hasn't read him. I've explained time and time again that Aristotle thinks the world is genuinely intelligible and here, again, you accuse me of thinking intelligibility is 'only' in the mind because you don't understand the terms of the debate because you don't know Aristotle.
>universal" is used in a different sense in defining nominalism and realism in contemporary thought than it is in Aristotle.
I'm actually the guy who is constantly saying this. This is why denying the subsistence of universals is not the same as radical skepticism etc. Here you're accusing me again of being some kind of skeptic/subjectivist because you're too retarded to follow my posts and have not read Aristotle.
>realism versus nominalism is not about subsistent forms/essences as beings.
It absolutely is - not that they are or are not 'beings' but that there is anything besides 1.) the real particulars; and 2.) the universals in our mind. It's depressing as shit that we've had this conversation so many times and you still manage to get everything backwards. I realize it is incomprehensible that someone could only endorse 1.) and 2.) and yet think the world is intelligible, but this is what the Metaphysics is about if you would care to read it. I insult you because you're retarded, a few months back you didn't even have any awareness of Aristotle's arguments against the existence of universals in the Metaphysics, actually no one did of those participating in the threads. So most of you really are useless pseuds and you can take cheap shots at me all day but nothing will change that.
>>24967190
Ngl niggie you schooled me a bit with this post. But what you describe here is not what the tradcath zoomers I've been arguing take as Thomist realism. But Aquinas always speaks of essence as the 'what-ness' of the thing - 'horse' is a thought in my mind but 'horseness' is some real something-or-other. But this is to conflate the essence with the universal, the ground of intelligibility with what is understood. To go back to my dumb example above with the Mennonite - if the horse is a horse by horseness, how come I can also say it is <x> breed of horse, or the horse of Mr. B, and in thinking this make THIS its essence in my thought? So I'm on board with asserting the intelligibility of being but not with saying that this intelligibility just is the nominalization of the universal - that's just another universal, a thought.

>>24967223
Aristotle was a representationalist, a universal is not a particular. He attacks this thesis in DA actually and associates it with Empedocles. He says in thinking the passive intellect is identical with what it thinks in the same sense, and he says the same thing here in the same language, vision is identical with what it sees - as seen. He consistently DENIES that a universal, a thought, it the same as a real, particular being, all over the place - in the Categories, in DA, in the zoological works, and all over the Metaphysics. He also, again, holds that the thing IS genuinely intelligible, so you are truly knowing its nature, but not it itself. As he says in Meta 1 the particular is not genuinely known; the 'knowing' of the particular is like perception. He says this also in other places. So you are another useless pseud who hasn't read Aristotle and cobbled together a fantasy reading based on what you've heard from other people, in secondary sources, maybe three or four of the dozens of books Aristotle wrote, etc.

>>24967298
on the other hand he is not a representationalist as thinking that we 'only' know our thoughts and being is this absolute other. But you guys thinking 'being just is thinking bro', when in fact thinking thinks being but being as such is not thinkable. Being is immediate, thinking is mediated. He talks about this for example at the end of Post An 1 when he's talking about the relation between doxa and episteme. I realize most of you can't understand what I just said, it's like talking about philosophy with a fucking five year old. "But... everyone KNOWS Aristotle thought the world was immanently intelligible!" That's correct, he does think this. But he still has this dualism between the particular and the universal, this is the crux of his break with Plato. It's just so frustrating you have no goddamn idea, everything I'm saying is IN ARISTOTLE explicitly. Then you want to blow up this dualism - when I know horse, the essence of horse is in my brain, illuminated by the divine intellect. Then why don't you know all about the horse? Why can you carve up this 'essence' at will in any number of ways? "Well then you're saying our understanding of the horse is arbitrary!" No, it is caused by the particular. As he says in DA the horse is 'potentially' the universal, is potentially UNDERSTOOD as what it is universally. It's not that the universal thought is hovering around constituting what it is, on the contrary reality grounds our thoughts, and God grounds the intelligibility of reality. You guys can read as much Palamas and fucking Maximus the Confessor as you want I really think it's a waste of time if you haven't studied the master and these threads offer abundant proof every time.

>>24967333
>>24967298
>>24967290
1.) No one here thinks an essence is a being. Talking about the relationship between essence and matter if a way of thinking about the relationship between intelligibility and contingency or particularity. Aristotle uses the exact same language when he talks about Callias and Socrates being one in form and two in matter.
2.) No one here denies that the particular is as such unknowable or that thought is mediated, these are commonplaces.
3.) The position you hold is not actually nominalism. As >>24967190 showed you don't even really disagree with anyone here as much as you think you do. And yet you still rage on because you're probably drunk.

>>24967290
>Still seething about the thread where he pretended to be someone else who was blown away by the intellect of Ariholic, tried to attack Palamas after seemingly only having read one paragraph of his corpus and ended up getting dog piled for being a retard.

This thread actually takes the cake though, because here >>24965704 you somehow managed to copy and paste Aquinas translated in accessible English, only to claim it said the opposite of what it clearly says (and this is even more obvious in context). You then proceeded to challenge people in terms that showed you don't understand basic distinction in Aquinas, while simultaneously accusing others of not reading texts and skimming, despite the fact that it's pretty hard to imagine you read De Ente et Essentia and came away missing basically everything. There seems to be a serious issue with projection here.

And the conflation of καθόλου vis-á-vis φύσις and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι / οὐσία continues unabated.

>>24967333
You're confused about what it means for a thing to be prior. The particular is prior in relation to us, but the universal is prior by nature. You take the second sort of priority as a mere accident of the thing. This is not Aristotle's view. I'll be vague in my citations just like you always are and suggest you read Metaphysics Gamma. You're right to the extent that Aristotle does speak of secondary substance as quality and so on but it's like you grab onto the nominalist-sounding passages to the exclusion of everything else. It is a quality insofar as it is potentially thinkable by a subject but it is also in itself what it is, as you yourself admit from time to time. Thinking may not be identical with the particular but being is, as such, intelligible, and that's what we are saying and have been saying. If you agree with us in this then there's hardly an argument left to have and you are a moderate realist. The only reason these debates have been so "frustrating" for you is that you keep insisting that your position is radical nominalism when it isn't.

>>24967410
Right, he always insists on the sections that deny existence to universals but ignores crucial passages like the first half of Meta 7 where Aristotle demonstrates that essence is prior to matter. If you understand why universals don't exist, but you also think essence is prior to matter, you are something like a Thomist. So when people use perfectly legitimate 'realist' language in these threads, which is grounded in Aristotle himself, he spergs out and assumes we are speaking as Platonic realists and reifying universals. Meanwhile as you say he insists that he is a radical nominalist when his own position, which he gets from Aristotle, is realist.