>>62772757
>what are truly the most ideal squad sizes and platoon make ups with this problem of attrition in mind?
Small fireteams of 3-4 men, worse case scenario 2 men to a team.
>how unit leaders actually do things like movement and maneuver in combat when working with such an ad hoc force?
Same logic as with a bigger force, you just have less. Take advantage of the fact the enemy might not know how few your number really is. Much harder now with drones.

>>62772757
>what are truly the most ideal squad sizes and platoon make ups with this problem of attrition in mind?
US Marines' three-squad structure; that way even if you take 1/3rd losses, you can still have two squads for conducting fire and manoeuvre as per doctrine
>how unit leaders actually do things like movement and maneuver in combat when working with such an ad hoc force?
train troops to be good enough that they can adapt; in the case of dealing with attrition, having junior ranks be capable to step in and replace their commanders, and having troops cross-trained so that they know how to do more than just their current jobs
you can see how this obviously helps the platoon to continue fighting when e.g. 2nd squad has taken 50% casualties, 3rd squad has taken 50% casualties, both are missing squad leaders and machine-gunners, and you need to combine them and have corporals do the work of gunnery sergeants and riflemen do the work of machine-gunners

flexibility, adaptability and resilience (defined as the ability to maintain required standards despite less than ideal circumstances) is what elevates better troops above others

>>62772757
What is /pit/'s opinion about Full Spectrum Warrior game series?

>>62772757
7 was a common squad size for WW2 units which took casualties, especially where veterans were mixed with individual replacements. It enabled a base of fire of 3 men while 4 probed and could break down into buddy pairs.
~20-25 was a common GWOT mini-platoon size for the smallest unit which could reliably and safely survive ambushes, instead of risking a wipeout. It also meshed with wheeled vehicles well: 8 drivers/gunners in 4 vehicles and 2x8 dismounted men.

>>62772933
>7 was a common squad size for WW2 units which took casualties, especially where veterans were mixed with individual replacements. It enabled a base of fire of 3 men while 4 probed and could break down into buddy pairs.
is that US Army? didn't they have a squad automatic weapon?
when meeting pic in OP how will they counter that machine gun?

>>62773129
>The German tactical infantry doctrine of the era based a (10-man Gruppe) squad's firepower on the general-purpose machine gun in the light machine gun role.[20] The advantage of the general-purpose machine gun concept was that it added greatly to the overall volume of fire that could be put out by a squad-sized unit.[21][22]
>It was possible for operating crews to lay down a non-stop barrage of fire, pausing only when the barrel had to be replaced. This allowed the MG 42 to tie up significantly larger numbers of enemy troops than was otherwise possible. The Americans and the British trained their troops to take cover from the fire of an MG 42, and assault the position during the sub 10 seconds time window of barrel replacement.[23][24]
>The Allied nations' infantry doctrines of World War II based a squad's/rifle section's firepower centered on the rifleman and/or a magazine fed light machine gun (BAR, Bren, DP-27/DPM, FM 24/29), and they used weapons with cyclic fire rates of typically 450–600 rounds per minute. The (slower) rapid firing rate used in emergency/final defensive line situations of the MG 42 was up to 500 rounds per minute.[6] The Allied nations had machine guns with similar rates of fire, but mounted them almost exclusively in aircraft, where the fleeting opportunities for firing made such high rates necessary. The Allies did have similar weapons, such as the M1919 Browning machine gun and the Vickers K machine gun, but these were issued more sparsely than the MG 42, with the Vickers K being an aircraft machine gun, only issued to infantry in specialized circumstances.
have fun charging that MG position when they change the MG's barrel

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>>62773129
>>62773176
squads don't 1v1 other squads, the US squad would deploy in a defensive positon and relay information to the platoon leader who would bring other weapon systems to help deal with it

>>62773270
so true, a squad takes like 2 casualties in the assaulting element and a squad attack is halted completely and without a platoon behind you it becomes a horrible chaotic situation just trying to keep the squad alive

For the couple centuries the average size of an infantry formation has decreased, for good reason. When smoothbore muskets and the like were the norm, you needed massed short ranged fire to achieve actual killing potential. For practical reasons that meant lines of men standing shoulder to shoulder. Because of communication limitations, company size was limited mostly by shouting range, which placed a limit on how many men an officer could command and at what range from other units was reasonable.

As technology advances, the riflemen gets more effective weaponry. Instead of needing dozens of guns firing at 100m to guarantee a kill, a handful of men could achieve the same results. At the same time, artillery's killing power is dramatically increasing, making it more necessary to spread the infantry out. However, to get the amount of firepower needed to achieve results on the battlefield level still requires a good number of guns firing, so large squads/platoons are still needed. This all leads to the WWI dilemma, where the limitations of communication, command and technology are all resulting in massive casualties.

Going to WWII and beyond, we start to reach a different limit in regards to firepower. Now every nation's squad (Italy sit down) is lugging around a decent amount of automatic weapons. Organic fire support and mechanized forces are more common. At this point, larger squads are rapidly becoming more of a limitation than a benefit, because having 50% more guys really doesn't change the 'effective' firepower you can put out. In the modern day, having 12 dudes and an IFV gives you a marginal increase in your battlefield effectiveness compared to 8 dudes and their IFV (assuming those 12/8 dudes even fit).

I find the idea of increasing the size of a squad to improve it's attrition resilience a bad idea. It's attempting to add another tiny ring to the inside of the survivability onion at the expense of the squad's suitability in nearly all other situations.

>>62773129
>believing official mtoe are representative
Not even once. All-BAR squads were fairly common after 1943.

>>62773343
There are some practical limits due to human biology. Infantry need a certain amount of numbers to pull 360 security and sleep.

>>62773270
Correct. The minimum size unit for conventional infantry combat is a platoon.

>>62773527
>Infantry need a certain amount of numbers to pull 360 security and sleep
Perhaps, but squad size shouldn't really be a limiting factor there, since if a single squad is stopping for sleep then the platoon as a whole will be.

>>62773176
>The Americans and the British trained their troops to take cover from the fire of an MG 42, and assault the position during the sub 10 seconds time window of barrel replacement.[
That sounds like nonsense.
Fire came in bursts and breaks, a couple seconds without fire don't mean the guy's changing barrels and by the time your soldiers have noticed that there's a delay in the next burst a couple seconds have already passed. Meanwhile a few seconds are all you need to change barrels on an MG42 if you know what you're doing.
Is that just fuddlore bullshit or another edition of
>let's lie to our troops and make them run through MG fire by telling them it's inaccurate since they wouldn't run at all otherwise
?

>>62773176
>wehraboopedia

>>62773716
>That sounds like nonsense.
it's some armchair wehraboo faggot putting together the MG42's theoretical RPM and barrel-change time with the fact that troops try to attack when the MG isn't firing, for obvious reasons
completely ignoring the fact that an MG42 would be out of ammunition within one to two minutes of the battle according to this retarded theory

>>62772757
You're overthinking it, can't speak for other nations but at least in the US an infantry team is crosstrained on all positions, even team leader. If you lose people from certain positions you just condense from other units / refill with new recruits. If you lose a higher position like a squad / platoon leader you can promote promising individuals or condense between units.

Infantry as part of well set up combined arms isn't that interesting or hard of a concept, defend when facing larger / better logistically supplied opponents, attack when you have numerical and logistical advantage, hammer enemy with every support weapon available, and then assault and kill all the wounded people on an objective.

As long as everyone is crosstrained you don't suffer any significant structural damage to a unit unless it's casualties at such a massive scale you lose some kind of numbers advantage, and if that's the case NO squad configuration is going to help.

>>62773343
I always imagined that armored fighting vehicles were the main combat units and primary source of firepower while infantry acted as support for said AFVs.
AFVs would do the bulk of the fighting, while infantry dismounts would clear enemy buildings safely under the watch of the AFVs' guns.
Infantry dismounts are basically an extension of the AFVs combat tools.

So infantry numbers would be much smaller especially in modern warfare and future warfare.

>>62773527
>all bar squads
I have always heard the line of troops stacking as many bars and smg as possible but for as much as you hear it happen photos are nearly nonexistent.
Not that I doubt, it sounds like a very natural evolution, I'd just love to see a field Pic of seven Chads all lugging bars except one 1919 gunner.

>>62773664
Yeah, but it sets a bound on platoon size. You need enough people to handle a sleep rotation. Introducing platoons also caps the more absurd attempts at super-squads which are premised on the absence of platoons. You don't need a 15 man squad in isolation when you have 4x 7 man squads working together.

>>62773789
>it's some armchair wehraboo faggot putting together the MG42's theoretical RPM
I was referring to the unrealistic "charge in-between barrel changes" bit, anon.
>muh wehraboos
Oh shut the fuck up with that shit he just looked things up on wikipedia. Try having normal conversations without directly casting everybody as a bogeyman.

>>62773921
look at the quoted text:
>It was possible for operating crews to lay down a non-stop barrage of fire, pausing only when the barrel had to be replaced.
>The (slower) rapid firing rate used in emergency/final defensive line situations of the MG 42 was up to 500 rounds per minute.
and tell me if the theory makes any sense at all. The only reason this is allowed on wikipedia is because, as with many other topics on wiki, some autistic fanboys spend all their time ensuring the page remains as it is and nobody can be arsed to challenge it.

>>62774175
>>It was possible for operating crews to lay down a non-stop barrage of fire, pausing only when the barrel had to be replaced.
Squads rarely worked alone and every squad had an MG so that's not even necessarily wrong, anon. At least that's how you were supposed to do it. Alternating fire from MGs.
>>The (slower) rapid firing rate used in emergency/final defensive line situations of the MG 42 was up to 500 rounds per minute.
Honestly that just sounds like there used to be 2 sentences and some retard deleted something while forgetting to proofread.
I'M sure you could get 500 rounds per minute out of an MG42 barrel though.
Once.

>>62774197
>>62774175
The G36 is a lot less suited to full auto and lasted at least 900 rounds in tests.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iTbTyFloelc
So 500 should be survivable for an MG42 in a last stand situation.

>>62774227
They could've kept going, the rifle was on fire, not out of action. There was no actual mechanical issue.

>>62774197
>I'M sure you could get 500 rounds per minute out of an MG42 barrel though.
>Once.
for like two minutes, and then the truppe runs out of MG ammo

>>62774227
it's not the question of the barrel life, it's the number of rounds carried by a Wehrmacht MG squad

>>62773254
fire and maneuver in WW2 was mostly conducted at the platoon level
both the US and germans had been trained to operate as a squad split into elements, but the former didnt have enough NCOs while the latter had lost most of them through attrition
typically a squad would act as a single element and provide fire for another squad, while platoon MG would provide the base of fire

how dense are infantry formations?
is it the norm to use mass human wave style of thousands of infantry to assault a beach or town?

Seeing videos in Ukraine gives me a warped idea that battles are fought primarily as platoons at the most.

>>62774278
>trained to operate as a squad split into elements
The smallest type of attack any WW2 army was trained to operate at was a platoon attack. In THEORY the same principles could be applied to any size of element, but in written doctrine (field manuals), there isn't such a thing as a squad-level attack.

>>62774303
in WW2 a battalion was typically assigned about 1 mile of front.
Obviously this varied.

>>62774248
>>62774242
The silly quote mentioned
>used in emergency/final defensive line situations
So that's not much of a concern.
Wikipedia unironically redeemed.

>>62774330
>in WW2 a battalion was typically assigned about 1 mile of front.

i can't tell if that's a lot or few compared to modern infantry doctrine.

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>>62774419
Frontage is heavily dependent on METT-TC factors as lame of an answer that always is. When you have entire divisions smashing into each other along a massive front, the frontage could be a kilometer or two or even as narrow as a single street. Breaching operations are notorious for requiring the massing of large formations into very small areas, a breach can be as small as potentially only being able to have one man at a time go through a cleared lane. Compare this to something like GWOT where you could have a single infantry company have an area of operation the size of Rhode Island.

What's the mission, what is the enemy like, what units and support do you have, how good or shit is the terrain, how long do you have to actually get shit done, and is the war big enough to not give a fuck about wasting entire cities worth of civilians? These are the factors that go into it.

That being said, you can definitely strike up some "universals", especially on the small unit level (individual soldier-infantry company). e.g. an 8-15 man squad can be commanded fairly well by a single squad leader and is enough to do a very basic attack against a small force or be able to survive a small ambush, 20-50 men can be easily lead by a platoon leader and gives you enough flexibility and firepower to hold your own and do a bit more complex maneuvers (pincers, having a squad in reserve, small patrolling, etc), and an infantry company of 100-150 is as about as big as you can go where a single man in the field can command it all and direct the fight in a literal way rather than an abstract way (pointing his finger at the enemy or position to move vs. moving symbols on a map).

Technically a standard infantry battalion is considered the smallest unit that is truly a full fledged unit capable of holding its own with all of the supporting assets it has. But at that point, unless you're doing some fucking Stalingrad shit, battalions aren't considered "small units".

>>62774330
>The smallest type of attack any WW2 army was trained to operate at was a platoon attack.
Squads were supposed to be capable of individual maneuver in combat and were explictly trained to be able to divide into fire teams of 3-5 men
A squad could either split into a scout, rifle, and BAR team, a rarely used formation from pre-war or into a rifle and machine gun section, more often used

Platoon-level maneuver was the standard due to the intense fighting and lack of skilled NCOs, but squad level maneuver existed as a doctrinal concept

>>62772757
>Ideal squad size
20 men in 4 teams.
- Fire Team of MG duo and Assault Gun/ATGM duo + Lead
- Recon team of marksman duo and sapper duo + Lead
- Rifle team of 4 grenadiers + Lead
- Command team of Commander, Radio/FO, Corpsman, Automatic Rifleman and Drone op.

>Redundancy inbuilt, the only vulnerable team is hard to tell from a rifle team.
>Full spectrum of effect upon enemy
>Enough rifles to take positions with 15 men charging
>Enough heavy fire to pin down an entire checkpoint or trench segment
>Organic intel and pathfinding
>Organic hunter-killer capability on men and vehicles
>No need to micromanage individual guns and getting in the way of your team leaders
>That's about how many men you're gonna have in your platoon by the time you reach the enemy
>Move in open top trucks because that's all you're gonna have in the decade of flying AT mines.

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>>62772757
>Often times in the real world however, platoons will typically be half to 2/3rds strength or even less, with many squads and "tactical groups" having to be formed ad hoc because the actual squads and platoons have been attrited so badly.
>what are truly the most ideal squad sizes and platoon make ups with this problem of attrition in mind?
>most ideal
The most ideal squad sizes and platoon make ups would be those from the field manual retard. Do you not understand the words you are writing?

>>62774639
>Gunner eats lead
>up to 12 men are now subject to perils of war until someone shoves the corpse aside and resumes firing.
>Repeat, even quicker if he doesn't reposition with the gun.
>IT IS IDEAL! RETARD!
Ironically the most ideal squad size is two SOF patrols with everyone without a main gun carrying a para Minimi instead of a rifle and most ideal platoon makeup is one or two patrol squads, 5 FPV drone squads and 5 AT Mine quad drone squads.

>Verification not required.

>>62774330
>>62774627
that just sounds like a deathball

>>62774565
>a standard infantry battalion is considered the smallest unit that is truly a full fledged unit capable of holding its own

seems pretty unwieldy.

>>62774688
Commanding men is unwieldy unless you micromanage the fuck out of them. Once you realize that the only way to sustain ops is to cease micromanaging and start macromanaging, things improve drastically and you stop trying to pit one squad against an entire op because surely 13 marine retards all with the same rifle and no organic MG can solo those fuckheads as long as every marine follows your brilliant engagement plan. Much more expedient instead to order platoon commander to figure it out, so that he invents the most bullshit wasteful plan that won't get him fragged the next morning.

>>62772757
>tactical groups

what even is a tactical group?
the Army for instance considers divisions as tactical units.

>>62772757
according to Dunbar's number, the maximum number of meaningful relationships you can make is less than 200 folks.
so the ideal infantry tactical size is 150 or less men commanded by an captain, since the captain also has to know his fellow captains in the same battalion and his superior officers higher up the chain.

>>62774718
The REAL tactical group is whatever hodge-podge of nonsense you can assemble out of remains of multiple squads or even teams in order to accomplish an immediate squad/platoon-level objective in service of a tactical-level engagement.

Attack of the survivors.

>>62774718
"tactical units" are the basic blocks of fighting and it depends on what kind of enemy you are fighting.
the higher the tactical unit the more sluggish it is to respond to COIN/insurgency, but on the flipside the more effective it is to fight peer warfare.
noticed during the GWOT, the tactical unit was the brigade hence the BCT heyday, but now since we might be fighting Russia in an actual war the Army wants to bring back the division as the tactical unit.

>>62772757
The ideal numbers are dependant on equipment first, mission second. Every answer itt will be simultaneously wrong and correct.

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>>62774688
HHC
>S-shop's
>combat trains
>scout platoon
>sniper section
>signals
>aid station
>medium/heavy mortars
>even more shit I'm forgetting
Line companies
>3 platoons each
>light mortars
>company trains
Weapons company
>ATGMS
>mk19's and .50's
>even more specialty weapons I'm forgetting about

This is why it's always funny to hear anon's talk about needing to go into combat with 90 pound rucks for sustainment. This is a carry over from GWOT where we really didn't know how to fight those wars and it forced platoons and companies to be extremely decentralized which meant hardly any supplies. Whereas when a battalion is properly supporting its line companies, you already have a few dozen trucks that are there exclusively for supplies, and that's not even incorporating all the trucks found within the Forward Support Company (FSC) that is attached to the battalion. Combined with the command staff and its own organic assets to conduct reconnaissance such as the scout platoon and snipers if need be (I personally view snipers more as an attrition asset to constantly harass the enemy and score HVT's but whatever) and has the firepower, manpower, and organic support to sustain its own fight. - It's essentially and incredibly small version of a division wherein it is its own fully contained unit with all the assets it needs to sustain itself (albeit short-term such as just a few days of sustained combat before needing higher echelon support).

>>62774732
i always wondered why unit traditions/pride/logos/espirit-de-corp/etc is always done in the battalion/regiment/etc and higher and you never see it in the company/platoon/etc and lower.
now i know why.

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>>62774718
>>62774738
This. It's an aspect of war few touch upon. A lot of battles often come down to a shit ton of ad hoc groups of 19 year old's trying to unfuck whatever situation they're in. This is why mission-command tactics and commanders intent is so important. The Normandy paratrooper operation is a textbook example of why commanders intent is so important. Most of the paratroopers original missions were immediately rendered impossible due to missing their landing zones and grouping up with other paratroopers they've never met in areas they had no idea where they were, and yet they would still group together and stick with the commanders intent to formulate their own missions.

"Secure the bridges, road junctions, and towns in Normandy to allow the ground invasion forces to advance inland."
- Gen. Eisenhower

>>62773254
>[...]but my weapon jammed. Cursing I recocked it and fired one round, when it jammed again
Kek, fucking ameritrash gun. You yanks are lucky Al and pals increased it’s popularity

what's the likelihood of seeing corp or army size units being used as tactical units?

>>62774831
no longer tactical in any shape or form so 0.

>>62774831
>what's the likelihood of seeing corp or army size units being used as tactical units?
Extremely abstracted bounding overwatch "leapfrog" that takes weeks to months to perform.

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>>62774831
When we have to retake Butte.

>>62774831
even during ww2, divisions were the highest tactical units there were.
so very unlikely to see anything higher than that.
but then again, populations of countries and technology has grown tremendously, and a TRULY global war involving every country could perhaps see corps being used as tactical units.

>>62774831
Corps are tasked with taking whole cities
The US had 2 corps involved on D-day, one beach each and each more concerned with how many kilometers they can push before the outrun their support rather than planning each fire mission
Their goals are no longer tactical, unless the general is micromanaging every battle personally, but with operational and strategic goals
At this level of command, the war is now lines on a map

>>62774361
it's still stupid because the lower RPM was not only used defensively, and it still wasn't used in the way implied; you can give an MG42 ten thousand rounds and stick it on the Siegfried Line, and it would still run out of ammo in twenty minutes

>>62772757
The fundamentals don't change with T/O. Fix and Flank or Find, Fix, Finish if you're a hooah will always be the bread and butter of infantry tactics. T/O determines the tools you have to accomplish said fundamentals, but they don't change.

>>62774419
it's certainly a lot compared to even the Cold War

the peak Wehrmacht strength was something like 230-plus divisions; the peak Bundeswehr strength was 25 divisions

>>62774627
>squad level maneuver existed as a doctrinal concept
it existed, yes; as doctrine, no
like I said, in theory it is doable. Richard Winters attacked an artillery battery with a squad's worth of men, and in his words, he put down a base of fire and moved, then put down another base of fire, and moved, etc
and he did essentially end up using the equivalent of fire teams or even individual men
but that was kind of an improvisation

however if you read WW2 US infantry FMs they explicitly state that the smallest independent manoeuvre unit is the platoon, and the smallest unit capable of organising a base of fire is the company. that is doctrine, as I said.

the doctrinal purpose of rifle squads in the WW2 US Army was to act as self-contained elements under the platoon commander. but the instructions given in the FMs are very bare compared to what we know today, baldly stating that there are only 2 functions of the infantry squad: fire, and movement. the only elaboration given on that is instructions how to work the weapons, and order of movement (various skirmish formations, etc).
hence the actual steps taken was left up to the platoon and company commanders' individual application more than today, resulting in vast differences in performance

today, an attack is divided in detail into Find, Fix, Finish, Follow-through (not present in WW2) and recommended steps, targets, prescribed tactics for particular situations, etc.

>were explictly trained to be able to divide into fire teams of 3-5 men
not in WW2
>a scout, rifle, and BAR team, a rarely used formation from pre-war or into a rifle and machine gun section
scouts were often used; but the specific "Scout" designation was eliminated and the position made ad-hoc
BAR teams were an improvisation

>>62774778
>why unit traditions/pride/logos/espirit-de-corp/etc is always done in the battalion/regiment/etc and higher
because it costs money and effort

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>>62774831
>tactical
it is no longer "tactical" then because at that level, logistics one way or another becomes the key (or even only) factor within the control of the HQ
so the Russians coined the term "operational" to refer to the manoeuvre of large units of brigade level and above, sometimes battalion level as well

the closest modern analogue is Desert Storm, which was technically a five-corps operations plan

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Reminds me of this movie. Especially the final fight where it's just a squad of guys going out of their way to blow up a couple of tanks. Just pure ad hoc, "fuck it" type shit. Kind of sad how often times men will just be thrust into human waves when that force can just resort to more unconventional "raiding" type shit. Often times a lot of guys die just because higher command echelons want to stick to their time syncs rather than give the time to set that kind of shit up. Also goes to show how imperative the will to fight/morale + veteran status is for experience. It's a movie but there's many instances in history of exactly that happening.

If you can't gain the security to protect a breaching force to conduct a massive breaching operation, then the only other option is stormtrooper shit. Something apparently many armies have to learn and relearn the hard way every time.

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>>62774627
AFAIK one of the most detailed small-unit attack plans in WW2 is the theoretical assault by a British infantry platoon; picrel is part of it

it explicitly divides the section into the rifle group and Bren group for the attack; and recommends dividing sections into 3 groups, but leaves the composition entirely up to the section commander, noting only that privates with natural leadership and capability should be put in command of their friends, because friends fight better together (a rather British notion, shades of Pals Divisions...). it doesn't give guidance for sub-section manoeuvre other than that the Bren is critical in covering the movement of the riflemen

this was an improvement over prewar British (and US) infantry manuals which had section/squad commanders control movement individually. still not a formal fire team however, unlike today.

the Bren is often mentioned but in context of prewar training, is mainly used to keep the enemy pinned and cut off; the enemy is supposed to be mainly killed with grenades, then close quarters battle with SMGs and rifles

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mci 0336 scouting & patrolling should be mandatory reading along with the usual FM infantry platoon and squad. Patrolling, particularly combat patrols are pretty much the bread and butter of combat in general short of large scale attacks or holding large defensive positions/strongpoints. It also goes into how to conduct proper approach marches with scouts which isn't just via sending a fireteam further ahead of the platoon and wait for them to die.

>Reconnaissance
>Raiding
>Ambushing
>Protecting yourself with guard detachments to not get fucked in the ass while moving
This is especially true for more insurgent/guerrilla type shit where you can't rely on some big decisive main effort to win the day but instead have to grind the enemies combat power down through successive raids and ambushes. Both Chechen wars are a good example of that. Patrolling is essentially the main way of fighting for any infantry unit that isn't a major offensive/defensive operation. And even when those two things are going on, they're largely supported by patrolling to set the conditions for both. It's pretty rad to know how to move as a squad or platoon sized force from A to B, but it's a whole other thing to know how to sneak in a one man guerrilla sniper to gang gang some checkpoint and then sneak back out without getting got. With ad hoc formations usually being a norm in those types of missions too.

It's sad that GWOT has pretty much made all patrolling into either being a dumb presence patrol or an urban patrol with the necessity of having a QRF even when not in an urban area.

>>62772865
I'm not a warrior but am on the full spectrum. AMA

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>>62772757
Ideally it probably depends on the mission. Here you have Soviet assault groups dedicated to eliminate German strong points in late ww2.
>Assault groups normally included four subgroups: a reconnaissance subgroup to clear an approach route to the objective, a blocking subgroup to engage and pin down the defenders, a fire subgroup to isolate the strongpoint from reinforcement, and an attack subgroup, including engineers and heavy tanks or assault guns, to eliminate the objective from the flanks or rear.

>>62775340
I wish that game wouldn't crash every half hour.

>>62773176
Fortunately the German formation will be far more heavily attrited than the American one before they ever encounter each other, if we're going by facts.

>>62779174
American infantry units were attrited as fuck with the bulk of individual replacements being former cooks by the end of the war. This is why most famous infantry divisions had casualty rates of like 400%.

>>62775194
These usually assume that the flanking path is undefended by the enemy. What happens when the first platoon is engaged trying to suppress the enemy and 2nd/3rd run into resistance?

>>62781074

each element does an uno you just advance on the side that is getting less attention

eventually as time goes on the enemy is attrited enough to close distance, report, consolidate, etc.

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>>62781074
you call the Company commander

>>62779367
>American infantry units were attrited as fuck
and the German infantry units were far more heavily attrited than the American ones

>>62781074
Either work around it further, or probe for a weak spot, or wear down the enemy with additional supporting fires

this document is bookended with strident warnings that these are only suggested tactics. these are tools provided for the commander to select, IF they match the situation; the commander is always reminded that he has the ultimate responsibility of coming up with a solution appropriate to the situation

>>62783004
>and the German infantry units were far more heavily attrited than the American ones
You fail to grasp the horrors that was the individual replacement system.

>>62775027
MG42s didn't have noticeably higher ammo usage than allied machine guns, anon.
Different shooting technique.

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>>62772757
Is this an effective tactic?

>>62781074
thats entirely situation dependent
if the main thrust cannot advance but the diversionary attack is doing well, its possible to commit reserves to the diversion and turn it into a main attack while the main attack now serves as the distraction
or if the flanking element is the one meeting resistance then the commander can reinforce the flanking attack to give it a better chance of fighting through it or reinforce the main attack so that it will force the defenders away from the flanks and back to the center

high initiative is highly valued in officers for the ability to make these calls

>>62784480
Honestly this is why squads are used as apart of a platoon/company effort rather than just sending fireteams. If you send a whole ass squad on the flank to assault the enemy position, just for that flanking element to run into trouble from another direction, it can leave a buddy team or a fireteam to repel whoever is in their way and have the other fireteam continue on. This is why video games like Squad aren't really good representatives of how small unit engagements actually work. You need to be able to be flexible and adapt to unknown or unforeseen consequences or variables, which usually translates into having more men. This is also where basic battle drills and tactical tasks come into play. When someone like an SL or PL needs to come up with a course of action (COA) on the spot, it usually involves picking the right battle drill/tactical task to execute in the moment, not some convoluted preplan.

tl;dr when it comes to maneuver i.e. fighting an enemy, that's more of a platoon game, not an isolated squad game and it often comes down to who can react and decide first and be able to properly execute instinctual battle drills effectively is who wins, with higher level echelons combining battle drills and tactical tasks to formulate more complex maneuvers (platoon, company, battalion) such as pincers and enveloping and committing the all too important and often neglected reserve force.

>>62783196
You fail to grasp the horrors that was 5 million KIA and 5 million POW

>>62783211
>Different shooting technique
Precisely
Which makes the Wikipedia article utter horseshit

>>62775132
>it is no longer "tactical" then because at that level, logistics one way or another becomes the key (or even only) factor within the control of the HQ ... the closest modern analogue is Desert Storm, which was technically a five-corps operations plan
I remember reading an interview with Schwarzkopf about the planning up to that, and the way he described what was happening, when the offensive actually started it was basically out of their hands. Of course it was a steamroll and better than expected but sitting in the HQ felt like rolling the dice.

>>62784981
now check the GI numbers.

>>62785187
>US
>407k KIA
>671k WIA
and that includes fighting the Japs LMAOOO

>>62783196
the US repple depple system was actually much better at handling attritition than the german one
alongside US battalions having at least a fireteam of riflemen solely to act as replacement troops, as well as lots of redundant men who could act as replacement troops

despite all the criticisms of green troops being put into deadly combat so soon after deployment, keeping the total number of men at the frontline at a steady number meant they could keep pressuring german lines
whereas german units were often combat incapable after the same fight and would provide a temporary but critical shortfall of men while they were rotated out for a fresh unit

>>62785198
NTA but rotating whole units out has always been acknowledged as the superior system, whether it is whole platoons or whole companies etc
the only reason to fill in individual replacements is when casualties are absolutely minimal, or in emergencies

>>62785212
>but rotating whole units out has always been acknowledged as the superior system
its better when its possible, but for the purposes of withstanding attrition, the repple depple system allowed a unit to maintain fighting strength for much longer

replacing large units was extremely slow, and left vulnerability if you had to do it in the middle of combat
replacing small units was also relatively unreliable, due to the large amount of travelling units needed to do from front to the replacement army and back
and doing paperwork in combat is a tall order

US replacing a soldier in 3 days meant that units could maintain full strength much longer, they only really became combat incapable when there were so many green units compared to veterans that they couldnt do anything, and even then they could at least act positionally
german units got replaced every 60 days, and only if the replacement army gave them priority
so they could be combat ineffective fairly quickly

>In any infantry unit from mid-June onwards there'd have been a mix of men representing every stage of that chart (combat exhaustion), which would tend to reduce the overall effectiveness of any given unit. At the rifleman-squad-platooncompany level, infantry units were NOT on an ever escalating performance curve.
>How, then, did divisions learn and improve if the individual riflemen weren't really getting a whole lot better at their jobs? They did it by becoming much better at the stuff that actually matters. Battalion and regimental staffs tended to survive much longer. And I specifically mean the staffs, rather than merely the commanders. Men in supporting arms like artillery, logistics, and even armour also had much greater longevity.
>Improvements in those areas meant that combat infantry units were fed into combat much better prepared and supported, and working to a plan based on realistic assessments and objectives. Given that, it didn't matter that Private Snooks in 3rd Squad, 1 Platoon, C Company, 2nd Battalion wasn't becoming a better soldier, because less was being asked of him, since he was being given more support to achieve objectives.

>>62785222
>allowed a unit to maintain fighting strength
in manpower but not in actual capability due to the loss of a properly trained and experienced man

in any case a division even in WW2 generally had to be replaced after about a month (if not less) of active combat

>>62785231
this is a fallacy because if the infantry had maintained their performance then the overall performance would have been even better

>>62785237
>in manpower but not in actual capability d
it allowed actual capability to be retained much longer

US battalions were often still combat capable even after heavy fighting simply because they had high numbers
even if most of them were green, most of them were still capable of offensive action
the same german units fighting them were often incapable of attack or defense, the only units left in them were support and logistics

so in this scenario, a battalion of US troops, even with little experience, will be facing against an understrength unit of german troops, whose own veterans were dead anyways
in this case, the US forces kept initiative while the german unit was deadlined for at least 2 months or would be combined with another shattered unit and sent back into the fight, in that case its just the same thing as the american system with extra steps

american system was ruthless, but it was effective
its not done now because the US has never had the same level of intense fighting in a short period of time, but it held a key advantage over german replacement system in WW2

>>62785249
it allowed SOME actual capability to be retained

you shouldn't compare US units with German units, as the German units were losing, may I remind you
you should compare US units with US units that used alternative systems

>>62785237
>fallacy
Wut? I'm not trying to prove anything, more just providing a differing angle to the question of individual soldier experience versus large unit effectiveness.
>the overall performance would have been even better
If we break down unit effectiveness to a bare basic (soldier experience) + (supporting elements experience) equation, then yeah no shit 2+2 is greater than 1+2.

>>62785266
>If we break down unit effectiveness to a bare basic (soldier experience) + (supporting elements experience) equation, then yeah no shit 2+2 is greater than 1+2
is there any other way to look at it?
can you somehow magically make the argument that a green replacement is somehow superior to a veteran replacement?

>>62785262
and the point is that replacing the entire unit to be rebuilt and replacing it is the usual system because it works under usual circumstances
but WW2 was not a usual circumstance, removing an entire unit from combat to be rebuilt and then sent back could take weeks if not months to accomplish and would leave depleted units in the field for much longer than they ordinarily would be and largely ineffectual the whole time

in this context, the US system of replacing all casualties after 3 days to keep a unit fighting for as long as physically possible enabled them to withstand the attritional aspect of war much better than the german system of replacing entire units

the tradeoffs in lack of unit cohesion and emotional trauma was simply lesser than keeping a unit at full nominal strength in combat and better at preserving maneuver capability after battle damage

>>62785272
>can you somehow magically make the argument that a green replacement is somehow superior to a veteran replacement?
a green replacement is better than no replacement

sending shattered units back to the reserve army and getting a unit back takes a lot of time, and the whole time this process is occuring you still need a unit in the field
and the understrength unit you have cannot perform offensive action
while replacing individual units in the field can and did cause extreme distress in the individuals, it meant that the unit as a whole was still had legs

>>62785272
>argument that a green replacement is somehow superior to a veteran replacement?
I only have three posts in this thread, this one, >>62785266 and >>62785231. I never made any argument about styles of replacement

>>62785275
>3 days
The US very rarely (if ever) received such devastating losses within 3 days to make a comparable situation; they were usually pulled off the front line to regenerate, which can be achieved within a month or so

Relief in place with a whole unit is better than the individual replacement system and can be accomplished within a month or two. After which time the restored division can go back in and relieve the previous division.

>>62785284
>a green replacement is better than no replacement
irrelevant; that wasn't the question
>takes a lot of time
not if the process is well-managed
this is why there are readiness cycles

>>62785298
Yes, I'm explaining how your post in >62785231 is irrelevant, because
>no shit 2+2 is greater than 1+2

>>62785318
>The US very rarely (if ever) received such devastating losses within 3 days to make a comparable situation
that was the literal replacement depot system, any casualty was replaced in 3 days, this ensured that a division maintained its legs even in heavy fighting
the germans, who replaced units by unit, found their units depleted of legs fairly within the same period of time because they did not receive a steady replacement of troops

constant in-field replenenishment allowed the US to withstand much greater attrition than rotating units back to the replacement army, since they could keep untis in the field much longer

>irrelevant; that wasn't the question
the original statement was that the US system was better at withstanding attrition than whole unit rotation
whole unit rotation would often mean no replacements at all

the repple depple system, for the purposes of keeping units ready for further offensives despite heavy losses, worked
the losses to unit cohesion from green recruits being sent directly to the frontline is well know, but the end result was still effective and better at withstanding combat damage
for the purposes of WW2 warfare, this advantage was more relevant

>>62785600
>that was the literal replacement depot system, any casualty was replaced in 3 days, this ensured that a division maintained its legs even in heavy fighting
you'll find that in actual heavy fighting the US withdrew its divisions off the line and put in fresh divisions in place
>the germans
were losing the war, they are not comparable; they took more casualties day by day than the US did
>because they
were having their reinforcements interdicted at all levels of the supply chain

>whole unit rotation would often mean no replacements at all
name me examples?
AFAIK that's not true, the US generally was able to plug the line with other units and relieve its divisions whole, generally within a month

bear in mind that when I say the division (or brigade) should be rotated out, I don't mean "back to the States", because that is usually detrimental. rather, the unit should be pulled off the front line and given small rear-area tasks or even very small combat missions (at say ten to one odds) while resting, refitting, rearming, receiving replacements, and hopefully even doing some training before being sent back into the fight

keeping a division "at the coalface" in heavy fighting for more than about a month is widely-acknowledged to be bad and, like, I said, never happened to the US Army in WW2 AFAIK

>>62785628
>you'll find that in actual heavy fighting the US withdrew its divisions off the line and put in fresh divisions in place
again, the the replacement depot system was literally to replace any trooper within 3 days with someone else

>were losing the war, they are not comparable;
it also shows the advantages the replacement depot system has, which is that a unit can be kept at full strength longer

the replacement depot system was literally in place because wholesale unit rotation was proving difficult to accomplish in WW1 for the aforementioned reasons
pulling an entire unit off the battlefield was difficult, time consuming, and meant that essentially a third of the army was unavailable at any time

so the replacement depot practice was put into place in WW2, where instead of raising and replacing units in batches, they would instead trickle feed replacements to units that needed them from the replacement depot
the time between a unit arriving for a replacement was 3 days

as mentioned earlier, there were problems with unit cohesion
but this was more than made up for with staying power, units could withstand heavy combat without being made combat ineffective because they would stay more or less at nominal strength
for the context of WW2, the replacement depot system worked

>>62785658
>the replacement depot system was literally to replace any trooper within 3 days with someone else
and generals preferred to pull divisions off the line when they had been in heavy combat instead

>it also shows the advantages
it does not because you are no longer comparing apples with apples

>for the context of WW2, the replacement depot system worked
you keep saying that
show me some examples, go on
which units stayed in heavy fighting in WW2 without being pulled off the line to rest?

>It has been demonstrated here that divisions should not be left in the line longer than 30 to 40 days in an active theater. If you do this, as has been done in this theater, everybody gets tired, then they get careless, and there are tremendous sick rates and casualty rates. Everybody should know this. The result is that you feed replacements into a machine in the line, and it is like throwing good money after bad. Your replacement system is bound to break down, as it has done in this theater.
>Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers
>Sixth Army Group
he had over thirty divisions under him, I think he knows what he's talking about, don't you?

>>62785671
you clearly arent listening to why the repple depply system exists, why it was used, and the advantages it gave to the US army in terms of withstanding attrition

>>62785700
You clearly aren't listening to anything I posted, even when I posted a direct quote
>the advantages it gave
Prove it.
Are you capable of reading two (2) words?

>>62785671
>don't keep units on the frontline for months on end
and
>reinforce units with fresh men as they take casualties
are not mutually exclusive things

>>62785735
>Prove it.
again, the reason it existed in the first place is because of their experiences in WW1
since pulling a unit out of combat could only be done if there was a replacement available in the first place, the front line tended to be mostly understrength with only the absolutely most destroyed units getting priority on replacements

hence the adoption of the replacement depot practice in WW2
the issues that the US suffered in WW1 were repeated with germany in WW2, depleted units were forced to stay in the field because rotating them out with fresh ones was hard
while a US unit in combat with them would take the same casualties, they would then recieve a replacement from the depot within days to keep them at top strength without pulling them away from combat
it was hard on the troops, but it was just as hard on the enemy

>>62785736
They're not, as I said many posts ago:
>>62785212

If you lose at any unit level casualties amounting to a full element, you already need to start consoldiating and combining that element, OR reorganise e.g. if a battalion loses a company, it should ideally be pulled off the line, if it continues fighting it is really fighting as a half-battalion rather than as a nominal battalion i.e. have to be given smaller missions

You can lose maybe 1 guy in 10 or 2 in 10 and absorb individual replacements fine but more than that starts getting serious

>>62785760
>Ww1
Overruled by WW2 experience as I cited above
>Germans
There are a hundred reasons why the Germans lost, from oil to wunderwaffle to bombing etc ad nauseam, you cannot attribute overall German performance to one factor

Anything else?

>>62785769
>you cannot attribute overall German performance to one factor
For the purposes of explaining the advantages of the replacement depot system, it works fine
Germans literally repeated the same thing that the Americans experienced in WW1 as a result of following the same system

The repple depple system had many faults, but attrition was not one of them

>>62785842
>the reason why German infantry divisions took heavy casualties is solely because of their replacement system and nothing else at all
No, sorry, it doesn't work that way

The only things you stupid faggots ever commanded in your lives are plastic models.
None of you know what you're talking about.

>>62785851
the slowness of full-unit replacement forced understrength units to stay on the line until a replacement could be found
this is the exact problem that the US had experienced before and wanted to avoid, keeping full strength units in combat even if it meant shoving anyone who was available into it
so after an engagement they could continue to act offensively instead of waiting to be rotated