It took humanity nearly 2000 years to solve Zeno's paradoxes of motion. Until the paradox was solved,one could say,"Motion is impossible " and we would have taken it as rational statement. We see Every Argument as rational until a counterargument emerges. So,It's hard to say a argument is completely rational because we never may know when it's counterargument might emerge or might not emerge or might remain undiscovered. Btw,just realized this post is a paradox
We know. Empiricism gigatrvked rationalistards hundreds of years ago.
>>25162237We know, that's why rationalism died and was replaced by empirical sciences and mathematics / symbolic logics that can be verified based on their results and not jus their internal "rationality". The only ones who didn't get the memo were Continentards
>>25162263>I define p as being true, therefore p is true >IGNORE THE COMMONLY USED DEFINITION OF P, I DID NOT INTENTIONALLY CHOOSE TO USE THE WORD P TO CREATE SUBTEXT BEYOND MY STATED CLAIMS!!!!!!!!!Analyticels are the modern rationalists, though.
>>25162274>straw manPathetic
>>25162402>objective, normative moral claims really exist>you have a moral obligation to do Xthe bailey>erm but actually I am a motivational externalist, normativity does not imply motivation>normative claims being distinct from factual claims because they count in favor of something>count in favor means to be a reason to do something>being a reason to do something means to count in favor of doing it>non-motivationally of course>you can just be unreasonable, you would just be objectively wrong :)>objectivity defined as my subjective opinion, but I call it objectivethe motte
>>25162274thanks i understand the technique of mot and bailey better after reading your post
>>25162465Who are you quoting?
>>25162465you switched the two aroundthe retarded parts are the bailey, the reasonable ones the motte
>>25162237>. Until the paradox was solved,one could say,"Motion is impossible "The preceding considerations implicitly contain the solution to all problems of the sort raised by Zeno of Elea in his famous arguments against the possibility of motion, or at least in what appear to be such when one takes the arguments only as they are usually presented; in fact, one might well doubt whether this was really their true significance. Indeed, it is rather unlikely that Zeno really intended to deny motion; what is more probable is that he merely wished to prove the incompatibility of the latter with the supposition, accepted notably by the atomists, of a real, irreducible multiplicity existing in the nature of things. It was therefore originally against this very multiplicity so conceived that these arguments originally must have been directed; we do not say against all multiplicity, for it goes without saying that multiplicity also exists within its order, does motion, which, moreover, like every kind of change, necessarily supposes multiplicity.But just as motion, by reason of its character of transitory and momentary modification, is not self-sufficient and would be purely illusory were it not linked to a higher principle transcendent with respect to it, such as the 'unmoved mover' of Aristotle, so multiplicity would truly be non-existent were it to be reduced to itself alone, and did it not proceed from unity, as is reflected mathematically in the formation of the sequence of numbers, as we have seen. What is more, the supposition of an irreducible multiplicity inevitably excludes all real connections between the elements of things, and consequently all continuity as well, for the latter is only a particular case or special form of such connections. As we have already said above, atomism necessarily implies the discontinuity of all things; ultimately, motion really is incompatible with this discontinuity, and we shall see that this is indeed what the arguments of Zeno show.
Take, for example, the following argument: an object in motion can never pass from one position to another, since between the two there is always an infinity of other positions, however close, that must be successively traversed in the course of the motion, and, however much time is employed to traverse them, this infinity can never be exhausted. Assuredly, this is not a question of an infinity, as is usually said, for such would have no real meaning; but it is no less the case that in every interval one may take into account an indefinite number of positions for the moving object, and these cannot be exhausted in analytic fashion, which would involve each position being occupied one by one, as the terms of a discontinuous sequence are taken one by one. But it is this very conception of motion that is in error, for it amounts in short to regarding the continuous as if it were composed of points, or of final, indivisible elements, like the notion according to which bodies are composed of atoms; and this would amount to saying that in reality there is no continuity, for whether it is a question of points or atoms, these final elements can only be discontinuous; furthermore, it is true that without continuity there would be no possible motion, and this is all that the argument actually proves.The same goes for the argument of the arrow that flies and is nonetheless immobile, since at each instant one sees only a single position, which amounts to supposing that each position can in itself be regarded as fixed and determined, and that the successive positions thus form a sort of discontinuous series. It is further necessary to observe that it is not in fact true that a moving object is ever viewed as if it occupied a fixed position, and that quite to the contrary, when the motion is fast enough, one will no longer see the moving object distinctly, but only the path of its continuous displacement; thus for example, if a flaming ember is whirled about rapidly, one will no longer see the form of the ember, but only a circle of fire; moreover, whether one explains this by the persistence of retinal impressions, as physiologists do, or in any other way, it matters little, for it is no less obvious hat in such cases one grasps the continuity of motion directly, as it were, and in a perceptible manner. What is more, when one uses the expression 'at each instant' in formulating such arguments, one is implying that time is formed from a sequence of indivisible instants, to each of which there corresponds a determined position of the object; but in reality, temporal continuity is no more composed of instants than spatial continuity is of points, and as we have already pointed out, the possibility of motion presupposes the union, or rather the combination, of both temporal and spatial continuity.
>>25162580>>25162583https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bBB5FE1X3I0
>>25162888
>>25162274read wittgenstein. im begging you at this point.
>>25164094What do you think I mean by that post? Analytictards go around defining P* against how P is typically used, then use that to implicitly argue for the common P while only defending their special retard definitionally true P*.Except, nobody actually disagrees with their definitionally true P*, they just don't use P in that way. There is no substantive disagreement. Wittgenstein said the exact same thing.
>>25162888They don't think it be like it is, but it do
>>25162487I don't. Why not build the whole town on the hill?
