Both got very moral and positive detachment teachings and inner/outer peace>Problem: people are toxic and form a tradition around these figures>Both approach the same clinging issues of love from radically different angles>One demands you need to be a forgiving follower or you will suffer more>One doesn't demand you need to follow anything and you wont sufferBuddha seems more leaning for me since you don't force control on your inner self and sin while Christianity teaches similiar stuff but inner control which probably lead to Conservative-American Christianity we see today or with Buddhism people who like negativity used it to have a spiritual oneupmanship or new age incorpation and toxic positivityBut the true meanings these people teach is a lot deeper and profound than spirituality and organized religion, it's freedom.
>BUDA>Died.>JESUS CHRIST.>Beat death and came back with the keys of hades. >Defeated sin>Died for you>Loves you and will forgive you no matter what.>By grace and faith only he gaves us eternal life/thread
>BUDDHA>Here's how you can demonstrably improve your state of being>JESUS CHRIST>Just trust me bro there's a secret world somewhere invisible where everything's perfect but only if you believe in it hard enough by worshipping me as a literal paranormal superhero on earth
>>24980632Embrace hinduism. Both of those figures are considered God-Men in hinduism.
>>24980809The Buddha refuted Hinduism tho.
>>24980944No he didnt, he only engages with the Vedic rites but he doesn't engage with the Upanishads or even distinguish Brahman from Brahma. Most Hindu ideas he accuses of being unhelpful but usually without giving any example of why.
>>24980632Buddhism and actual Christianity (Orthodox mystic theology) are very similar. Neither prescribe forcing both recommend surrender.
>>24980632>>Both approach the same clinging issues of love from radically different anglesTheir teachings are more similar than you seem to imagine.>One [OP means Christianity] demands you need to be a forgiving follower or you will suffer moreForgiving, yes. A follower in the sense of unquestioning obedience to an institution or some dogmatic rules, absolutely not. Modern Christianity is a far cry from the beliefs of the apostles. Fundamentalism is fundamentally in error, namely, by strict adherence to dogmatic or fixed moral codes. More "liberal" churches make an opposite error in their attempt to correct this, which is believing that conventional morality is le bad and that egoic desires should go unchecked. Actual Christianity is, like Buddhism, about realizing and spreading Truth - Christianity, taken apart from dogma, achieves this by promoting identification with the Savior, Jesus Christ, who suffered as a man but in whom is all men, even as Adam was all men. This Truth can't be stated as a set of propositions that one must accept as if signing a contract, as most so-called Christians see it. This is the same essential error as the Pharisees whom Jesus so opposed. It must be actively sought out, and grown into, little by little, each day a battle.>Ask and it will be given, seek and you shall find, knock and the door will be opened to you (Matthew 7:7)
>>24980976And you think Anatta is compatible with Hinduism?
>>24980976>Most Hindu ideas he accuses of being unhelpfulyeah basically the same thing as categorically refuting hinduism in any practical sense.
>>24982621>yeah basically the same thing as categorically refuting hinduism in any practical sense.Not really, because his assertions that they are unhelpful rely in a circular manner on other Buddhist dogmas that he asserts. At no point does he use logic or a demonstration based in empirical experience to demonstrate that they are in fact, unhelpful, it all just ties back to his other assertions in a circular manner. Anything that is circular like that is just a restatement of one's dogma, it's not an effective argument against anything. It only has any kind of value as a kind of apologetics for someone who already accepts Buddhism's presuppositions but its useless to a non-committed skeptic.In the Upanishads for example that predate Buddha by centuries they teach that the immortal Atma of bliss is already fully present within every individual and is already free, pristine and unconditioned etc already, and that realizing this Atma frees you from all suffering since suffering is the result of ignorance and misidentification, Buddha never engages with this idea or shows why it would be unhelpful. One argument Buddha uses against abstract conceptions of Self is that "if you can't control it, then it's not your self", but this is relying on a question-begging fallacy (petitio princpii) that the Self must necessarily be volitional or an agent which the Upanishads say is wrong. Since Buddha never shows why the Self would necessarily have to be volitional but he just uncritically assumes this, the argument just begs the question in a circular manner, and it would hence be invalid if you tried to write it as a formal argument. If you've never studied any kind of logic or philosophy outside Buddhism and don't use your critical thinking faculties, sometimes people get lulled by all the rhetoric into thinking Buddha has good formal arguments, but they immediately fall apart under 2 seconds of serious scrutiny. He wasn't intending them to be formal arguments to begin with but some Buddhists misunderstand them as such which is where you get misunderstandings like "he refuted X".
>>24982741>Buddha never engages with this ideayou have never read the suttas
>>24982844I have. You are welcome to post any argument or sutta that you believe shows otherwise, but Buddha never directly refutes the Upanishadic Atma directly.He says that blissful experiences should not be mistaken as a Self, but the Upanishadic Atma isn't an experience or an object of experience and its bliss is inherent to the Self and is not arisen or dependent so that doesn't refute anything. The Hindus are not even doing what he is accusing them of doing there.>In the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta the Buddha aims not merely to deny that the aggregates are the self, but to foreclose the possibility of an ātman standing apart from them by stipulating criteria of selfhood that are drawn from control, ownership, and susceptibility to suffering. This move is effective against any self conceived as an agent or possessor within experience, yet it arguably begs the question against the Upaniṣadic position by presupposing that whatever counts as “self” must be available to phenomenological inspection and implicated in the dynamics of mastery and affliction. The Upaniṣads, however, explicitly deny that ātman is an agent, a sufferer, or an object of appropriation, describing it instead as unconditioned, self-luminous consciousness that illuminates the mind without entering into its operations. By defining selfhood in terms that require causal efficacy or experiential vulnerability, the Buddha’s analysis preemptively excludes this conception rather than refuting it on its own terms. >If this line of reasoning were reconstrued as a formal argument, it would risk committing a petitio principii. The conclusion that no such ātman exists would follow only because the premises have already defined “self” in a way that the Upaniṣadic ātman cannot satisfy by definition. Rather than demonstrating an internal incoherence in the rival view, the argument would secure its result by stipulation, effectively assuming what it sets out to prove.
>>24980632I like the part where Christ wakes up the Buddha's lazy ass from becoming One-with-Nothing.Nigga we got work to do...
>>24982882More examples of how Buddha's anti-Atma critiques boil down to being fallacies if misconstrued as formal arguments:Several of the Buddha’s most characteristic anti-ātman strategies are deliberately non-formal and therapeutic, and when they are reconstructed as strict philosophical arguments against the Upaniṣadic ātman, they can indeed collapse into recognizable fallacies. This does not mean they are intellectually careless in context, but it does mean they resist translation into neutral metaphysical proofs.One example is the the exhaustiveness claim of the aggregates. Throughout the Nikāyas, the Buddha treats the five aggregates as an exhaustive inventory of what can be meaningfully identified or appropriated. As a soteriological framework this is coherent, but as a formal argument it risks a false dilemma. Either the self is one of the aggregates, or it does not exist. The Upaniṣadic position explicitly rejects this disjunction, positing an unconditioned reality that is not an item within any classificatory scheme. The Buddhist denial works only if one accepts in advance that all that exists must fall under conditioned categories.A third instance appears in the argument from impermanence to non-self. The Buddha repeatedly reasons that whatever is impermanent is unsatisfactory and therefore not self. As a contemplative inference this is powerful, but formally construed it can involve an equivocation on “self.” It is valid only if “self” is defined as that which must be permanent and blissful within experience. The Upaniṣadic ātman accepts permanence but denies that it is an experiential object at all. Once again, the conclusion follows because the opponent’s definition has been excluded from the outset.Finally, there is the argument from irrelevance: since an unaffected witness does not participate in craving, suffering, or liberation, it plays no role in the path and should be abandoned. If formalized, this risks a non sequitur. Metaphysical irrelevance to soteriology does not entail non-existence. The Upaniṣads would respond that liberation consists precisely in recognizing the ever-liberated nature of ātman, not in producing a new state within the causal order.What unites these cases is that the Buddha’s discourse is not aimed at winning a metaphysical debate on shared neutral ground. His arguments are internally consistent within a phenomenological and pragmatic horizon oriented toward the cessation of suffering. When abstracted from that horizon and recast as universal refutations of the Upaniṣadic ātman, they can indeed appear fallacious, not because they are sloppy, but because they were never meant to function as formal ontological proofs in the first place.
>>24980742>BUDA>Died.>JESUS CHRIST.>Died, but his followers made a fanfic to rationalize keeping the cult going on
>>24982882>>24982896what is blud waffling about
>>24982882friend, what do you think "eternalism" is in the pali suttas?
>>24981223Anatta are*
>>24981207>Modern Christianity is a far cry from the beliefs of the apostlesThat should give you an indication that these sects are false.
>>24980632>detachment>positive Don't sugarcoat bypassing
>>24983099>friend, what do you think "eternalism" is in the pali suttas?Calling something "eternalism" is not a refutation of it or a demonstration of why it's wrong. Buddha just asserts dogmatically that any view that can be grouped under eternalism involves suffering but he never proves this. Other non-Buddhist schools of thought simply disagree and Buddhism has no argument that can prove why this claim of theirs is true.
