>>23611700
My understanding is that it's analogous to the difference between the other two antepraedicamenta.
–Things that are not present-in a subject and not said of a subject are individual substances, such as "Aristotle", "the car in my garage",
–While things that are not present-in a subject and ARE said of a subject are what we might in English call general classes of substances. For example, "person", "car", etc.

Therefore,
>Present-in a subject BUT NOT said of a subject: accidents (full stop)
Example: The whiteness of that van (a particular whiteness unique to a particular object)
>Present-in a subject AND said of a subject: two subjects in one.
Example: "Whiteness" as an abstract concept. Multiple different things can be said to be "white" or to possess "whiteness," and may be grouped together as sharing that in common. When I say that statue is "white" or "has whiteness," those two things are referring to something present in and said of an object, because the statue falls into a group of many different white objects. But "the whiteness of that statue" is an accident unique to that particular statue, and the statue I'm referring to is the only object that possesses it. The whiteness of other objects might be compared to the whiteness of this statue, but they aren't the exact same. Unless you switch to talking about whiteness in general, which would be something that can be present-in and said of a subject, and (usually) many different subjects.

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>>23611700
perhaps you should stop being ignorant of geometry

>>23611700
>>23612606
...samefag? why the fuck?

you are the same faggot in the plato thread that used q.e.d. without knowing what it is, this is the second time today i noticed your ignorance of geometry is hindering your philosophical pursuits

>>23612714
I'm not that guy, and I savaged him for autistically focusing on the Organon. I swear, some of you "You're that same guy who..." posters have pareidolia. My post was nothing like that other person in style or content.
>>23612614
I know my geometry. How does ratio and measure play a part here (no pun intended)?
>>23612644
Not a samefag. He just copied my verbiage in some cases, but he's clearly advancing a different interpretation.
>>23612606
See, that's the typical interpretation. But it's not the interpretation I found here if you scroll down and see the chart: https://medium.com/@peterseanEsq/aristotle-grammar-and-reality-6b814efd24be

Also, what about the relationship between a substance human being and a substance body/mind/etc.? How does that hang together?

>>23612919
>I'm not that guy, and I savaged him for autistically focusing on the Organon.
I haven't otherwise posted here, but bullshit and stolen valor, because I'm the anon talking dramatic details in that thread against the Organon pseud. No one else has said shit to him besides the little retard here overly impressed in himself for knowing a Latin phrase. Is this how you farm engagement, just bullshit your way through?

>>23612951
There's multiple people dogging on him. I pointed out briefly that his fixation on the Organon is ridiculous.
>>23611476
>>23612883
Are my posts.

>>23612919
cool, good to have cleared that up, im not well read in autistotle but i have spent some time reading his stuff, i am retarded but perhaps through talking about parts of substance we can come to a better understanding with our combined knowledge

>>23612919
>Also, what about the relationship between a substance human being and a substance body/mind/etc.?
To my understanding, I think it's ok to have composite substances. So the universe can be thought of as a whole, or having constituent parts that are also standalone (i.e. the parts I'm referring to are not attributes that can only be "in" another thing, like roundness or sharpness). If so, then a person's hand can be thought of as a substance, regardless of whether or not it is part of a larger organism or whether it's severed from the rest of the body that it came from. The hand can be its own substance in any case, and at the same time, it can be one part of the substance of the person's body, if it is currently (considered to be) connected to it.

>See, that's the typical interpretation. But it's not the interpretation I found here
It looks like John Vella's way of framing these two concepts is to distinguish between things that are inherent to a substance as opposed to things that can incidentally occur in a substance. So according to this framework, Peter being human might be said to be inherent to Peter's existence, so it's in him and predicated of him. Peter being a lawyer would also be part of his existence - at least, at this moment in time. However, Peter's knowledge of law is only in him, but not predicated of him, since the knowledge of law that we are speaking of isn't considered part of what he is. Presumably then, the distinction under that framework arises from qualities or attributes in a substance that are considered inherent to the definition of that substance (at this moment in time), and those that are not (and not predicated). The latter would be attributes or qualities that could be said to be in not only Peter, but could be said to be in anyone with the capacity for it. For instance law knowledge, or Aristotle's favorite example of grammar knowledge. However, I think I can fold this back into what I was saying above. Peter's law knowledge isn't predicated. He is the only one who has that specific knowledge, as other people might have different levels of specialty in their study of law than Peter. Therefore it's not predicated precisely for the reason that the law knowledge that is in Peter belongs specifically to him. Other people with the capacity for knowledge won't have the exact same amount of knowledge that Peter does, and Peter's knowledge of law could be flawed in some areas. His knowledge of law is its own subject, just as Peter himself is a subject that is also a substance. By contrast, "lawyer" is a simple binary switch that divides all people, indeed all objects, into haves and have nots. A person either meets the definition or they don't -- some people possess lawyership, and some people do not, therefore it is predicated. If we use "lawyer" as a predicate, it has its own definition that is completely independent of any particular substance that may or may not possess lawyership.

>>23613311
Thank you for the response! I don't have the time to give your post a thoughtful response, but I do have some questions to ask you while I can.

1) Would the body, mind, etc., be part of the essence of Peter in some way, though not part of the definition? I remember that Porphyry made a distinction between

2) What do you think of Vella's "nested subjects" understanding vs. the typical "universal accidents" understanding of that antepraedicament in question? Especially in how he squishes in all accidents and such into what would normally be reserved for "particular accidents"?

3) A bit unrelated, but what is a subject qua subject for Aristotle? I know that he goes back and forth on what fulfills the criteria of subject (is it matter? is it form? etc.), but I seemed to have miss what he thinks is a subject. Sometimes people equate it to be substance, but other times Aristotle treats matter as a subject. So it seems like it's anything that can be provisionally thought of as a unitary focus, even if it has no unitary essence in itself.

I'll try to address the rest of your post in greater detail later today if I have the time. It's going to be a while.

>>23613609
>1) Would the body, mind, etc., be part of the essence of Peter in some way, though not part of the definition? I remember that Porphyry made a distinction between
Well that's where I think things seem a bit murky. While I can find a way to fold Vella's ideas back into my limited understanding of Aristotelian ontology, thereby showing that it doesn't appear to fundamentally contradict and can fit nicely, yet I don't know whether I would necessarily choose to describe things that particular way, if they don't really help clarity. I would choose to describe things more the way I did in the first post than in the sense of inherent "definitional" versus "incidental occurrence of a separate subject," even if one could find a way to make that work.

A couple points that come up with why I might not use that way to describe these antepraedicamenta is that, there are real philosophical questions about what is definitional to a subject and what might not be. As in people might disagree. Especially if you talk about changes over time. So if I say Peter might become a superhuman, and simultaneously stop being a regular human, did Peter cease to exist at that moment? I think there could be disagreement. But I don't think we're trying to resolve that question here. I think the focus of the difference between "predicated" and "not" is not so much about what is essential or definitional or not, but rather it more focuses on the analogous difference that we already know occurs in substances -- basically whether they are particular or universal. I think Aristotle wants to sort out exhaustively the types of possible subjects we could talk about using language, and therefore has chosen this way to distinguish four fundamentally different things that could be talked about. The real question about what is definitional and essential to a substance would, in my view/understanding, be deferred safely to a later discussion. Right now this is just laying down some groundwork about different kinds of subjects to (hopefully) improve clarity before getting to the categories.

>What do you think of Vella's "nested subjects" understanding
I don't think it's necessarily in contradiction to the typical understanding (because I think I was able to show how they could correspond before), but I don't think it's exactly the same either. It might be a possible way to view them, but someone could possibly poke holes in it, especially if they don't understand it correctly or if it's murky or unclear.

>Especially in how he squishes in all accidents and such into what would normally be reserved for "particular accidents"?
If that's really the case then it seems to me he might be onto something different. In the chart you linked I saw universal accidents on the bottom left and particular accidents in the bottom right (presented as "2 subjects in one," since "Peter's knowledge" is specifically in "Peter," thus we have one subject linked to another).

(1/2)

>>23613952
>3) A bit unrelated, but what is a subject qua subject for Aristotle?
IIRC, he would say that we can speak of accidents in abstraction, but said accidents only ever actually occur in composite form with matter in the real world. Likewise, we can speak of prime matter, but prime matter never actually occurs by itself in the real world without co-occurring with a form of one kind or another. So we can linguistically break down substances into constituent parts, and focus on accidents (both predicated and non-predicated) by referring to them with words, but these are only abstractions. They are abstractions that our minds have inferred, albeit they are still "real" in that lesser sense, because they are what matter always has to conform to. (Despite our understanding being limited, we can begin to grasp the forms by studying them, and they aren't purely artificial fabrications of the mind or labels and nothing more, as nominalists would say). This would be a key difference though from Plato's view of forms actually existing by themselves.

>>23613954
>but these are only abstractions.
Ok, I should clarify this part just a bit. I shouldn't say that non-predicated accidents are purely abstractions, but they are still things that can't exist on their own. Like the sharpness of the knife I am holding. That is real, but it's an aspect of the knife that can't be separated from it, and its existence is tied to the knife itself. Whereas the predicated universals, both in objects and not, are abstractions from particulars. Really the only one of the antepraedicamenta that fully "exists" as a standalone substance in the universe would be the individual substance (not predicated and not present-in). Hopefully that makes sense.

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>>23613952
>If that's really the case then it seems to me he might be onto something different. In the chart you linked I saw universal accidents on the bottom left and particular accidents in the bottom right (presented as "2 subjects in one," since "Peter's knowledge" is specifically in "Peter," thus we have one subject linked to another).
That is a good point, in that universal accidents were in the bottom left and particular accidents were in the bottom right according to the article on Vella. But in a way, I think it could work. We tend to think of qualities as following the ontological hierarchy of substances (e.g. the color "white" is predicated of particular shades of white), but if none of these qualities are substances, then we need to be careful of what we're doing here.

What Vella could be doing here is making every quality into an accident for the bottom left category. And then in the bottom right category, we have nested subjects that connect, in some way, back to something essential. e.g. Peter is alive says something essential about Peter (namely, he has a body), and then says something accidental about that essential part (namely, that his body is alive).

However, we run into a complication. The body is essential as a consequence of being a member of the "body" genus. But the weird thing is that the quality of being alive is essential for Peter as a living creature, an animal, and a human being... but accidental for the body itself.

Anyway, I think in this sense, it works to think of treating the body as a substance that is a part of the definition of Peter who is also a substance. If Peter has an expanded definition (which I think Aristotle admits exists logically but also says to avoid because it is "babbling"), it would be "An embodied living animal human being," and Peter's body comes into the story at embodied. Likewise, his mind comes into the story at human being (or perhaps in a limited way at animal with its lesser mental functions) due to his rationality. There is a Porphyrian understanding of qualities where you have "proprium", which seem to be implied consequences of the definition that are also true and essential, but not the main focus of a definition. Perhaps we can employ that here.

(1/?)

>>23613954
>>23613993
I'm thinking more about what makes something capable of being a unity that can be spoken about, at least in a provisional way, prior to any sort of consideration of substantiality. Because that is what seems to happen with Aristotle in Categories, in Physics, etc., when he speaks about subjects. A heap of sand, or a shade of color of an object, seems to be treated as a subject, even if it is not a substance due to lacking any sort of inherent unity. We can give it a provisional unity that allows us to focus on it and speak of it almost as if it were a primary substance.
>They are abstractions that our minds have inferred, albeit they are still "real" in that lesser sense, because they are what matter always has to conform to. (Despite our understanding being limited, we can begin to grasp the forms by studying them, and they aren't purely artificial fabrications of the mind or labels and nothing more, as nominalists would say).
I think Aristotle ends up focusing on the fact that every abstraction has a "history", and only the "agents of history" (to be very, very loose in what is an agent and very inclusive in what is history) are real, and that everything is ultimately tethered to that.

(2/?)

>>23613311
>To my understanding, I think it's ok to have composite substances. So the universe can be thought of as a whole, or having constituent parts that are also standalone (i.e. the parts I'm referring to are not attributes that can only be "in" another thing, like roundness or sharpness). If so, then a person's hand can be thought of as a substance, regardless of whether or not it is part of a larger organism or whether it's severed from the rest of the body that it came from. The hand can be its own substance in any case, and at the same time, it can be one part of the substance of the person's body, if it is currently (considered to be) connected to it.
I think this is where Aristotle's conception of hylomorphic substance starts to fall apart. Because on one hand, he recognizes substances as anything that could, in some intrinsic sense, be complete and for themselves. But on another hand, nothing enmattered is ever fully in control of its own destiny as it created and eventually destroyed. It's easier to think of a human being as a substance than a hand (since a hand, while having a complete structure, can't sustain itself as a hand without the rest of the body), but even the human being can't sustain itself without the rest of the ecosystem. And the ecosystem can't sustain itself without the rest of the inanimate earth, which can't sustain itself... blah blah blah... without the rest of the universe, the unmoved mover, God, whatever. So that is the ultimate substance by definition cand nothing else compares.
(3/3)

>>23613952
>>23613954
>>23613993
By the way, I got in contact with the author, and he drew his characterization of Category IV from here:
>We have seen how some predicates are in a subject but not said of any subject, and we have seen how other predicates are said of a subject but not in any subject. There is also a class of predicates that are both in a subject and said of a subject. At first this class of predicates may seem confusing given that said of and in present two completely different ways of relating to a subject. The key to understanding this class of predicates is that the same predicate can be said of one subject and in another subject; it is not possible, however, that the same predicate is both said of and in the same subject. Take Aristotle’s example of knowledge (lbl-2). Knowledge can be in a subject: this soul has knowledge. Predicating knowledge of the soul qualifies this soul; this predication describes a property of the soul, i.e. that it possesses knowledge. Knowledge can also be said of a subject: knowledge of grammar is knowledge. The term knowledge describes what kind of thing knowledge of grammar is, i.e. knowledge of grammar is a kind of knowledge. Note that in one case the subject is the soul and in the other case the subject is knowledge of grammar. This class of predicates that can be both said of and in a subject is more of a coincidence than a serious philosophical issue. It just so happens that some predicates can both be said of and in two different subjects.

>>23616586
the author of the article btw, not Vella himself lol

>>23616499
>Peter is alive says something essential about Peter (namely, he has a body), and then says something accidental about that essential part (namely, that his body is alive).
I would agree that's the empiricist scientific way to look at that statement. However this is leaving out ideas that could be expressed such as someone having a living soul distinct from a body -- which would point to a supernatural type of subject instead of a strictly natural one according to our understanding of energy and matter. One could use language to express that kind of an idea as well.

I don't know if that's what Aristotle would do, but in that way you wouldn't be required to view that statement as indubitably implying he has a body. Usually context will clue you in on the intent though. It just depends on who is making that statement and their intent.

>But the weird thing is that the quality of being alive is essential for Peter as a living creature, an animal, and a human being... but accidental for the body itself.
I think this is a valid point, and that it points to the fact that the trait of "personhood" doesn't have to be tied to every physical body in the universe. Controversially, a dead body can instead be seen as the remains of a person, or a former person. In that case, from an empirical perspective, "Peter is alive" asserts that he has a living body. However, how the status of the "person" (the individual substance named Peter) would be changed if that body was dead instead of alive would certainly be controversial.

>and then says something accidental about that essential part (namely, that his body is alive).
If you view his body as being his entire existence, then being alive isn't essential, since as long as his body doesn't go anywhere, then Peter doesn't go anywhere even if he's dead. But if you view his body as being just a constituent part of his existence, then you are allowed to say that Peter being alive does not absolutely necessitate that his body is alive, since he has an existence outside of his body. That is to say, his body might be a substance in its own right, but like his hand, it can be removed without him losing the quality of being alive. It seems like these are the two apparent paths you can take, but you'd have to choose one or the other and then stick with it throughout your reasoning.

>but even the human being can't sustain itself without the rest of the ecosystem.
Yes, I mean the ultimate source of being logically seems to be the ultimate cause behind the physical laws of the universe that we observe and try to understand. Whatever is causing the forces of the universe to behave in the way they do (not the forces themselves but whatever is causatively prior to them), causing energy and matter to interact, is what is sustaining everything. You can use language to isolate substances or accidents as subjects of statements, but the choice of how to do this might be based on faulty understanding or assumptions.

>>23616586
So, it makes it seem like there's a third aspect we can interpret Category IV as: a category of mixed/homonymous/etc. predication.

>>23616704
Yeah, I think there's an aspect where the fact that he has a body shows where the genera system somewhat breaks down. Because, what kind of body? That genus just means "something with matter." Even when the body dies, it will still have matter until it disappears. But when it disappears, the matter is still there, but certainly not in any recognizable body-like form. For Peter to have a body is therefore connected to being a certain kind of body, that of a living animal human being named Peter.

I don't know if I have time to touch upon some of the other dilemmas you raise, such as the fact that the soul "powers" everything of a living substance as a whole, and now we have mind, body, and soul dimensions to consider in the primary substance. Maybe I can return to that later.

>If you view his body as being his entire existence, then being alive isn't essential, since as long as his body doesn't go anywhere, then Peter doesn't go anywhere even if he's dead. But if you view his body as being just a constituent part of his existence, then you are allowed to say that Peter being alive does not absolutely necessitate that his body is alive, since he has an existence outside of his body. That is to say, his body might be a substance in its own right, but like his hand, it can be removed without him losing the quality of being alive. It seems like these are the two apparent paths you can take, but you'd have to choose one or the other and then stick with it throughout your reasoning.
I just wanted to quote this for emphasis when I return to this later.

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>>23611700
In Aristotle's metaphysics, the concepts of "parts" and "whole" are crucial for understanding how substances and their attributes are related. Here’s a breakdown:

1. **Substance and Its Parts**: For Aristotle, a substance (ousia) is a fundamental entity that exists independently. It has primary substances (e.g., individual humans or animals) and secondary substances (e.g., species and genera). Each primary substance is a composite of form and matter. For instance, a human being consists of a body (matter) and a soul (form).

2. **The Four Antepredicaments**:
- **Present-in-a-subject but NOT said of a subject**: These are accidents that exist within a subject but do not describe the subject itself. For example, "being skilled at law" is an accident that can be present in a person but doesn't define the essence of that person.

- **Present-in-a-subject AND said of a subject**: These describe relationships where one subject (e.g., the mind) has attributes or performs actions that are expressed in terms of another subject (e.g., the body). The mind "knows law," and the body "is alive." In this sense, the mind and body are interrelated but can be considered as distinct parts or faculties within the same substance.

- **Said of a subject but NOT present-in-a-subject**: This refers to properties or attributes that describe what a subject is, rather than something that is present in it. For instance, "human" is said of a specific individual but isn't present within that individual as an accident.

- **Said of a subject AND present-in-a-subject**: This could refer to attributes that both describe and are present in a subject, such as "being rational" in a human, where rationality is an inherent characteristic.

**Interpretation**:
- The "present-in-a-subject" part describes how properties or qualities exist within a subject.
- The "said of a subject" part explains how those properties or qualities can be used to describe or characterize the subject.

In your examples:
- **"David's mind knows law"**: Here, the attribute of knowing is present in the mind (a part of the substance), and this relationship is described in terms of David (the whole substance).
- **"David is alive"**: This indicates that "aliveness" is an attribute present in David's body and describes the overall state of David (the whole).

In summary, Aristotle's metaphysics sees substances as complex entities with interrelated parts, where the parts (like the mind and body) have attributes and functions that describe the whole substance. The classification helps in understanding how these attributes relate to the substance and each other.

>>23617820
ChatGPT

You forget the line that he clearly says that things that are in an individual substance are dependent on the substance and cannot exist apart from them. Moreover, Aristotle uses the word soul. So knowledge, a particular knowledge of grammar for example, exists in a substance and is also said in a general way, "knowledge".

>>23617843
Wouldn't there be a distinction between the particular knowledge of grammar and general knowledge of grammar too? What is the relationship between soul and substance, especially in terms of parts and definitions?

>>23611700
You're a little mixed up which is to be expected when studying Aristotle. When something has both the "present in" and "said of" relations it's a species or genus of a primary accident. So "this precise shade of orange" is simply present in. But "color" is both "present in" (because it's an accident, not existing independently) and "said of" (because it's not any particular shade of color but the universal 'color' in general). You could say the same thing about "orange" vs. "this particular shade".

As for the mind/body distinction - when David knows law, he knows by his soul, which is his form or essence (better to say essence because not all forms are essential forms). But the soul itself has parts - nutritive, sensitive, rational. But the parts all form one integrated whole because the essence of David necessarily involves ALL of these things (he talks about how this works, logically, in iirc the last lectio of De Anima 2). In the sentence "David is alive", "being alive" is part of David's essence because the soul is essentially alive. It's not an accident of David, it's part of what makes David David as opposed to a corpse. "Well then is it present in or said of?" It's said of because it's part of the universal "man" under which he falls. Also worth noting that Aristotle did not see the predication of essential elements as being predication at all, properly speaking, because they are what Kantians would call "analytic" or tautological, i.e. being "alive" is strictly implicit in the name "David", where some demonstration about a triangle is not strictly part of "having three sides" but follows from them and has to be mediately proven.

>is the body part of the essence of a person?
Yes insofar as it is actualized by the essence (as he says in Metaphysics many times the matter is in the logos of the composite). Body and soul form a unity. But considered as what is potential, i.e. considered qua matter, it is not part of the essence. In the same way if I draw a circle the extension through which the line runs is part of the "being" of the circle, and the abstraction "circle" is simply the actuality OF this extension. But "extension" considered in itself is NOT part of the circle but only insofar as it is actualized, and the essence "circularity" can be considered apart of from the concrete (albeit intelligibly concrete) circle.

> But we generally don't see a definition speak of mind, body, etc., even if it might be an implication of the fact that humans are rational animals, that animals are living creatures and thus animated bodies, etc.
The soul is simply the essence of something living. We don't refer to "forms" when we define either because they're presupposed in a definition. But this is an important point - the formula "rational animal" merely as a pair of words doesn't define anything, words and concepts are secondary to actual things. He talks about this especially in Post An.II but also in many other places (the opening of De Int, Meta 4 touches on it toward the end, etc.) So does "rational animal" actually describe everything that is in what is is to be man? No, of course not, Aristotle wrote 3 books on the soul and dozens on human nature (i.e. ethics and politics).

>Or is the "said of" element attempting to describe something about what body, minds, etc., are when they are most themselves (like energeia)? e.g. a living body is most itself when it is alive (and not when it is dead), a mind is most itself when it is actively thinking and grasping the object of its thought, etc.
Nope, they're describing what they are. A living body is ONLY itself when it is alive. And the human mind is not only active thinking but also the capacity for thought.

One little clarification when I said: "Also worth noting that Aristotle did not see the predication of essential elements as being predication at all, properly speaking" I was talking about definitions. 'essential elements' was vague of me.

>I'm not that guy, and I savaged him for autistically focusing on the Organon.
I autistically focused on the Organon for months before I read anything else and it served me well. Although working out all of those permutations of syllogism was a bit of a waste of time because he almost exclusively uses Pure-Necessary Barbara and the problems there are so obscure, still good training if nothing else.

>>23612919
>See, that's the typical interpretation. But it's not the interpretation I found here if you scroll down and see the chart: https://medium.com/@peterseanEsq/aristotle-grammar-and-reality-6b814efd24be
You can find a lot of bullshit when it comes to Aristotle. That chart is simply incorrect.
>Also, what about the relationship between a substance human being and a substance body/mind/etc.? How does that hang together?
The physical parts or elements of a thing are only present potentially. So for example a single cell in your body can be considered apart, but existing as a cell in a body it is part of one unified composite substance. The 'body' of the living person, considered apart from him as a living person, doesn't ackshually exist at all. But we can still speak of the 'body' because it's that by which the living thing is able to change (to be moving and resting, etc.) But all that is ackshually there is 1) the essence 2) the accidents.

>>23613311
>If so, then a person's hand can be thought of as a substance, regardless of whether or not it is part of a larger organism or whether it's severed from the rest of the body that it came from
He openly rejects exactly this example in more than one place. A hand can't exist apart from the body and if it did it would only be homonymously a hand. That doesn't mean the parts of a substance aren't real or can't be considered apart from themselves but ontologically they're parts of one unified substance and not substances in their own right (although the term 'substance' can be used to refer to them but homonymously to substance in the strict sense, and he makes this distinction in for example Meta 5).

>>23619151
> But all that is ackshually there is 1) the essence 2) the accidents.
And before someone says "oh no anon the essence is abstract", that isn't true, the essence of natural substances involves matter. And the essence apart from the primary substance is either a potential qualification of matter, or a universal form in the intellect.

>>23618395
>Wouldn't there be a distinction between the particular knowledge of grammar and general knowledge of grammar too?
A particular knowledge of grammar would be one single definition, proposition, conclusion, etc, that falls within the subject genus of grammar. So "don't use no double negatives" would be a particular within the broader subject.
>What is the relationship between soul and substance, especially in terms of parts and definitions?
The soul is the essence. Soul+body (i.e. matter) is the concrete person. The soul doesn't exist apart from the composite in reality unless you think Aristotle believed in immortality in some sense but I'm not gonna pretend to be able to solve that one. To define the substance "man" is to give a universal definition of soul and even this universal implicitly includes what Aquinas would call non-designated matter (i.e. the idea of "man" implies the presence of both soul and body). The soul, like any other natural substance, isn't really conceivable apart from matter (again unless man is an exception, even then it would be one part of the soul that was separable not the whole).

>>23616544
>I think this is where Aristotle's conception of hylomorphic substance starts to fall apart. Because on one hand, he recognizes substances as anything that could, in some intrinsic sense, be complete and for themselves. But on another hand, nothing enmattered is ever fully in control of its own destiny as it created and eventually destroyed.
No. Aristotle's conception of natural substance is not your vague notion that it could "in some instrinsic sense" (whatever that means) "be complete and for itself", it is simply for a thing to be the subject of accidents and to be apart from its accidents and this is the unity of matter and form. And if you say "why do I need substance? Why not just accidents and matter?" Because matter only exists potentially, it does not play the role of being a subject. So his conception of essence is logically necessary even if you want to try (and ultimately fail) to argue with him on whether "man" is a substance.

>>23619045
>It's not an accident of David, it's part of what makes David David as opposed to a corpse.

By that logic you can never say "David is dead" but only "David is not".

>>23620059
You can say "David is dead" but what you really mean is "David is not". Aristotle's logical analysis abstracts from ordinary usage.

Studying ancient logic is like studying ancient astronomy - a complete waste of time.

>>23619045
>(better to say essence because not all forms are essential forms).
Wait, so what are some non-essential forms?
>But "extension" considered in itself is NOT part of the circle but only insofar as it is actualized, and the essence "circularity" can be considered apart of from the concrete (albeit intelligibly concrete) circle.
Is this like "zooming in" and "zooming out" of the "layers" of what makes this circle a circle and what each "layer" contributes to this circle's being?
>I autistically focused on the Organon for months before I read anything else and it served me well. Although working out all of those permutations of syllogism was a bit of a waste of time because he almost exclusively uses Pure-Necessary Barbara and the problems there are so obscure, still good training if nothing else.
To be fair, that other person didn't demonstrate much knowledge about the Organon either, but that's neither here nor there.
>That doesn't mean the parts of a substance aren't real or can't be considered apart from themselves
So what are they, then, if they're not substances? What is the being of a part? Why can we consider a part intelligibly apart from a whole even if a part cannot exist without the whole?
>"in some instrinsic sense" (whatever that means) "be complete and for itself", it is simply for a thing to be the subject of accidents and to be apart from its accidents and this is the unity of matter and form.
So what is this whole shtick about energeia and entelecheia then? It's not just a thought experiment. It's a criteria for being, specifically being what something is and not being something else.
>it does not play the role of being a subject.
What is Aristotle's role for something being a subject (and considered separately from a substance since it takes a while for him to figure out why substance fills the role of subject)?

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>>23611700
yeah, mereology!

>>23620130
>Wait, so what are some non-essential forms?
White (of something that's not necessarily white). Moving (of something that's not necessarily moving). Five feet tall. Etc. All are forms but they're not substantial forms obviously.
>Is this like "zooming in" and "zooming out" of the "layers" of what makes this circle a circle and what each "layer" contributes to this circle's being?
Yes. The example of the circle and the "bare extensionality" that is the matter of the circle is in the Metaphysics. The extensionality of a circle is an example of "intelligible matter".
>So what are they, then, if they're not substances?
Nothing actually, only potentially. I don't have my book with me so I can't cite chapter and verse but I'm not trying to pull a fast one on you and pass of my weird theories as Aristotelianism, he talks about this in multiple places in the Metaphysics. To say that the hand is 'nothing actually' doesn't mean obviously that there is no hand, but that the hand can only exist as part of the living animal and as an element of that broader system.
>What is the being of a part?
Potential.
>Why can we consider a part intelligibly apart from a whole even if a part cannot exist without the whole?
If we intellectualize a part apart from the whole and intellectualize it fully we would necessarily understand it as part of that whole. Like if you had a "science of the hand" it would involve the hand's relation to the rest of the body, or even how the hand is used by human beings, etc. But of course we CAN consider it as a "mere hand", like if we were to think about the structure of its bones and so on. But such a "mere hand" does not actually exist in reality. You have hands that are parts of living animals, and severed hands that are only homonymously called hands at all (that's Aristotle's own example). But to make things even more confusing, as a matter of usage, the parts of substance are called substance. This is one of the things that makes Aristotle such a bitch to read, his words have multiple meanings that sometimes overlap and sometimes contradict each other. The distinction I'm talking about is in Meta 5 in the part on substance which is in the middle. BTW meta 5 is a book I wish I had read earlier on in my studies, it's not advanced metaphysics at all it's just a philosophical lexicon, and it was probably not part of the Metaphysics in the first place but got grafted in.
>So what is this whole shtick about energeia and entelecheia then?
Strictly speaking entelecheia refers to the actuality of change or motion while something is changing or moving but Aristotle generally uses it to refer to actuality in general. Energeia is simply the active manifestation of a thing's essence. But he uses these words nearly interchangeably, I've seen people even claim there is no distinction of meaning. Beyond that, I can't tell what you're asking. If you think I was suggesting that substance is just a thought experiment, I wasn't. (1/2)

>>23620130
>What is Aristotle's role for something being a subject
As far as the natural world goes, to be that in which accidents inhere primarily. Or if you mean "what is the thing that is the subject if it's not matter?" it's the composite of matter and form and it is by the matter that accidents can inhere. But as I keep trying to say, this is not a 'mix' of matter and form, 'there's the matter part and here's the form part', the matter is actualized by the form and only exists potentially. Matter only ever exists potentially - except we can speak loosely of wood being "matter for the house" and so on. But in itself the wood has its own matter.
>considered separately from a substance since it takes a while for him to figure out why substance fills the role of subject)?
Am I misunderstanding you? He says that primary substance = subject of accidents on like the first page of the Categories. Or do you mean "it takes a while for him to figure out HOW substance fills the role of subject", as in the role of matter?

>>23620256
>>23620282
It seems like a lot hangs on actuality and potentiality. How do you understand it? I've seen it portrayed as principles of: opposition, modality, privation, relation, unity, and/or movement.
>Strictly speaking entelecheia refers to the actuality of change or motion while something is changing or moving but Aristotle generally uses it to refer to actuality in general. Energeia is simply the active manifestation of a thing's essence. But he uses these words nearly interchangeably, I've seen people even claim there is no distinction of meaning. Beyond that, I can't tell what you're asking. If you think I was suggesting that substance is just a thought experiment, I wasn't.
So, the reason I bring up "entelecheia", something staying the same for itself, etc., as substances is because that's what a substance does in spite of change. It receives contraries but continues to persist. Right? So there's a way where we can expand the umbrella of substantiality to include parts and it helps to make sense of how Aristotle refers to other things as substance too, things that otherwise wouldn't make the cut if we take a strict enough criteria. At least, that's what I'm tracking. I'm interested to see how you would tear that apart lol.
>Am I misunderstanding you? He says that primary substance = subject of accidents on like the first page of the Categories. Or do you mean "it takes a while for him to figure out HOW substance fills the role of subject", as in the role of matter?
There's a point at the end of Physics Book I Chapter 7 (191a20) where Aristotle points out that it's not clear whether subject or form fills the role of substance, because the subject in question is matter (matter undergoes change in receiving forms). And it's obviously problematic because it flips the reason for substance on its head (what stays the same in spite of contraries)?

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>>23621808
Where do you want to start? If I say consciousness is said of you, then I would predicate things that inhere in consciousness. If I said consciousness was present in you, consciousness would be degrees of knowable.

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>>23623112
I'm waiting for a reply to >>23620606

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>>23620256
>>23620282
Are you a Bruell fan? Also, are you conflating qualities and forms?

>>23626989
I guess he never answered in that other thread, huh?

>>23620606
>Aristotle points out that it's not clear whether subject or form fills the role of substance
he says there what comes to be is a 'this'. if the subject is bookman the substance is the whole within the whole, aka whether bookman is refers to the man or refers to the book or the man is the book.

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dunno who's bumping the thread but I thank you for it long after I gave up on it