/kng/ - /k/ nuclear generalFrom the K-19 “Hiroshima” to my boy Sergei Preminin, discuss the Russian military’s history of reactors, and those abroadSequel to the first four threads. Feel free to also bring up their land based military reactors, Mayak is a bit of a doozyPREVIOUS: >>64284335
https://desuarchive.org/k/thread/63053811/https://desuarchive.org/k/thread/63104003/https://desuarchive.org/k/thread/63235460/reminder to always keep it simple to start and save the hardcore sperging out for a bit later.
>>64312521
Ok I can't post the sources it keeps saying spam even with one link, but I found em
>>64312599If that guy really does know Kyle Hill and he’s interested in Annushka’s 1949 meltdown, here’s some sources Insert important one herehttps://magazines.gorky.media/ural/2006/8/kaskad-zamedlennogo-dejstviya.htmlwww.proatom.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=8368https://www-libozersk-ru.translate.goog/pbd/Mayak60/link/260.htm?_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=sc
>>64312662For some goddamn reason the spam filter keeps blocking this, add this it’s very inportant
>>64312662I'll send these to him in the morning (and the other 2 in the screenshot)no response to my first message though...
>>64312685That’s only one message, it’s just it’s in the Wayback archived. Original is dead.Anyway to start this off lively, who wants to hear what the US thought about Chernobyl in May 1986! https://youtube.com/watch?v=8LGNDOUQeIM&pp=ygUZQ2hlcm5vYnlsIGJyaWVmaW5nIHJlYWdhbg%3D%3D
>be soviets in 1977>launch nuclear-powered spy satellite (because launching that shit into space is so safe)>fuck up the launch>NORAD notices your satellite is acting erratically and changing it's altitude by up to 50(!) miles>real ksp beginner shit>system to eject the reactor core into a safe orbit also fails>satellite breaks up over Canada, radioactive debris falls across the country and the US+Canada have to clean it upAnd then it happens again several times with similarly designed satellites.
If some hack author wrote a book where a mass murderer appointed a pedophile serial killer to supervise the construction of a top secret nuclear weapons facility which was the cause of two of the top five worst nuclear disasters in history and ended up releasing as much contamination as three Chernobyls over the years I would roll my eyes. And yet Mayak exists.>>64312794>and the US+Canada have to clean it upAs always, yeah. The Russians were the ones who bulldozed their Anthrax stockpiles into shallow pits and then said "not our problem".
>>64312840>bulldozed their Anthrax stockpiles into shallow pits and then said "not our problem".Was that on the island in Lake Aral?Which is now no longer an island because they caused the lake to dry up?
>>64312890>Was that on the island in Lake Aral?Yep. IIRC Russia refused point-blank to aid in any decontamination efforts and the decontamination was carried out by the US just for the sake of not having hundreds of tons of Anthrax lying around in the middle of the desert.>Which is now no longer an island because they caused the lake to dry up?Yep. The Soviets decided to divert the rivers feeding the Aral Sea to irrigate the desert while being fully aware that doing so would destroy the Aral Sea and the former SSRs have kept doing so because they've come to rely heavily on the cotton money.
>>64312794They really are children with stolen toys
>>64312794Huh, first time I heard about about Kosmos-954, I thought it was the same as those RTGs used on Voyager and in the ALSEP kits. >because launching that shit into space is so safeEh, besides the aforementioned US cases, this was apparently the 14th one
>>64312840>which was the cause of two of the top five worst nuclear disasters in historyWait, two?
>>64315704>Wait, two?Yeah. The first was the Kyshtym disaster in 1957 when there was a fucky-wucky and a waste storage tank exploded and released ~800 Pbq of high-level waste products over an area the size of New Jersey and the second was in 1968 when the lakes they had been dumping their radioactive waste into dried up and ~185PBq of radioactive waste went airborne and irradiated half a million people.>Before the 1957 accident, much of the waste was dumped into the Techa River, which severely contaminated it and residents of dozens of riverside villages such as Muslyumovo, who relied on the river as their sole source of drinking, washing, and bathing water. After the 1957 accident, dumping in the Techa River officially ceased, but the waste material was left in convenient shallow lakes near the plant instead, of which 7 have been officially identified. Of particular concern is Lake Karachay, the closest lake to the plant (now notorious as "the most contaminated place on Earth"[9]) where roughly 4.4 exabecquerels of high-level liquid waste (75–90% of the total radioactivity released by Chernobyl) was dumped and concentrated in the shallow 45-hectare (0.45 km2; 110-acre) lake[15] over several decades. >The sediment of the lake bed is estimated to be composed almost entirely of high level radioactive waste deposits to a depth of roughly 11 feet (3.4 m).
How does someone get into nuclear? I am not good at math, am I screwed from the get go? Enjoyed the last thread.
By the summer of 1946, designers for the "atomic project" facilities had been selected. As early as September 4, 1945, thePGU acquired the State Union Design Institute No. 11 (GSPI-11) from the People's Commissariat of Defense (GOKOResolution No. 9968 ss/op). The GOKO ordered the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense and other People'sCommissariats to second former employees of the First Main Directorate, who were still serving in the army andother departments, to GSPI-11.On June 10, 1946, the Special Committee clarified the list of organizations tasked with designing combined-cyclepower plants (the USSR Council of Ministers resolution was signed on June 21, 1946). Judging by the hearing materials, theprimary designers were GSPI-11 and NII-9. The resolution was finalized under Vannikov's supervision, and Zavenyagin'sname is not listed among the executors. However, his participation, as a matter of routine, cannot be ruled out.Considering that much has been written in detail about the creation of the nuclear industry, we will only visit theenterprises of the so-called first stage of the "atomic project," where A.P. Zavenyagin's involvement was direct andpassionate. Our guide was primarily documents recently declassified and published.
>>64316210The Noginsk Plant No. 12 occupied a special place in the “atomic project” program: it was to set up theproduction of aluminum-sheathed uranium blocks for the first F-1 reactor, as well as for the Ural plants whereit was planned to produce “nuclear” explosives.It was B.L. Vannikov, M.V. Khrunichev, and A.P. Zavenyagin who proposed transferring Plant No. 12of the People's Commissariat of Warfare to PSU for the purpose of organizing the production of uranium metalthere. This initiative was approved at the second meeting of the Special Committee on August 24, 1945, andon August 30, 1945, by Resolution No. 9946 of the State Defense Committee, Plant No. 12became the "property" of PSU.On October 10, 1945, the Special Committee reviewed a set of priority issues concerning Plant No.12. A number of assignments were given to A.P. Zavenyagin, either personally or as part of a team: finda way to allocate three engineering and construction battalions to carry out construction and installationwork; draw up a schedule for the design and manufacture of high-frequency vacuum electricfurnaces and refractory crucibles, as well as for the installation of the electric furnaces; and provideproposals for where the necessary technological equipment would be manufactured
>>64316224Three days later, the corresponding Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (No. 2629-714 ss) was signed. The primary contractor was the NKVD's Glavpromstroy (Komarovsky). The Combined-Plant State Unit was authorized to carry out planned construction and assembly work without working drawings, relying on sketches and instructions from designers on-site. Bonuses for outstanding workers were provided, along with special meals, dry rations, three-course hot lunches with 200 grams of bread, dinners, and quotas for manufactured goods.The PGU received permission to dismantle the necessary equipment and materials in Germany and to seize everything needed from captured bases. Delivery to the USSR was urgent.In addition to the reconstruction of the 12th, it was planned to establish a pilot plant there, where it was planned to test various methods of obtaining metallic uranium, select the most effective of them, and also obtain metal for experimental workThis was far from the last stage in the long process of reorganization of the former “gunsmith”.
>>64316233The first briquettes and blocks were produced (October 1945) from "German" crude uranium at a pilot plant supervised by Z.V. Ershova. Moreover, Russian researchers introduced a new technology compared to the German one: the recovery of uranium from tetrafluoride.Meanwhile, the development of uranium metal smelting progressed with varying success. At first, achieving the required metal purity was impossible. This depended on various factors, but the plant was ultimately responsible. Recalling that time, the director of Plant No. 12 wrote: "A.P. Zavenyagin told me: 'You, Comrade Kallistov (A.N. Kallistov, director of Plant No. 12 – Ed.), were dancing on a razor's edge back then.'" One document states that Zavenyagin, "when he came to the shop, listened attentively to reports, often sawing rolled rods himself to determine the thickness of the oxide layer, and in the laboratory, he inquired about the plastic properties and structure of uranium."In January 1946, I.V. Kurchatov, I.K. Kikoin, B.L. Vannikov, M.G. Pervukhin and A.P. Zavenyagin reported to I.V. Stalin: “The production of metallic uranium is being organized at Plant No. 12 (Noginsk), where a plant is being equipped to obtain 100 tons of fresh metallic uranium per year and 200 tons of regenerated (spent in boilers).The launch of the first stage with a capacity of 100 tons is scheduled for July 1, 1946, and the second (with an additional 200 tons) – for July 1, 1947. <…>The same plant will also produce metallic calcium and oxalic acid for uranium smelting. Equipment from the Bitterfeld plant in Germany will be used for this purpose, after our specialists have mastered the production of these chemicals at that facility.
>>64316246Currently, a pilot plant consisting of three workshops with a monthly capacity of 2 tons of metallic uranium has been equipped and launched at Plant No. 12. The plant produced its first 137 kilograms of metallic uranium in the fourth quarter (of 1945 – Comp.).The "reporters" reported that they expected to receive by mid-1947 100 tons of metal necessary for the construction of a "uranium-graphite pile."During the reconstruction of the plant and the establishment of metallic uranium production, with the participation of A.P. Zavenyagin, drafts of a number of relevant government decrees were prepared (they were adopted in October and December 1945). The issue of creating a domestic base for the production of vacuum electric furnaces for smelting metallic uranium, as well as the design deadlines and the presentation of a prototype of such a furnace, was decided.(When this special equipment was created, A.P. Zavenyagin, I. Kabanov, and I. Kurchatov addressed a letter to L.P. Beria: they asked for funds to be allocated for bonuses for the workers of the Electropech trust, which had issued PGU with 88 special electric furnaces, including 20 vacuum high-frequency electric furnaces, the first of their kind manufactured in the Union.)Although enormous resources were mobilized to accomplish the task, its novelty necessitated adjustments to the planned activities. By the end of May 1946, the situation was close to critical, and N.I. Pavlov, authorized by the USSR Council of Ministers to Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences, where the launch of the "uranium-graphite pile," or "F-1," was planned, visited the site (with a group of PGU senior staff and Academician I.V. Kurchatov on May 28, 1946), and reported to L.P. Beria: "...it has been established that the program for the production of the A-9 in 1946, in the amount of 40 tons, is in danger of being disrupted."
>>64316256As of May 28, Plant No. 12 had manufactured and delivered 4.8 tons of A-9 blocks to Laboratory No. 2 of the Academy of Sciences. According to the plant's management, metal production will soon reach 1.5–1.8 tons per month, with the bulk of the output expected in the fourth quarter.As a result, the timely launch of the F-1 experimental installation, which requires 20–30 tons of metal, on the scheduled date of September 1, 1946, is disrupted.The main reason for the current situation is the delay in the construction of new production workshops, the launch of which should ensure an increase in the plant’s productivity to 10 tons of A-9 metal per month. The government set a deadline of July 1st of this year for the commissioning of these workshops. Instead of taking energetic measures to expedite construction, with the goal of completing the work by July 1st, the Construction Department is planning its work according to a schedule that postpones the completion date to September 1st.In addition, the plant’s existing capacity to increase A-9 production is being realized slowly.<…>In this regard, it should be noted that the construction of the laboratories has also been delayed due to the fault of the Main Directorate of Industrial Construction of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (Comrade Komarovsky). Instead of the established deadline of April 1, construction of the main laboratory is still ongoing.
>>64316281It is also necessary to point out that for such an important enterprise as Plant No. 12, it is necessary to attract a significant number of specialists from outside.As a result, the timely launch of the F-1 experimental installation, which requires 20–30 tons of metal, on the scheduled date of September 1, 1946, is disrupted. accumulation.Ultimately, all the technological mysteries were solved, and production was established. True, it was not domestic uranium, but "German" uranium that was used to produce the entire first industrial batch of blocks (November 1946, 36 tons), which allowed the F-1 reactor to be launched on December 25 of that year. Finally, it is especially important to emphasize the importance of strictly accounting for all available raw materials for the production of A-9, since its resources are extremely limited. and a skilled workforce. Meanwhile, residential construction has not been sufficiently expanded. Currently, all captured raw materials are concentrated at the plant, where they are accounted for and used. Under thesecircumstances, there is no proper oversight to ensure the economical use of A-9, and no conditions are created to combat losses and increase finished product yields…"
>>64316292Gradually, the plant's output grew. And the time came for it to be shipped to the industrial "consumer": on March 27, 1948, the Special Committee ordered the PGU under the USSR Council of Ministers (M.G. Pervukhin, A.P. Zavenyagin) to transport all available cargo from Plant No. 12 to Base No. 10 (Combine No. 817. — Comp.) by April 15, 1948.Transportation was to be carried out by special trains consisting of two echelons on different routes. "Echelons are to be dispatched with triple rerouting en route." Subsequently, it was ordered that cargo for Base-10 be transported in separate cars. As it follows from the approved cargo transportation procedures, the provision of wagons for loading and the transportation itself are permitted only upon written instructions from the Deputy Head of the PGU, A.P. Zavenyagin.Over time, the production of metallic uranium was supplemented by the manufacture of diffusion filters, and then fuel elements; the plant began to develop a number of other products for the nuclear industry, both military and civilian.As documents are published, it will be possible to reveal in more detail A.P. Zavenyagin's specific contribution to the development of the plant, which, not without his active participation, became the cradle of technologies required for the "atomic project."One more note, however. When the time came (September 1948), Zavenyagin participated in the selection of the construction site for the second chemical-metallurgical plant, No. 250, in Novosibirsk. It was anticipated that the backup to Plant No. 12 would be able to achieve a production capacity of up to 1,000 tons of metallic uranium.
>>64316310A number of “nuclear” plants began to “nest” in the Urals. When “tying” the site for the construction of the first industrial nuclear reactor, it was necessary to take into account a number of requirements: external secrecy (relative distance from large cities and busy transport routes), thepresence.It would seem that selecting sites for the construction of the first plants, No. 817 and 813, was a relatively routine operation. But only to the uninitiated, at first glance.
>>64316321When selecting a site for the construction of the first industrial nuclear reactor, several requirements had to be met: external secrecy (relative distance from major cities and busy highways), the availability of a large amount of water for cooling the reactor core, large power sources, and a railway...A.P. Zavenyagin was tasked with finding a suitable location. He recalled that something similar existed in the northern Chelyabinsk region. A.P. had visited the area in 1937: he had been nominated as a candidate for deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from the Kyshtym electoral district.Even on his first visit, the area impressed him with its magnificent nature and abundance of lakes...In mid-October 1945, a Douglas aircraft carrying A.P. Zavenyagin, A.N. Komarovsky, V.A. Saprykin, and representatives of other organizations flew for a long time between Kyshtym and Kasli.Both during the flight and later, on the ground, various options for the location of the "object" and the future city were re-evaluated. They even conducted an additional wind study (military meteorologists, on behalf of A.P. Zavenyagin, were assisted by pilots from Colonel Khodyrev's air unit), after which the city and the plant were swapped.However, the matter was somewhat more complicated.Here are some excerpts from that search.On September 28, 1945, the Special Committee of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, having reviewed the Technical Council's proposals for a plan for further research and practical work in the field of nuclear energy utilization, instructed B.L. Vannikov, A.P. Zavenyagin, I.V. Kurchatov, I.K. Kikoin, and N.A. Borisov to select sites for the construction of the "uranium-graphite pile" and the diffusion plant within two weeks and submit their proposals to the Special Committee.
>>64316334And indeed, two weeks later, on October 13, A.P. Zavenyagin informed L.P. Beria that Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences I.K. Kikoin, accompanied by the head of Chelyabmetallurgstroy Ya.D. Rappoport, personally inspected construction sites in the Southern Urals and selected three suitable ones (as follows from other documents, with the participation of Lavrenov, a representative of the First Directorate of the USSR State Planning Committee).Later, on October 25, B.L. Vannikov, A.P. Zavenyagin, and N.A. Borisov sent a letter of conclusion to L.P. Beria: "Of the three sites inspected, the best are the site between the city of Kyshtym and the Ufa River and the site near Mauk Station.We consider it advisable to build Plant No. 1 (No. 817. — Ed.) on the first site and Plant No. 2 (No. 813. — Ed.) on the second.As for the third site, near Lake Kyzyl-Tash, although it has advantages in terms of amenities, it is located significantly closer to populated areas than the first two sites... Furthermore, the lake would serve as a good landmark for locating the site from the air.We request that the first two sites be approved for the construction of the aforementioned plants."The situation then partially changed. In accordance with the Special Committee's October 26, 1945, order, not only the site was reviewed, but also lists of mothballed construction projects in the Urals and other suitable areas were checked (from the perspective of the possibility of accelerated construction of enterprises on an already prepared "foundation"). The possibility of locating Plant No. 817 in completed or unfinished buildings that met the necessary requirements was determined.
>>64316354After reviewing materials on a number of sites, B.L. Vannikov and N.A. Borisov proposed the following options: for Plant No. 817, the site of the People's Commissariat of the Paper Industry and its Plant No. 752 (Vyatka River, Kirov Region); for Plant No. 813, the site of Plant No. 261 of the People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry (Verkh-Neyvinskoye, Sverdlovsk Region, 80 km from Sverdlovsk).However, they requested time to further inspect the facilities on site.They inspected them. And on November 12, three of them, including A.P. Zavenyagin, reported to L.P. Beria. But only about the site for Plant No. 813.On the other hand, for Plant No. 817, there was confusion.On November 14, 1945, I.V. Kurchatov sent a personal letter to L.P. Beria about relocating the site of Plant No. 817 to Lake Kyzyl-Tash. Let us quote: "Further study of the construction of Plant No. 817 revealed that the water in the cooling towers would have a temperature of approximately 80°C, which would inevitably cause significant vapor emission (especially in winter) and abruptly expose the site from the air.Another solution to the water cooling problem at the chosen location (between Kyshtym and the Ufa River) would require the construction of a large pipeline and a powerful pumping station and would also not prevent steaming due to the low flow rate in the upper reaches of the Ufa River.The matter would be significantly simplified if the plant were located near a lake, where the large amount of cold water would allow cooling without a cooling tower and without significantly heating the water, thus avoiding steaming.Among the sites proposed for consideration by the Special Committee, Comrade Kikoin and Comrade Rappoport mentioned a site near Lake Kyzyl-Tash (15 km from Kyshtym). Comrade Kikoin opposed this site. Zavenyagin, believing that the lake could serve as a landmark for aerial reconnaissance.
>>64316360I find this argument unconvincing, as the site is located in the Ural lake belt, where a very large number of lakes of the same shape as Lake Kyzyl-Tash are located in a small area.I request that you consider relocating the site of Plant No. 817 to Lake Kyzyl-Tash."Zavenyagin was likely upset that his arguments were so easily countered, especially from a professional standpoint. And, apparently, he asked B.L. Vannikov to excuse him from further participation in the assessment.At least, L.P. Beria's next letter on this topic (November 22) was signed only by B.L. Vannikov and N.A. Borisov. It specifically lists two landing sites for the 817th: "Kurchatovskoye" and one in the Kirov region. But already on November 30, 1945, at a meeting of the Special Committee, only one was mentioned: "T" (16 km east of Kyshtym, on the southern shore of Lake Kyzyl-Tash, Chelyabinsk region). Interestingly, the proposal to this effect was made by B.L. Vannikov, I.V. Kurchatov, A.P. Zavenyagin, and N.A. Borisov. Agreed!Thus, the site for Plant No. 817 was approved (Resolution No. 3007-892 ss of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, dated December 1, 1945).On the same day, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR also adopted Resolution No. 3008-893 ss "On Plant No. 261 of the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry"—it was transferred to the PGU of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (with all structures and auxiliary enterprises). Three weeks later, on December 21, the Council of People's Commissars ordered the PGU and the Main Industrial Construction Directorate of the NKVD to immediately begin construction of "facilities" No. 817 and 813.
>>64316365Plant No. 817 (the "builder" is the Chelyabmetallurgstroy NKVD) is scheduled to be commissioned in the second quarter of 2018. 1947, completion of construction work on Project 813 (Tagilstroy NKVD, headed by M.M. Tsarevsky) – September 1946. The corresponding special construction directorates were created – Nos. 859 and 865 NKVD…While the decision was being made on the construction site for the uranium enrichment and plutonium production facilities, the PGU and the First Directorate of the USSR State Planning Committee, with the participation of Academician Kurchatov, were tasked with promptly submitting a schedule for the design, construction, and installation work, and proposing "addresses" where orders could be placed for the manufacture of equipment, apparatus, and the supply of raw materials and supplies. N.A. Borisov, A.P. Zavenyagin, and A.N. Komarovsky were instructed to submit a list of measures to ensure the implementation of government directives.March 1946. The Special Committee again returned to the issue of the commissioning dates for Plants No. 817 and 813: the first was scheduled for the second quarter of 1947 (as stipulated by Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 3150-952 ss of December 21, 1945), and the second for September 1947. It was again emphasized that the PGU should design the plants.On April 9, 1946, the Council of Ministers of the USSR set the commissioning dates for two priority facilities at Plant No. 817: the uranium-graphite pile (July 1, 1947) and the workshop for the chemical processing of irradiated uranium blocks for the separation of ready-to-use pure plutonium (by September 1, 1947). B.L. Vannikov and A.P. Zavenyagin was tasked with ensuring the delivery of 100 tons of uranium slabs to Plant No. 817 by July 1, 1947, and thereafter according to the approved schedule.
>>64316370Another Council of Ministers resolution, dated April 9, 1946, set the commissioning date for Diffusion Plant No. 813 at September 1, 1947, to ensure that uranium-235 would be delivered to Plant No. 817 for reprocessing in a timely manner.Zavenyagin is involved in developing measures to support construction and staffing the future production facility (including issues of salaries, housing, amenities, supplies, and cultural services for scientific, engineering, technical, and other workers). He has his own "line" in the documents regarding the supply of high-quality equipment, the design and manufacture of specialized fittings, and the construction of wastewater storage tunnels for Plant "B"...Many difficulties awaited the teams involved in the construction of Plant "V" (the production of metallic plutonium and its products). "The development of the plutonium production plant project," recalled I.N. Golovin, "began long before the launch of F-1 (the first physical reactor in Laboratory No. 2. — Ed.). Various options were discussed at the council (the scientific council of PSU — Ed.), with the participation of numerous engineers and physicists. The project managers, I.V. Kurchatov, B.L. Vannikov, A.P. Zavenyagin, and V.A. Malyshev, delved into all the details but were unable to make a final choice, as the calculations had not yet been confirmed by experience.These difficulties led to delays in the established deadlines. Zavenyagin (and others, of course) were concerned about how to expedite the entire complex of works on Plant "V" and ensure the fastest possible production and delivery of its equipment. A.P. decided to create a design team directly during the construction of Plant 817.
>>64316372On the nature of A.P.'s assignments Zavenyagin is supported, for example, by the minutes of paragraph 3 of the Special Committee meeting of March 12, 1947 ('On the manufacture of equipment for Shop 'B' of Plant No. 817 (Shop 'B' was the original name of the radiochemical plant 'B' of the future Combine No. 817, where plutonium concentrate was obtained. - Ed.)'):'Accept the draft Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, submitted by Comrades Kurchatov, Zavenyagin, Pervukhin, and Borisov, 'On the manufacture of equipment for Shop 'B' of Plant No. 817', instructing Comrades Zavenyagin (convocation), Pervukhin, Parshin, and Borisov within three days to:a) clarify the delivery dates for the chemical equipment for Shop 'B', based on Comrade Slavsky's statement that The technical documentation required from the First Main Directorate for all equipment in Shop B will be fully issued to the Ministry of Mechanical Engineering and Instrument Making by March 20 of this year;b) jointly with Comrades Kazakov and Malyshev, clarify the deadlines and specifications for deliveries of special transport equipment by the Ministry of Heavy Engineering and protective device castings by the Ministry of Transport Engineering;c) determine the required quantity of gold for plating chemical equipment and establish the procedure for its use in production…;d) specify in the project the delivery deadlines and specifications for measuring instruments supplied by the Ministry of Foreign Trade… and coordinate their delivery with the Ministry of Foreign Trade.2. Assign oversight of the delivery of equipment for Shop B to Comrades Zavenyagin and Borisov, and personally to Comrade Malyshev for the delivery of 5,000 tons of protective device castings by the Ministry of Transport Engineering.
>>643163853. The draft Resolution "On the Manufacture of Equipment for Shop B of Plant No. 817," after revision, shall be submitted to Comrade I.V. Stalin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.4. Comrades Zavenyagin, Pervukhin, Borisov, and Parshin shall be required to take the necessary measures to ensure that the enterprises of the Ministry of Machine Building and Instrument Making fulfill the assignments for the manufacture and delivery of equipment for Shop B within the timeframe established by the draft Resolution.Everyone was in a hurry. The time allotted for the construction of the "facilities" was running out. Downright scandalous situations arose.V. Filippov: "I barely had time to process the acceptance reports and pay the bills. One day, Glavpromstroy presented an invoice for the installation of particularly valuable equipment. The cost included numerous valves, instruments, and control elements made of gold and platinum—traditionally, such additions to the price of cheap valves had been overlooked. Here, however, there were thousands of these 'trifles,' and each one cost thousands of rubles. I refused to approve this invoice, despite pressure from General Komarovsky.When he signed the invoice with Zavenyagin, I again refused to pay. Komarovsky then ran to Vannikov and persuaded him to sign it again. I, in turn, sent the invoice to Moscow—to the State Bank. They agreed with me.And then, at a party meeting, I spoke up and described this extortion. The main "regime enforcer," General Tkachenko, who was sitting next to me, quietly stole my notes. And he sent it to Moscow; he loved to write denunciations.
>>64316388And then something amazing happened: they liquidated the construction department, and therefore I was no longer needed. In Moscow, I learned the details of my dismissal from General Alexandrov, who was in charge of personnel. It turns out that an angry Komarovsky had written a report to Zavenyagin about my unsuitability for the position. It included, for example, this nonsense: "...all the city streets are dirty, and dead dogs are lying on them..." <…>When, after the test, I was nominated for government awards, Zavenyagin personally removed my name from the lists. The Order of Lenin and the title of laureate went to my deputy.And Zavenyagin continued to take revenge on me, trying to nix my projects or underestimate their value."It's possible that military construction engineer Filippov is guilty of subjectivity. But we decided to present them as rare eyewitness testimony and a participant in the events.Among the realities of the construction site is the situation described by V.N. Novoselov and V.S. Tolstikov: "In June 1947, the question of expanding crushed stone production at the crushing plant arose. General A.N. Komarovsky demanded a report on the matter. Saprykin commissioned Belyavsky, who was directly interested in the project, to develop a plan for a new, powerful crushing plant. Having quickly drawn up a plan for the plant, discussed with Saprykin many times, and having received his signature on the plan, Belyavsky went to see the head of Glavpromstroy of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in his private train car.Komarovsky, glancing at the presented plan, made a sour expression. and said sharply:"Yes, Comrade Belyavsky, it seems your ceiling isn't high. How can that be? The government has given us a deadline of just two years to build the facility, and you're proposing to build a giant plant just to produce crushed stone. Why do this if we've only been given two years?"
>>64316428Concluding his tirade, Komarovsky took a blue pencil, crossed out the drawing with a diagonal line, and wrote the resolution: "It is strictly forbidden to implement this plan. A. Komarovsky."Only the intervention of A.P. Zavenyagin, Deputy Head of the First Main Directorate, who was then overseeing the construction, saved the project to create a large-scale crushed stone production facility. A plant was soon built according to this plan at a quarry near Lake Kyzyltash. For many years to come, it supplied the entire construction site with crushed stone. This incident demonstrates how difficult it was back then, even for senior managers, to determine the construction prospects."...No, the construction of the main facility of the future Combine No. 817—the "uranium-graphite reactor"—failed to be completed on schedule: in April 1947, for example, only the pit for the first industrial reactor was ready. It was an impressive sight: 54 meters deep, with a surface diameter of 110 meters... But the completed "reactor" was still a long way off. And yet, L.P. Beria had promised Stalin to complete construction near Kyshtym by November 7, 1947.To be fair, not everything depended on Rappoport. Numerous reworkings were the fault of the designers, who were constantly behind schedule. This led to increased construction costs and constant problems with the procurement of labor and materials.Part of the problem was that for a time, the leadership of Chelyabmetallurgstroy and Construction Administration No. 859 (Ya.D. Rappoport, V.A. Saprykin) was located in Chelyabinsk, i.e., approximately 100 kilometers from the "site," while Colonel Z.P. Borisov was in charge on-site (from June to October 1946), while D.K. Semichastny was the formal head of the 1st Industrial Construction Region. This arrangement lowered the threshold for liability. Isn't it surprising that such a thing could happen?
>>64316449When the failure became obvious, the Special Committee deemed it necessary to dispatch (June 24 – July 3, 1947) A.P. Zavenyagin, I.V. Kurchatov, A.N. Komarovsky, and N.A. Borisov to the "site" to inspect the state of affairs and prepare for the installation of Plant No. 817, and to take measures to ensure the required pace of construction and installation work. (According to some sources, that commission also included M.G. Pervukhin, B.L. Vannikov, E.P. Slavsky, and A.D. Zverev.)On July 8, 1947, after reviewing the progress of Plant No. 817's construction on site, L.P. Beria, extremely irritated by the failure to meet government deadlines, "fired" the construction manager, Ya.D. Rappoport (this was insisted upon by the plant's director, deputy head of the PGU, E.P. Slavsky, and the authorized representative of the USSR Council of Ministers, I.M. Tkachenko). M.M. Tsarevsky became the new "foreman"—from July 12, 1947.
>>64316454As often happens, the change in leadership had an effect. The tandem of M.M. Tsarevsky and V.A. Saprykin proved successful, and given the assistance provided, including a sharp increase in the number of construction workers, the preconditions for a significant acceleration of the work were created.Attention also continued to the other technological buildings that were to become part of Combine No. 817. In appearance, these structures did not aspire to be among the masterpieces. Was that it?N.I. Ivanov: "The building of the fourth workshop, where the plutonium charge was manufactured, was temporary. It had to be quickly 'constructed,' since KB-11 was originally planned for this purpose. A.P. himself selected one of the storage facilities of Plant No. 817 for the laboratory section; a stone production 'half' was immediately added there."Later, about a year later, the PSU board approved me as head of Shop No. 11 (the new one, replacing Shop No. 4).They didn't ask any questions: if they invited me, it had to be done. And that was it.Zavenyagin finally asked: "What did you paint the shop with?" I answered. "What about fire safety?" "Right now," I said, "it's perfectly fine."I think he remembered that the old building was completely unsuitable from a fire safety standpoint. And he was interested in the paint job for the following reason: there was an incident during one of the experiments (pressing uranium powder, before they started making plutonium charges) when the punch was ejected, the powder scattered across the walls, and it began glowing and burning. It wasn't a pleasant experience. It was a different matter—it all worked out. But Zavenyagin was informed, and he didn't forget about the emergency."
>>64316463The best scientific and industrial resources were involved in the construction of the first industrial reactor.S. Sandler: "One day, Minister Khrunichev summoned me, handed me a piece of aluminum alloy tube with internal threads, and instructed me to organize the production of such tubes (casings for uranium rods – Ed.).A few days later, I was familiarized with a secret decision (a special folder) that required the production of casings in a specific quantity. I was relieved of all other work.During the approval of the technical specifications for the manufacture of the casings, prepared by metallurgist Academician Ambartsumyan and corrosion specialist Corresponding Member Akimov, sharp disagreements arose, and Beria summoned Zavenyagin and me. He harshly reprimanded us and demanded daily reports (signed by both me and the minister) on the fulfillment of the daily schedule.The casings were manufactured in a separate room with a special regime. Of course, no one relieved me of my other duties; I was in the room until lunch. workshop, and then went off to perform "other duties." The shells were given such great importance back then that Vannikov, Pervukhin, and Zavenyagin were constantly visiting the plant. Kurchatov called often."...Finally, the day arrived, June 19, 1948, when the first industrial reactor reached its design capacity of 100 MW. Plutonium production began.V.S. Yemelyanov: "That year (1949. — Ed.), we were all under particular nervous tension. After all, none of us knew whether the bomb would explode or not. The test was supposed to sum up, in a way, all the work, a long journey, for we were creating something that didn't yet exist. We had to obtain plutonium and use it to create a bomb. We obtained it. But was it plutonium?
>>64316465I remember that at that time we worked until 3 or 4 a.m., and I was once walking back from one of these vigils with A. Zavenyagin... We began reminiscing about our studies at the Mining Academy. But, apparently, he wasn't thinking about distant times at all. during my school days, because he suddenly said:"What if we didn't get plutonium in this 'kinglet'? What if it was something else?"The joy associated with the reactor's startup was marred by serious problems, which A.P. had to overcome.B.V. Brokhovich: "...even then, during the first power increase, due to the ball valve not fully closing, the uranium blocks were not cooling sufficiently, which led to the fuel cells (17-20) becoming stuck.First, they tried to push the working blocks downwards (design scheme), but it didn't work.Then they decided to extract the process channel pipe with the blocks upwards using an overhead crane. They pulled… a break! The lower, jammed section of the pipe remained in the reactor cell. They tried to push it out with a jack from below. To no avail. Special cutters had to be developed and then manufactured, which were then used to clear the melted cell.When part of the work was completed, it was discovered that the defective cell was glowing: graphite was burning and fusing with uranium, forming carbides. There was of a masonry fire (as happened many years later in Chernobyl).Kurchatov inspected the cell. On his command, the "goat" was blocked with water channels, after which he and Zavenyagin raised the power. (Yes, together! Responsibility was not divided. Who should we ask? Beria? Stalin? There was no other way. This was the first time this had been done... Was Zavenyagin competent? In my opinion, more so than the Chernobyl plant staff in 1986.) They raised the power, and there was no fire..."
>>64316482Meanwhile, the cell cleaning continued. Until June 30th..."As operation progressed, it became clear that 'Annushka' (as E.P. Slavsky promptly dubbed 'Object A', or 'the boiler'. — Ed.) lacked reactivity. Even additional loading didn't help—the reactor shut down. It turned out that electrochemical corrosion of the process pipes was occurring. By the end of 1948, the process had become widespread, and the water cooling the uranium blocks began leaking into the graphite stack, causing the reactor to stall and shut down.Since it was not possible to install new tubes on the reactor block pillars, they followed the decision jointly reached by Kurchatov and Zavenyagin: first, they extracted the uranium blocks with suction cups, then installed new, more durable anodized tubes, and, after first calibrating the extracted active blocks (there was no reserve—no uranium ore—they reloaded them. (And Zavenyagin signed the decision. Igor Vasilyevich, the scientific director, could not certify that the country lacked uranium and no blocks!..)Although blocks with relatively low activity were used for calibration, the "A.P. Zavenyagin section" cost the personnel almost 1,000 roentgens (but no more than 100 per person), and the work itself lasted 66 days. (They paid, of course. 10 rubles per extracted block.) I.V. Kurchatov."
>>64316490A.K. Kruglov: "The aluminum channels installed in the reactor had unanodized tube surfaces in the first load. When water entered the graphite stack, the graphite-water-aluminum contact triggered an intense corrosion process, and by the end of 1948, massive tube leaks began, soaking the graphite stack. Operating the reactor with these tubes became impossible. On January 20, 1949, the reactor was shut down for major repairs.A complex problem arose: how to replace these channels and preserve all the valuable uranium blocks. It was possible to unload the uranium blocks through a designed unloading system. However, their passage down the process flow (channel - ...spent fuel pool) would have caused mechanical damage to the block cladding, preventing their reloading into the reactor. And there was no spare uranium load at the time. It was necessary to partially preserve it. Irradiated and highly radioactive uranium blocks.At A.P. Zavenyagin's suggestion, an attempt was made to remove the damaged reactor tubes, leave the uranium blocks in the graphite paths, and install new, anodized tubes. This proved impossible, as removing the damaged tubes, which had internal ribs for centering the uranium blocks, disrupted the alignment of the column of blocks—the blocks shifted toward the walls of the graphite bricks.The reactor's chief mechanics developed devices that allowed them to use special "suction cups" to extract uranium blocks from the damaged process tubes through the top into the reactor's central hall. This operation was unavoidable without overexposure to radiation. A choice had to be made: either shut down the reactor for an extended period, which Yu.B. Khariton estimated at one year, or salvage the uranium load and reduce losses in plutonium production.
>>64316493The PGU management and the scientific director made the latter decision. The uranium blocks were extracted with “suction cups” through the top of the reactor, with the entire male staff of the facility involved in this “dirty” operation.”Besides the 1949 meltdown described by B.V. Brokhovich and A.K. Kruglov, there was another: a second "goat" formed on July 25 1948 in cell 20-18.P.I. Tryakin: "They reported to Moscow. The command came from there: 'Do not shut down the reactor; Zavenyagin is flying out to you.'"Upon arrival, A.P. assumed overall command of the accident cleanup. A short meeting, a detailed plan, a continuous schedule, monitoring... A team of experienced mechanics was formed—those who had participated in clearing the first "goat." They were supervised by the facility's chief mechanic.So, the cell was open, the radiation was active... But the decision had been made, and drilling of the channel began.Due to frequent tool changes, contamination was present in the central hall (Central Hall. — Ed.). The temperature rose, and Zavenyagin sat rooted to his chair—sitting right in the center of the reactor, wearing a general's greatcoat and chrome boots. He didn't boss the mechanics around, didn't yell at the managers—he simply made sure there were no downtimes and that the schedule was met.But surely it was possible to observe the work from a distance, without exposing oneself to radiation?
>>64316494It seems Avraamiy Pavlovich disregarded the radiation exposure, didn't take the monitoring cassette with him, and wasn't concerned about his health at the time. By being near the workers, he thereby emphasized the importance and urgency of the entire operation.The workers saw this and understood: if the general was nearby, that meant...But after the evening conversation with I.V. Kurchatov, according to the dosimetrists' report, Generals Muzrukov and Zavenyagin arrived in the Central Hall the following day as required: robes thrown over their greatcoats, galoshes over their boots....A.P. He left for Moscow only after the accident had been completely contained."V.I. Shevchenko: "Despite the precautions taken and the use of the far-from-perfect protective equipment available at the time, it was not always possible to avoid personnel overexposure. <…> Dosimetry service specialists had to constantly combat violators of radiation safety regulations, especially high-ranking officials.In the reactor's Central Hall (it was not stopped, as a reminder – Ed.), a team of mechanics was clearing the "obstructed" channel 20-18. The duty dosimetrist entered the laboratory and said that something had to be done: the plant's management, and in particular B.G. Muzrukov, A.P. Zavenyagin, and others, were in the Central Hall every day, wearing their personal clothing and shoes.After listening to him and entering the Central Hall, I saw the following scene: A.P. Zavenyagin, in his general's uniform and his shoes, sat on a chair in the center of the reactor's "patch," observing the cleaning of the cell. He took tangerines from his coat pocket, peeled them, and ate them right there. When I reminded him that he was not allowed to wear his personal clothes, much less eat there, he replied, "Nothing will happen to me," and continued his work. B.G. Muzrukov stood nearby, also in his personal clothes and shoes, but silent. I was forced to tell Kurchatov about this..."
>>64316504B.G. Dubovsky: "I first met Zavenyagin in 1949: I.V. Kurchatov introduced me as the scientific director of Object A (the first commercial nuclear reactor for plutonium production).When the melting-corrosion accident occurred in 1949, a commission headed by A.P. Zavenyagin was dispatched to investigate its causes. I remember him as prudent and calm. Yet the situation among the team was almost tragic: the nuclear reactor was not operating! All the shift logs were carefully studied, specialists and workers were called in to clarify the circumstances of the accident...I was surprised that Zavenyagin delved into the technology and the essence of the matter so professionally... Unfortunately, everyone involved in the cleanup (which involved removing the active uranium blocks) received a certain dose of radiation. Including A.P.I was the developer of the dosimetry instruments, the entire dosimetry system, and often approached I.V. Kurchatov and A.P. Zavenyagin with requests to move away from the active zone. But they replied, "Look how people work in the thick of it. There's no need to hang dosimeters on us, there's no need to waste time on nonsense..."One day during those days, my car malfunctioned, and Kurchatov asked A.P. to give me a ride home in his car. On the way, I brought up the accident, but Zavenyagin didn't respond... The next day, A.P.'s driver said to me, "What are you doing? He never talks in the car; that's his time to think. And you were disturbing him..."M.P. Grabovsky: "[When the dosimetrist told I.V. Kurchatov about the management's behavior ("What kind of example are they setting for the workers?"), he] found a solution. He provided the dosimetrist with his official car and ordered a preventive background measurement to be taken immediately in Muzrukov's apartment.
>>64316512The radioactivity level was dozens of times higher than normal. Shevchenko pointed to the plant director's wife the off-scale meter in the hallway and restroom and muttered:"It's all because Boris Glebovich doesn't change his clothes. He walks right into the 'patch' in his own shoes."The enraged woman asked to be driven immediately closer to the nuclear device where her husband was located at the time.Kurchatov ordered the guard to let her into the building and escort her directly to the Central Hall. [It's not hard to imagine what her husband and Zavenyagin heard]...The cell took six days to drill.(There's a theory: A.P.'s behavior was deliberately demonstrating the supposed safety of the cleanup efforts. After all, many of the liquidators were afraid of the consequences, and it was necessary to demonstrate that there was nothing to fear. In short, it was a kind of performance, the "actors" of which, one would think, understood the degree of risk. — Ed.)When Avraamiy Pavlovich was leaving for Moscow, Kurchatov urged him to pressure the metallurgists at Research Institute 9 to urgently refine the cladding technology."And one other problem is really troubling me," Igor Vasilyevich admitted. "The pipes are starting to leak. They might be able to stand by until unloading. But we need to prepare backup, anodized ones in advance."Zavenyagin promised to look into this and help."
Love these threads, they're always darkly fascinating.
>>64316540He figured it out and helped.B.G. Dubovsky: "In 1950, under Kurchatov's guidance, I managed to develop an optimal design for the reactor's fuel channel. In my opinion, it could have prevented the formation of 'goats.'" Many in management were against the experiment, but Zavenyagin nevertheless authorized the replacement of the tubes, but cautiously, without undue haste. In a telegram to B.G. Muzrukov, director of the Mayak Production Association, he ordered: "...to install only one Dubovsky five-ribbed fuel channel per month."My proposal yielded good results, but this became obvious later, and at the time, A.P. was certainly taking a risk. It's no coincidence that the rumor circulated in Moscow that arbitrary action was permitted...And this is not the only example of Zavenyagin actively supporting experimental work on the reactor, which was carried out at the initiative of I.V. Kurchatov."
>>64316565What was happening during the construction of Plant No. 813?A.M. Petrosyants: "At one time, I was closely involved in the construction and commissioning of Plant No. 813. A.P. assigned me this task. 'We have,' he said, 'two important tasks. Establish the production of nuclear fuel, plutonium, at Plant No. 817 near Chelyabinsk, and highly enriched uranium-235 at another plant in the Sverdlovsk region. Your task is to build this plant and master the technology.'Up to 40,000 people, mostly prisoners, worked on the construction of the diffusion plant. I once complained to Zavenyagin about the builders' slowness, the extremely difficult living conditions for the prisoners (they needed food, clothing, and shoes), and the poor equipment supply (a pickaxe, a crowbar; there were practically no vehicles). A.P. arrived, sorted things out, and helped. And this happened more than once.Our equipment was primarily manufactured by two companies: the Leningrad Kirov Plant and Nizhny Novgorod Plant No. 92, a former cannon factory. Yelyan was the director there. He was a wonderful organizer. (Undoubtedly, A.P. knew and valued A.S. Elyan, director of the Gorky Machine-Building Plant, well. The same one about whom I.K. Kikoin recalled: "The factories assigned to us for the creation of the necessary equipment were very well chosen, especially one of them. The director of this plant, A.S. Elyan, was called the God of War. <…> The plant, or rather the director of the plant, from the very first days of the war, having halted production for two weeks, took a huge risk by assuming full responsibility for the plant's reconstruction, and soon increased output from 8-10 to 100 guns per day." Zavenyagin's partiality toward Amo Sergeyevich was apparently also explained by the fact that he remembered his brother, the businesslike V.S. Elyan, with whom he had worked back in Norilsk. — Ed.).
>>64316570The developers of the diffusion technology were having difficulties, and in 1949, Beria arrived at the plant. Along with the PGU management. After listening to the reports, including mine, he interrupted the meeting: "The country has provided in abundance everything you asked and demanded, despite all the difficulties. Therefore, I give you three months to resolve all the issues related to the plant's launch. But I warn you: if you don't comply, get your ass ready. There will be no mercy. If you do everything right, we'll reward you." And he left.
>>64316576("There Will Be No Mercy"... "One day," V.S. Yemelyanov recalled, "I went to see Zavenyagin late at night and brought him a small plutonium pellet in a ground-glass cup. He examined it for a long time and suddenly asked:"Are you sure this is plutonium?" And he, tearing his eyes away from the cup with the metal ball in it, looked at me with what seemed to me to be some fear and said with concern: "Or maybe it's something else, not plutonium?")So, the plant was launched, and in the spring it produced its first products. There were awards, too..."Later (in 1951), it was A.P. Zavenyagin who gave the go-ahead for the construction of the D-5 diffusion plant, the largest at the time (opened four years later).When the design of the separating filters of diffusion machines was radically improved, a decision was made at the ministerial level (1953, order of A.P. Zavenyagin) to build a large workshop for the production of new filters at Plant No. 813.
>>64316590"I would like to emphasize A.P.'s attentive and sensitive approach to new technology and exploration work," continued A.M. Petrosyants. "Especially to those that could yield surprises, unexpected results. When it was unclear whether they would yield anything effective."As the production of "fuel" for nuclear warheads (sufficient quantities and with a good concentration of uranium-235 isotopes) was established, diffusion technology itself was becoming obsolete—it was expensive, energy-intensive, and inefficient. And so, at the IAE, under the leadership of I.K. Kikoin, work began jointly with industry plants on a new method for separating uranium isotopes using high-speed centrifuges.This required a major effort and the involvement of not only the defense industry in the development and production of specialized centrifuges.At the time (since 1953, on Zavenyagin's recommendation), I was heading Plant No. 813, and we were involved in developing the centrifuge method. A.P., by then already Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, was very helpful and attentive to all our questions. In particular, when I suggested involving GAZ (there, we could establish both flow and achieve good quality), Zavenyagin approached the director and chief engineer of GAZ with a request to set up a special workshop. They fussed and delayed, but A.P. insisted, pressed, and probably called Beria. And things got moving.Finally, in close contact with the nuclear plant workers, the Kirov Plant Design Bureau (Leningrad) established the production of centrifuges and all the necessary equipment for them. They equipped the Ural Electrochemical Plant (as the Verkh-Neyvinsky Plant later became known), and then a number of other enterprises, and the centrifuge method of separating uranium isotopes and enriching them with uranium-235 isotopes was fully mastered."
>>64316596…On June 30, 1949, the Special Committee dispatched B.L. Vannikov, A.P. Zavenyagin, and V.S. Yemelyanov to Combine No. 817 to oversee all on-site operations for the fabrication of plutonium hemispheres for RDS-1. They were soon joined by I.V. Kurchatov, Yu.B. Khariton, and specialists from KB-11. They prepared proposals concerning certain measurement data, the mechanical processing of individual components of the charge, and its technological characteristics.The equipment developed at NII-9 was unable to ensure uniform heating of the pressed metal mass (initially, an aluminum dummy). August was approaching, and the project managers, A.A. Bochvar and A.S. Zaimovsky, were overcome with anxiety. One can imagine the feelings of those who answered to the Special Committee—B.L. Vannikov, A.P. Zavenyagin, I.V. Kurchatov, B.G. Muzrukov and E.P. Slavsky.In a short period of time, the equipment was redesigned and high-quality products were being produced. For now, from a dummy sample. The plutonium "cylinders" finally arrived. But they were just barely enough—only 10% more than the mass of the two final thin-walled hemispheres, which would then undergo mechanical processing.July 27—Another meeting at Combine No. 817. Zavenyagin was among the small group present. KB-11's proposals on the final product dimensions and the workflow for finalizing them were reviewed.During the pressing process, a depressing atmosphere reigned: had the physicists made a mistake? Had all the factors influencing the increase in critical mass been taken into account? Would a nuclear explosion occur?God had mercy. The product turned out to be of high quality.
>>64316605N.I. Ivanov: "As soon as work with plutonium began, Kurchatov, Vannikov, Khariton, and Zavenyagin began to frequent the shop floor.A.P. usually arrived alone, without an entourage. He'd throw on a robe and enter the shop floor. He didn't need an escort: he knew exactly where and what was going on. He'd go straight to his destination. Zavenyagin was primarily interested in the work of the press operators and the cutting machining department. He'd interview the scientific directors of these departments—Samoilov, Poido—and then talk to Bochvar and Zaimovsky. His attention was focused entirely on the process of manufacturing the "part." He wanted to verify everything—from start to finish.After A.P.'s visit (usually an hour and a half), we'd exchange impressions. We especially cared for Samoilov, because the success of other operations depended on the press operators. "Avraamiy Pavlovich," he said, "is constantly warning me to do everything without a hitch, to make sure everything goes as it should."But there was no stress or intimidation. On the contrary, our leaders, starting with Kurchatov, Bochvar, and Khariton, did everything they could to ensure people's complete psychological stability. They spoke to all of us, regardless of rank, with the utmost respect, as if we were equals, asking questions as if they wanted to learn from each other, not impose their own opinions. And we understood—they trusted us, expected the best performance, and believed that it would happen.It was clear that A.P. shared this attitude. He understood, like everyone else, that a person works well when he is calm, thinking about the task at hand, not about punishment. You must admit, if a person is constantly afraid of something, what kind of worker is he? But we had a creative atmosphere; everyone was focused on the best possible result. Quickly and at the best possible level.
>>64316619Just before the first "part" was manufactured, Zavenyagin came almost daily. And once it was in production, when the second one was being stamped out, he literally never left our side, supervising every step. We were afraid of any provocations, sabotage, and A.P., too, was especially attentive, just to be on the safe side."A.G. Samoilov: "Upon arrival in Chelyabinsk-40 in December 1948, with a group of institute employees (NII-9. — Ed.), led by A.A. Bochvar, me, as the author of the vacuum unit technology (I.V. Kurchatov called it a "fabulous invention," a "miraculous vacuum hot-forming unit"; it was intended for the manufacture of the plutonium core hemispheres for the first atomic bomb. — A.S., Ed.), and the operator, A.P. Zavenyagin was appointed head of the "metal pressure processing" group by order. <…> As the group's head, A.P. Zavenyagin told me that I bore full responsibility for the lives of people and for the quality of the explosive product. It was easy for him to say that!After all, lives had indeed been at risk, and "not only my own, but also those of all seven members of the group, who had to be stationed near the press. If a neutron surge had occurred during the work, I, the operator, would have been the first to die, and the employees standing next to me could have been seriously injured."
>>64316624Now – the turning. The operation is not only a very important one, but also labor-intensive, requiring great attention, caution, and ingenuity.Perhaps the only photograph of Zavenyagin in the uniform of the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (probably 1943-1944).Perhaps the only photograph of Zavenyagin in the uniform of the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (probably 1943-1944).During the turning of the plutonium hemispheres, a dramatic situation arose, which is described in some memoirs. Unfortunately, the participants themselves did not leave testimony, and therefore, when transmitting and retelling what happened, some circumstances are presented differently. But what is associated with Zavenyagin is consistent, and therefore, authentic.N.I. Ivanov: "Poido (M.S. Poido, mechanical engineer. — Ed.) told me how it was. The stamped plutonium blank turned out to be very precisely spherical. Well, exactly as in the drawing. All that was left was to face it and select the inner hemisphere.Before installing the "hemisphere" on the machine, Poido and Alexander Ivanovich Antonov, a highly skilled lathe operator, took measurements and calculated. They showed that the part's axis needed to be tilted slightly before machining the end.
>>64316631(When turning the hemispheres, a procedure was established: after each cutter pass, M.S. Poido calculated the dimensions of the workpiece, and only then was the next cutter pass made.)Zavenyagin was standing at the machine, and when Poido (who had taken over!) began turning, he noticed that the cutter wasn't cutting across the entire surface.And his nerves seemed to give way. He ordered the machine stopped and demanded an explanation. Apparently, in a harsh, stern tone. Mikhail Stepanovich didn't repeat what he had said, but it was clear that even he, a calm, composed man, was deeply affected by Zavenyagin's words. Of course, the situation was extraordinary: as A.P. felt, a critical piece was being screwed up. Right before his eyes!Poido and Antonov assured him that everything was correct. They explained the reason for their actions as best they could. Nevertheless, the part was removed, checked, and reinstalled—just as Poido and Antonov had calculated. A.P. admitted he was wrong.After turning, the part exactly matched the drawing, and everyone calmed down."
>>64316639A.G. Samoilov: "A.P. Zavenyagin suddenly decided that the product's sphericity was flawed and directed all his anger at M.S. Poido, who listened to these accusations in silence, without uttering a single word in his defense. After A.P. Zavenyagin's departure, Mikhail Stepanovich courageously continued to machine the product to completion and completed it with great precision on primitive equipment. Several times after this, I asked Andrei Anatolyevich Bochvar to contact A.P. Zavenyagin to somehow mitigate this incident, but, unfortunately, the conversation between A.A. Bochvar and A.P. Zavenyagin never took place. Apparently, A.P. Zavenyagin could have been given some leeway for the tense situation. A huge responsibility, regardless of one's position, rested on each of us. The case of M.S. Poido could have led to a double tragedy, because without M.S. Poido we would have certainly ruined the product.”There was no spare plutonium, and if the bomb's test failed, the test schedule would have to be significantly delayed.As is well known, the first atomic bomb was developed at KB-11.On December 14, 1945, the Special Committee of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR accepted the proposal of B.L. Vannikov, A.P. Zavenyagin, I.V. Kurchatov, Yu.B. Khariton, and A.I. Alikhanov to establish KB-5 (the original name of the future KB-11. — Ed.) and instructed a group of investigators, including A.P. Zavenyagin, to determine a preliminary location for it.
>>64316646In January 1946, Kurchatov, Kikoin, Vannikov, Pervukhin, and Zavenyagin presented a report to I.V. Stalin on the status of work on obtaining and using atomic energy. It stated, in part: "Considering the exceptional secrecy of the work, it has been decided to organize a special design bureau for the construction of an atomic bomb, with the necessary laboratories and experimental workshops, in a remote, isolated location.The proposed location for this bureau is the former ammunition production plant (No. 550) in the Mordovian ASSR, in the former Sarov Monastery (75 km from the Shatki railway station southeast of Arzamas), surrounded by forest reserves, which will allow for reliable isolation of the work."By March 16, 1946, the problem had been fully assessed, and the Special Committee made a final decision, assigning the First Main Directorate (B.L. Vannikov) "the implementation of all activities related to the development of KB-11 operations and the logistical support for all KB-11 operations..."At the same time, the commission's proposal (which included A.P.) to locate KB-11 at Plant No. 550 of the People's Commissariat of Agricultural Machinery and the adjacent territory (the future Arzamas-16 – Ed.) was accepted. The site for the research and production complex was chosen based on Stalin's stipulation: "In a secluded location, away from major highways and roads, no further than 400 kilometers from Moscow."The official date of creation of the new “atomic” center is considered to be April 9, 1946 (Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 805–327 ss). The Council of Ministers approved the leadership of the bureau and its location.On April 13, 1946, the Special Committee gave the task to B.L. Vannikov, M.G. Pervukhin, I.V. Kurchatov and A.P. Zavenyagin together with P.M. Zernov and Yu.B. Khariton promptly, in five days:
>>64312521>Russian Nuclear Submarines (and other atomic fuckups)Pic related
>>64316656a) develop measures to ensure construction is carried out in two stages:First, adapt the existing buildings of Plant No. 550 and construct the necessary construction to support KB-11's operations at the new location, beginning in June-July 1946 (part of the laboratories, residential and utility buildings, communications, water supply, lighting, the testing ground, and roads);Second, complete the construction of all remaining facilities necessary for the full deployment of KB-11 at the new location by the end of 1946;b) re-examine the planned scope of construction for KB-11 from the standpoint of the possibility of reducing it;c) determine the composition of the scientific and engineering personnel, as well as the composition of the laboratories, to be transferred to the site in June-July 1946;d) more specifically define the tasks to be accomplished by KB-11 at the former Plant No. 550;d) review and adopt operational Measures necessary to expedite the deployment of KB-11 at its new location will be taken in a timely manner;e) develop measures to select and train design teams and the corresponding equipment at Research Institute No. 6, Central Design Bureau No. 504 of the Ministry of Agricultural Machinery, and Plant No. 88 of the Ministry of Armaments for their subsequent transfer to KB-11's new location.Government Resolution "On the Plan for the Deployment of KB-11 Work at Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences" (No. 1286-525 ss) was adopted on June 21, 1946. The primary objective was to create the "Reactive Engine S" (abbreviated RDS) in two variants: a plutonium-powered version using spherical compression, and a uranium-235-powered version using cannon-assisted propulsion. The deadlines for submitting the samples for state testing were also set: for the plutonium sample - by January 1, 1948, for the uranium sample - by June 1, 1948.
>>64316661The Council of Ministers assigned the construction and installation work for Design Bureau No. 11 to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Construction Directorate No. 880 of the Main Industrial Construction Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was designated as the specific contractor. The first stage of work was to be completed by October 1, 1946, and the second (full scope) by May 1, 1947. Everything was provided for, right down to increased salaries and special meals.Subsequently, Design Bureau No. 11 issues were repeatedly reviewed: discussions included scientific, technical, and production assignments, as well as, unfortunately, delays in construction. The Council of Ministers objectively acknowledged (Resolution No. 234-98 ss/op of February 8, 1948) that the planned work had not been accomplished due to "the novelty and unforeseen scientific and technical difficulties involved in creating the RDS and, in part, the Design Bureau's delays in recruiting personnel, launching work, and constructing the necessary buildings and structures for KB-11."With the participation of A.P. Zavenyagin, decisions were made to strengthen KB-11 with senior design personnel and build a "local" assembly plant (the corresponding government decrees were issued on June 10, 1948).In early 1949, a high-ranking commission headed by B.L. Vannikov and A.P. Zavenyagin visited KB-11's research and design sector.
>>64316667E.V. Vagin: "In our building, building 19bis, a simplified diagram of the automation and initiation system was displayed on tables in one of the rooms. It consisted of a battery that operated a multiplier, which fed a high-voltage power supply (HVPS), assembled using a two-arm voltage multiplier circuit. The HVPS supplied high voltage to the capacitors of the ignition unit (IU). Sockets were connected to the IU harnesses, and uncharged IU housings were inserted into the plugs.When the circuit was closed by the high-voltage actuator relay, the IU sent a voltage pulse to the IU electrodes, causing a spark to jump between the electrodes. Sergei Sergeevich Chugunov explained the automation diagram, and V.S. Komelkov explained the initiation system. Also present were Yu. B. Khariton, V. I. Detnev, V. I. Alferov, and others.During the demonstration, the following incident occurred. For greater clarity, The VIP cover had been removed, and after the actuator relay had tripped, voltage remained on the capacitors. Zavenyagin, asking something, touched a capacitor with his finger; naturally, an electric discharge made him jerk his hand away. Vannikov, standing behind him, exclaimed, "Listen, Avraamiy Pavlovich, sparks are flying out of your ass!" Everyone laughed, defusing the tense atmosphere.V.I. Zhuchikhin: "A commission headed by Kurchatov visited our laboratory at KB-11 every month. Zavenyagin came with him. Of all the visitors, he was the least bothersome. No questions. He just watched silently...We became closely acquainted two years later, in '49, when we arrived at the "two" (Semipalatinsk Test Site). I was responsible for the detonation control system, and we tested it countless times.
>>64316672And then one day, during testing, A.P. came to see me. He was observing the work. He didn't interfere, didn't ask any questions, didn't make any comments. He only began to inquire and question me after we'd finished. He was mainly interested in reliability. I answered in as much detail as possible.Later, during the assembly of the charge and all the dress rehearsals, Zavenyagin was always present.I knew that A.P. was Beria's representative, who had been the commander of the camp in Norilsk*. Therefore, as an experienced man, I was initially afraid of him. But unlike the head of the security department, P. Ya. Meshik, also a lieutenant general, no one ever heard Zavenyagin raise his voice, let alone utter a harsh word. And he often thanked everyone for their efforts. Once, in my presence, he reprimanded Meshik: "Enough! Go away! Bless you!" With these words, he usually put people in their place. And I was filled with respect for him."* By Order No. 840 of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs dated April 8, 1938, A.P. Zavenyagin was appointed Head of Construction at the Norilsk Combine — see: GARF, f. 9401, op. 9, d. 817, l. 1230.By Order No. 427 of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs dated March 29, 1941, A.P. Zavenyagin was relieved of his duties as Head of Construction at the Norilsk Combine and the NKVD camp — see: GARF, f. 9401, op. 9, d. 862, l. 1117.
>>64316676Finally, on April 8, 1949, the management of KB-11 informed L.P. Beria that all theoretical, design, and technical problems regarding the RDS-1 had been resolved.The time for testing the first bomb was rapidly approaching...Krasnoyarsk-26, 1950.Krasnoyarsk-26, 1950....Following the pioneers of the "atomic project," new plants and factories emerged—backups of existing ones and pioneers of new technologies. Plant No. 814 (Sverdlovsk-45) mastered the magnetic separation of uranium isotopes; at Plant No. 815 (Krasnoyarsk-26), the most powerful reactor for producing weapons-grade plutonium was built. The production of highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium was also organized at Plant No. 816 (Tomsk-7)...These and other facilities were developed with the active participation of A.P. Zavenyagin. It is known that he was a "co-author" of the issue of designing and preparing for construction of Plants No. 815 and 816, which was considered by the Special Committee under the USSR Council of Ministers on June 19, 1948. Furthermore, A.P. was included in the group tasked with promptly developing and coordinating with I.V. Kurchatov "more detailed proposals and a draft of the corresponding memorandum addressed to Comrade Stalin."Later, after the Special Committee resumed work on the construction of Plant No. 816 on December 6, 1948, A.P. — among those tasked with clarifying everything related to this issue, verifying the calculations underlying the proposals for the new plant's capacity, the type of technological machines, assessing construction sites, capital investment volumes, materials, and equipment...
>>64316681On December 30, 1948, the construction of Plant No. 816 was again on the agenda of the Special Committee meeting. Justification for its necessity, design capacity, construction timeframe... Zavenyagin's name was right there.Unfortunately, it's impossible to go into detail: the documents haven't been declassified, and anyone who knew A.P. and is still alive can no longer be found.Or, if we're lucky. Like with V.K. Masher, the builder of Plant No. 815...Let's first recap: the site for the underground section of the mining and chemical plant was chosen where the Atamanovsky Ridge—the northern spurs of the Sayan Mountains—comes close to the Yenisei River. Here, the riverbed is squeezed between high rocky banks (known as the "Prigash").The construction of the plant and the town of Zheleznogorsk was entrusted to the Iron Mine Construction Directorate of the Main Industrial Construction Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (now Sibkhimstroy). The directorate of the future enterprise was provisionally known as the "Eastern Office."Zavenyagin was interested in both design and mining operations, as well as roads, power lines, and temporary structures. A.P. repeatedly insisted that everything must be solid, well-built, and comprehensive. Roads, for example, should only have asphalt and concrete surfaces.
>>64316684V.K. Masher: "In 1951, A.P. returned to the construction site to accelerate mining operations. He gathered all the managers and assigned each one a task. Briefly, authoritatively...We—I was then the chief engineer of the construction district—were tasked with constructing a so-called shelf: a ledge in the mountain about a kilometer and a half long, on a slope 50-60 meters above the Yenisei River. The miners had built it, but it was narrow, with no room for vehicles to pass each other; it had to be widened.In addition, we had to build a compressor station, water intake structures, and trenches to discharge water from the gorge into the Yenisei.We organized a separate section, and A.P. held daily briefings... It felt like, while discussing specific issues with us, he was temporarily becoming not a boss who could easily decide a person's fate ("Release him..."), but an engineer who understood our difficulties well.Along the way, a small boiler house needed to be built, two small boilers that would provide heat for the heaters at the tunnel portal being cut into the mountain.The design turned out to be such that the boiler house building ended up on top of fill soil. And moving it closer to the portal, as I proposed, wasn't possible—the miners objected: they needed space to accommodate the tunneling equipment."Tell me, will this boiler house last through the winter?" Zavenyagin asked me."It will. But in the spring, it might fall apart.""Well, put it up then. We won't need it any longer."Well, we took some precautions to avoid any problems. And although cracks appeared in the cinder-concrete walls in the spring, it didn't matter—the boiler house had served its purpose.
>>64316690But it remained standing for a while—until the inventory (at the end of the year): if you take it apart, you'll be able to prove later that it was there. And lo and behold! There were officials, high-ranking ones at that, who asked, "How did you build it on such soil? Did you know it would collapse?" They couldn't understand what, for Zavenyagin, was a simple, realistic view of things."
>>64316697With a Norilsk address— What an extraordinary photograph: a massive concrete foundation, a dilapidated pipe... Is this also a nuclear project?— Oddly enough. By a twist of fate, the Norilsk Combine also became involved.— And what kind of "bomb" was made here?— Well, not a bomb, of course—heavy water for a new type of reactor. And the photograph shows all that remains of the once-secret structure, nicknamed "Macaronka": a cascade of towering columns and impressive evaporators.It is often suggested that Zavenyagin resorted to Norilsk as a lifesaver when a conflict arose between him and M.G. Pervukhin, the Minister of the Chemical Industry (and simultaneously Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers). However, this is only part of the "scenario" played out with the production of so-called heavy water (a compound of oxygen and heavy hydrogen).But first, a brief explanation of why it was necessary. It turns out that a reactor using heavy water, which, like graphite, serves as a neutron moderator in the "pile," is "simpler in design [than a 'uranium-graphite pile'] and requires 10 times less metallic uranium..." [I.V. Kurchatov; cited in 149]. Official information explains:
>>64316700"[Uranium-heavy water piles] require 15-20 tons of heavy water and 8-10 tons of uranium for a single loading. A uranium-heavy water pile operates more intensively than a uranium-graphite pile and is therefore more complex from a thermal engineering perspective. <…> Obtaining heavy water in large quantities is significantly more difficult than extracting uranium from ore.…To obtain heavy water with a concentration of 99.5% from ordinary water, the water must be enriched approximately 6,000 times. Therefore, installations for producing heavy water from ordinary water or other hydrogen-containing raw materials are extremely complex and cumbersome, consuming large amounts of energy" (special transformers with a capacity of 930,000 kW are required—almost the annual energy requirement of the entire national economy).Let's try to reconstruct the sequence of the main events and the content of the process itself.One of the first documents concerning the production of heavy water was the decision of the Special Committee of the State Defense Committee of August 31, 1945: a corresponding draft Resolution of the State Defense Committee was adopted (the Resolution itself was dated September 4, 1945, No. 9967 ss/op), and the Technical Council was instructed to "thoroughly discuss the issue of other methods for obtaining product 180 and submit its proposals on the most rational methods of producing this product, as well as on measures to involve scientific institutions, individual scientists, and other specialists in the development of this issue, for discussion by the Special Committee; ... consider the issue of a plan for the development of capacity for the production of product 180 over 2-3 years, the construction of the necessary power and industrial installations and their deployment, and submit its proposals for discussion by the Special Committee."
Watch this anonsThe Russian Woodpecker trailerhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zotm8tZmqM4Full Moviehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HC70R62Tu4MThe relationship between Russias failed and hugely expensive long range anti ballistic radar system and the chernobyl 'accident'
>>64316702A.M. Rosen: "...in 1945 [I was involved in developing the design specification] for a plant for producing D2O by rectifying liquid ammonia. At the Ministry of Chemical Industry [this project] was overseen by Minister M.G. Pervukhin and his deputy A.G. Kasatkin, a renowned expert in chemical engineering processes and apparatuses. At the end of the year, engineer V.K. Bayerl (who had previously worked for the well-known firm Bamag), invited from the GDR, joined us.[The project was] progressing extremely slowly. This was largely due to the director's personality (GIAP. — Ed.). He couldn't resolve a single organizational issue: 'I need to think about it, consult with my comrades,' and the issue was shelved.[This pace] did not suit A.P. Zavenyagin at all. At the end of 1945, he convened a meeting (at PGU) dedicated to this issue and decided to transfer the work to [Research Institute No. 9] and to prepare a government decree on this matter. At this meeting, I met a thin, energetic woman—S.M. Karpacheva…"
>>64316706>Watch this anons>The Russian Woodpecker trailer>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zotm8tZmqM4 [Embed]>Full Movie>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HC70R62Tu4M [Embed]>The relationship between Russias failed and hugely expensive long range anti ballistic radar system and the chernobyl 'accident'
>>64316709On January 17, 1946, L.P. Beria, G.M. Malenkov and N.A. Voznesensky forwarded to I.V. Stalin a report by I.V. Kurchatov, I.K. Kikoin, B.L. Vannikov, M.G. Pervukhin and A.P. Zavenyagin on the state of work on obtaining and using atomic energy. One of the report's sections is "Heavy Water Production (for the 'Uranium-Heavy Water Pile')".The aforementioned leaders of the "atomic project" reported: "The production of the necessary reserves (13-20 tons) of heavy water is encountering great difficulties. <…> To create a capacity of 20 tons of heavy water per year, it is necessary to build a number of plants, expand the capacity of power plants, and manufacture in the USSR or purchase a large amount of complex equipment from abroad during 1946 and the first half of 1948. <…> The total cost of equipment and construction of electrolysis plants and the associated expansion of power plants will amount to approximately 1 billion rubles.Despite the complexity and high cost of the electrolytic method, it is necessary to begin construction of plants [where the required quantity] of heavy water will be obtained by this method, while simultaneously conducting intensive research into other, simpler and cheaper methods. <…>Scientific, technical and The Engineering and Technical Councils of the Special Committee developed measures that included:1. Construction of 11 heavy water production plants with a total capacity of 21.3 tons per year using the electrolytic method, including: <…>in Norilsk – 2.2 tons per year. <…>This placement was chosen based on the need to disperse heavy water production and the possibility of utilizing spare power plant capacity…”
>>64316720But this proved insufficient. And on February 19, 1946, the Special Committee of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR instructed the Scientific and Technical Council and the Engineering and Technical Council to re-examine the hydroxyline (heavy water – Ed.) production plan and submit their proposals, taking into account the exchange of opinions, to the Special Committee within one week.Pervukhin (convocation), Krutikov, Borisov, Zavenyagin, and Kravchenko were tasked with immediately finalizing the dispatch of a team of specialists to the western zone of Germany to procure and transport the necessary equipment for the electrolysis shops (especially mercury rectifiers and transformers).On March 7, 1946, A.P. Zavenyagin, A.G. Kasatkin, M. Volmer, V.K. Bayerl, and G. Richter sent a letter to L.P. Beria entitled "On the Production of Heavy Water by Isotopic Exchange of Ammonia with Water, Followed by Distillation of the Ammonia." The Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was informed that a more efficient method for producing heavy water had been developed than that previously proposed in Germany by Professor Harteck and Dr. Bayerl. The summary of the new technology concluded: "Obtaining heavy water from ammonia will be one of the most cost-effective methods." At the same time, they proposed completing the research, developing a design for a plant, and constructing it at the Stalinogorsk Nitrogen and Fertilizer Plant of the People's Commissariat of Chemical Industry, entrusting its construction and installation to the NKVD and the People's Commissariat of Chemical Industry.The authors attached a draft resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to the letter. It was adopted on March 18. Top Secret Document No. 618-254, "On Measures for Developing a New Method for Hydroxyline Production," states:"In order to test the method proposed by Professor Volmer and Dr. Bayerl on an industrial scale..."
>>643167241. Direct the First Main Directorate of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (Comrade Zavenyagin) to complete the organization of Laboratory No. 10 (under the direction of Professor Volmer) at Research Institute No. 9 within ten days and ensure that the necessary research on hydroxyline production is completed there by May 15.2. Direct the First Main Directorate of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (Comrade Zavenyagin) and the People's Commissariat of Chemical Industry (Comrade Kasatkina) to organize a Special Design Bureau, OKB-10, at Research Institute No. 9, headed by Dr. Bayerl and involving engineers from GIAP and Research Institute No. 9.Assign OKB-10 the technical design of the hydroxyline production facility. <…>3. Entrust the construction and installation of the hydroxyline production facility at the Stalinogorsk Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant to the NKVD of the USSR (Comrade Kruglova). <…>9. Permit the Chief of the 9th Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR (Comrade Zavenyagin) to spend 100,000 rubles on bonuses for employees engaged in research and design work using the method of Professor Volmer and Dr. Bayerl.10. Obligate the People's Commissariat of Trade of the USSR (Comrade Lyubimova) to allocate 50,000 rubles worth of manufactured goods to the NKVD of the USSR (Comrade Zavenyagin) in the second quarter of 1946 to provide bonuses for employees engaged in research and design work.
>>64316729S.M. Karpacheva: "Avraamiy Pavlovich, knowing that I spoke German, sent me to a meeting in Opalikha, where Germans had been temporarily accommodated in the hospital. He instructed me to speak with Professor M. Volmer, who had proposed an economical and energy-saving scheme for producing heavy water, which was significantly different from those existing in Norway and here. <…>Three days after my report to Zavenyagin, [a meeting was held in his office on Lubyanka Square]. <…> At the meeting, a government decision was prepared to build a facility according to… a scheme [developed at GIAP and similar to Volmer's] and to establish a special laboratory at VNIINM, where several ordinary employees from GIAP were transferred along with A.M. Rosen."(In the memoirs of S.M. Karpacheva, recorded by N. Kurnosov, details are provided: “I was appointed head of the experimental laboratory, which was located not far from the Kurchatov Institute, on Oktyabrskoye Pole. M. Volmer became the project’s scientific director. The Germans lived in the Ozery sanatorium near Odintsovo and were driven to work in the institute’s car. Then Beria declared that all these physicists and chemists were German spies and ordered them locked up in the guarded territory of our enterprise. Volmer was given a cottage, and the others were allocated a two-story house. True, this house had guards, without whom the Germans couldn’t go anywhere. They were paid very large sums of money, compared to us, and half of their salaries were transferred to foreign currency accounts in Germany.”)
>>64316740A.M. Rosen: "...I was appointed... [Karpacheva's] deputy and chief technologist of the experimental design bureau, specifically created [at NII-9] to develop a design for a D2O production plant. <…>Unfortunately, the preamble to the government decree emphasized the developments of German specialists and only briefly mentioned the Soviet ones. This caused a conflict between A.P. Zavenyagin and M.G. Pervukhin, a conflict that, as it later turned out, had far-reaching consequences for us. But we didn't yet understand this at the time and were glad that the work was finally getting underway. <…>The experimental design bureau was quickly staffed. A laboratory was also created, headed by the outstanding German scientist Professor Volmer... the talented physicist Dr. G. Richter participated in the work. Volmer quickly conducted an experimental study—[very important for determining the parameters] of the entire enormous installation... Design work also began. <…> The decisive character of Director V.B. Shevchenko. The issues that arose were immediately resolved. The technical design for the plant was completed in 1947. According to the design, the main part of the installation was a unique cascade of five columns, each approximately 100 meters high and with diameters of 4.7; 1.7; 0.8; 0.3; and 0.3 meters, mounted on a pedestal and surrounded by 12 evaporators, each 3.2 meters in diameter and 6 meters high. (D2O production capacity was 8 tons per year. — Ed.). <…> The entire process was fully automated. Control was conducted from a central control panel."On April 4, 1946, the USSR Council of Ministers adopted another decree on heavy water (No. 739-293 cc)—"On the Production of Hydroxyline," which named the Ministry of Internal Affairs among the executors:
>>64316741Among the seven workshops mentioned in the decree, the Norilsk workshop (along with the one proposed for construction at the Dneprodzerzhinsk Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant of the Ministry of Chemical Industry) took second place, behind only the Chirchik electrochemists. The plant also became responsible for the general design of its "G" workshop.Zavenyagin personally received a number of assignments:"7. To oblige the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (Comrades Zavenyagin and Zakharov) to ensure an uninterrupted supply of electricity from the plant's combined heat and power plant to fulfill the plan for "G" at the Norilsk Plant, amounting to 72,000 kW from the second quarter." 1948 <…>9. Establish the following procedure for the construction and installation of workshops "G", converter substations, and all activities related to waste gas processing:a) The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (Comrades Zavenyagin, Komarovsky, and Zakharov) will carry out construction and installation work at the Chirchik Electrochemical Plant of the Ministry of Chemical Industry, the Berezniki Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant of the Ministry of Chemical Industry, and the Norilsk Combine of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs;
>>64316751b) The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (Comrades Zavenyagin and Komarovsky) shall only carry out construction work on the Dneprodzerzhinsk Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant of the Ministry of Chemical Industry, while installation work shall be carried out by the Ministry of Chemical Industry…10. The First Main Directorate under the USSR Council of Ministers (Comrade Vannikova), the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (Comrade Zavenyagin), the Ministry of Chemical Industry (Comrade Pervukhin), the Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy (Comrade Lomako), and the Ministry for the Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises (Comrade Yudina) shall be required to develop, within ten days, and submit for consideration and approval by the USSR Council of Ministers measures for the construction and installation of the "G" workshops provided for in this Resolution. <…>
>>6431675712. The First Main Directorate under the USSR Council of Ministers (Comrade Vannikova), the Ministry of the Chemical Industry (Comrade Pervukhina), the Ministry of Power Plants (Comrade Zhimerina), the Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy (Comrade Lomako), the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (Comrade Zavenyagina), and the Ministry for the Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises (Comrade Yudina) are required to develop and submit, within one month, for consideration and approval by the USSR Council of Ministers agreed proposals for the implementation of all measures related to the power supply of the "G" workshops, as provided for by this Resolution, including: <…>b) measures to expand and equip the thermal power plants of the Berezniki Magnesium Plant, the thermal power plant of the Bogoslovsk Aluminum Plant, the thermal power plant of the Norilsk Combine of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Berezniki Thermal Power Plant of the Ministry of Power Plants;c) measures to expand district grid facilities and substations related to the power supply to Shop G, as well as measures to construct and expand the corresponding plant substations. <…>19. Instruct Comrades Pervukhin (convocation), Borisov, Zavenyagin, and Zhimerin to resolve within one month the issue of the feasibility of constructing Shop G in Leningrad…S.M. Karpacheva: "The laboratory where Volmer was to become the scientific director and I the head was organized at VNIINM. <…> [OKB-10 and one of the 'sharashkas' were supposed to collaborate with us, where the design specifications and the construction of the heavy water plant were to be developed…]
>>64316767[But things were going poorly for the 'designers,' and] after a few months… Zavenyagin merged OKB-10 with Volmer's laboratory and instructed me to find an organization specializing in the implementation of [fairly complex] designs and negotiate with them. <…> All this required serious organization of the work, which occupied me, Rosen A.M., who had transferred from GIAP as my deputy, and Bayerl V.K. (former director of the German company Bamag. – S.K.). <…> Laboratory studies were completed within a year…"A.M. Rosen: "The second government decree determined the construction site. Initially, it was planned to build the plant in Novomoskovsk, at the Ministry of Chemical Industry's nitrogen fertilizer plant, where there was extensive experience working with liquid ammonia and where reserves could always be replenished. However, a conflict between Comrade Zavenyagin and Comrade Pervukhin led to the Ministry of Chemical Industry's rejection of the plan to build our plant in Novomoskovsk (GIAP was tasked with developing a competing option), and Norilsk was chosen as the construction site."
>>64316774Strange as it may seem, strained personal relationships sometimes hindered the implementation of important government decisions, even in a sector such as nuclear energy.S.M. Karpacheva recounted that a disagreement between A.P. Zavenyagin and M.G. Pervukhin resulted in the Ministry of Chemical Industry's refusal to organize the relevant work not only in Novomoskovsk but also at other plants.The true reason, apparently, was not competing projects: A.P. Zavenyagin, i.e., the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was appointed responsible for the implementation of the entire program, while the Ministry of Chemical Industry was relegated to the role of subordinate executor.The situation in question is described in the literature, but for some reason not strictly according to the original source, which resulted in some important details and emotional nuance being lost. And if we quote Susanna Mikhailovna's manuscript, then..."It led to a scandal at the PSU Scientific and Technical Council, where, in the presence of invited guests (me and Rosen), A.P. Zavenyagin and M.G. Pervukhin began arguing in such 'unparliamentary' tones that I really wanted to run away or at least not hear this argument, [which] led nowhere...A few months later, upon returning from vacation, I called A.P. Zavenyagin to find out [what they had finally decided on]. At first, I heard laughter in response to my question, then he said:"You'll be horrified, we had to decide on construction in Norilsk!"Indeed, I was stunned by this statement."But there's no ammonia there; both equipment delivery and operation will be very expensive! We'll go broke, Avraamiy Pavlovich!" "I screamed into the phone.
>>64316054Do you live near a plant? What's your current income? (Yes it matters, getting into nuclear is a time and money sink at first)
>>64316785"There was no way out," A.P. said. "The Ministry of Chemical Industry blocked its plants from us. But we'll get through this, don't panic. We only need to bring in ammonia once—for startup—and then only replace the losses, which won't be significant, since the plant is sealed. And during operation, we'll save on electricity consumption. And most importantly, no one will interfere with us here. <…>Unfortunately, A.P. was wrong: there turned out to be a lot of obstacles in Norilsk and Moscow. But no one could have imagined how much effort and nervous energy the construction and startup of the plant would require! And how many obstacles were created within the Ministry of Internal Affairs itself!"On August 15, a report entitled "On the Status of Work on the Use of Atomic Energy in 1945 and the First Seven Months of 1946" was published. The section "On the Status of Work on Heavy Water Production" provides a detailed analysis of the current situation.Let's look at what is close to Zavenyagin and directly concerns the Norilsk Combine. Among the research institutes and other organizations working on the problem is the "nine" of the First Main Directorate under the USSR Council of Ministers (with the participation of a group of German specialists). The Norilsk Combine is among the seven enterprises slated for heavy water production (Resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 737-293 ss of April 4, 1946). The required electrical capacity is stated as 84,000 kW, and the cost of work on the main facilities, including equipment, is 79 million rubles. But “construction work (which, we remind you, must be carried out by the plant itself. – Ed.) has not yet begun.”
>>64316793A.M. Rosen: "The Norilsk Combine itself, despite its challenging climate, would have been a good location for building such a plant (thankfully, there was sufficient cold water available to cool the condensate), if not for the following circumstances: the plant fell under the control of the NKVD, or more precisely, its 7th Special Department, headed by Colonel M. Gagkayev; equipment could only be delivered during the summer navigation season.This second circumstance delayed preparations for installation and the plant's installation.But the first circumstance was more important. As is well known, the human factor plays a significant role in solving any problem. It's hard to imagine a worse "factor" than M. Gagkayev. A former deputy head of the NKVD's Dalstroy, where he abused his absolute power, he was averse to technology, had no desire to organize teamwork, tolerated no objections, and valued only sycophancy. And he selected the right employees—complete sycophants, ignorant of technology and uninterested in the work."
>>64316797A.P. Zavenyagin, Head of Construction at the Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Plant, 1938.A.P. Zavenyagin, Head of Construction at the Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Plant, 1938.In early 1947, the issue of Shop "G" in Norilsk was raised, as they say, point-blank. Having discussed the essence of the matter, the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (minutes No. 32 of February 18) decided not to consider, but postpone until the next meeting, the submitted draft resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On providing assistance to the Norilsk Combine for the expansion of the Thermal Power Plant" and to instruct the Scientific and Technical Council of the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (comrade Pervukhin) to once again discuss the issue of the advisability of building workshop "G" in Norilsk, taking into account the possibility of replenishing the planned hydroxyline production for Norilsk through the practical implementation of new methods for obtaining hydroxyline or the construction of workshop "G" in another, more advantageous location and to submit their proposals to the Special Committee."One can imagine the passions that raged for three weeks, until the next "gathering." What a blow to A.P.'s pride!But on March 12, this remained "off-camera": the Special Committee discussed the problems of equipping Shop G, without specifically addressing the Norilsk Combine. Only much later, on July 22, 1947, did the Special Committee finally accept the proposal of Zavenyagin, Pervukhin, and Borisov to halt construction of Shop G at the Norilsk Combine.Apparently, A.P. was forced to give in. To dispense with a dissenting opinion. Most likely, the arguments, especially those of M.G. Pervukhin, prevailed. Could it be that the people responsible for the project let him down?But it seemed that the story of August 9, which had run its course, had found a new lease on life.
>>64316803Let's return to the Special Committee meeting on July 22. It instructed Vannikov, Malyshev, Zavenyagin, Kurchatov, Borisov, Yudin, and Zhigalin to "reexamine once again the draft resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers on the construction of Installation No. 476 (an industrial facility for the production of heavy water, built at the Kolomna Locomotive Plant – Ed.) submitted by Comrades Zavenyagin, Pervukhin, and Borisov and to submit their proposals for discussion by the Special Committee within five days."However, at the very next meeting of the Special Committee (August 9), the "draft resolution submitted by Comrades Vannikov, Malyshev, Zavenyagin, Kurchatov, Borisov, and Yudin on the construction of Industrial Unit No. 476 for the production of hydroxyline by ammonia distillation, with its construction site in Norilsk (proposal by Comrades Borisov and Zavenyagin)" was adopted. Zavenyagin (convocation), Borisov, and Pervukhin were instructed to amend the draft USSR Council of Ministers resolution within three days, necessitating a change in the facility's construction site.And on August 21, 1946, Resolution No. 2936-952 ss of the USSR Council of Ministers was adopted.In 1947–1948, bench testing was completed and...A.M. Rosen: "...if it weren't for A.P. Zavenyagin's constant assistance, we wouldn't have launched the plant. <...>Between 1949 and 1952, [it] was largely assembled... In 1951, S.M. Karpacheva and I visited Norilsk and were convinced that launch was just around the corner."V.F. Kalinin: "...they summoned me to Zavenyagin's office.""Do you fly? Fly to Norilsk.""When?""Right now, you'll still have time to catch a plane."
>>64316816I flew as I was, without stopping home, in boots and a hat. In Krasnoyarsk, I was met in the morning by pilots in fur boots. I flew with them to Norilsk on a cargo plane. To keep me warm, they wrapped me in carpets, which, fortunately, were on the plane. In Norilsk, I was met by the "Prince of Taimyr," V.S. Zverev himself. A small narrow-gauge train with two tiny warm cars: one with a sofa, the other with a samovar and cognac. Although I don't drink, I had a drink and immediately fell asleep.Zverev was the sole director of both the metallurgical plant and the city where, on Zavenyagin's orders, a heavy water production plant was being built. And since I was working on heavy water, Zavenyagin sent me. It was a technical matter. He needed to figure out why the technology wasn't working.I arrived there in my boots and hat and spent the entire winter there, about four or five months. Admittedly, I was rarely outside. Since I was Zavenyagin's authorized representative, they treated me with great respect, promptly carried out all my orders, obeyed me, and so on. Every morning, we'd gather: "Come on, guys, who can explain what happened last night?" No one could have imagined what happened that night. But in the end, everything that needed to be done was done.One day, Zverev told me that a group of imprisoned mechanics (90 people) had been released thanks to good reviews of their work and would not be returning to work the following day, as former prisoners are not allowed to work in closed facilities. I laughed and said:"But they're working, and if they leave, all the installation work will stop!""There's a way out: if they voluntarily remain prisoners; Of course, we'll pay them their wages and let them go with good papers when the installation is finished. Tell them that, they might not believe me.After a short meeting in the far corner of the workshop, the 50-year-old foreman of the mechanics said:"We understand, we agree, we are communists."
>>64316821A.M. Rosen: "In the fall of 1952, launch operations began, which I had to lead (as the plant's scientific director and chief technologist) together with V.K. Bayerl, the design bureau's chief engineer (S.M. Karpacheva fell ill and did not participate in the launch operations, which led to a conflict with A.P. Zavenyagin).Before the launch, I had a meeting with A.P. Zavenyagin in Krasnoyarsk. The fact is that our representative, M.A. Polyanov, who was overseeing the installation, was signaling that the plant's chief engineer was no good and, what's more, a drunkard. Director V.P. Prokhorov was also no good. (Polyanov showed us a thick file of his correspondence, or rather, his squabbles with the plant, as evidence of his tireless concern for the institute's interests, and in my inexperience, I didn't realize it was something else.)A.P. Zavenyagin listened to me and advised me. I'd like to inspect the project on-site and then call him. Upon arrival, I was convinced that the chief engineer was a perfectly capable man, but truly an incorrigible drunkard (he was fine the first day, but by the second, he was unbearable, and unsteady on his feet). I had to fire him, and M.A. Polyanov was appointed in his place (alas, on my recommendation). ["Alas"—because] at his new job, he immediately started writing me reports and causing conflicts."The launch of the technology was plagued by frequent malfunctions and accidents. These were resolved step by step. Incidentally, one of the employees, Rita Belozerova, who oversaw analytical monitoring of the ammonia dehydration process, was sent by Zavenyagin from Chelyabinsk.
>>64316827A.M. Rosen: "Major [problems arose during the 'tuning'] of the high-speed T3 compressor, whose rotor was made of aluminum alloy. Theoretically, this was a progressive solution... but in practice, the rotor broke when any small solid particles got in. "The nets weren't helping."If it weren't for the "nerve-wracking atmosphere created by Gagkaev and the Gagkaevites. After [each emergency], they drew up long reports and wrote letters to Moscow stating that I (like Beyerl) was clearly a foreign agent. Fortunately, the letters reached Zavenyagin, and he addressed them "to the file" (he showed me one, not without a certain amusement, and when I asked if Gagkaev could be removed, he said: "You want to replace the NKVD personnel department? In vain!" (The interference from the Gagkaevites disappeared later: his "service" was reduced by P.F. Lomako, and after the 20th Party Congress, Gagkaev himself was expelled from the Party. - A.R.) <…>The replacement of the director was a great help: instead of V.P. Prokhorov, A.P. Zavenyagin sent his man, F.E. Brazhnikov, with whom we worked closely. <…> From time to time, scientists would come to our plant to learn about the situation and assist where possible. In particular, in the spring of 1953, V.B. Shevchenko (who had recently been relieved of his duties as director of Research Institute No. 9) came. <…>
>>64316821>voluntarily remain prisoners>"We understand, we agree, we are communists."You've gotta be fucking shitting me
>>64316831The transformation of young specialists working at the plant into experienced engineers and the team's cohesion played a very important role in the development of the work. I remember with particular warmth the leading technologists—the plant's shift supervisors, who controlled the process from the central control panel. They had an excellent understanding of both the technology and the automation. These were Katya Mayorova, Tsilya Bobovnikova, Muza Levkovich, and Nina Ryazanova. They were assisted by the instrumentation and control shift supervisors—Oleg Trofimov, Petya Vyrodov, Yura Galkin, and others. After the plant's director was replaced, when the new director, Comrade Loginov, was getting acquainted with our plant, they They put forward proposals to strengthen the plant's engineering management, and at their suggestion, the young engineer O.V. Trofimov was appointed chief technologist, and then chief engineer of the plant... Work proceeded more smoothly. But several more tests lay ahead. <…>In the summer of 1955, the unit produced a satisfactory product, which we reported to A.P. Zavenyagin. He expressed satisfaction. However, the plant's productivity was half that of the design." (The design modifications were carried out on a hydrodynamic rig created with the support of A.P. Zavenyagin. — A.R.)
>>64316831In 1957, the plant reached 85% of its design capacity.The Norilsk "macaroni plant" produced its products for seven years, but heavy water proved expensive ("due to inflated prices for high-pressure steam"), and its production was halted.Test SiteAnd did Zavenyagin have anything to do with it? After all, he could have been exposed to an excessive dose of radiation there...The issue of constructing a special test site for "finished products" (atomic charges – Ed.), as well as for the purpose of "studying the damaging effects of the product on living organisms using various experimental animals," was considered by the Special Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers on November 11, 1946. A.P. Zavenyagin was one of the authors of the corresponding draft Resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers (adopted on November 14, 1946, No. 2493-1045 ss/op). The PGU was instructed to submit proposals by December 1, 1946, regarding the site and timeframe for constructing the test site, the candidate for its director, and measures to ensure construction.On May 31, 1947, the Special Committee conducted a preliminary review, and then the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution to construct the Mountain Station (as the special nuclear weapons testing range was called – Ed.) at Site No. 1 in the Irtysh River region, 170 km west of Semipalatinsk. A.P. Zavenyagin was among those who drafted the government directive.Then, on May 31 and June 19, respectively, the test program for Facility No. 905 (Mountain Station – Ed.) was approved, presented by a commission consisting of Pervukhin, Zavenyagin, Kurchatov, Semenov, Khariton, Shtemenko, Voronov, Vershinin, Vorobyov, and several others.Within two years, the test site was fully equipped. As B.V. Brokhovich recalls, "Zavenyagin took an active part in its construction: the military units subordinate to him built all the main structures."Finally, the most crucial stage.
>>64316845On August 19, 1949, the Special Committee assigned A.P. the task of supervising the delivery of the plutonium charge and neutron fuses from KB-11 to Training Range No. 2. Zavenyagin was tasked with accompanying "Cargo No. 1" throughout its entire journey and ensuring its safety during preparations for the test.A.A. Brish: “…we traveled slowly along the narrow-gauge railway—we were transporting a charge, after all… We had a plutonium charge with us, so we were so careful… Khariton and Zavenyagin were traveling… Incidentally, we were traveling at night… A few kilometers before the ‘point,’ Beria’s deputy appeared and joined us.”On August 21, A.P. Zavenyagin, I.V. Kurchatov, and Yu.B. Khariton were already there.August 22. Dress rehearsal for the explosion. On the last day, the plutonium charge was also examined, with Zavenyagin's participation.August 23. KB-11's work procedures for preparing and actually testing the RDS-1 charge were reviewed. A.P. was among the meeting participants.V. Alferov: “Near the steel tower, a special building was constructed in which the bomb was assembled; it was called DAF—from the first letters of his last name.” Dukhov, Alferov, and Flerov. The assembly was divided into three stages: Stage I—the bomb core, handled by Dukhov; then Stage II—connecting the automatics; and Stage III—installing the initiation device. The assembly proceeded as follows: Dukhov and two people doing everything themselves—for the sake of secrecy, no one else was allowed in. A special log was kept: Khariton carefully read the instructions, the person doing the work followed them to the letter, Khariton came over to check—was everything correct?—and then read the instructions again. Then Khariton reported to Kurchatov, who came and signed the log, and everything continued.
>>64312528If you were on a sub that you know is done for, what would you do?
>>64316853Kurchatov himself devised this procedure: despite his democratic nature, he liked to have important details recorded in written documents—"pisdokumenty," as he and his entourage called them.During the assembly of the two hemispheres, measurements were taken with calipers and compared with the drawing. Suddenly, the very chamfer they'd forgotten to include in the drawing was revealed. Khariton blanched, but Dukhov kept his cool and said, "Look, the drawing says: blunt the sharp edges." But then Zavenyagin appeared: "Blunting, he said, doesn't mean making a chamfer; a chamfer is 0.2 mm or more." They called Kurchatov, who, not without humor, said to Zeldovich, "Yasha, calculate—will the wave break because of the chamfer?" Zeldovich understood everything and went to "calculate." A few minutes later, he brought back a completely blank sheet and showed it to Kurchatov. He glanced at it and gave the command: "Continue assembly!"V.I. Zhuchikhin: "During the final operations (at the testing ground, 1949. — Ed.), A.P. Zavenyagin was always present at all work areas. He carefully examined the work process, always trying to fully understand the essence of the matter, especially each device and its reliability. Moreover, he showed his interest not during the work, but only after its completion, before signing the certificate of readiness. It turned out that his meticulous questions did not interfere with the work, but at the same time forced people to reflect on everything they had done and repeatedly think about whether everything had been done, whether it was as it should be, whether anything needed to be improved.
>>64316860[Zavenyagin] was a representative of Beria's department, but was the direct opposite of General Meshik (P. Ya. Meshik, head of the security service at the testing ground. — Ed.). An exceptionally kind, very balanced person, from the very first words of conversation he immediately put people at ease and created a relaxed atmosphere. The situation. He never raised his voice, and if he needed to cut someone short, he'd simply utter a short phrase: "That's all. Goodbye!"—meaning "shut up and go away." <…>[While they were preparing for the tests], A.P. nearly injured himself. For the descending cage (referring to the tower on which the "product" was installed—Ed.), they'd made… a hole about a meter deep with four metal pins to support the cage. A.P., with his hands behind his back, was strolling around the pit for a long time. And then he tripped… He was lucky: he only got a slight scratch."
>>64316865A barrier was immediately erected to prevent such a thing from happening again.E.I. Zababakhin: "Apparently, we owed it to [Kurchatov] that, in the extremely difficult circumstances of the first tests, there were no serious emergencies or noticeable problems. Zernov, Vannikov, Malyshev, and Zavenyagin played a major and positive role in this, but things went smoothly not because there was a clear division of management functions—scientific and administrative (I don't think this existed yet), but because of an atmosphere of efficiency and goodwill..."26th. Late evening.The heads of KB-11 presented I.V. Kurchatov and A.P. Zavenyagin with reports on the readiness of all components of "Product 501" for the test, after which the time was set—August 29, 8:00...I.N. Golovin: "Work is ongoing around the clock. Kurchatov and Zavenyagin are personally overseeing all preparations... They can both be seen at the site of the future explosion, in the bomb assembly rooms, or in the concrete dugout laboratories."On the night of August 29, Yu. B. Khariton and N. L. Dukhov with their assistants, in the presence of I. V. Kurchatov, A. P. Zavenyagin, A. S. Alexandrov, and P. M. Zernov, installed the neutron initiator piston in the central part of the device, where the plutonium "Dukhov sphere" was already positioned.3:00 AM. Assembly of the nuclear charge is complete.About an hour later, the "device" is lifted onto the 30-meter tower. Among the several people completing preparations for the explosion there is A. P.6:00 AM... A. P. was the second-to-last to leave the tower. K. I. followed. Shchelkin, who sealed the entrance.
>>64316871V.I. Zhuchikhin: “Lominsky (T.N. Lominsky, head of the KB-11 testing grounds. — Ed.) inserted the capsules, Matveyev assisted him, Shchelkin read the instructions, Zavenyagin stood in the corner as a controller-observer, not interfering in anything. <…> The last operation was mine. Then we walked down the stairs. Lominsky and Matveyev were first, and then me. Then Zavenyagin came down. He went down and looked up, and Shchelkin was last. For safety, the stairs were fenced off. Shchelkin caught on the fence, and the flashlight fell out of his pocket. And then the flashlight was flying from above, and Zavenyagin looked and said: “What’s falling there?” And suddenly this lantern falls with a crash next to him…”What the hell.…The car is already waiting. Let's go. At the intermediate point, S.N. Matveyev, in the presence of A.P. Zavenyagin and K.I. Shchelkin, switched on the connector, thereby connecting the equipment on the turret with the control and monitoring system installed in the command post.Much has been written about the atmosphere that reigned at the test site just before the explosion. Zavenyagin had already done his job, and even if he was among the "chief testers," he didn't betray his feelings. Although the personal responsibility of the "controller" was certainly oppressive. And in the event of failure, they would remember him too. Certainly.And L.P. Beria also tried to "defuse" the tension. In his own style, of course: “…suddenly, in the general silence, ten minutes before the explosion, Beria’s voice rang out:“But nothing will work for you, Igor Vasilyevich!”“What are you saying, Lavrenty Pavlovich! It will definitely work!” Kurchatov exclaimed, continuing to watch, only his neck had turned purple and his face had taken on a grim, focused expression.“Ten seconds…, five seconds… three, two, one, launch!”
>>64316877Kurchatov abruptly turned to face the open door. The sky had already dimmed against the illuminated hills and steppe. Kurchatov rushed out of the casemate, ran up the earthen rampart, and with a cry of “It’s her!” he waved his arms wildly, repeating, “It’s her, it’s her!” as enlightenment spread across his face.The column of the explosion billowed and ascended into the stratosphere. A shock wave, clearly visible on the grass, was approaching the command post. Kurchatov rushed to meet it. Flerov lunged after him, grabbed his arm, forcibly dragged him into the casemate, and closed the door.State Commission Chairman L.P. Beria embraced Kurchatov and said:"It would have been a great misfortune if it hadn't worked out!" Kurchatov knew well what a disaster it would have been…”The reaction of those present to the test’s success has been described many times. However, A.P. Zavenyagin is not among those who made it into the pages of historical chronicle. Where and how he expressed (or did he express?) his feelings, we will likely never know.It is also unclear whether he was among the approximately 15 people, led by L.P. Beria, who were at KP-1.But it was Zavenyagin who put the final nail in the coffin: on September 4, a week after the explosion, he reported to Beria: “Non-disclosure agreements regarding the test (of the atomic bomb – Ed.) have been collected from 2,883 people, including 713 employees of KB-11, the test site, research organizations, and governing bodies directly involved in the test, including all authorized representatives of the Council of Ministers and scientists.The remaining test site workers "The collection of signatures from 3,013 people will be completed within three days…"Such is the prose… Could it be that, let's say, Beria wanted to make Zavenyagin potentially responsible for a possible future mistake—either personal or someone connected to August 29th…
>>64316880And that's why A.P. was delayed for a while… At least, he wasn't among the passengers on the first return flight, on September 4th, according to V.I. Zhuchikhin.There is, however, evidence that after the explosion, A.P. had other concerns.I.K. Klimenko: "The 364 animals prepared for the experiment included both large (dogs, sheep) and small (rabbits, white rats, guinea pigs, and white mice). In this first experiment, no strict separation of animals for further post-explosion studies was conducted, and their condition after the explosion had to be used to assess the impact of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion (air blast wave, light radiation, and radiation). This circumstance immediately after the explosion caused complications that greatly complicated further work.The fact is that at certain open biological sites, where the animals did not die on the spot from the blast wave at the moment of the explosion (from 1000 m and further), the blast wave destroyed metal cages containing small animals, in particular white mice. They scattered across the Experimental Field, and animal caretakers and orderlies were forced to catch them and return them to their cages. The work was facilitated by the fact that, against the background The white mice were clearly visible from the charred soil. At each distance, only the cage numbers were known, and the white mice were not individually numbered, as is the case with larger animals. As a result, when late in the evening of August 29, the test directors (I.V. Kurchatov, A.P. Zavenyagin, and others) invited S.S. Zhikharev, head of the biological sector, to report on the explosion's effects on the test animals, a rather embarrassing incident ensued.
>>64316882While reviewing the logbook containing the initial results of the explosion's biological impact, A.P. Zavenyagin noticed that there were more animals 1,250 meters from the center of the Field after the explosion than before. He questioned the other results, but I.V. Kurchatov, after listening to our explanations, understood what was going on and assessed it all with his characteristic sense of humor.B.M. Malutov: "Comrade A.P. Zavenyagin was retained as head of the remaining work to summarize the test results.In early September 1949, he summoned me and expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the slow pace of work to open up the underground sections of the metro located... in the epicenter area. In response to my explanation that work there was being hampered by the still extremely high levels of radioactivity... Comrade Zavenyagin issued a categorical order: "I order all sections of the metro to be opened up within a week!"My objection that this was completely unfeasible was followed by a second, more blunt order to open these structures within a week, to which I also responded harshly: "Give me a written order. But keep in mind that I will also write on it that it is impossible to complete this work within a week without neglecting the safety of the people."Well, at this point, A.P. Zavenyagin's nerves gave out: he literally started shouting that I was an undisciplined officer, that he didn't understand why I had been entrusted with such a responsible job, and that I should leave immediately.After this incident, V.I. Babarin and I headed back to the epicenter and descended into the open shaft—it had only been dug 10 meters deep in a few days, and another 30 meters and three more adits needed to be dug. I checked the precautions required to transport soldiers to and from the work site. I consulted again with V.I. Babarin. We both came to the conclusion that this work of opening the underground structure could not be completed within a month."
>>64316887The first explosion was followed by more. Some evidence remains of what sometimes happened. And not without the participation of A.P. Zavenyagin.A.I. Khovanovic: “The year 1951 arrived. Intensive preparations for the next tests began. <…> Just before the dress rehearsal, some abnormal impulse occurred in the automation. I.V. Kurchatov and A.P. Zavenyagin immediately gathered the key personnel at the Experimental Field. Kurchatov sternly demanded strict adherence to instructions and warned of strict liability for the slightest violation. Zavenyagin remained eloquently silent.Fortunately, no further incidents occurred during test preparations.”V.I. Zhuchikhin: "One of my meetings with A.P. was in 1951, during the testing of the second version of the atomic bomb. With the same plutonium load, smaller size and weight, it proved twice as effective as the RDS-1. We proposed this design even before the first bomb was tested, promising to complete it within six months, but they wouldn't let us. We approached Zavenyagin (the conversation took place in Sarov), but he also refused: the deadlines had already been reported to the 'boss.'"S.L. Davydov: "...in [1951], preparations for the test were far from smooth. When the Experimental Field was prepared for the dress rehearsal, [one of its participants] inadvertently started up all the filming equipment. [They tried to blame me for giving the wrong command, but it was also suggested] that the equipment's start-up was possible due to a faulty insulation in the automation cable. <…> The rehearsal was canceled.I checked the insulation resistance of all the cables connected to the AP (programming apparatus. — Ed.). I discovered several insulation faults.
>>64316889While I was busy checking the cables, I didn't notice A.P. Zavenyagin and my superior, Major General V.A. Bolyatko, approaching the structure. <…> Zavenyagin had apparently arrived to determine my share of the blame for the incident and to inquire about my opinion regarding the cause of the accidental activation of the equipment. <…> I confirmed my agreement with Georgy Lvovich's (G.L. Shnirman, head of the laboratory at the Institute of Chemical Physics, developer of the PA. — Ed.) opinion and, as proof, added that I had also discovered a fault in the cables leading to the command post.Zavenyagin wanted to personally verify the accuracy of my words, and I demonstrated to Avraamy Pavlovich the testing method and the presence of faults. Zavenyagin, an engineer by training, understood my point.He asked why I was checking the cables—it wasn't part of my duties. To this, I replied, not without a certain boastfulness, that such is every engineer's rule: if a neighbor discovers a fault, check to see if there's a similar fault on your property. <…> My answer satisfied Avraamy Pavlovich: "Engineer Zavenyagin understood Engineer Davydov," and he ordered that Rivelis (I. Ya. Rivelis, Engineer Major, Head of Instrumentation Works – Ed.) be informed of the inspection results. <…>I located Rivelis by phone and reported the discovered faults in the cables. Instead of gratitude, I received a curse and a declaration that I had no right to inspect the cables. Zavenyagin, standing nearby, heard Rivelis's answer, took the phone from me, and warned Iosif Yakovlevich that if the cable network wasn't repaired in the next few days, he, Rivelis, would be brought to trial. Of course, the cables were quickly repaired.I think that the harsh tone of Zavenyagin’s conversation was not only dictated by the event that had occurred, but was also the result of numerous complaints against Rivelis that came from scientists.”
>>643168951953.V.I. Zhuchikhin: "...Zavenyagin also took part in the preparations for the hydrogen bomb tests. As before, he didn't make any noise or swear. Unlike Vannikov..."S.L. Davydov: "...on the day of the first aerial detonation (referring to the 1953 tests of new types of atomic bombs dropped from aircraft after a thermonuclear explosion – Ed.), A.P. Zavenyagin arrived in the control room (the automation command post – Ed.), frankly admitting that my youth prevented him from entrusting me entirely with such a responsible task. For this, I was subsequently sincerely grateful to him. His presence saved me from serious trouble.The fact is, everything was going fine until the aircraft went into combat approach. Both Zavenyagin and I stood with chronometers in our hands, listening for the first tone signal to be followed by the program-defined tone sequences. Instead, the transmission of signals from the aircraft simply ceased.We exchanged puzzled glances, the stopwatches remaining unstarted. After a few seconds of consultation, we decided to start the equipment "on a hazard." Of course, the launch didn't coincide with the explosion, and a lot of the equipment malfunctioned.It turned out that the poorly briefed navigator of the carrier aircraft had turned off the power to the sound generators. If A.P. Zavenyagin hadn't been there, I would have had to justify myself, since the Air Force testing ground… flatly denied any guilt and even produced a film recording of all the signals. They had to show me the control films as well.Zavenyagin was outraged by the stance taken by the pilots and directed his wrath entirely at them.
>>643168981955.Yu.A. Romanov: “In the mid-1950s, I, still a relatively young man (I was born in 1926), had the opportunity to participate in a meeting chaired by Zavenyagin. I can, without exaggeration, boast of this, the only instance of personal contact.[If you recall], during the development of thermonuclear weapons, for a long time [the model was based on] already known principles. Although they did not promise high performance, the prospect of fulfilling [the relevant] government decree… generally seemed realistic, and those responsible for [the final result] were, of course, captivated by this.However, even then [something distinguished by its novelty] had emerged, and I was directly involved in the idea underlying it: working as a department head in the division headed by Sakharov, I knew the problem well, carried out [the necessary] calculations on Andrei Dmitrievich’s instructions… [and] realized the futility of it.” [previous solutions].The new version, although based on unproven scientific principles, promised high performance parameters.It must be said that Minister Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Malyshev, to put it mildly, disapproved of attempts to divert attention to [the search task] (it wasn't even in the plans) and sternly demanded that work be accelerated according to [the approved program]. Furthermore, he ordered Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov to assign me optimization calculations for the first version during his vacation, relieving him of all other duties.But when he questioned me, I stubbornly [stood my ground]. You might say it was bold. No, it wasn't. I simply didn't have the burden of responsibility that weighed on those who had once proposed, prepared, and promoted [the products that essentially embodied the ideas of] the 1953 thermonuclear explosion. I felt freer.
>>64316905Ultimately, the atomic scientists managed to secure a [government directive] allowing them to expedite work in a different direction. [It], if I'm not mistaken, [was signed] two days after Malyshev's departure, and responsibility for implementing the new idea fell to his successor, A.P. Zavenyagin.This brings me to the episode I want to recount.At a meeting in May 1955, Zavenyagin, after listening to the opinions of everyone present, posed the question this way: we need to "launch" a shortened version [of the new product]. The idea was to verify the basic ["positions"] as quickly as possible, and then, [if doubts disappear, to make every effort to quickly complete what had been started]. Meanwhile, the first version was also being prepared for testing.In November, our promising product was [detonated]. As we expected, the results exceeded the potential performance of the first version. Therefore, its testing was no longer necessary. (Isn't that why A.D. Sakharov recalled: "[After the hydrogen bomb tests] Zavenyagin looked excited, like everyone else, happy?")And what if the "second" had misfired? Then, in the absence of a prepared document, the government decree would have been disrupted, which could have led to conclusions that would not have contributed to technological advancement. And most likely unpleasant for those who carried it out.Avraamiy Pavlovich, I assume, had all this in mind. His silent wisdom has remained in my memory, leaving a feeling of admiration. "For life…"But not everyone experienced such a feeling, and not always. Perhaps because the meaning of what was happening was often hidden from the uninitiated.
>>64316909V.F. Dyachenko: "…he (A.D. Sakharov – Ed.) treated society, power, etc., as an objective reality, given to us, unfortunately, through sensation. And he was able to brilliantly combine a human approach to the individual with a scientific approach to society and systems.One time, I attended a meeting at the Ministry regarding the testing plan for the "products." The bosses – Kurchatov, Zavenyagin – were silent and silent, only two words at the end – the most basic option had been chosen. I was shocked by such "stupidity," everyone was surprised. Everyone, that is, except Dmitrievich. He even seemed pleased, like a scientist who has received experimental confirmation of his ideas."…On October 30, 1961, at 11:32 a.m., a bomb with a yield of 50 million tons of TNT was detonated over Novaya Zemlya at an altitude of 4,000 meters. This explosion of a super-powerful hydrogen bomb was included in the Guinness Book of Records. V.B. Adamsky and Yu.N. Smirnov, who was directly involved in the design development and testing of the N-50, wrote: “The 50-megaton bomb had no military significance. It was a one-off demonstration of force, accompanying specific political circumstances, intimidation between the powers.”V.B. Adamsky: “The history of the creation of a super-powerful hydrogen bomb dates back to 1956. It was then that A.P. Zavenyagin… proposed creating a very powerful device, and our colleagues in the Urals were tasked with this. Even the casing for the future bomb was created. But at the end of 1956, Zavenyagin died, and work on the device ceased. N.I. Pavlov, who was the head of our main department at the time, once remarked that with the death of A.P. Zavenyagin, his idea also died. And anyway, no one particularly liked it; it didn’t seem attractive: simply put, it was no longer "Fuel"—a big, powerful bomb. I don't even know what Zavenyagin's motives were. Perhaps it was a straightforward technical desire to "expand the scale."
>>64316914The Semipalatinsk test site "rewarded" Zavenyagin with another dose of radiation. Did A.P. underestimate the danger? Or neglect it?V.I. Zhuchikhin: "Perhaps he died early because he went to the center of the first explosion. He, Zernov, and the driver. In a Pobeda. On the heels of the explosion. The engine failed due to intense radiation, and they returned on foot.Everyone was immediately hospitalized and kept there for over a month. There, in the "deuce." At A.P.'s. "The most severe damage was revealed..."If only this were the only case! No, indeed. B.M. Malutov: "[August 1953. Only] a few hours had passed since the explosion of a very powerful device. Doubting our urgent report that the railway bridge, located 800 meters from the epicenter, although damaged by the explosion, could be repaired without much difficulty, A.P. Zavenyagin decided to personally verify this.In the evening, when most of the groups participating in the test had already left the Field, he, contrary to existing instructions, wearing a general's uniform, drove out to the Field and reached the ill-fated bridge, but the car he was driving got stuck in the dust created by the explosion, in a highly active area.Avraamiy Pavlovich got out of the car and began walking around the Field. It's good that the colonel saw him. Shchetinin, returning from the Field, immediately drove up to the stranded car and took Zavenyagin and the driver out.Everyone returning from the Field passed through the sanitary checkpoint. Zavenyagin, A.P., was also reluctantly admitted. His clothes and shoes were so heavily contaminated that all the instruments were going off-scale. Avraamy Pavlovich refused the sanitary checkpoint's chief's request to remove and change his clothes and underwear and wash himself.
>>64316916The head of the sanitary checkpoint called me and asked what to do in the current situation. My answer was brief: act according to the instructions; there should be no exceptions for anyone, including those with the rank of general. The colonel general (?) was forced to comply: take off his clothes, wash, and put on his soldier's underwear and the clothes available at the sanitary checkpoint.Later that evening, A.P. Zavenyagin summoned me to his hotel. As I walked there, I expected another scolding, although there was no reason for it. I was wrong: Avraamiy Pavlovich, dressed in soldier's underwear, was sitting in a good mood at the table with Avetik Ignatyevich Burnazyan, the Deputy Minister of Health of the USSR. On the table was a bottle of cognac, half empty (cognac was considered by some to be a preventative measure against radiation sickness). There was no reminder of the incident at the Field or in the sanitary checkpoint, thereby making it clear that everything was done correctly. Only instructions were given for the following day regarding a more thorough inspection of the military equipment exposed to the explosion."G.I. Krylov: "I may be asked: was it really true that during my ten-year tenure at the test site, there were no instances of safety violations that resulted in unpleasant consequences? Of course there were. Excessive bravado, disregard for danger, and, finally, basic indiscipline are inherent in our character. We had virtually no cases of ignorance of the situation, especially since ignorant people are more cautious and meticulous in following instructions.In 1953, the Deputy Minister of Medium Machine Building… Zavenyagin drove into a dangerous zone without authorization. He hoped to avoid a section of road eroded by the explosion, but he got stuck and, naturally, received a small, fortunately small, dose of radiation. Comment, as they say, is superfluous."
>>64316922We don't know the true extent of the radiation's impact on A.P.'s health. Furthermore, there have been some obvious speculations.V.G. Gazenko: "I've heard that radiation was the cause of a certain lump Zavenyagin had on his head. What a fantasy! Read A.D. Sakharov's memoirs, and everything 'falls into place': after one of the tests in 1955, 'the shock wave in the headquarters cracked the ceiling and the plaster collapsed,' and one piece hit Avraamy Pavlovich. Sakharov saw Zavenyagin "rubbing a huge lump on his bald head with his hand."Radiation sickness, as the cause of A.P.'s death, is 'repeated' by many, including N.S. Khrushchev ("...he died, having suffered from exposure to atomic charges").Perhaps his "visits" to the danger zone spurred the development of illnesses Zavenyagin didn't like to talk about. However, it's possible his health problems began earlier, in the 1930s.I.S. Golovnin: "One day, Zavenyagin fell ill and asked my father to check on him. I went with him to Beryozki, where the factory and city management lived, in the director's Ford. Just for a ride. What better way for a ten-year-old boy to do that?! I saw Zavenyagin when he came out to see his father off. Back then, Avraamy Pavlovich was young, with short hair, and slightly balding. He was both engaging and reserved. His features were soft, but his gaze was deep, thoughtful, and intense. Tearing himself away from his thoughts, he looked at me warmly, and we left. At home, I heard my mother asking, "Well, how are things going?" After a pause, my father replied, "General exhaustion, he's keeping it all to himself. He asked me not to advertise it."
>>64316927A.N. Voronkin: "On April 30 (1941 – Ed.), I met with A.P. in his office as Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. He had changed dramatically – he'd gained weight, and any sudden or rapid movements made him short of breath. I said I didn't like the way he looked. He replied that he didn't like it either, but what can you do, age takes its toll." (This at forty! Really, what a forty-year-old...) B.V. Brokhovich: "Once, while on a business trip, Zavenyagin stopped by to see Anatoly Nazarovich Kallistov in Novosibirsk, whom he had known from work (this was after the war, from 1945 to 1951) as the director of Elektrostal Plant No. 12. Now Kallistov was in charge of Novosibirsk Plant No. 250.A.P. looked very ill. The doctor diagnosed pneumonia and said he couldn't go any further; he had to go to the hospital.But Zavenyagin refused hospitalization, citing only acute bronchitis. He did, however, take a doctor with him to accompany him to Moscow.This is typical of A.P. and his attitude toward himself and his health."A.M. Petrosyants: "He complained about his health. But not his heart. He loved the warmth and often bundled up. If the temperature in his office dropped below 22°C, he'd make a fuss."T.V. Tabakova: "When A.P. was appointed Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, he was given an office without a rest room. And I must say, I was warned that he'd just recovered from a serious illness, and such an office wasn't exactly suitable for someone who wasn't quite healthy."
>>64316932But A.P. didn't raise the issue of changing his office. It was only after some time that he asked for a new sofa: he found the leather one uncomfortable. And sometimes, apparently, he needed one. And if he said, "I want to rest," I'd lay down whatever was needed—a pillow, a blanket...A.P. truly looked unwell. His face was paler than usual, and he tired quickly. He'd lie down to rest even when he'd been working half a day at the Council of Ministers.There were, however, persistent rumors that Khrushchev was planning to appoint A.P. Chairman of the Council of Ministers, but his health... If it weren't for that...December 31st (1956 – Ed.) was a free day, Sunday, I think. I hadn't noticed anything out of the ordinary in the days before. And when they called me ("A.P. has died..."), I was very surprised: at least for several days before that, he hadn't complained about anything, hadn't been sick. Although his health was indeed not the best, he didn't go to a sanatorium. He was admitted to the hospital, but he didn't stay there long. Sometimes he'd stay home for a week...I remember once, leaving work, I said, "I guess I'm not resting. And I'm working at home... Somehow I can't seem to get any rest."The last photograph of A.P. Zavenyagin, 1956.The last photograph of A.P. Zavenyagin, 1956.The heart attack that night is said to have been caused by stress caused by certain events in the highest echelons of power, allegedly dating back to the 30th.M. Kolpakov: "He left the city alone after a difficult day (there were fundamental disagreements with Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev at a meeting—both were heated and nervous). He suffered a severe heart attack on the night of December 31st.
>>64316935Perhaps, if everything had happened in the Moscow apartment, everything would have been alright.But the doctors in the ambulance that rushed from Moscow merely pronounced him dead."The video "Gone with the Revolution," filmed by the Krasnoyarsk television studio, stated: "According to his daughter, Yevgenia Avraamiyevna, her father's final heart attack was preceded by his final atomic battle. This time with Khrushchev. Khrushchev demanded ground-based tests of the atomic bomb, while Zavenyagin persuaded and resisted."A.L. Lvov: "On December 30, 1956, Zavenyagin suffered severe stress at a regular plenum. Outside the city... he suffered a severe attack of angina. His daughter, a candidate of biological sciences, believes he died of shock."However, according to archival data, there was no Central Committee Plenum that day. Perhaps he was referring to the December 1956 plenum, where the Sixth Five-Year Plan and improvements to national economic management were discussed? But, firstly, it took place from December 20–24, and secondly, and this is more important for us, Zavenyagin did not speak at that plenum and had no polemics with N.S. Khrushchev. Perhaps only two relatively innocuous episodes.The first was when Khrushchev posed a question to Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy A.G. Sheremetyev."Khrushchev. Comrade Sheremetyev, how much molten slag do we get per ton of pig iron?Zavenyagin. 40 percent in the Donbass.Sheremetyev. From 600 to 900 kilograms.Khrushchev. Two metallurgists are citing different figures. Apparently, around 600 kilograms, i.e., 60 percent." (It turns out A.P. doesn't know the industry figures. Not good-o-o-o...).And the second time was when the Minister [of Construction Materials?] M.S. Suetin complained.
>>64316941"Suyutin. <…> Our brick factory in Glazov is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, but it's not operating at full capacity. We say, 'Give us this factory, we'll supply all the bricks we currently lack.' Why do we need a new factory? Let's use this one at full capacity. But they tell us, 'No, that's impossible.'Khrushchev. Which comrades are saying that?Suyutin. In particular, Comrade Serbin and Comrade Komarovsky have spoken along those lines.Khrushchev. And what other meaning? Have we reached Zavenyagin yet?Suyutin. ...We haven't reached him yet.Khrushchev. But Zavenyagin will say the same thing he told Serbia.Suyutin. I think we can fully provide what's needed.Khrushchev. How, Comrade Zavenyagin, did I guess right?Zavenyagin. No. I don't know about that. Ko "They didn't contact me."(Before the author's copy was edited, Zavenyagin wrote: "No, you didn't guess." A.P. crosses out "you didn't guess" and adds: "I was told about this..." This, of course, is more accurate and closer to the point.)In both cases, the situation was non-scandalous, without raised voices and having nothing to do with the prospects of the nuclear industry.But let's imagine they did argue. Even then, N.S. Khrushchev's harshness would hardly have signified a fundamental disagreement or deep discontent. In his memoirs, Nikita Sergeyevich speaks of A.P. quite warmly and respectfully: "He was an honest man, able to skillfully use his knowledge and energy. <…> He was an interesting person and a good worker. He held many positions."There is also indirect evidence that nothing extraordinary occurred. Those who saw A.P. on December 30th recall...
>>64316943A.M. Petrosyants: "I saw A.P. on his last day at work. Nothing special happened. He was calm, not upset at all. Was there some kind of 'clash' with Khrushchev? Honestly, I don't know. But he treated N.S. Zavenyagin well. He knew A.P. from Ukraine, and it was most likely his decision to appoint Zavenyagin as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers."V.G. Gazenko: "I don't think he had any problems that day, December 30th. He wasn't called anywhere; he was there. Overall, it was quiet and calm..."A.P. Kopytsina: "It was a calm, normal day. And he left early, around ten o'clock..." "He didn't call home," added T.V. Tabakova.But Zavenyagin did suffer a heart attack. A.D. Sakharov also writes about him and about the ambulance arriving late."V.S. Yemelyanov: "It was just after four in the morning when I was awakened by a knock on the door. Jumping out of bed, I asked, 'Who is it?' and heard the anxious voice of A.M. Petrosyants, one of the active participants in our work."Open up." I opened the door. "Get dressed quickly. Let's go to Zavenyagin's dacha. He's dead."I dressed as if in a trance, and we drove off. We sat in silence. <…>We arrived before the doctors. Zavenyagin was lying in bed. "It seemed he was asleep and would soon rise."We'll venture another guess as to what led to the tragic denouement.Shortly before the New Year, A.P. and his wife received an invitation from N.S. Khrushchev to attend the New Year's celebration on December 31st at the St. George Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace. It's quite possible that Zavenyagin delayed until the last minute, but on the 30th, he finally told Nikita Sergeyevich that his and his wife's seats at table No. 1 would be empty. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers didn't understand, waved him off... And probably ordered: "Be it so..." Zavenyagin apologized again, but replied just as firmly: "I can't..."
>>64316947If we assume that they had managed to argue the day before (and Khrushchev usually didn't hold back his emotions and expressions), then we wouldn't be far off in guessing how tense he was internally. A.P., how much effort it took him to stay "within the bounds."He didn't show it when he returned to work.Perhaps we shouldn't pursue this topic at all, or look for any evidence... but agree with what I.I. Novikov wrote: "The titanic work accomplished by Zavenyagin and Kurchatov could not be accomplished by others even in ten lifetimes. Their lives ended early: Zavenyagin at 56, Kurchatov at 59. They knew that, given the creative intensity in which they lived, and which they would never have agreed to exchange for another, calmer one, the limit was near. At Avraamy Pavlovich's funeral, after we stood in the honor guard, Igor Vasilyevich said to me: 'Now it's my turn—in the next leap year,'" his gaze was thoughtful and clear.They departed this life only when their life's work—the creation of the country's nuclear power—was accomplished; they departed with the sense of duty fulfilled and a job well done. Their heroic deed will not be forgotten."A. P. Zavenyagin: Pages of a Life. — Moscow: PoliMEDia
>>64316950Articles on related topics:Purpose. N. A. Chernoplekov."Scientific delights." Academician M. A. Sadovsky.Years with Kurchatov. Academician A.P. Alexandrov.Star of Khariton. Vladimir Gubarev.Chief designer. A.K. Chernyshev.Academician Alikhanov and the Soviet Atomic Project. Gennady Kiselev.He did not allow his soul to be lazy. E. P. Velikhov.Through the eyes of Arzamas-16 physicists. Yu. B. Khariton, V. B. Adamsky, Yu. A. Romanov, Yu. N. Smirnov.“I have been reduced to the level of a “learned slave...” S. S. Ilizarov.At the forefront of the scientific and technological front. R. I. Ilkaev.Muzrukov. Bohunenko Natalya Nikolaevna. (chapters from the book — the entire file — 600 KB)By chapterMemoirs. Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov. (the entire file — 400 KB)By chapterThe Formation of a Citizen. V. B. Adamsky.For Nuclear Parity. Yu. B. Khariton.A. P. Zavenyagin: Pages of a Life. M. Ya. Vazhnov. (chapters from the book — the entire file — 400 KB)By chapterThe Lion and the Atom. Scientist, Citizen, Thinker."He Lived Not Between Us, but With Us"Academicians of Snezhinsk. Vladimir GubarevFrom the Unpublished. Memories (chapters from the book). Mikhail Aleksandrovich Sadovsky.Friends and Colleagues about Mikhail Aleksandrovich SadovskyThe "Ufa Trace" of the Soviet Atomic Bomb. Yu. V. ErginThe White Archipelago. (chapters from the book) Vladimir Gubarev.Taming the Core. (chapters from the book) I. A. Andryushin, A. K. Chernyshev, Yu. A. Yudin.USSR Nuclear Tests (chapters from the book).On the Creation of the First Domestic Atomic Bomb. G. A. Goncharov, L. D. Ryabev.How the Atomic Problem Was Solved in Our Country. M. G. Pervukhin.A Weapon That Has Exhausted Its Potential. L. P. Feoktistov.Nuclear Weapons Museum.
God, I love these threadsYou could teach like an actual,GOOD university-level history course just from the material here. All praise is due to professor anon
In the process of hunting down my primary sources. I've got two leads. The memoirs of EP Slavsky(I know Kurchatov is a dead end, but Slavsky always comes up, even Legasov knew him he died a month before his country did), and the second source is as far as I can tell the guy who published the 1949 incident publically first.Take a fucking guess. Zhores FUCKING Medvedev himself. I should have known....ok most of you don't know who that is, he's the guy who blew the lid open(pun unintended) on the Kyshtym Disaster in the 70s and told the world what happened there. Bastard apparently did it twice, wunderbal
How badly could the Norky's plausibly fuck up their reactor? It was built in the late 70s/early 80s and is a Magnox design copied from the Calder Hall/Chapelcross 1953-54 design, albeit probably modified a smidge. It's not B Reactor tier, but the Magnox is still a Gen 1 and didn't have the deepest safety margins, and that's not factoring in Nork maintenance and production pressure.
>>64312840>If some hack author wrote a book where a mass murderer appointed a pedophile serial killer to supervise the construction of a top secret nuclear weapons facility which was the cause of two of the top five worst nuclear disasters in history and ended up releasing as much contamination as three Chernobyls over the years I would roll my eyes. And yet Mayak exists.Beria?
>>64316854anon i.....i would tell you how i really feel....
Great thread!
>>64312840I'll probably be dead before we find out about true extent of this type of shit but i would love to have a detailed run down of the horrific chemical and etc dumps and fuck ups russia really has. America managed to pollute the entire fucking planets water to the point where they can find that shit on the top of mountains and in the bloodstreams of uncontacted tribes, and we KNOW about this shit, just IMAGINE the cluster fuck of shit russia has to have done to themselves and by proxy the rest of us in the long run with chemical development and dumping.
>>64317555It's not chemicals but look up the soviet whaling fleet and it's activities for one global scale russian environmental crimeAlso you likely already know but how hard they royally fucked up the water situation in central Asia can't be overstated.The ripple effect is insane.
>>64317555also >>64306482The russkies weren't the only ones. Search how did the US disposed of most of its chemical weapons stockpiles in the 1960s AKA "Operation CHASE" (which stands for "Cut Holes And Sink 'Em"). Russians can probably up that one, but still...
>>64317555Aralsk-7 is (not) your friend.
>>64293591>What about the tiny countries? Any funny things happening?Former Czechoslovakia here. In 1958 ve started building a civilian nuclear powerplant in Slovakia near the town of Jaslovské Bohunice, which took 14 years to finish. Only one block of the original plant became operational, the A1, housing a KS150 reactor, a gas-cooled, heavy-water moderated affair fueled by natural uranium metal, developed under Soviet technical leadership and locally manufactured. The reactor was physically large, bigger than the VVER-1000, and rather low-powered at rouhly 550 MW thermal, 150 MW electric. Layout resembled Magnox reactors with external steam generators.As a pilot project the plant rarely operated at full power, but it's operation was more or less on the uneventful side until January 1976, when a faulty fuel bundle shot out of the reactor during refueling and CO2 coolant flooded the reactor room, suffocating 2 operators.The real fuckup came a year later, in February 1977. The fuel bundles came packed with baggies of dessicant and one of them ripped open, dropping silicagel balls all over the fuel assembly. Folks at the fuel cell workshop vacuumed them, but didn't check the inside well enough and some dessicant was left inside the bundle, partially blocking coolant passages. When inserted into the reactor the fuel bundle experienced severe localized overheating, with some fuel elements melting. The heat buildup eventually burned through the fuel rod channel in the moderator tank, releasing heavy water into the primary coolant loop. (Heavy) water comprimised zirconium cladding on all of the fuel assemblies, fucking everything up and spreading contamination throughout the whole primary loop and to a lesser extent throughout the whole plant (since the steam generators were leaky bitches).Due to the extent of damage and contamination and the fact tha 2 new VVER-400s were being build nearby it was decided not to repair the reactor and decomission it instead.
>>64312794CLEAN IT UP WAGIE
>>64316837Probably figured that saying no would get him shot.
>>64317555There was that time they built twentyfive hundred nuclear thermo reactors to power unmanned outposts and such. Then left them to rot.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NT8-b5YEyjo>>64318263I have an article from 2005 saved on that, but I can't find a copy on-line. I think the current worst part about the US dumping is we litterally don't know where at least half of it was dumped in the first place. At the time the thought was "the solution to pollution is dilution". The ocea is BIG if our stuff gets out of barrels it'll just be diluted and nothing bad will happen. To the US armed forces it was just a matter of taking out the trash. So record keeping was sparse at best. What was dumped included everything from old stockpiles of mustard gas to unlabeled barrels from Oak Ridge. So, yeah. That's some horrifying shit that is litterally just waiting to happen.
>>64318642That's INES-4 for you, BTW.The decomissioning process itself was probably where the real fun begins, as it was pretty sketchy and after the important, high-profile stuff got sorted out, plant managers quickly went full gipsy, burning low-active waste behind the plant "so nobody can see it" and dumping liquid waste from holding tanks into local stream at night, faking water samples and tampering with dosimetry records on the wastewater station.After some out-of-schedule radiation measurement registered 20 to 70 kBq/litre of caesium 137 per litre in plant effluents, the State security (StB, the Secret police if you want) started an investigation into it and found serious violations of radiation safety - disconnected dosimetry equipment, untrained personnel in supervisory roles, leaking liquid waste storage tanks, increased tritium levels in groundwater, excessive soil contamination and, of course, the abovementioned intentional dumping of radioactive wastewater. Plant staff fought tooth and nail to thwart investigation, some ministry officals supported them citing that it's not in the best interest of public to learn about the radiation shenanigans, which is probably the only thing they could agree on with the StB.Then 1990 came and with the dissolution of the StB the investigation got shelved.
>>64318778>we litterally don't know where at least half of it was dumpedI was under the impression that this was intentional and the records were purged so noone could try to pick up some VX from the seabed and go wild...?
>>64318855No, it was "We don't give a shit where it ends up." Also recovering anything from deep water (where things were supposed to end up) no matter the time period, is difficult at best. But was a whole lot harder in the 60's and 70's (when that shit was dumped IIRC) Double also, these dump sites were in territorial waters, so by default they're monitored to an extent that you'd notice if somebody was trying to haul shit off the ocean floor. But it really was mostly a "just get rid of it" mentality. Keep in mind as well a lot, if not most, of the "disposal" was carried out by private contractors who were given a load of obviously horrible waste and told to "dump it here" without any kind of escort. Would YOU want to be in close proximity to military waste/weapons/chemicals/etc for a minute longer than you absolutely had to be? And neither would they. A LOT of that shit got dropped into the water as soon as the captains of those vessels thought they could safely get away with it. So even with marked dumping grounds that should contain certain things, I'm willing to bet at least 1/3 of what should be there is actually somewhere between the marked site and the shore.
Kyle Hill screwed up again, he said Peabody was the highest radiation dose ever when those fucks at Grozny were(and even then I think there’s also another Russian one with more than Peabody). Not the first time>Said Crofut was the only nuclear suicide and ignored the one in Moscow in 1960>Said Chalk River was the first meltdown and ignored Annushka
>>64320210I think a lot of people are ass at checking for Russian sources aside from TCG.Basically every video I’ve seen on the Kyshtym Disaster is super vague on the details and doesn’t mention witness testimony or what happened on site after the blast at all.
>>64320210>Kyle HillIs he worth a shit? He always struck me a very onions-ish mouthpiece kind of guy, if not an outright grifter.
>>64320230He's a memester and he thinks all radiological tech is ackshually super safe.He's funny in a blindingly-oblivious-1950s-optimist kind of way.
>>64319883lollmao evenHave we summoned another accident into being through these threads?
Reactor "diseases">Unforeseen situations began to arise literally within the first hours of the reactor's operation. This was understandable, as fundamentally new technologies and equipment were being developed in a large-scale industrial environment.>During the reactor's first day of operation at design capacity, an accident occurred. Due to insufficient cooling water, the uranium slabs fractured and fused with the graphite stack. This type of accident was known as a "goat.">V. I. Shevchenko was the first to sound the alarm. His instruments, located at the moisture detection platform, registered high levels of radioactivity in the water, approximately three hundred doses above the permissible limit. The reactor was slowed down, and at 12:00 p.m. on June 20th, it was completely shut down after only a few hours of operation.
>>64320516>A dramatic situation was unfolding. On the one hand, the reactor had been proven operational, the enormous efforts of hundreds of thousands of people had paid off, but on the other, the apparatus had been disabled within the first few hours. What was to be done? Immediately after Beria's victory report, the first major problem was reported. Beria, the only Politburo member with a technical background, immediately recognized the danger of the situation. When B. L. Vannikov asked, "When will the reactor be operational?" he couldn't give a definitive answer.>Everyone capable of making a difference was immediately called to a meeting. Everyone acknowledged that the technology and tools for dealing with such an accident were lacking. Both would have to be developed as the emergency response progressed.>They tried burning out the uranium blocks and dissolving the aluminum cladding and pipe with alkali, followed by drilling with hollow-core drills. However, this method was ineffective. The reactor plant team's frantic, round-the-clock work for three weeks proved ineffective. The consequences of the accident—the destroyed uranium blocks—could not be recovered. Furthermore, all emergency operations were conducted under conditions of elevated gamma radiation levels and high concentrations of radioactive aerosols, resulting in overexposure of personnel and radioactive contamination of the building housing the reactor.>Under continuous pressure from Beria, I. V. Kurchatov gave the order to bring the reactor to full power, without completely eliminating the consequences of the first accident.
>>64320536>But misfortunes never come alone. On July 25, the thirty-sixth day of startup, the same accident occurred—the sintering of uranium blocks with graphite. This time, they decided not to shut down the reactor, but to eliminate the accident while the unit was still running.>The work areas could not be cleaned of radioactive contamination. All attempts to clean the linoleum and Mettlach tiles were unsuccessful. After replacing them several times without resolving the problem, the floor was covered with stainless steel. This achieved the desired effect. The floors began to be cleaned of radioactive contamination.>The second "goat" was eliminated based on the experience of the first accident, but this did not reduce the difficulties. To reduce the release of radioactive aerosols and uranium-containing dust into the air and to accelerate the cooling of the cutting tool, water was pumped into the accident site. As a result, the graphite stack was exposed to unacceptable moisture. Contact between the wet graphite and the pipes (process channels) containing the uranium slabs led to massive corrosion of the metal. Water began to flood the graphite stack.>It was impossible to continue working like this. Superhuman effort, dedication, and even conscious self-sacrifice while working in the reactor's powerful radiation fields could not stop the reactor's growing "disease." On January 20, 1949, the apparatus was sent for major repairs. But by this time, they had already produced enough plutonium for an atomic bomb.Goat is Russian slang for fuel melting just FYI
>>64320540>During the overhaul of the first reactor, a serious problem arose. As we've already mentioned, the unanodized tubes were corroded and needed to be replaced with new ones, coated with anti-corrosion coating. However, they contained thousands of uranium slugs, which needed to be irradiated with neutrons for some time to extract plutonium. These slugs could have been unloaded the usual way—from the top. However, this inevitably led to mechanical damage to the aluminum casings of the uranium slugs, making their reuse impossible.
>>64320553>The country didn't have enough uranium to load the reactor again. Every uranium slab had to be conserved, and now thousands were effectively being thrown away. The already partially irradiated and highly radioactive uranium slabs had to be preserved at all costs. In this case, there was only one way: using special suction cups, thirty-nine thousand uranium slabs were pulled out of the pipes. Everyone involved in the operation was severely overexposed. This could have been avoided, but then the nuclear reactor would have been shut down for at least a year. This could have effectively ruined the uranium project. Inevitably, repressions and a search for "enemies of the people" would have begun... A large number of technological violations and accidents led to chronic overexposure. During the first year of the reactor's operation, personnel often worked without dosimeters. Yefim Pavlovich Slavsky himself, as well as other production managers, did just that. It's important to keep in mind that the instruments didn't detect all types of radiation. For example, neutron radiation, very powerful in the reactor, could not be detected at that time because it had no electrical discharge, and all dosimetry instruments operated based on the electrical effect. Even so, in 1949, according to documented dosimetry data, almost a third of those working at the plant received an annual radiation dose of over 100 rem, compared to the then-accepted annual dose of approximately 30 rem. One can imagine what these doses were for those working without a dosimeter... A significant portion of the radiation load in 1949 was received by Annushka workers during major repairs.
>>64320558>On March 26, 1949, after the repairs were completed, the reactor began to gain power.>On December 1, 1946, construction began on a radiochemical plant (Object B), in conjunction with a radioactive waste storage facility (Object C), which later became infamous due to the 1957 accident.>During the first months, this construction project seemed to be on the periphery of Moscow's leadership, overshadowed by the builders and installers' struggle to quickly launch the first industrial nuclear reactor. The scope of work here was initially small. Until mid-summer 1947, construction of the radiochemical complex was carried out by the same first construction district as Annushki.>The pace of construction increased daily, with the construction of Building 101 and the installation of equipment proceeding simultaneously. As O. S. Rybakova recalls, as soon as the floor was laid at a certain level, the installers immediately began installing the equipment and laying the lines.>The enormous building, housing the technological equipment vertically, was constructed of solid reinforced concrete. However, the builders experienced no shortage of rebar or concrete. They were supplied to the site continuously. Initial delays in schedule were overcome.
>>64320562>As always, disaster struck unexpectedly. One of the largest structures at Site B was a reinforced concrete pipe, over one hundred and fifty meters tall. Concreting was carried out using alumina cement in slipform. A concrete mixing plant operated at the base of the pipe. Metal scaffolding was located inside the pipe for lifting people and materials. Due to severe frosts, a greenhouse was erected to protect the construction workers from frost and wind while the pipe was being extended.>One freezing day, the builders rushed to raise the formwork again before the concrete had fully hardened. The formwork failed to withstand a strong gust of wind. The Teplyak tipped sharply to one side at a height of 143 meters. Several people fell to their deaths. Only one remained hanging by his arm, pinned by the metal structure. A surgeon was brought to him. Risking his life, he sawed off the arm, saving the victim's life.>The consequences of the accident had to be dealt with immediately. No brave climbers were found among the civilians. Generals Chernyshov and Tsarevsky appealed to the prisoners to restore the greenhouse. They promised that the team that did so would be immediately released, regardless of their sentence. Brave craftsmen were found. Within a few days, everything was restored, and the concrete pipe was laid on time. The generals kept their word: all those involved in this operation were released early.>At that time, our industry was not yet capable of producing metals resistant to highly aggressive environments. Therefore, in some sections of the process chain, equipment, valves, and pipelines were made of silver. The most critical equipment was made of platinum, and the pipes and valves were made of pure gold.
>>64320572>In late August 1948, testing of the apparatus and training in remote control skills began. In the early days, it was difficult to believe the automation would operate flawlessly. After turning on a valve from the control panel, the technicians rushed down to the elevation to verify with their own eyes that the valve had actually opened.>The design of the equipment, the locations of the lines and valves, numbering in the tens of hundreds, had to be memorized forever. Anyone who failed to memorize all this during the test run paid dearly during plant operation. Several operations were conducted on unirradiated uranium. The goal was to thoroughly master the technological process and the operation of the equipment. Difficulties abounded. It turned out that some processes were no longer functioning as they had in the pilot plant.>However, the difficulties of mastering the newly installed equipment were not only technological. M.V. Gladyshev recalls that October–December 1948 remained etched in his memory as the most difficult months of preparation and commissioning the plant.>The regime's demands were unusually strict, and the control bodies themselves didn't know what needed to be kept secret and what wasn't. For example, a silent diagram with the machine's number was drawn on the control panel. One of the authoritative controllers, wearing trousers with red stripes, saw the numbers on the diagram and demanded they be removed, claiming that the machine's number could be used to determine its quantity and production volume. His demand was complied with, and work became even more difficult.
>>64320576>Operating technology blindly is not easy, especially at night, when fatigue sets in and attention wanes. The security forces, headed by Beria, were extremely strict, bordering on recklessness. A guard stood at every entrance to the department and demanded a pass, asking for a first name, patronymic, and last name while holding the pass upright. This happened many times during a shift, and in emergency situations, it brought the female operators and shift supervisor G.N. Zyryanova to tears and hysterics. After extensive negotiations, this security procedure was abolished, and then the guards were removed altogether. >On December 22, 1948, products from the nuclear reactor arrived at the radiochemical plant.>All Base-10 management gathered in the launch control room. Representatives from the project and scientific institutes were present. The technological process was supervised by B.V. Gromov and A.P. Ratner. Shift supervisor Zoya Arkhipovna Zverkova supervised the process. The process lasted approximately eighteen hours, and Zverkova remained at the control panel the entire time.>There was a special, solemn atmosphere. Everyone spoke in hushed tones. The startup was not without its surprises: the rush and tension were evident. M.V. Gladyshev recounts that unexpected events began from the very first days. When the sedimentation was carried out, no sedimentation occurred. They spent a long time searching for the cause, worried, throwing up their hands, unable to answer the high-ranking officials with their general's stripes. Only when they saw a yellow liquid leaking from the cracks of the exhaust ventilation did they realize that all the solution had been forced into the blow-off valve, which was connected to the ventilation duct. During the water test, the air supply had been improperly adjusted, and when it was supplied in large excess during the sedimentation, it carried all the slurry into the blow-off valve.
>>64320579>After some squabbling and a new adjustment, they washed away the sediment as best they could, but in the process, they significantly contaminated the room with radiation. People were walking around in their regular clothes and shoes (though wearing galoshes), spreading the "dirt" throughout the premises. They redid the blowdown and repeated the precipitation process with a new batch.>The process seemed to go smoothly. But when they obtained the first plutonium solution, they discovered there was no plutonium in it (almost none). Everyone was scrambling again, repeating analyses, meetings, and discussions began. When they realized what 200 grams of plutonium represented and the volumes and containers in which it had been processed, they began to hope that it had simply settled on the walls of the vessels. And so it turned out.>Only after the surface layers of the apparatus and pipelines had been saturated with plutonium did it appear in solutions and at the final stages of processing. Naturally, anticipating its appearance was difficult, especially for the management, when Beria's staff was on standby. Perseverance prevailed.>The development of radiochemical production was a difficult endeavor—processes carried out in test tubes simply wouldn't work in real solutions or large apparatus. Along the way, not only technical but also research challenges had to be addressed. So many questions arose that scientific directors A.P. Ratner and B.A. Nikitin, chief engineer B.V. Gromov, chief mechanic M.E. Sopelnyak, and department heads A.F. Pashchenko and N.S. Chugreev spent days at a time working at the plant.
>>64320582Chief instrument engineer S. B. Tsfasman carried out extensive technical and organizational work: He not only debugged instruments under difficult conditions with his own hands, but also, when necessary, invented new ones based on unusual physical effects.The main burden fell on the operators, machine operators, and on-duty engineers: hard work combined with enormous psychological stress (when a mistake could cost dearly) exhausted people; the period of getting into working mode was very difficult, and the plant workers did not spare themselves: rarely did anyone go home when the shift ended; they usually stayed to make sure the process was running smoothly.Another crucial point must be taken into account: everything took place under conditions of exposure to ionizing radiation. The pioneers were exposed to a powerful radiation attack immediately after the launch.Ionizing radiation is imperceptible to the senses - radiation is invisible, has neither color nor smell.The lack of reliable dosimetric monitoring complicated matters considerably—there were no devices capable of recording various types of radiation; they were still being developed, and if they existed, they were in small quantities and experimental designs. We had to create our own, which, while not perfect, still allowed us to get a sense of the radiation dose.The plant, designed according to general chemical engineering principles, failed to meet safety requirements in its layout and technical solutions. Not only the designers, but also the scientific directors and authors of the technology, due to their "test tube" mentality, failed to grasp the full danger of radiation exposure to humans during the organization of plutonium production on an industrial scale.
>>64320588>One of the most significant drawbacks was the multi-story layout of the main building. With this layout, the movement of solutions from apparatus to apparatus, from lower to upper floors, necessitated the use of compressed air, which increased the risk of misdirection when transferring solutions under pressure. Unfortunately, this happened repeatedly.>In the event of an emergency, radioactive solution that had been “misdirected” could leak through the floors and appear in the most unexpected places, exposing personnel to severe radiation.>There were plenty of other shortcomings: pipes containing radioactive solution were installed without protection in areas where people were present, and the design of the apparatus proved to be unrepairable under radioactive conditions.>According to Gladyshev, these design flaws were not due to negligence, but rather to ignorance, a lack of operational experience, and a laboratory mindset. Back then, no one had any idea how the plant would operate, how to make it safe to operate, or how to prevent personnel from being overexposed. Everything was being done for the first time. Leading specialists, doctors of science, and academics were constantly on site, but even they underestimated the treacherous nature of radiochemical technology.
>>64320593>A crucial period in the plant's life had come to an end. At the end of February 1949, the first finished product was obtained and immediately sent for further processing to Facility "B." There, the plutonium was completely purified of impurities, producing metallic plutonium, an atomic explosive.>For the construction of facility "B," from the seven options proposed by the special commission, A.P. Zavenyagin approved a site on which several brick buildings, a network of dirt roads, and a railway line from the Tatysh siding were located.>In September 1947, the design brief was submitted to the First Chief Directorate for review, after which the designers began drafting the project. However, the design process was difficult. The equipment had to be developed, its layout determined, and the structural design determined, all before the technological principles had been fully established.>Their development proceeded at an accelerated pace alongside the design, but there were more than enough problems at first. To address these, scientists from the Institute of General and Inorganic Chemistry of the USSR Academy of Sciences, led by its director, Academician Ilya Ilyich Chernyaev, were brought in. They began developing the technological principles for producing spectrally pure plutonium, followed by laboratory testing at Research Institute 9. Liya Pavlovna Sokhina, a graduate of Voronezh University and a staff member from Base 10 who had been sent on an internship to Moscow, also participated in this work.>Once the technology for fine purification of plutonium in laboratory conditions was mastered, its creators went to Kyshtym.>Construction of the chemical and metallurgical plant, Facility B, was far from complete. In March 1948, a decision was made to establish pilot production in a building previously used as an ammunition depot.
>>64320603>The temporary production facilities were intended not only to begin processing and manufacturing the product but also to test various process options on large quantities and select the optimal one. Thus, while work on Workshop No. 1 was underway, reconstruction of Building No. 9 began.>The renovated Building No. 9 was equipped like a typical chemistry lab: wooden fume hoods and simple lab benches. However, the portable "equipment" consisted of platinum beakers, gold funnels, and platinum filters. All operations were performed manually, with no mechanization. There were no special devices for working with radioactive substances. Much remained to be understood, much to be grasped through sweat, blood, and loss.>The first "product"—plutonium concentrate, pre-purified from the bulk of uranium and fission products at Plant 25—was received for reprocessing on February 26, 1949, at 12:00 a.m. The first batch was accepted by shop foreman Ya. A. Filiptsev, head of the chemical department I. P. Martynov, in the presence of B. G. Muzrukov, G. V. Mishenkov, and Academician I. I. Chernyaev.>The solutions were delivered by truck in metal containers and then poured into "glasses" (for which I. I. Chernyaev called this period of operation of the chemical department of Building No. 9 "glass-like"). Further operations were then carried out in these "glasses.">The team faced complex challenges: as a result of research conducted in Moscow on milligram quantities of the actual product, two options were developed (and we know that when several options are proposed, none of them are absolute).
>>64320609>The initial choice was made in favor of the one that yielded a higher quality final product. Later, Slavsky organized a research group led by A.D. Gelman, including P.E. Bykova, L.P. Sokhina, E.A. Smirnova, and others. Having tested the second option, they not only resolved the dispute in favor of the first but also developed recommendations for increasing the plutonium yield.>Mastering the process was difficult. Matters were further complicated by the frequent delivery of substandard product from Plant No. 25, and the large number of impurities complicated the refinement process. The extremely tight deadlines further exacerbated the situation.>The first shift supervisors in the chemistry department were graduates of Gorky and Voronezh Universities: F. A. Zakharova, A. S. Kostryukova, M. Ya. Trubchaninova, and A. A. Bystrova. The first operations were carried out by engineers T. I. Nikolaeva, N. I. Skryabina, L. P. Turdazova, L. P. Zenkovich, and Z. G. Modenova.>"Analyzing the early days of the nuclear plant decades later," reflects L.P. Sokhina, "one can definitely say that while reactor production and plutonium metallurgy were mastered and advanced by men (female physicists and metallurgists were few), the chemical technology of separating plutonium from irradiated uranium blocks and purifying it to spectrally pure form was shouldered primarily by women, young girls. It must be said, however, that the chemists were tasked with the most thankless, the dirtiest, and the most hazardous work.">Often, scientists themselves took over the apparatus operators' jobs, trying to get to the bottom of the problems that arose.
>>64320613Unexpected events lurked at every turn: plutonium oxalate would burst into flames in the drying oven, peroxide precipitates would decompose, ejecting the solution from the beaker, or the plutonium oxalate would simply refuse to settle. Technologists were allowed to consult with the scientists at any time of day or night in the "academicians' house," fortunately located a hundred meters from Building No. 9. A. A. Bochvar, I. I. Chernyaev, A. D. Gelman, V. D. Nikolsky, and A. N. Volsky were kind mentors to the young workers, treating all the shop workers in a comradely manner, without any overbearing tone.There were also accidents, one of which occurred during M. Ya. Trubchaninova's shift during the processing of metallurgical slag. L. P. Sokhina and L. E. Drabkina, under the supervision of I. I. Chernyaev, were developing a technology for extracting plutonium from slag.
>>64320624>The slags were crushed, treated with water to remove calcium and barium salts from the precipitate, and the black precipitate was filtered. It was then to be dissolved in sulfuric acid. It was noticed that as the precipitate dried, it began to spark when stirred with a glass rod. Upon learning of this, Chernyaev recommended carefully transferring the wet precipitate to a quartz flask, calcining it in a bale of carbon dioxide, and only then working with it. Careful transfer of the wet precipitate to the calcining vessel was successful. Half of the black precipitate was transferred to the flask and calcined to plutonium dioxide in a stream of carbon dioxide, which was used to reduce the oxygen concentration. Ya. A. Filiptsev suggested to technologist A. V. Elkina that, after grinding the clumps of precipitate, they should load it into the flask in large portions. While grinding, an explosion occurred. The fume hood caught fire. Hot particles of the substance scattered throughout the room, covering the walls and ceilings with a green residue. Particles of the product rained down on the heads of those present like grains. Ya. A. Filiptsev received a sludge in his eye, and A. V. Yelkina suffered burns to her hands. >Donning gas masks, A. A. Bochvar and I. P. Martynov meticulously removed all the plutonium solution from the walls, ceiling, and the remains of the fume hood using filter paper. Several containers of filter paper containing varying amounts of plutonium had to be burned, and the product extracted from the ashes.>A month and a half of intense work under difficult conditions yielded results: the purification technology was refined and made it possible to obtain spectrally pure plutonium dioxide, from which metallic plutonium was obtained on April 16 in the metallurgical department under the leadership of A. A. Bochvar and A. N. Volsky, with the participation of V. A. Karlov, N. Ya. Ermolaev, and V. S. Nosov.I'll b back with morelater pls reply
There was an NRC list of the worst nuclear accidents in civilian power post TMI in the US ranked. Can’t find it, but I think the worst was one of the Davis-Besse ones. (They’re all INES-3).Couldn’t find an official ranking of Pre-TMI ones, but if you exclude the experimental prototypes like (SRE or Fermi) I think it might be that one that had a control room fire? Not sure
Nikolai Antonovich was once asked: “Why did Kurchatov choose you as the chief designer of the first reactor for producing plutonium for the atomic bomb?”I told Kurchatov I didn't understand anything about physics. Igor Vasilyevich replied, "Nonsense! You've worked at the molecular level, and you'll work at the atomic level too." "I've seen many leaders in my time, but I don't remember one like Kurchatov. He was a very intelligent, highly decent man who never raised his voice. Everyone respected him, and many envied him. I think Kapitsa was envious, too. It's just a theory that he left the atomic project because he wanted to work exclusively on peaceful issues. He didn't want to play second fiddle."During Nikolai Antonovich Dollezhal's visit to Laboratory No. 2, Kurchatov proposed a horizontal arrangement of the uranium "blocks" in the F-1 reactor. Materials sent by Soviet intelligence officers working on the US Manhattan Project indicated that it was in reactors with horizontally arranged fuel channels that the Americans obtained the plutonium for their first atomic bombs.NII KhimMash designers rejected the horizontal nuclear reactor design and proposed their own vertical design. At a meeting of the Scientific and Technical Council, they demonstrated its advantages over the American one.In January 1946, the design of the country's first nuclear reactor began at NIIkhimmash, a project developed in four months. Working drawings of the reactor and the main materials from design institutes were coordinated with Kurchatov and, once approved, accepted for production at the plants. Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov visited NIIkhimmash every three to four days and thoroughly reviewed the design process. This allowed him to make timely adjustments to the workflow.
>>64321065>Reactor A was initially intended to operate for three years. However, the operational safety margins and reliability of the equipment incorporated into the design of the reactor's main components, taking into account subsequent upgrades, allowed the reactor's capacity to be increased by 5.3 times and its operation to last 38.5 years.>The A1 nuclear reactor was a highly complex engineering structure of its time.>The following were installed: 5,000 tons of metal structures and equipment, 230 km of pipelines of various diameters, 165 km of electrical cable, 5,745 units of shut-off and control valves, and 3,800 devices.>The reactor core consisted of graphite columns shaped like vertical cylinders 9.2 meters in diameter and 9.2 meters in height. These columns, in turn, were composed of 600 mm tall graphite blocks with a 200 x 200 mm cross-section. A central hole with a diameter of 44 mm was drilled throughout the graphite block's entire height. The total weight of the graphite stack was 1,050 tons. The graphite columns, installed around the columns containing the process channels, acted as lateral reflectors. The graphite stack rested on a steel cylindrical box-shaped structure into which the process channel pipes, control and protection channels, were welded. The stack was surrounded by a 1.3 m wide annular tank filled with running water. The graphite stack was capped by an upper protective cylindrical box-shaped metal structure supported by the lateral protection tank. Pipes for the passage of process channels and channels of the reactor control and protection system were welded into the upper metal structure.>The design and dimensions of the reactor's biological shield allowed for direct maintenance of the reactor during full-power operation. Control and emergency protection drives were adopted for reactor control.
>>64321068>The 1,124 process pipes running through the reactor's masonry were made of aluminum alloy with a diameter of 43 mm and a wall thickness of 1 mm. Three ribs ran along the inner surface of the pipes along their entire length. The ribs of the process pipes ensured that the "blocks" were spaced from the pipe walls to ensure uniform cooling of the working blocks with water.>The process tubes are designed to hold the working "blocks." Each "block" is made of a uranium rod covered with an aluminum alloy sheath. The working block is 102 mm long and 35 mm in diameter.>Seventy-four blocks were loaded into a single process channel. To position the blocks at a given height within the core, cylindrical aluminum blocks were pre-loaded into the process channels. These served as supports for the working blocks and were positioned near the pipes and ducts of the lower metal structure.>Loading and unloading of the "blocks" was to be carried out while the reactor was operating. Unloading devices were installed beneath the reactor. Each channel was equipped with a shutoff device at the top, allowing the "blocks" to be loaded into the process channel through it.>The reactor's upper containment was located 9.3 meters below ground level. Three-meter-thick concrete walls were built around the reactor, filled with large water tanks. The water used to cool the reactor was taken from the lake and returned to it without drainage, contaminating the lake with radioactive products. The total water flow rate was 2,500 m3/hour. The water temperature at the reactor outlet was 85-90 degrees Celsius.
>>64321073>In the first months of 1946, new access roads were laid and the construction site was prepared. Excavation of foundation pits began in the summer. Major General Yakov Davidovich Rapoport, who had been responsible for the construction of the White Sea-Baltic Canal in the 1930s, was put in charge of the construction. The construction project he oversaw became a tragic chapter in history due to the unnecessary deaths of over 10,000 prisoners working on it. The village of Chelyabinsk-40 was also built by prisoners, with at least 70,000 people working there at any one time.>In August 1946, active work began on digging a pit for the future reactor, the vertical design of which required a depth of 54 meters.>In April 1947, excavation work on the pit was completed. The final depth of the lowest point was 53 meters. Eleven thousand diggers were involved in the final stage of rock excavation. A total of 157,000 cubic meters of soil were removed. Manually, with minimal mechanization, a pit of unprecedented size was excavated over seven winter months. In July 1947, by order of Deputy Minister of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs V.V. Chernyshov, to incentivize prisoner labor, 100 grams of vodka was authorized once every five days for meeting production quotas. Guard riflemen, for those whose teams met their quotas, received a 20% pay increase. Failure to complete shift assignments resulted in the guards losing their bonus pay, prisoners losing their vodka, and civilian workers remaining at the facility for up to five days in barracks.>In July 1947, the shaft's concreting work was completed to the ±0 level, with 82,000 cubic meters of reinforced concrete laid and 6,000 tons of rebar installed. This was the first time "heavy" concrete was used, with iron ore added to the filler to improve biological protection.
>>64321077>In early 1948 , Kurchatov arrived in Chelyabinsk-40 to oversee the reactor assembly. The plutonium production reactor was named "Ustanovka A," or "Annushka." It was located in an 18-meter-deep pit, over which a tall structure was erected. Reactor assembly began in March 1948. Addressing the engineers, Kurchatov quoted Pushkin's poem "The Bronze Horseman." This poem famously recounts how Peter the Great founded a great city on the banks of the Neva "to spite a haughty neighbor." The poem was referring to Sweden. "We still have plenty of haughty neighbors," Kurchatov said.>In the spring of 1948, Stalin realized that he would not have an atomic bomb in the near future – the two-year period he had allotted for the “uranium project” had long since expired.
>>64321087>Stalin was furious; he believed that only the possession of atomic weapons by the USSR would secure its status as a superpower, and that the Soviet Union was once again defenseless, as it had been in 1941, but this time against the US atomic bomb. Academician Ioffe, naturally, did not remind Stalin that at a session of the Academy of Sciences in 1936, the Leningrad Physicotechnical Institute, which he headed, had been harshly criticized "for being disconnected from the practical needs of socialist construction." In the late 1930s, L.D. Landau and V.A. Fock were arrested. S.P. Shubin, A.A. Witt, and M.P. Bronstein perished in camps. In 1938, the "Trotskyists" in the Physics Department of Moscow State University were crushed. Fearing Stalin's terror, the outstanding young physicist G.A. Gamow did not return home from a foreign assignment. For several years, P. L. Kapitsa, a future Nobel laureate and a favorite student of the great E. Rutherford, was unable to work due to severe depression caused by government persecution. B. M. Gessen and I. E. Tamm, employees of the Physics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences (FIAN), were mercilessly obstructed. Five days after Germany invaded the USSR, 30 employees of the Ioffe Institute volunteered or were mobilized to join the army, and a month later their number had increased to 130. The institute was reorganized, prioritizing defense projects, in which the institute was already involved. Kurchatov was forced to abandon his work on nuclear fission, and his laboratory was disbanded. Some of its equipment was transported to Kazan, where the Ioffe Institute was evacuated. The rest, including the unfinished cyclotron, remained in Leningrad. Kurchatov joined Anatoly Alexandrov's group to work on the problem of protecting ships from magnetic mines.
>>64321094>The all-powerful Marshal Beria now knew that his fate, too, hung in the balance. Lavrenty Pavlovich ordered that he be briefed daily on the progress of the "A" nuclear reactor. Any downtime of more than two hours for the installers, as well as any equipment shortfalls, were to be considered an "emergency.">Mistakes were punished severely, sometimes mercilessly. Vannikov was famous for this. In one famous case, engineer Abramzon, who made a mistake while installing equipment, was sent straight from the workshop to the camp located right there, outside the walls of Building A. Vannikov confiscated the unfortunate man's pass and said, "You're not Abramzon, you're Abram in the zone," and that was enough to land him in prison for many years.>Under the supervision of the project's scientific director, Kurchatov and Vannikov, who had headed the People's Commissariat of Ammunition since 1942, uranium "slugs" in aluminum casings were loaded into the reactor. Several hundred tons of uranium were delivered to the plant, of which approximately 100 tons had been shipped from Germany in 1945.>On June 7, 1948, Kurchatov began the reactor's physical startup. During the night, the reactor's power output rose to ten kilowatts. Igor Vasilyevich suppressed the chain reaction and shut down the reactor, making it clear that Annushka was operational.
>>64321100>Operations began two days later. A week later, Kurchatov made the following entry in the operations log: "To shift supervisors! I warn you that if the water supply is interrupted, there will be an explosion. Therefore, under no circumstances should the water supply be interrupted.... It is necessary to monitor the water level in the emergency tanks and the operation of the pumping stations." The water from the reactor returned so hot that within a few seasons, the lake had completely changed. The water in the lake never froze, even in the harshest winters. It was always steamy, and frost reigned, creating absolutely incredible patterns. Foxes lurked along the banks, waiting for the ducks and geese that flocked to the warm water.>Did Igor Vasilyevich really foresee Chernobyl?! After all, the first Annushka reactor was the prototype for the RBMK-1000 reactor. Unfortunately, he was unable to prevent the disaster in 1986, despite warning about it back in the summer of 1948. Incidentally, the nuclear scientists committed a crime by leaving the RBMK-1000 reactor at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant without proper cooling.>On June 19, 1948, the USSR's first uranium-graphite industrial nuclear reactor, "A," for producing weapons-grade plutonium, reached full capacity. By this time, it had already accumulated several micrograms of plutonium. A victory report was immediately sent to Moscow. Beria reported the success to Stalin. At the time, he was still unaware that the first accident had occurred.
>>64321100>Mistakes were punished severely, sometimes mercilessly. Vannikov was famous for this. In one famous case, engineer Abramzon, who made a mistake while installing equipment, was sent straight from the workshop to the camp located right there, outside the walls of Building A. Vannikov confiscated the unfortunate man's pass and said, "You're not Abramzon, you're Abram in the zone," and that was enough to land him in prison for many years.NEED need need a chudjak edit of this
>>64321111>>64321111 (You)>In June, the reactor began operating, but unexpected problems arose. Severe corrosion of the aluminum casing of the fuel began. An even more serious problem was swelling of the fuel causing folds and protrusions to form on the uranium surface. Beria's representatives suspected sabotage, but Kurchatov stated that unexpected behavior of materials in strong neutron fields was entirely to be expected. One of the most severe types of accidents was the so-called "goats," when the reactor cooling pipes melted and ruptured, sintering the uranium fuel rods with graphite. This accident occurred within the first day of the reactor's operation.>Instruments located at the moisture detection site registered high levels of radioactivity in the water, approximately 300 doses above the permissible limit. The reactor was slowed down, and at 12:00 PM on June 20th, it was completely shut down after only a few hours of operation.>A dramatic situation was unfolding. What was to be done? Immediately after Beria's report of the successful launch, the first major problem was reported. Beria realized the danger. B. L. Vannikov, when asked, "When will the reactor be operational?", couldn't give a definitive answer.>Everyone who could make a difference was immediately called to a meeting. Everyone acknowledged that the technology and tools to deal with such an accident were lacking.>They tried burning off the uranium "blocks" and dissolving the aluminum cladding and pipe with alkali, followed by drilling with hollow drills. However, this method was ineffective. The reactor plant team's round-the-clock, feverish work over three weeks proved ineffective. The fused uranium "blocks" could not be extracted.>All emergency operations were carried out under conditions of elevated gamma radiation levels and high concentrations of radioactive aerosols, which resulted in personnel exposure and radioactive contamination of the building where the reactor was located.
>>64321149>Under continuous pressure from Beria, Kurchatov gives the order to bring the reactor to full power, without completely eliminating the consequences of the first accident.>On July 25, 1948, thirty-six days into the launch, the uranium blocks fused with graphite again. This time, it was decided not to shut down the reactor and to eliminate the accident while the unit was still running.>The second "goat" was eliminated based on the experience of the first accident, but this did not reduce the difficulties. To reduce the release of radioactive aerosols and uranium-containing dust into the air, as well as to accelerate the cooling of the cutting tool, water was pumped into the accident site. As a result, the graphite stack was exposed to unacceptable moisture. Contact between the wet graphite and the pipes (process channels) containing the uranium "blocks" led to massive corrosion of the metal. Water began to flood the graphite stack.>Kurchatov, Slavsky, and everyone else on the Annushka unit at the time received enormous doses. It was impossible to continue working like that. Inhuman exertion, dedication, and even conscious self-sacrifice while working in the reactor's powerful radiation fields could not stop the reactor's growing "disease.">The operating team had no experience operating such dangerous equipment and had to learn on the fly through trial and error. Furthermore, the equipment was constantly exposed to very powerful radiation fields, which often dramatically altered the properties of materials and posed a direct threat to human health and life.>Technological violations and accidents led to overexposure. During the reactor's first year of operation, personnel often worked without dosimeters. Maintenance personnel were entitled to 100 grams of alcohol per person as "radiation protection." After completing their tasks, workers were always in a hurry to sign the documents to receive the coveted 100 grams.
>>64321152>Kurchatov's biographies omit the events of early 1949 altogether. Accidents at the industrial reactor are reported with the coded phrase: "Not everything always went smoothly, as usually happens in new endeavors." Certainly, it was the radiation exposures, of which there were several, that dramatically shortened Kurchatov's life. In the 1950s, he rapidly weakened physically, was frequently ill, and died in 1960 at the age of 57. But his name will remain in the history of Russian civilization. Thanks to his dedicated work, a nuclear war has never occurred on Earth.>Interior Ministry General Zavenyagin, who oversaw the prisoners' work, which also took place in shifts, was also exposed to radiation. He died in 1956 at the age of 55. The most severely affected was B.A. Nikitin, the head of the radiochemical plant's startup, who also participated in the "defect detection" of uranium blocks. The defective blocks were sent to the sector of the "facility" he supervised. He developed a more acute form of radiation sickness, which became chronic, and he died in 1952 at the age of 46.>In late 1948, massive leaks in process channels and wetting of the graphite stack began. The aluminum tubes installed in the reactor had not had their surfaces anodized during the first load. When water entered the graphite stack, the graphite-water-aluminum contact triggered intense corrosion. Operation of the reactor with these tubes became impossible.
>>64321159>On January 20, 1949, the reactor was shut down for major repairs. A complex problem arose: how to replace the fuel channels while preserving all the valuable uranium "slugs." The uranium "slugs" could be unloaded through a designed unloading system. However, as they passed down the fuel channel into the spent fuel pool, mechanical damage to the slug cladding could occur, preventing their reloading into the reactor. At that time, there was no spare uranium load available. These already partially irradiated and highly radioactive uranium "slugs" had to be preserved.>Uranium "blocks" remained in the reactor's fuel channels. They had to be removed at any cost, as the country simply didn't have enough uranium for the reactor's second load. So the chief mechanic's office developed special "suction cups" that allowed the uranium blocks to be extracted upward, into the reactor's central chamber.>This operation could not be avoided without exposing the participants to radiation. A choice had to be made: either shut down the reactor for a long period, which Yuli Borisovich Khariton estimated at one year, or save the uranium load and reduce losses in plutonium production.>The reactor, which had reached full power in June 1948, was shut down approximately halfway through its cycle. According to its creators' calculations, the 150 tons of uranium loaded into it contained enough plutonium to manufacture the first Soviet nuclear plutonium bomb, which the government decided was to test by the end of 1949.
>>64321161>To address the consequences of the accident, the reactor had to be completely dismantled, 39,000 uranium "slugs" removed, 150 tons of uranium refueled, and the "slugs" coated with anodized aluminum, which was more resistant to the powerful neutron flux and urgently manufactured by aircraft industry factories. Refuelling the reactor could only be done manually. Thousands of workers were needed, and lethal radiation exposure—both external and internal (through the lungs)—was inevitable. Neither respirators nor dosimeters were yet in use.>A choice was faced: either avoid endangering people or save the uranium load and reduce losses in plutonium production. The leadership of the First Main Directorate (PGU) and the scientific director made the second decision – to save the uranium load. This was a joint decision by L.P. Beria, B.G. Vannikov, the head of the PGU, his deputy A.P. Zavenyagin, and I.V. Kurchatov. The entire process of removing 39,000 uranium slabs from the reactor – 150 tons of the reactor's uranium filling – took 34 days. Each "slab" required visual inspection...>In the recorded memoirs of Yefim Pavlovich Slavsky, who served as the chief engineer of the damaged reactor in 1949 (from 1947 to 1949, Slavsky served as chief engineer and deputy director of Combine No. 817, now the Mayak Production Association – Ed.), it is stated: "The task of salvaging the uranium load and producing plutonium was being solved at the highest cost – through the inevitable irradiation of personnel. From that hour on, the entire male personnel of the facility, including thousands of prisoners, underwent the operation of removing pipes (including partially damaged 'blocks'). In total, 39,000 uranium 'blocks' were removed and manually processed."
>>64321163>Kurchatov was the first to step into the nuclear inferno, into the central hall of the damaged reactor, completely gassed with radionuclides. He led the operation to unload the damaged channels and inspect the unloaded uranium slabs individually.>"This epic was monstrous," recalled three-time Hero of Socialist Labor Yefim Pavlovich Slavsky, the future Minister of the USSR's Atomic Industry. He recounted how Kurchatov sat at his desk in the hall, with irradiated uranium "blocks" stacked nearby. Kurchatov inspected them. "If he had sat there until he sorted everything, he could have died.">Thousands of prisoners carried out the bulk of the work dismantling the reactor's "blocks." Several camps surrounded the "facility," housing mostly former Ostarbeiters, Soviet citizens repatriated from Germany, as well as military construction workers (also effectively prisoners), and soldiers, mostly from penal battalions—they weren't demobilized after the war, but were sent to work on secret construction projects.
>>64321168>On March 26, 1949, Annushka began producing plutonium again...>First and foremost, reactor shutdowns had to be minimized. Initially, they numbered in the dozens and were associated with operational violations and false alarms of the emergency protection system. Shutdowns were immediately reported to superiors, and the longer ones were reported to Beria himself. Sometimes he himself would call on the "VCh" radio and ask:>- "Is he breathing or not breathing?">Much depended on the engineers operating the apparatus. Even a minor oversight, a minor mistake, could lead to a shutdown for a whole day.>Most often, the reactor shutdown occurred due to unacceptable dynamics of changes in the flow rate of water cooling the uranium “blocks”.>If the first element, the heart of the Chelyabinsk-40 nuclear complex, was considered to be "Annushka"—the A-1 industrial uranium-graphite reactor—the second element was undoubtedly "Facility B"—the radiochemical plant where plutonium was separated from uranium irradiated in the reactor. The plutonium separation plant was completed in December 1948 and began production early the following year. Concurrently, "Facility C"—the radioactive waste storage facility infamous for the 1957 Kyshtym accident—was built alongside it.>The third component of Chelyabinsk-40 was "Facility B"—a chemical and metallurgical plant where separated plutonium was purified and processed into bomb metal. The first "product" (plutonium concentrate, pre-purified from the bulk of uranium and fission products) arrived for reprocessing on February 26, 1949. Mastering the process was difficult: the radiochemical plant frequently delivered substandard product, and the large number of impurities complicated the purification process.
>>64321176>The development of an atomic bomb using uranium was delayed for several years due to technical problems. It required uranium-235, which had to be produced using the expensive gaseous diffusion method of separating the uranium-235 isotope from natural uranium, which is almost 99.3% uranium-238.>By June 1949, the plant had accumulated enough plutonium to manufacture the first atomic bomb, and a train carrying the plutonium headed to the city of Arzamas-16, where the first nuclear charge was made, which was successfully tested at the Semipalatinsk test site.>On August 21, 1949, the main charge arrived at the test site. At 4:00 a.m. on August 29, the atomic bomb was lifted onto the 37.5-meter-tall test tower. The bomb exploded with a yield of 20 kilotons. It was a success. The event occurred on August 29, 1949, four years after the first nuclear test in the United States. By mid-September, the Americans determined from the radioactive debris of the explosion, which spread into the upper atmosphere, that it was a near-replica of the bomb dropped on Nagasaki on August 9. The Soviet Union did not announce the bomb's test because Stalin feared the United States would launch a preemptive strike on "Annushka."there ya go
>>64321180>The Soviet Union did not announce the bomb's test because Stalin feared the United States would launch a preemptive strike on "Annushka."More like Annudashoah
>>64320572>>One freezing day, the builders rushed to raise the formwork again before the concrete had fully hardened. The formwork failed to withstand a strong gust of wind. The Teplyak tipped sharply to one side at a height of 143 meters. Several people fell to their deaths. Only one remained hanging by his arm, pinned by the metal structure. A surgeon was brought to him. Risking his life, he sawed off the arm, saving the victim's life.Fucking hell.
>>64316821>One day, Zverev told me that a group of imprisoned mechanics (90 people) had been released thanks to good reviews of their work and would not be returning to work the following day, as former prisoners are not allowed to work in closed facilities. I laughed and said:>"But they're working, and if they leave, all the installation work will stop!">"There's a way out: if they voluntarily remain prisoners; Of course, we'll pay them their wages and let them go with good papers when the installation is finished. Tell them that, they might not believe me.>After a short meeting in the far corner of the workshop, the 50-year-old foreman of the mechanics said:>"We understand, we agree, we are communists."every single bit of this is in the running for the most russian thing I've ever heard
>>64317555A russian version of the CSB would be amazing
>>64312840>>64317555>pull out the sole air filter because it got clogged>leave it empty>forget to tell anyone>what's the worst that could happen lmao>work in a bioweapon factory that was build in a fucking city because no one would expect it thereIt was cleared up pretty comprehensively shortly after the fall of the USSR so we know most of the details despite the KGB destroying much of the records but alas we're back to square one and Russia went back to the cutaneous anthrax cover up story with a side dash of WESTERN BIOTERRORISTS I have no hope that we'll get any info on their commie time fuckups at least till a proper government change occurs in Russia since putins FSB fags want to keep a lid on it as if it was the height of the cold war
>>64312671web archive is blocked iirc.
>>64316816>do you know what Norilsk looks like?Pretty nice nowadays, the real question is what Norilsk *feels* like. The air pollution is apparently still pretty nasty.But if Gulag-era, cancerous-asshole-of-the-world Norilsk was better than Mayak, I shudder to think how that looked.
>>64316821>Every morning, we'd gather: "Come on, guys, who can explain what happened last night?" No one could have imagined what happened that night.Sounds like one hell of a party.
>>64316790About 45m from one. I am not rich but I can afford a few classes a semester?
>>64323421>a few classes a semester?Oh no, don't bother with that. Go get a job as decontamination labor. Unfortunately I don't know what plant you're near so I can't tell you the best way to go about that.
>>64312521I stumbled on an interesting thing while digging around the Lada mafia wars in russia during the 90s>Vladimir Kaplun, director of the Kartontara packing company, was killed with a 7 curie cesium-137 source hidden in the backrest of his chair>Over several weeks Kaplun contracted radiation sickness and was hospitalized for a month before his death from blood loss from multiple ulcers in the stomach>The contamination was identified after his death by colleages but no culprit was found
>>64323875Bellefonte in North Alabama. Still doing college and just no real idea what I want to do yet
>>64318642Jesus, nuclear power should have a higher barrier to entery, savages cant operate such finicky machines. The fact that it lacks many safety features, not to mention anti-safety features such as the ability to refuel while in operation, makes this a disaster waiting to happen (especially in the hands of communists...)
>>64325319>BellefonteThat doesn't count, it's not operational. I'm also heading there in 48 hours lol
So which of these are the worst Atom Lads? Any other bad pre-TMI civilian US power accidents? (Aside from Fermi-1). There’s an NRC ranking of post-TMI ones
>>64325781BFN fire, 110% Fun plant, mentioning birthday candles gets hilarious reactions.
Also do you guys think Atomic Power was better than Nuclear Power word wise
>>64325781Found the NRC source.It’s talking about the 2003 Davis-Besse incident. >Significant is the NRC’s highest category for a precursor. Since 1979, 18 events have been rated as “significant,” four of which had higher risk estimates than this situation, and there were two in the past 10 years which were roughly equivalent to Davis-Besse. The four more serious events were, in order, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the loss of feedwater event at Davis-Besse in 1985, damage to a heat exchanger at the Brunswick plant in 1981, and the unavailability of a high-pressure injection pump at the Shearon Harris plant in 1991. The roughly equivalent events( were the draining of the reactor coolant system at the Wolf Creek plant during a 1994 maintenance outage and a loss of offsite power at the Catawba plant in 1996.So the worst post-TMI accidents in US civilian power are, officially1. Davis-Besse 19852. Brunswick 19813. Shearon-Harris 19914. 3-Way-Tie between Wolf Creek 1994,’Catawba 1996, and Davis-Besse 2003.(Surprised LaSalle wasn’t there given what I heard last thread about them being one failure away from destroying the reactor) Couldn’t find a source for Pre-1979(aside from Fermi-1 which was a prototype) ranking, but the picture had the ones Wikipedia listed and there are a couple others I know about like Dresden-II’s high water fuckup(and apparently Dresden-1 had issues). I’m sure the two anons here who know stuff could make a rough guesstimate of how they’d rank them
>>64323875>decontamination laborDoes that pay well on the outside? I've got 12 years experience, including some real oopsie-doodles. Triple anti-C's, wet suits, respirators, etc.>but it has to pay *real* well>there's a reason why I changed jobs so I don't have to do that shit anymore, and they pay me pretty fucking good right now
Russians shouldn't be allowed near large bodies of water. Bad times for sll.
>>64325906Eh, depends on the plant and union In his area it's going to be a local labor union hall and their rates plus a special duties bonus. I think it's like $1800(ish) a week after taxes. But the union benefits and pension is okay. Up north it's more like $3700 a weekThey mostly mop, handle Radwaste trash, and hang lead blankets. It's more of an entry level job to get in the plant and start applying for better positions >>64325871DB's management should have been put in front of a firing squad.
>>64315814>The sediment of the lake bed is estimated to be composed almost entirely of high level radioactive waste deposits to a depth of roughly 11 feet (3.4 m).I'm sorry, excuse me!?!?
>>64322114Based fellow CSB enjoyer.
>>64318642>Any funny things happening?The only nuke-related funny thing I know is that I learned my town got twinned with Oarai right after I watched GuP and that's how I learned the third thing they're known for (besides fish and fictional AFV sports) is a nuclear research institute.
>>643259966 Sieverts per hour anon, just standing on the shoreNo wonder they dumped concrete all over it
>>64326421>6 Sieverts per hourNot great, not terrible.
>>64312908>>Was that on the island in Lake Aral?be USSRdecide cotton is life"we’ll turn the desert into paradise, comrade"divert every river feeding the Aral Seaengineers: "won’t that, uh, kill the sea?"Khrushchev: potato.gifAral starts shrinking like vodka bottle at officer’s clubmeanwhile in middle of nowhereVozrozhdeniya Island, secret biowar test siteanthrax, plague, tularemia, all the hitsliterally dumping weaponized spores into sandSoviets confident it’s fine because “remote island”fast forward1991.exeUSSR collapsesAral shrinks so much the “island” becomes a peninsulawhoops.jpglocals can literally walk into the old germ warfare rangerumor.jpg about rusting anthrax drums baking in the sunRussia: “not our problem lol”Kazakhstan & Uzbekistan: broke.jpgUSA: “we can’t just have hundreds of tons of anthrax blowing around the desert”Operation Clean Sweep beginsAmerican engineers shovel literal metric tons of spore-soaked dirt into pits and burn itsome locals swear the sand still glows green in the moonlighttodayAral Sea basically puddles and salt flats“Sea” towns now 50 miles inlandships rusting in desert like Mad Max propsVozrozhdeniya Island isn’t even an island anymorejust part of the mainland, anthrax includedcotton profits still kingAral fishermen mald in silence
By the way, I strongly recommend That Chernobyl Guy to all who are interested in the deep lore of nuclear accidents. This feller goes into detail, cites primary and secondary sources, and even digs into the political dynamics and shenanigans that were at play with the RBMK reactors, as well as exploring the incompleteness of the science of the reactor design when it was being put into service. He also provides some of the best researched criticism on the INSAG reports, both of which still uphold the soviets' main narrative that operator error played a major role in the accident, when, based on previous mishaps like Ignalina, and testimony of people who worked with these reactors citing the operating instructions in effect at the time, it is apparent that a power excursion could have happened when operating the reactor entirely within its officially stated parameters. The effectively sole cause of the accidents instead appears to have been that the designers had made critical errors in their reactivity calculations, which, when discovered empirically during the operation of the reactors, were not corrected, and the operating instructions were not amended until after the Chernobyl accident. https://www.youtube.com/@thatchernobylguy2915/playlists
>>64316554God strolled the earth with holy pride,Surveying nations far and wide.France was drunk on cheese and bread,Japan had gadgets stacked instead.Italy sang with pasta grace,Britain sulked with gloomy face.Germany polished steel and gears,Brazil just danced away the years.America boomed with burgers, guns,China churned out ten new suns.Each nation doing what they do,And God declared, “My work rings true.”Then came Russia, bleak and dire,Lakes that glowed with atom fire.Villages soaked in waste-bed streams,Generations lost in schemes.Brothers marrying cousin’s bride,Factories collapsed inside.Forests burned, the land laid waste,Whole damn country pickled, raped.God looked once, then looked again,Crossed Himself and whispered then:“Out of all I shaped by hand,Russia’s where I dropped the plan.”
>>64316233the primary contractor was a crew of peasants who made shit tanks for apartment blocks as a localized sewer and who had never made anything so complicated as a staircase
>>64322705Thankfully pozzia is too small and empty so its damage is more limited. Now changs is something that is really curios to study. In between the face saving mentality, the tight censorship, the all encompassing corner cutting and publicly known disasters, like cancer villages, ghoulish amounts of pollution, dead seas, undrinkable ground water etc. it leaves to the imagination what is going in the "secret" sites like anthrax island was in vatnik union
>>64316449>"It is strictly forbidden to implement this plan. A. Komarovsky."I am going to start saying this, like on fb and shit when people are just babbling nonsense. Refuse to elaborate, but comment cryptically.
>>64316490100 per person is fucking 1000 millisieverts and instant on the spot AREI probably skips every step right to acute poisoning. Did this happen for 66 straight days or is that cumulative?
>>64323029>Pretty nice nowadaysIsn't the ecological dead zone still visible from fucking space.
>>64326764I said it LOOKS nice. I didn't mention anything about being long-term livable, or even short-term if you really value your health.
>>64326791And I meant the city, not the nickel mines or whatever the city was for.
>>64326639Go to bed Pope, you've been dead 3 centuries.
>>64326764it is, hell i even read somewhere that it's more polluted than the next 10 worst polluted cities in russia put together but the other anon is alos right, it looks not as decrepit as other cities for russian standards at least because because the nickel industry keeps it togetherIt's still a commie block hellhole for anyone living outside the eastern block though
>>64326764>>64326791>I said it LOOKS nice.Indeed, i wouldn't want to swim in it but the river looks dope
>>64326810Why is the Balkan so much worse than the industrial centers of western Europe?
>>64325808I want one of these lights
>>64326807Every so often Fate produces a man, from the blood of the people... a leader...
>>64325550Nice, what for?
>>64326843Serbia and Bosnia run their coal plants without desulphurization systems, making Serbia alone put out more SO2 than the whole EU, with Bosnia and Macedonia they put out 2,5 times more
>>64326810I am honestly surprised that China doesn't look more of a hell hole than it does SO2 wise. Though wtf is going on with southern Mexico? and Peru.
>>64316706world radiation map:https://map.safecast.org/?y=14.2&x=18.3&z=3&l=0&m=0
>>64327057more:https://remap.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Advanced.aspxhttps://www.ctbto.org/our-work/ims-maphttps://www.uradmonitor.com/https://radmon.org/index.phpI'm sure with all these shit can be triangulated.
>>64327008>I am honestly surprised that China doesn't look more of a hell hole than it does SO2 wise.It was 3 times as bad but they managed to get it down to the current level, they started to fix their shit (at least in that regard) in 2005 or so>Though wtf is going on with southern Mexico? and Peru.Peru is la Oroya, a Norilsk type mine, Mexico coal plants i think, they are somewhere around top5 in the total SO2 rankings right behind the India/Russia/China powerhouses
>>64327065Anon, the united states unfairly developed so they have a RIGHT to be filthy because it is assumed they will clean it up when they (never) succeed.Trust the plan.
>>64326843basically this picture
>>64324138>>Vladimir Kaplun, director of the Kartontara packing company, was killed with a 7 curie cesium-137 source hidden in the backrest of his chairI'm surprised that the guy who planted it in the first place survived long enough to do so. Doesn't Cesium-137 usually only show-up in nuclear waste?
>>64327453>I'm surprised that the guy who planted it in the first place survived long enough to do so.Depends how long did he handle it and how, you could easily get radiation burns barehanded, if he transported it unsecured we're easily in ARS territory >Doesn't Cesium-137 usually only show-up in nuclear waste?Yeah, it's used similar to cobalt 60, at that power probably industry radiography equipment It also started somewhat of a trend, with another attempt happening in Irkutsk right after, and almost absurd shit like hiding a source in your boss's hat or a radioactive ink blotter on a bankers desk
>>64326841It looks beaufiful in the sense of an exotic toxic frog in dangercolors.
>>64326909You're being hunted retard, get out ASAP
>>64326841Good movie, by the way.
>>64326677>Thankfully pozzia is too small and empty so its damage is more limited.in the case of Sverdlovsk / Yekaterinburg they were simply lucky as fuck, that the wind didn't blow towards the city that day>>64312890>>64312908They also had interesting fuckups there, one of which came to light only in 2002, about a ship "Lev Berg" that came way to close to Vozrozhdeniya Island in 71 when they happened to test smallpox bombs there, resulting in a infected crew member that spread it further in AralStroke of luck again, that it was caught pretty soon and that back then most of people were still vaccinated so only three unvaccinated kids were killed
>we got mentioned in the comments of a "thatchernobylguy" video Huh, interesting, I wonder if he posts here.
So top five worst US Civilian Nuclear Power accidents is-1. Three Mile Island Unit-2 Meltdown2. Fermi-1 Meltdown (this counts right?) So what’s 3? The worst one since 1979 according to the NRC(the 85 Davis-Besse one) or the worst one pre-1975 which according to anon here was the 1975 Brownsferry Fire. What’s 4th then, the other one or the second worst in one of those two time periods? We have the list for post-TMI, but no official pre-ranking.
>>64329487>They also had interesting fuckups there,They had one or two more oopsies with Anthrax, there's a book about some (in)famous Soviet industrial accidents.I know Ihave it, I know I read it but I can't find it or remember the name. Dementia, to much lithium, who knows.It was a great read, in a 'I didn't want to sleep well anyway' kind of way.
>>64331872Was it The Dead Hand? IIRC the author talked a fair amount about Vozrozhdeniya in that one.
>>64312908I can't even remotely begin to imagine russia having to send clean up crews out to the california desert to clean up an old biolab. what a fucking shithole
>>64331872I can recommend "Biological espionage : special operations of the Soviet and Russian foreign intelligence services in the West" by Kouzminov, a guy who worked in the S "Illegals" directorate of KGB as an officer in the bioweapon divisionI'ver read that book almost 20 years ago but the below part stuck with me 1/2>Before the activisation of Department 12’s work with overseas sources in 1987-8, biological materials often came to us without proper precautions having been taken for their containment. The containers in which they were delivered from the KGB rezidenturas were temporary and, frequently, not meant for the transportation of potentially dangerous biological pathogens. >Sometimes there were no appropriate containers at all. In those days samples were forwarded almost always in the same packaging as they had been received from the sources. These might be soldered glass tubes, vacuum flasks, petri dishes, or thermoses with dry ice. The consequences could have been disastrous if dangerous micro-organisms had been accidentally released into the open environment. When poorly packaged materials were received, Colonel Ismail Aliev, our deputy chief, could be heard yelling, ‘Guys! Don’t drag any of that shit into the centre! The whole Intelligence Service will die! Carry all this stuff straight from the plane into the secret labs!”
>>643331852/2>At the time we laughed. But now I recall the sudden deaths in Department 12: Major Dmitry Kashirin in 1990 and Lieutenant Colonel Leonid Duganov in 1993. They were the most frequent receivers of VOLNA materials. Dmitry worked in the American Section. He had superb health, practiced karate, and loved to swim. He had been awarded the Red Star medal for missions in Afghanistan. Leonid Duganov, my good friend, worked in Oleg Dolzhenko’s group. Just a few weeks before his death he called me at my home. He had a lot of plans for the future, was asking me about my new work. He said he wanted to see me and to warn me about something. Something was bothering Leonid about operational matters under Dolzhenko. But we weren’t able to get together. Dmitry died very suddenly, in his house; Leonid in a KGB hospital, where he was rushed a week before his end. We were never informed what exactly happened to them. Asking questions was not acceptable. And I then thought the cause of their sudden deaths might be some dangerous micro-organism or virus or other biological material from accidentally unsealed containers that they had received via the VOLNA channel. All in all, the stuff he mentioned in that book is now more relevant then ever, and i can legit recommend it
>>64318642I keep looking but I can't find Sadaam.
>>64320487>diesel-electric subProbably not. Unless it's specifically about the two purple tipped "special weapons" torpedoes they carry.
>>643157042 of the top5 is still downplaying the scope of Mayak, when even russian shills claim there was 1200 ARS deaths (which is already a fucking insane number, a Chernobyl worth of ARS deaths every year for 40 years)In reality there were probably around 4000 which according to another anon could be 90% of all ARS deaths world wide>the 2017 radiation spike over Europe was confirmed to originate from within 100 km of the plant, but that's clearly not enough to blame Majak, and everything's OK there, why are you asking?
>>64332716Possible. The files were on an HDD that died years ago, and my memory just blanks on teh title.It recounted various biological, chemical and nuclear weapons development programs, and related industrial accidents in the USSR.
>>64332716>The Dead HandMOTHERFUCKING CHINK FUCK SPIES GODAMNIT
>>64334736Sadly, the actual book is not there.audiobookbay does have the audiobook, though.
How much heat is the fuel at ZNPP putting off via decay? I wanna know what we’re looking at once the pumps fail in a couple days
>>64327986That's because someone fucked with the color saturation to make it beautiful in the sense of an exotic toxic frog in danger colors.
>>64335689WHAT DID YOU DO TO THE PLANT ANON!?
>>64335834AUGUSTUS NO
>>64326601Gas line explosion?
>>643294871.4-1.5 billion vs barely 140+ million is a big enough difference. where vatnik nests are they shit up the place for sure. but in terms of contaminated land there are vast empty stretches of wilderness where they physically dont have enough mongoloids to shit up the place
>>64333217Grim
>>64336295That's the russian air force accidentally dropping a bomb on Belgorod.
