In early August, Lee sent Joseph Kershaw's infantry plus a cavalry division to Culpeper to watch the Yankees and reinforce Early if necessary. Union intelligence however heard that Lee sent three entire infantry divisions despite the fact that Lee didn't have that many men to spare. Grant believed this intelligence report and so as to prevent Early from being reinforced to the point where he could overwhelm Sheridan and to also take advantage of the supposed weakening of the Confederate lines around Petersburg, Grant ordered a renewed offensive on the north bank of the James.Winfield Hancock was to move to Lee's extreme left and make a breakthrough if possible and get around his flank and cut the Virginia Central Railroad. Hancock marched the II Corps north of the river on August 14, only to learn that there were three gray-coated divisions there when he thought there was only one. The II Corps had to make a grueling march in hot weather and many men dropped from heat exhaustion. When they got into position, the Confederate divisions of Charles Field and Cadmus Wilcox drove them back in hard fighting. David Birney's division of Butler's army came up but it took most of August 15 to get into position so nothing in terms of action happened that day. They attacked on the morning of the 16th and after an initial breakthrough, Hancock and Birney became flummoxed by the difficult terrain and Field launched a counterattack and repulsed them.
August 17 passed quietly. Lee planned a counterattack for the 18th but failed to get any troops into position before sundown and the effort amounted to naught. Hancock withdrew two nights later. The battle at Deep Bottom had cost Hancock almost 3,000 men against Confederate losses of about 1,500 and he reported that many of his troops performed poorly, demoralized by the realization that the Confederates had more troops present than originally thought, a lot of the soldiers were green recruits--by this time the II Corps was pathetically low on experienced officers, and once again an attempt to find a quick way into Richmond failed.Deep Bottom was not without results, however as it forced Lee to extend his lines further south. On August 18, Grant had Warren take the V Corps out past Ft. Sedgwick ans west to the Weldon Railroad, trying again the maneuver that failed almost two months ago. Warren seized the road near Globe Tavern four miles south of Petersburg. Confederates from the divisions of Harry Heth and Robert Hoke came to oppose them. They drove back the V Corps to a position near Globe Tavern in a furious attack but warren's troops rallied and counterattacked, regaining all the lost ground. During the night the IX Corps came up while the Confederates were reinforced by cavalry and part of William Mahone's division.
August 19 was a rain soaked day which prevented any action until late in the afternoon when the weather cleared. Mahone attacked and routed part of Samuel Crawford's division; Crawford was almost captured trying to rally them and the Confederates surrounded and captured almost two entire brigades. Meanwhile, Roymen Ayres's division beat off assaults by Heth's troops; the IX Corps came up to drive Heth off and the fighting ended as the sun went down. August 20 brought more rain and so nothing happened that day. Warren withdrew to a new line of entrenchments that night, connecting to the main Federal lines on the Jerusalem Plank Road. The skies cleared on August 21 and the Confederates attacked that morning but the V Corps was well-entrenched and Mahone and Heth were driven back with substantial casualties.Three days of fighting had produced 4,296 Union and 1,620 Confederate casualties. Warren gained control of an important piece of the Petersburg Railroad but the Confederates were not deterred and they quickly set up a line of wagon transports to bring supplies to Petersburg from a rail head just south of the point of Union occupation. To prevent this from happening, Grant on August 22 sent Hancock and two divisions to break the Weldon Railroad as far south as Rowanty Creek, 13 miles below Warren's position. If successful, Lee's wagon trains would have to come up roundabout over a 30 mile pull by way of Dinwiddie Courthouse, and so Lee quickly moved to counter this.
On August 25, Wilcox's Confederate division attacked and was repulsed by Nelson Miles's troops while Gibbon to the south blocked the advance of Wade Hampton's cavalry. Heth and Mahone's divisions quickly arrived on the scene. Six Confederate brigades attacked Miles's division and broke through the northwest corner of the fortifications. Two Union regiments broke and ran. Miles sent Horace Rugg's brigade into action but these men just laid down and refused to fight. Hancock rode through the lines in a panic yelling "We can beat them yet! Don't leave me, for God's sake!" At last Hancock was able to rally enough men to repulse an attack by dismounted Confederate cavalry, ending the battle.Ream's Station had resulted in only 557 Union troops killed or wounded but dismayingly over 2,000 men were captured (the Confederates lost 814 men) and the Confederate attack was one the old II Corps would have beaten off easily. Hancock had to report that John Gibbon's division, once one of the best in the army, had fought poorly and almost entirely thanks to untrained replacement troops. Veterans had fought as hard as ever, problem was that there weren't many of them left by this point.
In short, Ream's Station was a fiasco and it was obvious that the II Corps was a spent force and only a long period of rest, recruiting, and drill would bring it back up to strength. Still, the Weldon road was broken, Warren held the ground he took, and the supply route into Richmond was reduced while Lee had to stretch his thinning line even further. These blows were too much for Lee to counter. Moreover, Grant did all this when his own manpower was at an all-time low. As August ended, the three infantry corps in the Army of the Potomac numbered less than 30,000 men between them while Butler's Army of the James could only must 17,000 men. Never had the margin over Lee been so small, and never was there less truth to the myth that Grant was wearing his opponent down with limitless numbers.If anyone needed proof of the effect this was having, Lee's dispatches to Jefferson Davis from this period showcase his growing concern that he simply did not have the manpower to meet all these Union thrusts.
>>16890653>Never had the margin over Lee been so small, and never was there less truth to the myth that Grant was wearing his opponent down with limitless numbers.Lost Causer maymay iirc.
