>>23919623
The question now arises as to whether there is a real fusion of distinctions during deep sleep or in those states inaccessible to aham comparable to it. It is wrong to assume that Ātman is really contaminated by differentiations, and that therefore one must reach that state of indistinction, known as mukti or Liberation, following a path of spiritual discipline. The truth is that our real nature is always free from all distinctions and differences, even when it appears stained and contaminated by them, as our innate ignorance makes us believe. Until ignorance ( avidyā ) has been swept away, we continue to imagine that differences remain, at least in potential form, even when nature repeatedly immerses us in the undifferentiated reality of the state of deep sleep and the other analogous states mentioned above. Thus Śaṃkara describes the grave error of judgment, typical of ordinary people:

>During the period of maintenance [and development] of the universe, due to false knowledge, it is found that empirical life develops in differentiation, although the Ātman is always devoid of distinctions; which confirms that it is an illusory perception similar to that of a dream. Thus, from the empirical point of view the same false knowledge leads us to believe that differentiation persists in a potential state even during pralaya. This refutes the objection that rebirth is possible even for the liberated, because in their case false knowledge has been completely destroyed by true Knowledge. BSŚBh II. 1. 9

>>23919626
SSSS:
>People who are in wakefulness possess avidyā . They imagine the existence of the “seed” of the world in deep sleep. In truth there is no seed there. If there were no seed when individuals become one with Brahman ( Sat ) in deep sleep and pralaya , then they could not come into the waking state and creation again. When they come back to that Reality, it would necessarily have to be admitted that there was a “seed” in deep sleep and pralaya . But this “seed” is only “not-knowing” the Reality. Not-knowing the Reality and the existence of the Reality are not at all contrary to the doctrine of Non-duality, because “not-knowing” is not a thing, it is only a mental form, which comes and goes with adhyāsa


>The removal of avidyā as upādhi takes place only through Knowledge and not otherwise. In deep sleep there is no knowledge, therefore the removal of non-knowledge through mere deep sleep is not possible. The absence of knowledge of the reality of adhyāsa is uncaused and has no cause; this is established by anubhava . In suṣupti there is no distinction between jīva and Brahman; in deep sleep, however, the proper nature of Brahman is unknown. Such a proper nature is experienced by all: how, then, can one imagine a distinction between jīva and Brahman there? This position is held by the Vivaraṇa but is not found in the Bhāṣya of Śaṃkara. By ordinary men, subject to adhyāsa , in ordinary view these claims are also advanced: “since there is no effect without a cause, considering the phenomenal world as an effect, there must be its cause even in deep sleep”. For this reason “ a power of differentiation connected with false knowledge is inferred ”. In reality, however, there is no power of differentiation: the differentiation is only imagined due to adhyāsa , and its cause is only misunderstanding and nothing else. The differentiation which is imagined due to adhyāsa comes with adhyāsa and goes with adhyāsa.

>In such a condition, Liberation proceeds only from the arising of Knowledge, and of that there is no doubt. The jīva is eternally of the same nature as Brahman. As the removal of ignorance comes only with the perception of the proper nature of Brahman, just so will Liberation follow the perception of the proper nature.

>>23919643
>There is considerable difference between the state of deep sleep and Liberation, though it is only Brahman without a second that exists in both. In deep sleep there is ignorance in the form of “not knowing” the Reality, whereas there is no ignorance at all in Liberation, though the being has become one with Brahman in both. Before going into deep sleep, the individual does not understand the oneness with Brahman. Everyone, without knowing that he is one with Brahman, becomes one naturally in deep sleep. Though there is a natural non-duality in deep sleep, the misunderstanding of Brahman with jīva is not (in that case) annulled by correct knowledge. This causes one to wake up in the same individuality. This misconception (whereby the individual believes that he has gone into deep sleep, and has been there for some time, existing at least potentially, and then returns to his present condition) exists in the mind, which is only an imagination due to adhyāsa . When adhyāsa is proved false and is contradicted by the true knowledge of Brahman it never returns.

>Question : It has been said that in suṣupti avidyā is non-understanding ( agrahaṇa ). Again, agrahaṇarūpāvidyā , ignorance which has the form of non-understanding, is a vṛtti of the manas , also called the internal instrument ( antaḥkaraṇa ). Therefore the presence of the antaḥkaraṇa must be admitted in deep sleep. The bhāṣyakāra has also held that “ (in deep sleep) the attainment of Reality takes place through the presence of seeds, due to which one returns ”; but therefore one thing is Brahman and one thing is the seed (which is a part of the modification of the antaḥkaraṇa ): then how can there be two things in Reality if Brahman is non-dual?

>Answer : There is no opposition here between the Reality ( tattva ) from the supreme standpoint ( paramārtha ) and the seed which is dependent on erroneous knowledge ( mithyājñāna ). Without being aware of their identity with Brahman in deep sleep, the jīvas “enter” Brahman. This “not knowing” Reality is the seed, which is imagined out of ignorance. This seed, projected by adhyāsa , does not actually exist. Therefore it is not opposed to the doctrine of Non-duality. Not knowing Brahman is not opposed to unity with Brahman.

>In reality Non-duality is experienced by all in deep sleep. There arises no evidence acquired through inference ( anumāna ) or any means of proof of anything used by man (in suṣupti ) which can be contrary to intuition.

>>23919646
>Question : Why [the thought that] “I am not aware of anything in sleep” cannot be a true memory? What is the reason behind this? It is vikalpa and not smṛti . What is meant by vikalpa ? Please explain this clearly.

>Answer : Smṛti is the experience that arises from previous impressions ( saṃskāra ). “I do not know anything in sleep” – this, to become smṛti – requires experience in the form of “I do not know anything” in deep sleep. But this is impossible, since the mind does not exist at all in deep sleep. Furthermore, states are not actual events in any particular series of time, and the time experienced in waking cannot be considered as the substratum of all three states. Therefore the memory (in waking, from the waking point of view) of sleep, from the paramārtha perspective , is not a real recollection. Therefore it is called vikalpa . Vikalpa means “an empty thing” ( vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ ) – like the horns of the hare or the son of the barren woman. These are mere vikalpas or conjectures, erroneous notions, for a hare has no horns at all nor is it ever the experience of anyone that a barren woman gives birth to children.

>In deep sleep the disidentification of the Self with the mind does not exist, because the mind is absent there. In sleep, the Ātman remains alone, without a second, a fact confirmed by our statements in waking life, such as “I slept happily”, “I was not aware of anything”. The jīva , in fact, was (in that condition) one with its own essential and blissful nature which is pure Consciousness. If it had not been Ānanda itself , it could not have come out with attestations testifying to the experience of full bliss that it had during deep sleep.

>>23919643
>Question : In the Mūlāvidyābhāṣya Vārtikaviruddhā it is argued that in the commentaries on the Prasthāna traya the non-duality of the true nature of Ātman is shown, which in deep sleep ( suṣupti ) is completely free from the limitations of avidyā . But, in the work Māṇḍūkyarahasya Vivṛti, Svāmī Satchidānandendra Sarasvatī Mahārājā has stated that: “ this avidyā has a double nature, that of the cause (kāraṇa) and that of the effect (kārya): among them that through which there is non-understanding (agrahaṇa) of the essence of the Self is called causal ignorance (kāraṇāvidyā), when the characteristics (dharma) of the state of deep sleep and of the one who is in it are superimposed on the Self ”. And Śaṃkarācārya states: “ therefore this condition consists in tapping into the Reality (Sat) in which the causal seeds [due to which one returns to the phenomenal world] are present ”.

>So how can one maintain that there is no avidyā in deep sleep? How can one maintain non-duality with respect to such a condition?

>Answer : Avidyā exists in three forms: 1) absence of knowledge ( agrahaṇa ), 2) wrong knowledge ( anyathāgrahaṇa ), 3) doubtful knowledge ( saṃśayagrahaṇa ). These are mental modifications of the nature of wrong notions or thoughts. They are called upādhis of the jīva . Due to these upādhis , one mistakenly takes Oneself to be an individual. These upādhis come and go without any reason. The question of reason and cause arises only after the coming of these upādhis . Since the individual is the result of these upādhis (called adhyāsa ), he cannot conceive the cause of adhyāsa . If these upādhis are removed from the real knowledge of the Ātman , then they do not return. In deep sleep the absence of these upādhis is experienced by everyone . Conversely, the presence of these upādhis is experienced by everyone in waking and dream. “ That which is non-existent cannot be found ” ( BSŚBh IV. 1. 2). The individual is always Brahman. Because of these upādhis, the latter is misunderstood and mistaken for the jīva . “Now, since both in waking and in dream, by virtue of identification with the superimpositions such as body, etc., it is as if the acquisition of another nature takes place, it is precisely in view of this that one speaks of the realisation of one's own true nature, since there is the cessation of that [state of erroneous association with a false superimposed nature] brought about precisely by deep sleep. Therefore, it is not in accordance with reason to maintain that in the state of deep sleep identification with the Being sometimes occurs and sometimes does not occur” ( BSŚBh III. 2. 7). The individual appears as if he were different from Brahman in the waking and dream states of consciousness because of the upādhis with which he appears to be associated...

>>23919677
>...In deep sleep there are no upādhis and therefore the individual is said to be one with Brahman. In truth, he is always Brahman, but, due to adhyāsa, he wrongly knows himself as if he were an individual. It is therefore wrong to say that the individual is absorbed in Brahman at one time and not at another. He is always Brahman by nature. One's own nature cannot come and go. “ The condition of deep sleep is verily Ātman ” ( ātmaiva suṣūptisthānam, BSŚBhIII. 2. 7). The deep sleep of the individual is actually Brahman or Ātman . This answer is given through the vision which removes the provisional superimposition ( apavādadṛṣṭyā ).

>The individual jīva did not know that he was already Brahman before going into deep sleep, that is, before (apparently) merging into Brahman. The “non-knowledge” of the Ātman had not been removed by the real knowledge of Brahman in the waking state. This “non-knowledge” is the “seed” [of the return from suṣupti ].

>“ Therefore (in deep sleep) the attainment of Reality takes place through the presence of seeds ,” so stated the bhāṣyakāra . This “not-knowing” cannot belong to Reality. It belongs to the jīva . Whenever the individual returns to the waking or dream states, these so-called “not-knowing” and “wrong-knowledge” also return spontaneously as his upādhi.

>“ … thus, my dear, though immersed in Reality, they do not know: «We are immersed in Reality» ” ( ChU VI. 9. 2); “ Through the disappearance of the forms due to the upādhi, (the sleeping one) reabsorbed in Himself does not know Reality ” ( BSŚBh III.2.7). Individuals “become” Brahman but are not aware of being Brahman or Reality.

>This answer is given from the point of view of the deliberate superimposition and attribution ( adhyāropadṛṣṭyā ) of states to the jīva.

>Upādhis do not exist in deep sleep . Therefore it is correct to say that there the jīva knows nothing else as it is one with Sat, i.e. with Brahman. It is in the experience of all that there is no ignorance in deep sleep. Ignorance, which is that which projects duality, does not exist in deep sleep. Śaṃkara has stated this in his commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (IV. 3. 32): “And there where ignorance, responsible for the projection of objects as other than Self, is suspended, that is, still in deep sleep, where any object distinct from the other through ignorance is absent, there what and through what can one see, smell or know? Therefore, “completely enveloped by the self-conscious Self ( BU IV. 3. 21), which is by nature self-luminous, ‘he becomes’ infinite, perfectly pacified …””. “ He, free from individuality, has the luminous nature of a Deva ” ( ChU VI. 8. 1). So also in the commentary's expression it is said that the upādhi disappears in deep sleep.

>>23919684
>No statement contrary to experience becomes valid. The avasthās of waking, dream and deep sleep should be considered according to their respective experiences in their own domains, and no one should imagine or make inferences about the other two states from the standpoint of waking ( sārvatrilokānubhavānusareṇaiva jāgradādyavasthāḥ ).

>>23919623
Śaṃkara a SSS on the Śruti, is the infallability of the Śruti really intended to imply the permanence of a physical book written on birch leaf etc. alone?

>We say authoritative (referring to the śruti as śabda pramāṇa) because the Upanishad doctrine, understood as śabda , or as “the word”, is considered the ultimate and most elevated instrument of knowledge ( antyapramāṇa ), much more than the logical deduction ( anumāna ) used by us up to now. The śruti, in fact, is the doctrine handed down by those liberated ( mukta ) who have directly experienced the supreme Truth and who have transmitted it as an oral teaching, in the form of Upanishads , through the generations of disciples. This nature clearly distinguishes it from the “revealed” sacred texts. Regarding the latter, we read in Śaṃkara: “ Objection: Even the opponent of the Vedānta can appeal to the authority of the Āgama [a tantric text, in this case the Pāśupata Tantra] which has been revealed by the omniscient God. Answer: No, because in that case there would be the repugnant error of mutual dependence ( anyonya āśraya doṣa ) , since the authority of the Āgama must rest on the omniscience of the God who revealed it, and the omniscience of the God must rest on the authority of the revealed Āgama ” ( BSŚBh II. 2. 38). Svāmī Satchidānandendra comments on this quotation as follows: “ It is obvious that Śaṃkara here refers to the Bible, the Qur'an, the Zend Avesta and the sacred books of religions, because they all claim that their inspired nature depends on weak argumentation based on a vicious circle, exactly as it happens with the Āgamas of Hinduism ” (Svāmī Satchidānandendra Sarasvatī, Intuition of Reality , Holenarsipur, APK, 1995, pp. 8-9). Note that śruti , exactly like śrāvaṇa , means hearing. Hearing of what? Of the śabda , that is, the oral teaching of Vedānta .

>>23919729
Guénon also wrote on the perpetuity of the Veda in pg. 96 of his symbols of sacred science:

>It is to be noted, on the other hand, that each element of the hieroglyph is also shaped like the conch (shankha), which obviously has a direct relationship with the Waters and which is likewise represented as containing the seeds of the future cycle during the periods of pralaya or 'outward dissolution' of the world. This conch encloses the primordial and unperishable sound (akshara), the monosyllable OM which, by its three elements (mātrās), is the essence of the triple Veda; and it is thus that the Veda subsists perpetually, being in itself before all the worlds but as it were hidden or enveloped during the cosmic catyclysms which separate the different cycles, to be subsequently manifested anew at the beginning of each of them.1 Furthermore, the schema can be completed as being that of the akshara itself, the straight line (a) covering and closing the conch (u), which contains within it the point (m), or the essential principle of all beings.9 By its horizontality, the straight line then represents at the same time the 'surface of the Waters', that is, the substantial setting in which the seeds will be developed ( this development being represented in Oriental symbolism by the blooming of the lotus flower) after the end of the intermediary period of obscuration (sandhya) between two cycles. At this stage, keeping to the same schematic representation, we will have a figure that can be described as the turning round of the conch, as it opens to allow the seed to escape along the straight line now oriented in a vertical downward direction which is that of the development of manifestation starting from its unmanifested principle.


1:
>The affirmation of the perpetuity of the Veda must be linked dlrectly to the cosmological theory of the prlmordiallty of sound (shabda) among the sensible qualities (as the quality that belongs to ether, Akasha, which ts the llrst of the elements): and this theory must Itself be related to that of 'creation by the Word' In the Western traditions. The Primordial sound Is the divine Word 'by which all things were made'.

>>23919626
>>During the period of maintenance [and development] of the universe, due to false knowledge, it is found that empirical life develops in differentiation, although the Ātman is always devoid of distinctions; which confirms that it is an illusory perception similar to that of a dream. Thus, from the empirical point of view the same false knowledge leads us to believe that differentiation persists in a potential state even during pralaya. This refutes the objection that rebirth is possible even for the liberated, because in their case false knowledge has been completely destroyed by true Knowledge. BSŚBh II. 1. 9
This is a false translation of that passage which is actually misquoting it to falsely represent it as saying the exact opposite of what it says. Is this by SSS or by a later SSSfag?

You literally can't make this up lmao. The level of delusion of SSSfags is only matched by their shamelessness and dishonesty.

>>23919626
>>23919760
The genuine text from the Shankara Bhashya on 2-1-9 is as follows:

And it was pointed out that if all distinctions are obliterated during resorption there will be no reasonable ground regulating the re-emergence of creation with the usual differences. That too is untenable for the very reason that there is a supporting illustration. As in natural slumber and samadhi (absorption in divine consciousness), though there is a natural eradication of differences, still owing to the persistence of the unreal nescience, differences occur over again when one wakes up, similarly it can also happen here. Bearing on this is the Upanisadic text, "All these beings, when they become one with Existence (during sleep), do not know, `We have become one with Existence'. Whatever they might have been here-tiger, lion, wolf, pig, worm, butterfly, gnat, or mosquito-they become so over again (after returning)" (Ch. VI. ix. 3). As during the state of the continuance of the world, it is seen that like dream, there are empirical differentiations under the influence of unreal ignorance, despite the existence of the supreme Self as an undifferentiated entity, so also we can infer that even in dissolution, a power of diversification, possessed by unreal nescience, persists, Hereby is answered the objection that free souls may become subjected to rebirth. For (in their cases) unreal nescience stands eradicated by full illumination. And the other objection that was implied at the end that even in dissolution the universe will continue in the supreme Brahman with all its diversification, that too is dismissed by the non-admission of such a position. Hence this view of the Upanisads is quite logical.

Dishonest SSSfags like whoever OP is quoting this from twist and misquote this passage to create the lie that Shankara says that "from the empirical point of view the same false knowledge leads us to believe that differentiation persists in a potential state even during pralaya", i.e the passage is being misquoted to support the SSS talking point that avidya in sushupti is only imagined from the POV of the waking state but it isn't really present in sushupti. Meanwhile, in fact in Shankara's actual written text Shankara is stating that a false nescience with a power of diversification persists in shushupti and pralaya and that this accounts for remergence, which is what the Advaita traditionalists say and is the opposite of what SSS says.

What will non-initiates achieve with this insane babble? Do you even speak fluent sanskrit? And I mean speak, not just writing and reading. It would be of the most extreme arrogance for someone not initiated in devanagari to try to expose.

>>23919760
>>23919765


Your chosen translation:
>As during the state of the continuance of the world, it is seen that like dream, there are empirical differentiations under the influence of unreal ignorance, despite the existence of the supreme Self as an undifferentiated entity, so also we can infer that even in dissolution, a power of diversification, possessed by unreal nescience, persists, Hereby is answered the objection that free souls may become subjected to rebirth. For (in their cases) unreal nescience stands eradicated by full illumination. And the other objection that was implied at the end that even in dissolution the universe will continue in the supreme Brahman with all its diversification, that too is dismissed by the non-admission of such a position. Hence this view of the Upanisads is quite logical.

SSSS:
>During the period of maintenance [and development] of the universe, due to false knowledge, it is found that empirical life develops in differentiation, although the Ātman is always devoid of distinctions; which confirms that it is an illusory perception similar to that of a dream. Thus, from the empirical point of view the same false knowledge leads us to believe that differentiation persists in a potential state even during pralaya. This refutes the objection that rebirth is possible even for the liberated, because in their case false knowledge has been completely destroyed by true Knowledge. BSŚBh II. 1. 9

Your Translation:
>And it was pointed out that if all distinctions are obliterated during resorption there will be no reasonable ground regulating the re-emergence of creation with the usual differences. That too is untenable for the very reason that there is a supporting illustration. As in natural slumber and samadhi (absorption in divine consciousness), though there is a natural eradication of differences, still owing to the persistence of the unreal nescience, differences occur over again when one wakes up, similarly it can also happen here. Bearing on this is the Upanisadic text, "All these beings, when they become one with Existence (during sleep), do not know, `We have become one with Existence'. Whatever they might have been here-tiger, lion, wolf, pig, worm, butterfly, gnat, or mosquito-they become so over again (after returning)" (Ch. VI. ix. 3).

>>23919819
SSSS
>This is not a weak point at all, because there is [indisputable] evidence on this point: just as in the case of one who has gone into deep sleep, samādhi or any other similar state where there is eternal absence of distinction, the distinction reappears as before as soon as he wakes up, for the simple reason that false knowledge has not been eliminated, so it can also happen even in this case. There is the following śruti to confirm this: “All these beings have become one with the Pure Being, but they are not aware that they have become one with the Pure Being. Whatever they were previously, whether tiger, lion, wolf, boar, insect, butterfly, horsefly or mosquito, they become that again.” BSŚBh II. 1. 9

Ive read both passages over, and I cant figure out where the clear distortion is?
You need to be more specific.

>>23919765
> "from the empirical point of view the same false knowledge leads us to believe that differentiation persists in a potential state even during pralaya",
Why dont you bring up the sanskrit, "potential state" is an accurate translation of what is in your translation "power of diversification" is it not? We can go back to the original sanskrit. Nothing about "potential state" and "power of diversification" seems to imply some distinct mutually exclusive meaning which only SSS implies. Of course these are both english translations, which is why the commentary put in OP alongside the text also further explains the context of the quotes. Still that "potential state (to manifest differentiation by adhyasa etc.)" Is dishonest and delusional when compared with "power (of differentiation)" doesnt follow. Both potency and power in english are not so divergent in meaning as to lead to the sort of mishap you are implying.

Again bring up the sanskrit text.

>>23919765
>Meanwhile, in fact in Shankara's actual written text Shankara is stating that a false nescience with a power of diversification persists in shushupti and pralaya and that this accounts for remergence, which is what the Advaita traditionalists say and is the opposite of what SSS says.
Read your translation again:

>And the other objection that was implied at the end that even in dissolution the universe will continue in the supreme Brahman with all its diversification, that too is dismissed by the non-admission of such a position. Hence this view of the Upanisads is quite logical.

Does he not himself refute the continuance of any differentiation in dissolution? Again SSSS accepts avidya or a seed of of ignorance in deep sleep, only that that seed is the mere not-knowing (agrahana) which quite obviously when corrected leads to the same differentiation ceasing. Shankara refuted
"the other objection that was implied at the end that even in dissolution the universe will continue in the supreme Brahman with all its diversification, that too is dismissed by the non-admission of such a position."

>>23919814
>what will non-initiates achieve with this insane babble
Clearly nothing, the nature of the initiatic secret is that it is incommunicable and independent of appearances. Such that even if an unqualified person were to go and join some organization it would be fully possible that they could remain in the dark regardless of all their apparent understandings and learnings. The method of vedanta is to remove superimposition since Brahman is by "definition" that which is unsublatable. Regardless of that, reflecting on these subjects like the three states, knowledge and ignorance can be of use in preparing a person to rise above whatever contingency remains in empirical understandings. It is simply a matter of intellectual ability, desire for knowledge etc. You dont have to appeal to "initiation"

>>23919843
>leads to the same differentiation ceasing
"Ceasing" does not imply that it ever existed, afterall you cannot negate something which is sat/truly existent. Thats the thing, not-knowing is not a seperate existent substance it is merely the absence of knowing, light dispels darkness.

>>23919858
By the way Advaita Vedanta and this purely intellectual approach is not the same as all forms of initiation indiscriminately, some are in stages and rely on subtle actions even more so than others. For example in different sufi tariqas in the west especially, some sensations may be induced and the person may be convinced that those sensations are signs of realization. How all those things work is on a different level to whats being discussed here. So initiation (whatever you are envisioning that is) is not required to merely discuss and reflect on the knowledge here. The traditional vedanta acknowledges the stages approach but that is only the point of departure, arguably dvaita and visitadvaita are more inline with those other approaches.

Can someone catch me up on what SSS(S) and BSSBh are?

>>23919914
Here to catch up if youre interested in the topic
https://www.advaita-vision.org/mulavidya-real-or-unreal/#:~:text=stating%20that%20even%20there%20(i.e.,D.B.

https://www.advaita-vedanta.org/archives/advaita-l/2007-March/018450.html
https://www.advaita-vision.org/ssss-and-ignorance/
https://www.advaita-vision.org/on-the-teaching-of-ssss/
https://www.advaita-vision.org/in-praise-of-sss/

A question and answer from swami paramarthananda this

Q: Namaste Swamiji,

I know you are busy with important things, but I was hoping you might have some time to answer a question for me.

Swamiji, you have said that Ishvara projects this world and all the jivas' minds, and this has been likened to the dream example. I wanted to ask: Is this waking experience like a dream? Specifically, regarding its substance, I understand from Atmabodha that the substance is Mula Avidya or ignorance. Does this mean that this whole world and everything in it simply appears like a dream and is ultimately substanceless?

A: Yes. From the standpoint of Paramarthika Brahman the waking world is SUBSTANCELESS, exactly like a dream is substanceless to the jiva upon waking. The substance of the cosmos is avidya, and therefore from the stand point of paramarthika brahman it is substanceless, exactly like a dream.

You will see if you study advaita enough, especially through the line of swami Dayananda and other traditional authors like swami Chandrashekharendra Saraswati VIII
That ultimately interms of Paramartha Absolute Reality, SSS views are compatible and perfectly logical, its only more intellectually subtle (yet even in that it is important)

The other anon slanders him continuously as counterfeit, even a purposeful mistranslator of scriptures (as if he had malicious intent) but when it comes down to it, that anon has no point, since he selectively reads.

>>23919974
My bad
Only the following was a quotation


>Q: Namaste Swamiji,

>I know you are busy with important things, but I was hoping you might have some time to answer a question for me.

>Swamiji, you have said that Ishvara projects this world and all the jivas' minds, and this has been likened to the dream example. I wanted to ask: Is this waking experience like a dream? Specifically, regarding its substance, I understand from Atmabodha that the substance is Mula Avidya or ignorance. Does this mean that this whole world and everything in it simply appears like a dream and is ultimately substanceless?

>A: Yes. From the standpoint of Paramarthika Brahman the waking world is SUBSTANCELESS, exactly like a dream is substanceless to the jiva upon waking. The substance of the cosmos is avidya, and therefore from the stand point of paramarthika brahman it is substanceless, exactly like a dream.

I dont want to make it seem as if my extra comment came from the swami

>>23919914
Oh also
BSSBh is just an abbreviation for the Brahma Sutra Shankara Bhashya

>>23919974
>Only great men (magn+animus), above all others, can be the butt of bitter attacks – be it personal or to their output or works – as was the case with Hujwiri, 6th Buddhist Patriarch, Jesus of Nazareth and, in other realms, Shakespeare in England, Cervantes and Lope de Vega in Spain – and so many others. Such was also the case with, to me the best Advaitist writer of the 20th Cent., Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati. The attacks or resistance to accept their views is often motivated by envy. As it has been well-documented, there was initial resistance to accept or agree with the notion of mulavidya in the early work of Swamiji (SSS from now on) as he unfolded it.

>The first to accept his account or elucidation was Ananthamurthy Sastry: ‘I realized that I should pay attention to the basic texts more than [to] the commentaries, and now I come to the realization that the opinion of Sharma (SSS) is the opinion of the Bhasyakara and is in keeping with the Shastra and Anubhava… But the other scholars stopped coming for the discussions on Mulavidya from then on’.

>‘Inspired by a verse of the Bhavagad Gita, Swamiji commenced writing on ‘how the tradition of Shankara is based on this adhyaropa and apavada, how the other prakriyas are found embedded in this, and how to consider it as a common methodology. Is there any authenticity in the commentary of Shankara for all this, how people who took to logic and argumentation deviated from this path? Such people have been in the position of having a jewel box but having lost the key’. – ‘Contribution of Saccidanandendra Saraswathi to 20th Century Advaita’, S. Ranganath, p.27.

>The above very brief account is reminiscent of an earlier attack on Shankara by Sri Aurobindo, who wrote among other things, ‘three times God laughed at Shankara, first when he returned to burn the corpse of his mother, again, when he commented on Isha Upanishad, and the third time when he stormed about India preaching inaction’. – (According to Sri Aurobindo the contents of the Isha Upanishad brings home the ‘uncompromising reconciliation of uncompromising extremes’. – cf. Prasthanathraya, Vol ll, V. Panoli, p. 31.)

>>23919819
>>23919821
Looking over again the only real differences in the translation are "unreal ignorance" vs. "false knowledge" and then word ordering


>As during the state of the continuance of the world, it is seen that like dream, there are empirical differentiations under the influence of unreal ignorance, despite the existence of the supreme Self as an undifferentiated entity, so also we can infer that even in dissolution, a power of diversification, possessed by unreal nescience, persists, Hereby is answered the objection that free souls may become subjected to rebirth. For (in their cases) unreal nescience stands eradicated by full illumination.

here you are maybe misreading this sentence "As during the state of the continuance of the world, it is seen that like dream, there are empirical differentiations under the influence of unreal ignorance, despite the existence of the supreme Self as an undifferentiated entity, so also we can infer that even in dissolution, a power of diversification, possessed by unreal nescience, persists, Hereby is answered the objection that free souls may become subjected to rebirth." and taking it to mean the inference (that power of diversification remains in pralaya) is necessary to imply that free souls may be not become bound again, however the opposite seems to be intended. As the "power of diversification, possessed by unreal nescience, persists" only so much as
"during the state of the continuance of the world, it is seen that like dream, there are empirical differentiations under the influence of unreal ignorance," which would clearly make liberation impossible!


>During the period of maintenance [and development] of the universe, due to false knowledge, it is found that empirical life develops in differentiation, although the Ātman is always devoid of distinctions; which confirms that it is an illusory perception similar to that of a dream. Thus, from the empirical point of view the same false knowledge leads us to believe that differentiation persists in a potential state even during pralaya. This refutes the objection that rebirth is possible even for the liberated because in their case false knowledge has been completely destroyed by true Knowledge.

The extra part you include from your translation even further confirms what SSS and his followers are saying, that power of diversification/the potential state to manifest as diverse does not remain in Pralaya.
>And the other objection that was implied at the end that even in dissolution the universe will continue in the supreme Brahman with all its diversification, that too is dismissed by the non-admission of such a position. Hence this view of the Upanisads is quite logical.

>>23919765
>Shankara says that "from the empirical point of view the same false knowledge leads us to believe that differentiation persists in a potential state even during pralaya", i.e the passage is being misquoted to support the SSS talking point that avidya in sushupti is only imagined from the POV of the waking state but it isn't really present in sushupti. Meanwhile, in fact in Shankara's actual written text Shankara is stating that a false nescience with a power of diversification persists in shushupti and pralaya and that this accounts for remergence, which is what the Advaita traditionalists say and is the opposite of what SSS says.
That makes no sense?
see >>23920137
Shankara is saying that if it were true that Unreal nescience/False Knowledge persisted during Pralaya then free souls would be subjected to rebirth.

But clearly according to the text only
>As during the state of the continuance of the world, it is seen that like dream, there are empirical differentiations under the influence of unreal ignorance, despite the existence of the supreme Self as an undifferentiated entity,
So
>also we can infer that even in dissolution, a power of diversification, possessed by unreal nescience, persists,
Such that
>Hereby is answered the objection that free souls may become subjected to rebirth.
For
>(in their cases) unreal nescience stands eradicated by full illumination.
>And the other objection that was implied at the end that even in dissolution the universe will continue in the supreme Brahman with all its diversification, that too is dismissed by the non-admission of such a position.
You are implying the opposite and saying that
>at the end that even in dissolution the universe will continue in the supreme Brahman with all its diversification
Which is only as real as
>the state of the continuance of the world, it is seen that like dream, there are empirical differentiations under the influence of unreal ignorance, despite the existence of the supreme Self as an undifferentiated entity,

It seems clear you are yourself objecting the Shankara's position, by proposing that even in dissolution the power which supports the universe with all its diversification will continue which according to Shankara "too is dismissed by the non-admission of such a position. "

You accuse SSS and SSSfags of being delusional, mistranslating the text and so on. but it seems you are not even able to read the translation you yourself have provided here.

By
>>23920137
and
>>23920153
This
>Meanwhile, in fact in Shankara's actual written text Shankara is stating that a false nescience with a power of diversification persists in shushupti and pralaya and that this accounts for remergence, which is what the Advaita traditionalists say and is the opposite of what SSS says
stands disproven and is mere postulation which shankara never gave any admission to

In your translation:
>And the other objection that was implied at the end that even in dissolution the universe will continue in the supreme Brahman with all its diversification, that too is dismissed by the non-admission of such a position.
And in the perfectly clear "SSSfag" translation in the earlier part of the excerpt:

>As During the period of maintenance [and development] of the universe, due to false knowledge, it is found that empirical life develops in differentiation, although the Ātman is always devoid of distinctions; which confirms that it is an illusory perception similar to that of a dream. Thus, from the empirical point of view the same false knowledge leads us to believe that differentiation persists in a potential state even during pralaya.

And yours:
>As during the state of the continuance of the world, it is seen that like dream, there are empirical differentiations under the influence of unreal ignorance, despite the existence of the supreme Self as an undifferentiated entity, so also we can infer that even in dissolution, a power of diversification, possessed by unreal nescience, persists

Notice how you seem to have ignored the "As" and "so" which in english functions like "Only If" "therefore" etc.

Even ignoring that, how are you then interpreting "This refutes the objection that rebirth is possible even for the liberated, because in their case false knowledge has been completely destroyed by true Knowledge."

or
>"Hereby is answered the objection that free souls may become subjected to rebirth. For (in their cases) unreal nescience stands eradicated by full illumination."

As by ignoring the former argument it connect tot he rest of the sentence, how could unreal ignorance be eradicated? Only so far as it is absent just as the illusory dream perception is also absent.

>>23919819
Your cope is hilarious. I can hardly believe you doubled down on such a deceit, but then you are an SSSfag after all so I really shouldn't be surprised. It's abundantly clear from the context, what Shankara in saying in that passage.

BSSB 2-1-9 is providing the rejoinder to the view of the opponent explicated by BSSB 2-1-8:

8. Since in dissolution there is the predicament of the cause becoming just like that effect, therefore this (theory that Brahman is the material cause)
becomes incongruous.

To this the opponent makes this rejoinder. If it be admitted that this creation, possessed of grossness, parts, insentience, limitation, impurity, etc., has Brahman as Its material cause, then during merger, i.e. dissolution, when the course of creation is reversed and the effect becomes indistinguishable from the cause, it will taint the cause with its own attributes. Thus since in this way arises the possibility of Brahman's becoming tainted during dissolution by the impurities etc. of creation, the Upanisadic view that the omniscient Brahman is the material cause of the universe is incongruous. There is also another absurdity. When all differences become obliterated, there will be no possibility of a re-emergence with a division between the experiencers and the objects of experience, since there can be no fixity of rules to guide the new creation. Besides, there will be this impropriety: If it be admitted that the experiencing souls can be reborn after they have become unified with supreme Brahman during dissolution when even the results of their past actions become obliterated, then there will arise the possibility of even the free souls being reborn. If on the contrary it be held that even in dissolution this world maintains its distinction from the supreme Brahman, then there will be no possibility of dissolution; and yet there can be no effect that is nondifferent from the cause. In this way this is all inconsistent to be sure.

The opponent here is specifically speaking of Pralaya and is saying that in the position of Vedanta that Brahman would be tainted by any remaining residue in Pralaya and also that things cannot emerge again; but then this reasoning is rejected in BSSB 2-1-9, which Shankara explains as refuting the prima facie argument against the Vedantists position which is presented in 2-1-8:

>>23920413

9. But that cannot be so on account of the existence of supporting illustration.

Vedantin : The answer here is: There is certainly nothing incongruous in our point of view. As for the argument that when the effect merges in the cause, it will tarnish the cause with its own drawbacks, that is unacceptable.
Why?
For there are illustrations to substantiate this; there are illustrations to show that even though the effects merge in their causes, they do not pollute the latter with their own peculiarities. For instance, such products as plates etc., fashioned out of the material earth, have the peculiarities of being high, medium, and flat during their separate existence; but when they become reabsorbed into their original substance, they do not transfer their individual features to it. Nor do such products as necklaces etc., fashioned out of gold, transfer their individual peculiarities to gold during their merger into it. The host of living creatures of four classes, emerging from earth, do not transmit their individual characteristics to the earth during their absorption into it. But there is no such illustration in support of your point of view. Resorption itself will be an impossibility if the effect should persist in the cause together with its peculiarities. And though cause and effect are non-different, the effect has the nature of that cause and not vice versa, which fact we shall state under the aphorism, "The non-difference of the effect from the cause is known from words like `origin"' (II. i. 14). And your argument that the effect will pollute the cause during resorption does not go very far; for the position is the same even during the state of continuance (of creation), since the cause and effect are admitted to be non-different. The effect is recognized to be equally non-different from the cause during all the three periods of time according to the Upanisadic texts like the following: " ... and this all are the Self" (Br. II. iv. 6), "All this is but the Self" (Ch. VII. xxv. 2), "All this that is in front is but Brahman, the immortal" (Mu. II. ii. 11), "All this is certainly Brahman" (Ch. III. xiv. 1). The way that the objection has to be met there (during continuance) by holding that the cause is not affected by the product and its characteristics, these being superimposed on the cause by nescience, is equally to be followed in the case of dissolution as well. Moreover, there are parallel instances.

>>23920414
As a magician himself is not affected at any time-past, present, or future-by the magic conjured up by himself, it being unreal, so also the supreme Self is not affected by this world which is a delusion. As a dreamer, remaining the same under all conditions, is not affected by the delusion of dreaming, just because that delusion does not persist in him during the states of wakefulness and sleep, so also the witness of the three states, who ever remains the same, is not touched by the three variable states. This appearance of the supreme Self in identity with the three states is a mere superimposition, as in the case of the rope appearing as a snake etc

With regard to this it is said by the teacher Gaudapada, versed in the traditional views of Vedanta, "When the individual sleeping under the influence of beginningless Maya is awakened, then he realizes the birthless, sleepless, dreamless, non-dual (turiya)" (Ma. Ka. I. 16). Thus the objection that was raised that in resorption, the cause, like the effect will be open to the defects of grossness etc., has no validity. And it was pointed out that if all distinctions are obliterated during resorption there will be no reasonable ground regulating the re-emergence of creation with the usual differences. That too is untenable for the very reason that there is a supporting illustration. As in natural slumber and samadhi (absorption in divine consciousness), though there is a natural eradication of differences, still owing to the persistence of the unreal nescience, differences occur over again when one wakes up, similarly it can also happen here. Bearing on this is the Upanisadic text, "All these beings, when they become one with Existence (during sleep), do not know, `We have become one with Existence'. Whatever they might have been here-tiger, lion, wolf, pig, worm, butterfly, gnat, or mosquito-they become so over again (after returning)" (Ch. VI. ix. 3). As during the state of the continuance of the world, it is seen that like dream, there are empirical differentiations under the influence of unreal ignorance, despite the existence of the supreme Self as an undifferentiated entity, so also we can infer that even in dissolution, a power of diversification, possessed by unreal nescience, persists, Hereby is answered the objection that free souls may become subjected to rebirth. For (in their cases) unreal nescience stands eradicated by full illumination. And the other objection that was implied at the end that even in dissolution the universe will continue in the supreme Brahman with all its diversification, that too is dismissed by the non-admission of such a position. Hence this view of the Upanisads is quite logical.

>>23920415
There is absolutely nothing in there talking about how "Thus, from the empirical point of view the same false knowledge leads us to believe that differentiation persists in a potential state even during pralaya".

The opponent is saying that in Pralaya nothing can re-emerge, and Shankara rejects that view by answering it, just as he does elsewhere, that the re-emergence from pralaya, sushupti and samadhi is explained by the persistance of a false avidya with the power of differentiation. Pralaya is the original dilemma in question being addressed, and Shankara answers it by affirming avidya in seed-form in sushupti and by saying the same thing is also true viz. reemergence from both sushupti and yogic samadhi. And indeed, this is the only reasonable and coherent way to make sense of what Shankara writes here, because something that is not genuinely present in shushupti/pralaya cannot provide any explanatory value of how reemergence occurs, only something that is genuinely present can account for this. Some mistaken notion of something being present in shushupti/pralaya based on the waking state that does not correspond to anything that is actually present in shushupti/pralaya cannot of course provide any explanation for how reemergence occurs, because being entirely absent, it would have no influence upon the fact of reemergence whatsoever.

In the actual sentence that Shankara writes and which SSS deceitfully twists to his own ends, when he writes " As during the state of the continuance of the world, it is seen that like dream, there are empirical differentiations under the influence of unreal ignorance, despite the existence of the supreme Self as an undifferentiated entity, so also we can infer that even in dissolution, a power of diversification, possessed by unreal nescience, persists", Shankara is just saying that aviyda is responsible for empirical differentiations in both waking and dreams, and that this same avidya with the power to bring about differentiations remains in sleep just as its also present in the other states. He says absolutely nothing about this being a false notion or a mistaken, i.e. that the avidya in question is not actually present. The passage is merely saying the presence of avidya in sushupti is CONSISTENT WITH it being present in the other states too, and Shankara is clearly presenting that as being a correct viewpoint, since it is this avidya in sushupti which Shankara presents as answering the objection raised against Vedanta in 2-1-8.

>>23920418
The part that SSS inserts about "from the empirical point of view the same false knowledge leads us to believe that differentiation persists in a potential state" is entirely a fabrication by SSS and does not occur in the text, and it has an entirely different semantic meaning than what Shankara actually writes, it conveys the opposite of what Shankara actually writes. Apte translates the passage just like Gambhirananda does too, so it's not just a quirk of one translation. SSS is just making shit up because he is a serial liar.

There is a world of difference between saying:

"Just as X is present in A & B, X is also present in C as well, and this is the correct view that answers your objection"

Vs

"False knowledge based on A leads us to believe (wrongly) that X is present in C"

Shankara clearly states the first, and not the latter statement.

>>And the other objection that was implied at the end that even in dissolution the universe will continue in the supreme Brahman with all its diversification, that too is dismissed by the non-admission of such a position. Hence this view of the Upanisads is quite logical.
>Does he not himself refute the continuance of any differentiation in dissolution?
All he is saying there is that avidya remains in an indistinct, undifferentiated form (that has the power or potential of differentiating during reemergence), not that it's entirely absent. So, the the purvakashin's charge that the universe remains with all its diversity in pralaya is answered doubly, both by Shankara saying that its present in an undifferentiated form and not with all its particularities being present in a diversified form, and also (earlier in the passage) by saying that the Cause is unaffected by the merger into itself by the effect anyway regardless of whether they are diversified or non-diversified.

>>23919843
>Again SSSS accepts avidya or a seed of of ignorance in deep sleep, only that that seed is the mere not-knowing (agrahana) which quite obviously when corrected leads to the same differentiation ceasing.
Do you have a single source for this in any book by SSS? Everything I have seen written about SSS, and everything I have seen from looking at his written works myself indicated that he does not accept that avidya is present in any form in sushupti. The idea that he accepts it as being present in some form seems to be propagated by online SSSfags and schizos who are engaged in some weird project of trying to reconcile the position of SSS with the traditional view of the Sampradaya despite them being totally at odds.

>>23920137
>Looking over again the only real differences in the translation are "unreal ignorance" vs. "false knowledge" and then word ordering
see>>23920420

There is a world of difference between saying:

"Just as X is present in A & B, X is also present in C as well, and this is the correct view that answers your objection"

Vs

"False knowledge based on A leads us to believe (wrongly) that X is present in C"


Shankara, both based on the context of answering the objection raised in 2-1-8, and from his own words, is clearly saying that aviyda (X) is present in sushupti (C), just like its present in waking (A) and dream (B), and that this refutes the argument raised against Vedanta in 2-1-8. SSS is dishonestly adding in words not found to make it seem like Shankara is saying the second sentence list above, i.e. that something about the waking state (A) makes us falsely think that avidya (X) is present in shushpti (C) when it's really not. Not only is this not what Shankara actually writes, it would mean that Shankara failed to answer the argument raised by the purva-pakshin in 2-1-8.

>>23920443
Also, the passage is doubly damning for the theories of SSS, since Shankara expressly states that the supreme Self is not touched by the three states and that the appearance of the supreme Self in identity with the three states is a mere superimposition.

SSS: In Sushupti there is just the Self, speaking about Shushupti as a state is only from the POV of the waking state but there is just the Self present there

Shankara: The Self is not touched by the state of Shushupti and the identity of the Self with the state of Shushupti is a false appearance.

>>23920137
>The extra part you include from your translation even further confirms what SSS and his followers are saying, that power of diversification/the potential state to manifest as diverse does not remain in Pralaya.
That's wrong, that sentence is addressing the argument of the purvapaksin raised in 2-1-8, that the universe remains WITH ALL ITS DIVERSIFICATION in pralaya, tainting Brahman with duality.

And Shankara is concluding his response to that argument in that sentence by saying that the universe is NOT present in DIVERSIFIED FORM because what is instead present in pralaya and shushupti is the avidya in undifferentiated/indistinct form that remains present with the power of diversifying, and that when this power is enacted or made actual in the act of diversification that this is what makes the reemergence happen.

So, Shankara is actually expressing the exact opposite of what you claimed and not that "that power of diversification/the potential state to manifest as diverse does not remain in Pralaya". LMAO. I don't like to descend to the level of personal insults but have to be a genuine dumbass or someone who is brainwashed by extreme levels of ideology/delusion/sunk-cost fallacy to read that sentence in its context as meaning the exact opposite of what Shankara is clearing saying.

>>23919814
>What will non-initiates achieve with this insane babble?
Nothing. It's the Eastern equivalent of all those Western occultists who spend 15-20 years packing their heads with minutiae and are too afraid to let it go, so they spend their days showing off how much they've read, how much 'knowledge' they have, instead of passing through.

>>23920489
>And Shankara is concluding his response to that argument in that sentence by saying that the universe is NOT present in DIVERSIFIED FORM because what is instead present in pralaya and shushupti is the avidya in undifferentiated/indistinct form that remains present with the power of diversifying, and that when this power is enacted or made actual in the act of diversification that this is what makes the reemergence happen.
For confirmation of this, all you need to do is read the sentence from right before where the twisted quote of SSS starts from, since Shankara is seen expressing this very reasoning in this section:

And it was pointed out that if all distinctions are obliterated during resorption there will be no reasonable ground regulating the re-emergence of creation with the usual differences. That too is untenable for the very reason that there is a supporting illustration. As in natural slumber and samadhi, though there is a natural eradication of differences, still owing to the persistence of the unreal nescience, differences occur over again when one wakes up, similarly it can also happen here. Bearing on this is the Upanisadic text, "All these beings, when they become one with Existence (during sleep), do not know, `We have become one with Existence'. Whatever they might have been here-tiger, lion, wolf, pig, worm, butterfly, gnat, or mosquito-they become so over again (after returning)" (Ch. VI. ix. 3).

When he says, "still owing to the persistence of the unreal nescience, differences occur over again... similarly it can happen here", he is explicitly saying that the PERSISTENCE of aviyda in shushupti explains the reemergence both from pralaya and sushupti "similarly it can happen here". And he additionally cites Shruti as a reason for accepting this avidya in shushupti too, and this is the exact same Chandogya passage he cites as a reason for accepting avidya in sushupti also in his bhashya on BSSB 2-3-31, which is extra confirmation that this is exactly what he means to express here (as if any extra confirmation is needed lol).

It's no surprise that the quote from SSS begins right after this section, because if he cited the full section it would explicitly contradict what he says. So, he starts his quote from right after the critical section and then twists it to suggest the opposite of what Shankara is actually saying.

>>23920420
Mere semantics

Lets compare again
>As during the state of the continuance of the world, it is seen that like dream, there are empirical differentiations under the influence of unreal ignorance, despite the existence of the supreme Self as an undifferentiated entity, so also we can infer that even in dissolution, a power of diversification, possessed by unreal nescience, persists


>During the period of maintenance [and development] of the universe, due to false knowledge, it is found that empirical life develops in differentiation, although the Ātman is always devoid of distinctions; which confirms that it is an illusory perception similar to that of a dream. Thus, from the empirical point of view the same false knowledge leads us to believe that differentiation persists in a potential state even during pralaya.

SSSS:
>Thus, from the empirical point of view the same false knowledge leads us to believe that differentiation persists in a potential state even during pralaya.
Your "authoratative" translation:
>so also we can infer that even in dissolution, a power of diversification, possessed by unreal nescience, persists

No difference.


>Shankara, both based on the context of answering the objection raised in 2-1-8, and from his own words, is clearly saying that aviyda (X) is present in sushupti (C), just like its present in waking (A) and dream (B), and that this refutes the argument raised against Vedanta in 2-1-8. SSS is dishonestly adding in words not found to make it seem like Shankara is saying the second sentence list above, i.e. that something about the waking state (A) makes us falsely think that avidya (X) is present in shushpti (C) when it's really not. Not only is this not what Shankara actually writes, it would mean that Shankara failed to answer the argument raised by the purva-pakshin in 2-1-8.
I dont see any added words? What text are you reading, in some places hes only translated with different word ordering preserving the same meaning between both.
>>23920428
Read what I posted above
>>23919643
>>23919646
>>23919649
>>23919677
>>23919684
>>23919690

>>23920571
These were (the quoted posts) writren by SSSS, the other stuff by an SSSSfag, I still think you misunderstand what shankara is even saying in those verses. Youre seeing added words where I see none, apart from the much debated (yet meaningfully debated) unreal nescience vs false knowledge mithyajnana translation.

>>23920457
SSS distinguishes Sushupti and Liberation. You are reaply stretching.

>(A) makes us falsely think that avidya (X) is present in shushpti (C) when it's really not
What?

>As during the state of the continuance of the world, it is seen that like dream, there are empirical differentiations under the influence of unreal ignorance, despite the existence of the supreme Self as an undifferentiated entity, so also we can infer that even in dissolution, a power of diversification, possessed by unreal nescience persists

What is the problem? Are you even reading the same text, "As" and "So" theyre comparing the waking state in this case to deep sleep.

>>23920541
How does SSS twist anything when he is not arguing the empirical world as such is obliterated due to the absence of distinction during deep sleep? Who or what are you even replying to? As shankara said the power of differentiation at least in its manifested result, as such is gone in liberation to hold otherwise would be contrary to what shankara is saying. There is a difference also between mere "undifferentiated" source of differentiation, and then the unmanifest. Guénon wrote about in his article on the two nights. It seems youre main problem is in understanding that the world dissapears/is completely obliterated for the jnani who is jnana itself. In a post I remember from you elsewhere, you mentioned how it would be literally insane to conceive of attaining moksha whilst being a householder/living in the world, etc. That you put that into writing indicates something which is quite meaningful.

>And the other objection that was implied at the end that even in dissolution the universe will continue in the supreme Brahman with all its diversification, that too is dismissed by the non-admission of such a position. Hence this view of the Upanisads is quite logical.

>>23919623
Why do advaitards insist on pushing a repeatedly refuted doctrine on everyone else? We had two threads weeks ago that some posters refuted asvaita vedanta, showing the problems advaitins couldn’t solve. Just move along.

>>23920519
Speak for yourself. At the very outset, there is nothing to even let go of let alone hold onto.

>>23920590
>How does SSS twist anything when he is not arguing the empirical world as such is obliterated due to the absence of distinction during deep sleep?
Because Shankara is presenting avidya in shushupti as being both scripturally based and as a valid logical inference to make whereas SSS misquotes it to make it suggest that Shankara is saying that such an inference is actually baseless and leads to an improper conclusion (despite this contradicting the rest of the passage like the part right before)
>Who or what are you even replying to?
Against the view SSS writes about that avidya isn't present in sushupti
>As shankara said the power of differentiation at least in its manifested result, as such is gone in liberation
Yes, because it has been ended or neutralized by full illumination, although only for that jiva and not others.
>It seems youre main problem is in understanding that the world dissapears/is completely obliterated for the jnani who is jnana itself.
I never once said that
>In a post I remember from you elsewhere, you mentioned how it would be literally insane to conceive of attaining moksha whilst being a householder/living in the world, etc.
I was only quoting the exact words of Shankara on that point, and I was contextualizing them. Shankara does in fact say this but he means not being literally insane but that such a person is acting and thinking irrationally, he says something to the effect that making positive efforts to remain as a householder while striving for liberation is like trying to drink water and not drink it at the same time.

>>23920597
>? We had two threads weeks ago that some posters refuted asvaita vedanta, showing the problems advaitins couldn’t solve.
The poster arguing against Advaita was refuted and all his arguments were shown to consist of fallacies or rely on fallacies.

>>23920137
>"unreal ignorance" vs. "false knowledge"
'unreal ignorance' is a wrong translation of the compound mithyajñana, which should be split up as mithya+jñana (incorrect or false knowledge) according to Samkara (it is contrasted with samyak+jñana, correct or true knowledge).

This mistake (by Padmapada and followed by other advaintins) gave origin to the mulavidya theory. This should not be overlooked as the whole issue with ignorance in deep sleep stems from it.

Like Samkara and Suresvara, SSSS accepted ignorance as false-knowledge (mithyajnana), absence of knowledge (jñanabhava) or doubt (samshaya). The point is that ignorance is here presented as only a wrong notion (mithyapratyayarupa as per Adhyasabhashya) and can easily be removed by knowledge (jñana).

In the end, as there is no ignorance at all, it makes no difference to attribute any ignorance to sushupti (unless for the purpose of teaching) as the goal is not to establish any ignorance but to remove it.

>>23920428
>Do you have a single source for this in any book by SSS? Everything I have seen written about SSS, and everything I have seen from looking at his written works myself indicated that he does not accept that avidya is present in any form in sushupti.
> In its relative phase, we have to admit that Sleep, whose sole content is Pure Consciousness untainted by a second, is essentially the cause of Dream or Waking; that, in other words, Pure Consciousness intuited as unlimited in sleep, somehow manifests itself in the other two states as subject and object, and appears as the ego endowed with a body, senses, and the mind on the one hand, and as a world governed by the laws of time, space and causation on the other. This Pure Consciousness has to be supposed as invested with an inscrutable power in virtue of which it brings into existence this magnificent universe, and after sustaining it for a while, dissolves it into Itself without a residuum. As the Mandukya says : 'This is the Lord of all. He is Omniscient, He is the Internal Controller, He is the one source of all, the origin and dissolution of all beings.' (Avasthatraya_or_The_Unique_Method_of_Vedanta)

>>23919985
>V. Panoli
Are there any pdf of his prasthanathraya bhashya translations?

>mithyapratyayarupa

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>>23920627

>>23920623
>'unreal ignorance' is a wrong translation of the compound mithyajñana, which should be split up as mithya+jñana (incorrect or false knowledge) according to Samkara (it is contrasted with samyak+jñana, correct or true knowledge).
>This mistake (by Padmapada and followed by other advaintins) gave origin to the mulavidya theory. This should not be overlooked as the whole issue with ignorance in deep sleep stems from it.
No, it's actually a red herring since for Padmapada and the other Traditionalists the entirety of the illusion/samsara is mithya, so 'unreal X' or 'unreal ignorance' as another part of samsara has the status of being mithya or false. For Shankara and Padmapada, anything that is neither real existence nor absolute nothingness belongs to the realm of the indeterminable or the false.

>As regards the nature of the universe, Padmapada holds that it is indeterminable in the sense of not being either real like Brahman or unreal like an absolute nothing. In other words, he defines mithyatvam or indeterminability as ‘Sad-asad-vilakshanatvam’
https://www.kamakoti.org/kamakoti/articles/Preceptors%20of%20Advaita%20-%209.html

>In the end, as there is no ignorance at all,
It does not have real paramarthika existence, it's present on the Vyavaharika level and it's wrong and illogical to deny this.
>it makes no difference to attribute any ignorance to sushupti (unless for the purpose of teaching) as the goal is not to establish any ignorance but to remove it.
False, Shankara emphatically rejects this reasoning, and as Shankara points out in numerous bhashyas, aviyda in sushupti is both taught by Shruti pramana, and it's logically necessary to accept because otherwise Vedanta would involve the fault of things being produced capriciously out of nothing, which opens the door to freed jivas being bound again (his point and not mine). Avidya being established as present in all 3 states being something that is established by by Shruti and reasoning is not something that conflicts whatsoever with overcoming the deluding power of Avidya that causes further transmigration, because this is removing by the scriptural teachings about the Self and non-duality, i.e. avidya does not have to be absent from shushupti in order for the scriptural teaching to terminate its abilities to cause further births.

>>23920669
>avidya does not have to be absent from shushupti in order for the scriptural teaching to terminate its abilities to cause further births.
If avidya is not absent full stop, termination of further births is impossible.

>>23920428
>Do you have a single source for this in any book by SSS? Everything I have seen written about SSS, and everything I have seen from looking at his written works myself indicated that he does not accept that avidya is present in any form in sushupti.
Here's the section from SSS's Samkara siddhanta titled >Which is That Avidyā Which Shri Śańkara has Accepted to Exist in Sushupti ?
http://www.adhyatmaprakasha.org/php/bookreader/templates/book.php?type=english&book_id=038&pagenum=0045#page/90/mode/1up
>In both the above two sentences Agrahaṇa has been accepted to exist in Sushupti. ‘Agrahaṇa' means 'not 'cognizing' - this is the common meaning adduced to it.
The problem raised by SSS is about the nature of this agrahana (avidya) which is interpreted differently by the mulavidyavadins and departs from Shankara's doctrine:
>Here it is accepted that in Sushupti, Ajñāna of the type of 'not cognizing' exists. It is also clarified that for this ‘Sarvaikatwa' (everything becoming one and the same) is the cause. The fact that here in this context there is not an iota of scope for Mūlāvidyā becomes crystal clear
>Here also it amounts to saying in clear terms that 'Because of the reason of Ekatwa (unitary existence, non- duality) alone of Atman, who is Chaitanya (of the essence of Pure Consciousness), in Sushupti there is no distinctive knowledge accruing.” It also serves to clarify that - 'The Avidyā that exists in Sushupti' - means verily this distinctive knowledge not being there, but not Mūlāvidyā

Anyway, if you're really interested read the whole section (or the whole book).

>>23920623
On what page of "The Unique Method of Vedanta" is that from? I would like to see that passage in its context to verify.

The Advaita tradition accepts that Avidya is present in Sushupti on the Vyavaharika level, but not that it has Paramarthika existence. SSS appears to be saying that "in its relative phase", Pure Consciousness is "supposed to be invested with an inscrutable power" but then SSS denies this as being true in its own right by saying its only a convention adopted from the point of view of the waking state.

For Shankara and the genuine Sampradaya of the Mathas, something being true on the Vyavaharika level is not synonymous with something being a simple convention that is adopted from the POV of the waking state. For example, Pralaya is held to genuinely occur in-between universes on the Vyavaharika level, and this is not a mere convention but something that that the universe actually does. On the Paramarthika level its not happening, but on the Vyavaharika it is.

I don't if SSS's problem is that due to his modernist empiricist pretensions he understands "vyavaharika" to be synonymous with "something that is only a convention from the waking state but which otherwise has no truth of any kind". The difference of these is obvious viz. the question of avidya in sushupti. Shankara and the genuine tradition hold that avidya in shushupti is present as part of the Vyavaharika mithya and that this provides a logical and coherent account of the fact of emergence, however, since for Shankara and Padmapada "vyavaharika" is not synonymous with "only a waking convention", this allows them to affirm at once without contradiction that aviyda is actually present in dreamless sleep and causally accounts for waking while also being Vyavaharika and non-Paramarthika, whereas for SSS it has to be one or the other and you cannot affirm both at once (i.e. if its Vyavaharika its only a convention and not actually present), in contrast to Shankara and the tradition.

>>23920702
>If avidya is not absent full stop, termination of further births is impossible.
That's not true because only it's ability to cause further rebirth for the jiva needs to be terminated in order for the jiva to end the cycle of transmigration . Avidya and its effects that are present on the basis of past karma, i.e. prarabdha-karma, can be present while being unable to produce further rebirths, and it is the presence of this which accounts for the continuity of empirical experience for a jivanmukti until death, as Shankara himself points out when discussing the prarabdha-karma.

If avidya is present in a neutralized from without causing the subtle body of the jiva to transmigrate any longer there is no coherent logical reason why the subtle body would still have to necessarily transmigrate, and absent any logical reason your assertion that this is impossible is just question-begging.

>>23920669
>It does not have real paramarthika existence, it's present on the Vyavaharika level and it's wrong and illogical to deny this.
by 'In the end' I mean paramartha.

Here's what you cannot understand: there is no continuation between vyavahara and paramartha; there is no such thing as 'degrees of realities' in AV. The vyavahara has no substance (vastu/tattva/padartha), it's mere misunderstanding and ignorance. There is no 'vyavahara level' bellow 'paramartha level'.

>False
Are you denying that the function of the Sruti consists essentially in denying and removing avidya? for real?
>aviyda in sushupti is both taught by Shruti pramana
no one's denying that >>23920705
>logically necessary to accept because otherwise Vedanta would involve the fault of things being produced capriciously out of nothing,
If you understand that the vyavahara is not a 'small reality' there is no problem whatsoever in accepting SSSS. Also, the fact of establishing Brahman as the cause has the only goal of determining it as the sole Reality, it has no purport of 'establishing the apperance of samsara with logical necessity', this is a HUGE misunderstanding. As Shankara says such knowledge 'has no use', the goal is to remove ignorance recognizing the Absolute's sole reality, not to explain how samsara comes about.

>>23920702
>If avidya is not absent full stop, termination of further births is impossible.
OH NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
This is literally refuted by Shankaracharya himself in BSSB 4.1.15 lmao

Vedantin: After the acquisition of knowledge, those virtues and vices that have not begun to yield their fruits and that were accumulated in earlier lives or even in this life before the dawn of knowledge are alone destroyed, but not so are those destroyed whose results have already been partially enjoyed and by which has been begun this present life in which the knowledge of Brahman arises. How is this known? Because the text, "He lingers so long only as he is not freed from the body; then he becomes free" (Ch. VI. xiv. 2), shows that liberation is put off till the death of the body. Were it not so, the text would not have spoken of any waiting till the death of the body. For one would then attain liberation immediately after the acquisition of knowledge inasmuch as there would be no reason for his continuing in the body after all the works are annihilated by knowledge.

Opponent: If this realization that the Self is not an agent annihilates all results of work by its own intrinsic power, how can it demolish only some leaving behind others? For when the same kind of contact is present between fire and some seeds, it cannot be held that some of the seeds will lose their power of germination while others will not.

Vedantin: The answer is: It cannot be that knowledge can arise without the help of some residual results of actions that have begun to bear fruit. And when it is granted that knowledge is based on that medium (viz the body produced by the residual results), it is but natural that knowledge has to wait (for its result) till the acquired momentum of that medium exhausts itself out as in the case of a wheel of a potter; for there is nothing to stop it in the intervening period. As for the knowledge of the Self as the non-performer of any act, that destroys the results of works by first sublating false ignorance. THIS FALSE IGNORANCE, EVEN WHEN SUBLATED, CONTINUES FOR A WHILE owing to past tendencies like the continuance of the vision of two moons.

>>23920752
>Are you denying that the function of the Sruti consists essentially in denying and removing avidya? for real?
Yes, sublation =/= removal of presence. Ignorance is sublated and not a thing whose presence is removed. As Shankara clearly states, ignorance is sublated, which negates the power of producing further births, but despite this it "continues for a while owing to past tendencies".

"Know thyself???" What is that? Pfft Neovedanta garbage.....

>And when he (Apollonius) had taken his seat, he (a Brahman sage) said: ‘Ask whatever you like, for you find yourself among people who know everything.’ Apollonius then asked him whether they knew themselves also, thinking that he, like the Greeks, would regard self-knowledge as a difficult matter. But the other, contrary to Apollonius’ expectations, corrected him and said: ‘We know everything, just because we begin by knowing ourselves; for no one of us would be admitted to this philosophy unless he first knew himself.’ And Apollonius remembered what he had heard Phraotes502 say, and how he who would become a philosopher must examine himself before he undertakes the task; and he therefore acquiesced in this answer, for he was convinced of its truth in his own case also.
The Life of Apollonius of Tyana, Philostratus, (c. 170 – c. 245 AD)


>(Thou) hast shown me how to seek myself and know who I was, and who and in what manner I now am, that I may again become that which I was: whom I knew not, but thyself didst seek me out: of whom I was not aware, but thyself hast taken me to thee.
Acts of Thomas, 15

>Jesus said: Whoever knows the All but fails to know himself lacks everything.
The Gospel according to Thomas, Log. 67

>The soul which is attempting to rise to the height of knowledge must make self- knowledge its first and chief concern. The high peak of knowledge is perfect self- knowledge.
Richard of Saint-Victor

>No one can be saved without self-knowledge.
St Bernard

>>23920773
>removal of presence.
But that is exactly what I'm talking about!
Ignorance is not some 'thing' to be removed! this is the point advocated by sruti, shankara and SSSS.
and the SAME happens with the vyavahara (jagat, jiva, desha, kala, karanakarya, etc, etc ,etc), it is not some 'THING' to be removed, because it is INSUBSTANTIAL (not a vastu, not a padartha, not a tattva; contrary to what the dualists uphold).
>ignorance is sublated, which negates the power of producing further births, but despite this it "continues for a while owing to past tendencies".
There is no vyavahara independent of avidya! this is vedanta 101, please.

>>23920716
As I suspected, the problem here (as I said before) is your acceptance of the doctrine of 'leves of reality' present in neoplatonism, sufism, etc., As if it pertains to Vedanta.

And I'm afraid to say that NOT EVEN the mulavidyavadins criticized by SSSS accept such a thing. No matha or advaitin whatsoever accepts this, be it a follower of SSS or not. (please don't quote translations by advaita-ashrama where they translate vyavahara as 'relative reality', this does not prove anything).

Vyavahara being the product of adhyasa does not implicate in being a mere 'convention and not actually present'. It also does not amount to being a 'nothingness'.

Besides, how do you even reconcile passages from the mandukya karika where it equates (!) the waking state with dream? where they are treated as the same and not as a mere illustration?

>On the Paramarthika level its not happening, but on the Vyavaharika it is.
Even the most hardcore mulavidyavadin will laugh at this, seriously. Do you really believe the paramarthika and vyavahara exists in parallel? Can't you see the implications of this kind of reasoning? This is not AV, this is plain dualism and results in anirmokṣa prasaṅgaḥ (impossibility of liberation)

>>23920619
He wasn’t, lol. In one of the threads the advaitins even stopped engaging in the thread since they couldn’t offer any counter-argument.

>>23920867
>Do you really believe the paramarthika and vyavahara exists in parallel
this is what happens when you take avidya as some positive substance (power) instead of simple superimposition (adhyasa), no wonder Ramanuja got pissed off with advaita

>>23920871
can you link the thread?

Shankara anon is a faggot. None of that Advaita shit can be demonstrated.
Nagarjuna anon is a faggot. None of that Buddhism shit can be demonstrated.
Guenon anon is a faggot. None of that Sufism shit can be demonstrated.
That Dogen anon is a faggot. None of that Soto Zen shit is at all useful.
That Lao Tzu anon is a faggot. None of that Taoism shit is at all useful.
You're all a bunch of time-wasting faggots.
You're all a stain on this board.
You're all a bunch of weebs, ding dongs, and poosars.

>>23920867
>Ignorance is not some 'thing' to be removed! this is the point advocated by sruti, shankara and SSSS.
It's not a thing that has paramarthika existence, but it's equally present in the vyavaharika just as much anything else in vyavaharika is.

Frankly, I don't know why you are even bothering to reply anymore after you stated "without the complete absence of avidya liberation is impossible" and then I showed how Shankara himself explicitly refutes that and says that even after being sublated a kind of avidya persists until bodily death (and hence is present in sushupti until bodily death as well). That itself alone indicates that your and SSS comprehension is so different from Shankara's that's it's not even worth discussing.

>There is no vyavahara independent of avidya! this is vedanta 101, please.
1) Brahman isn't limited in its ability to manifest vyavaharika illusion by the avidya of any one particular jiva. Shankara says that all the categories that the jiva thinks in are based on avidya but he never says that Brahman manifesting the false illusion as such depends on the jiva having avidya. SSS uses a question-begging fallacy to interpret sentences of Shankara saying the former as endorsing the latter even when the text doesn't say this. Thus, Y jiva's avidya being sublated doesn't prevent that causal body (karana sthula) made of ignorance from continuing with the subtle and gross bodies until death for the jivanmukti, since Brahman is maintaining and structuring samsara through His power in such a way that things function this way regardless of what individual jivas do or sublate. Furthermore, samsara involve multiple jivas interacting on the same plane, and if one jiva sublating avidya ended all vyavahara then everyone's samsara would already have been ended by the first jiva to attain moksha, Shankara himself makes this point in BSSB 3.2.21

Vedantin : Here our question is: What is meant by this sublation of the universe of manifestations? Is the world to be annihilated like the destruction of the solidity of ghee by contact with fire; or is it that the world of name and form, created in Brahman by nescience like many moons created in the moon by the eye-disease called timira, has to be destroyed (or sublated) through knowledge? Now if it be said that this existing universe of manifestations, consisting of the body etc. on the corporeal plane and externally of the earth etc., is to be annihilated, that is a task impossible for any man, and hence the instruction about its extirpation is meaningless. Moreover, (even supposing that such a thing is possible, then) the universe, including the earth etc., having been annihilated by the first man who got liberation, the present universe should have been devoid of the earth etc.
-Shankara, BSSB 3.2.21

Unless you admit that the Vyavahara continues independently of X or Y Jiva sublating avidya then there is absolutely no way to reconcile the position of you or SSS with that of Shankara

>>23920974
>>23920867

2) independent of any debate about the above point, Shankara himself is saying that avidya continues until death and is connected with vyavaharika experience even after it's been sublated, and there is zero ambiguity about what he says there. So if you are disagreeing with that position then you are positing some modernist kind of Neovedanta and you can no longer claim to be representing Shankara's actual position.

>No matha or advaitin whatsoever accepts this
In fact, all schools must admit the existence or non-existence of the phenomenal world according as it is viewed from the relative or the absolute standpoint.
-Shankara, Brihadaranyaka Bhashya 3.5.1

>Besides, how do you even reconcile passages from the mandukya karika where it equates (!) the waking state with dream? where they are treated as the same and not as a mere illustration?
Just like how the genuine Sampradaya does, the MK and Shankara's Bhashya on it are saying that insofar as neither is the Paramarthika reality they are the same, but it's not denying that the waking world is mind-external and is shared with other jivas who remain awake in the world when one jiva sleeps. MK and the Bhashya are attacking the view of the realist who holds that the waking world has true existence and is reality itself, its not denying that the world is mind-external. This is why Shankara doesn't contradict himself in attacking subjective idealism and in affirming that the world is mind-external, in your view Shankara is contradicting himself. Shankara is a committed epistemic realist who holds that the exterior world of gross elements is exterior to the mind of the jiva, and that in seeing objects like tree etc the suble body or its manas literally extends outwards beyond the object and touches or has some interaction with whatever its attention falls upon. Dream and waking are two different levels of the mithya, one is shared with other jivas and is mind-independent and the other is interior and not shared.

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>>23920867
>>23920979
Sharma understands this well:

> Shankara believes in epistemic realism and ontological idealism. He is equally opposed to subjective idealism and ontological realism. For him, the empirical reality of this world of subject-object duality cannot be denied nor can its ultimate reality be upheld. The world is empirically real and transcendentally unreal. It would be absurd to suppose that Shankara, while criticising Buddhist idealism, compromises with his own idealism or becomes a realist or uses the arguments of realism in which he himself does not believe. Shankara accepts and defends only epistemic realism as it is not incompatible with his absolute idealism. His criticism is directed mainly against subjective idealism. He also carefully distinguishes his Vedantic idealism from the Buddhist idealism which he criticises.

There is an entire book on this called "Advaita Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Outline of Indian Non-Realism" by Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad which gets this right and makes the same point as well, in agreement with the genuine Sampradaya

>Based on original translations of passages from the works of three major thinkers of the classical Indian school of Advaita (Sankara, Vacaspati and Sri Harsa), but addressing issues found in Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein and contemporary analytic philosophers, this book argues for a philosophical position it calls 'non-realism'. This is the view that an independent, external world must be assumed if the features of cognition are to be explained, but that it cannot be proved that there is such a world, independently of an appeal to cognition itself. This position is constructed against idealist denials of externality, realist arguments for an (truly existing) independent world and the sceptical denial of the coherence of cognition.

>Do you really believe the paramarthika and vyavahara exists in parallel?
No dummy. The Vyavaharika is present as the false (mithya) that it is manifested or present simultaneously with the genuine existence of the Parmarthika that alone has real existence. To say that something is empirically present or manifested doesn't mean that its paramarthika. So this doesn't actually result in dualism or impossibility of liberation.

>>23920979
*literally extends outwards beyond the GROSS BODY and touches or has some interaction with whatever its attention falls upon.

>>23920871
>He wasn’t, lol.
Yes he was, his main argument was claiming that you cannot speak about anything being false without also affirming a conscious witness of something that is false but this is factually untrue if we just look at language because falsity has a different meaning from perceptual illusions and can be applied to propositions and hypothetical scenarios which have no conscious observer of them.

Furthermore, this critique assumes that reality is downstream of language and that Vedanta using a linguistic term in a different meaning than usual is tantamount to a formal logical contradiction or something that is metaphysically incoherent, which it's not at all. When language is downstream of reality, whatever the denotative power of any one word or concept is does not place any constraint on the way in which reality can exist, it just means that language is inadequate to perfectly capture reality.

So, not only was the underlying factual claim about language that the argument was based on false, but it also relied on a question-begging fallacy about reality being downstream of language in order to claim that this alleged incorrect or atypical usage of language (which it wasn't) was tantamount to logical or metaphysical incoherence.

>>23920979
*MK and the Bhashya are attacking the view of the (ontological) realist who holds that the waking world has true existence and is reality itself, its not denying that the world is mind-external (i.e. epistemic realism and not ontological realism).

>>23921032
>his main argument was claiming that you cannot speak about anything being false without also affirming a conscious witness of something that is false
No, this was not the argument. He literally took direct quotes from Shankara in order to ground the sense of the terms illusion, falsity in his arguments, whereas the advaitin was disigenuously pushing another sense of the term, but one that was even alien to Shankara and Advaita itself.
>this critique assumes that reality is downstream of language
That was not the argument, but the advaitin was the one who kept going into semantics.
>it just means that language is inadequate to perfectly capture reality.
If it was so advaitins in that thread wouldn't be too caught up with a term which has a clear sense.
>not only was the underlying factual claim about language that the argument was based on false
There was no specific semantic claim about language involved by the anon who refuted Advaita, he was showing how his terms and their meanings coincided with those of Shankara and Advaita Vedanta, whereas the advaitins were trying to push a specific one to avoid the obvious contradiction within Advaita Vedanta.

Advaita Vedanta was refuted and remains so.

>>23921048
>No, this was not the argument. He literally took direct quotes from Shankara in order to ground the sense of the terms illusion, falsity in his arguments, whereas the advaitin was disigenuously pushing another sense of the term, but one that was even alien to Shankara and Advaita itself.
Maybe you missed this but in the second thread in which that discussion was continued, those passages were again cited and it was explained in there that Shankara was making an analogical comparison between the Vyavaharika and the perceptual illusion which is Pratibhashika, but that Shankara was not saying that the Vyavaharika is identical to the Pratibhasika but only that they are alike in certain respects. The Pratibhasika necessitates an empirical observer but the Vyavaharika doesn't and can be false like a proposition can be said to be false. Vyavaharic objects that are present in samsara with no observer of them (distant planets etc) are false in the sense of lacking absolute reality, the proposition that they truly exist is itself false. You don't need any observer of them to affirm that they are false in the sense of lacking true existence/reality and are metaphysical false in this sense.

After pointing this out, the original anti-Advaita poster gave up in the second thread, since his argument depended on this not being true, and it depended on the false mistake that Advaita has to treat the Vyavaharika as identical to the Pratibhasika, when this isn't actually true and Shankara specifies that there are only alike in certain respects.

>>23921069
>After pointing this out, the original anti-Advaita poster gave up in the second thread, since his argument depended on this not being true, and it depended on the false mistake that Advaita has to treat the Vyavaharika as identical to the Pratibhasika, when this isn't actually true and Shankara specifies that there are only alike in certain respects.
Needless to say, such fallacies can never hope to refute Advaita, which has never been refuted.

>It's not a thing that has paramarthika existence, but it's equally present in the vyavaharika just as much anything else in vyavaharika is.
You still don't get it. There is no 'thing' in vyavahara (its avastu), because its a product of avidya (mithya-pratyaya, wrong notion, haven't you read the Adhyasa-Bhyasha?). There is only mithya-jnana (false knowledge) and no mithya-padartha/tattva (no "false-object" like mithya-vyavahara/prapancha)

>Frankly, I don't know why you are even bothering to reply anymore
I'm afraid you're referring to someone else. But I'll reply anyway: avidyalesha, prarabdha-karma are vyavahara matters, so what? How can you have vyavahara without presupposing avidya (as adhyasa, not a 'power')?
>Shankara, Brihadaranyaka Bhashya 3.5.1
So? at least post the sanskrit excerpt
> MK and the Bhashya are attacking the view
MK and Bhashya refutes both, idealist and realist. Stop being dishonest here. He equates both (jagat/svapna) and calls it unreal, actually he says that any kind of perception is unreal.
>>23920987
>The Vyavaharika is present as the false (mithya) t
mithya what? jñana or padartha? You have not addressed the point. If it's padartha it cannot be removed by knowledge (because knowledge cannot remove a 'thing', only a 'notion') and results in anirmoksha-prasanga. If it's due to mithyajñana it can be removed (as it were) and there is no problem.
Your position implies the parallel existence of vyavahara-paramartha by the supposition of a vyavahara-world (labelled as mithya, which makes no difference) independent of mithyajñana or adhyasa (mutual superimposition of atmAnatma)
>. He is equally opposed to subjective idealism and ontological realism.
>Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein and contemporary analytic philosophers,
When it suits yourself you have no problem accepting 'western' ideas and 'modernism', huh? good to know

*
There can be no dialogue between us: While I hold avidya as adhyasa (just like Shankara in Adhyasa-Bhashya) you hold it as bhavarupa-bijashakti-anirvacanya (for me though, it can be easily conciliated anyways, because it's avidya-kalpita/krta/pratyupasthapita). This simple point, affects all further doctrinal matters (sushupti, prarabhda, avastha,vyavahara, jñana, etc). It is a total waste of time to discuss if there's such a fundamental misunderstanding.

>>23921069
>Maybe you missed this but in the second thread in which that discussion was continued
There was no continuation. The advaitin in the second thread ignored every argument from the former one and started again with semantic games, trying to show that when Shankara said that the empirical illusory world is superimposed on real Brahman is like the rope and snake confusion, which agrees perfectly with the real sense of the term illusion, the advaitin (you perhaps) resorted to the very same sophism you are presenting now, that Shankara didn't mean what he really meant.
>Vyavaharic objects that are present in samsara with no observer of them (distant planets etc) are false in the sense of lacking absolute reality, the proposition that they truly exist is itself false
This has barely anything to do with the discussion since this was no point of contention (after all it is known that the illusions don't have existence in themselves and depend on what is real, which was acknowledged several times in the thread).
>After pointing this out, the original anti-Advaita poster gave up in the second thread.
Wrong, it is clear in the thread that the advaita defender was making the dumbest and most clueless assertions about Advaita's relation with epistemological/metaphysical realism, making distortions about both of them. So dumb that there was no reason to keep trying.

Advaita Vendata was refuted and remains so, since no advaitin can answer: what perceives samsara?

>>23921119
>what perceives samsara
what's samsara? a lower/relative-reality (if that even makes any sense at all) or just an illusion i.e. a mistake, like the shell mistaken for silver? Mulavidyavada complicates what is essentially a very simple problem. After determining what this word means you can answer your question.

>>23921107
>You still don't get it. There is no 'thing' in vyavahara (its avastu), because its a product of avidya (mithya-pratyaya, wrong notion, haven't you read the Adhyasa-Bhyasha?). There is only mithya-jnana (false knowledge) and no mithya-padartha/tattva (no "false-object" like mithya-vyavahara/prapancha)
Saying "it's not a thing" is meaningless unless you specify what you mean. Vyavaharic objects can be spoken of from the POV of Absolute reality or from the conventional perspective. From the POV of Paramarthika they don't exist and the Atman doesn't experience them but from the conditional perspective they are present as a plane of experience for embodied beings and it's wrong to deny that they are experientially present for them. Holding these two positions at once is not any contradiction, one doesn't contradict the other because phenomenal presence =/= paramarthika existence. Each time you get refuted you retreat into these undefined obscurities that allow you to posture without really saying anything. Shankara never denies that objects are present at the empirical level but only denies their Paramarthika status

Even Schuon gets this right:

>The conceptions of Ramanuja are contained in those of Shankara and are transcended by them. When Shankara sees in the localization and duration of sensory objects a direct and tangible manifestation of their unreality, he does not say, as Ramanuja seems to have believed, that they do not exist (conventionally) as objects,
but he says that as existing objects they are unreal (non-paramarthika). Ramanuja affirms against Shankaracharya truths which the latter never denied on their own level.
Ramanuja shows a tendency to put everything in a concrete form as a function of the created world, and this indeed corresponds both with the Vishnuite point of view and with the Western outlook which shares the same perspective.
I might add, from the SSS perspective as well

It's funny that you accuse me of not reading the Adhyasa-Bhashya when you claimed that without the total absence of avidya then moksha is impossible and then I disproved that by citing where Shankara affirms that avidya can be present even after sublation in BSSB 4.1.15. Is the Adhyasa-Bhashya the only part of the BSSB that you've read? Because it sure seems that way.

>>23921107
>avidyalesha, prarabdha-karma are vyavahara matters, so what?
So, by Shankara saying that the world continues after the jiva sublates avidya (see his comment about the present world being devoid of earth etc due to past jiva), he is affirming that the Vyavaharika in the form of the universe continues even after an individual jiva sublates avidya, so Shankara doesn't find it at all incoherent to speak about Vyavahrika being present in dependence upon Brahman independent of the status of one jiva's sublation.
>How can you have vyavahara without presupposing avidya (as adhyasa, not a 'power')?
Because Brahman is the cause of the Vyavaharika samsara through its own inherent nature/ability and does not rely on any accessory,
"just as it is in these cases, so aksarat, from the Imperishable (Brahman), of the foregoing characteristics, THAT DOES NOT DEPEND ON ANY OTHER AUXILIARY; sambhavati, originates; iha, here, in this phenomenal creation; visvam, the entire Universe"
- Shankaracharya, Mundaka Upanishad Bhashya 1.1.7

>MK and Bhashya refutes both, idealist and realist. Stop being dishonest here. He equates both (jagat/svapna) and calls it unreal, actually he says that any kind of perception is unreal.
This is a fringe view and most scholars disagree even ones who don't side with the mathas on everything, it's also not supported by what he actually writes. He only denies that the waking world is paramarthika and not that it's present on the empirical level as a mind-independent phenomena. This is what allows him to attack subjective idealism in the BSSB and BrUpBh without contradicting himself when he says in the section on Yogachara Buddhism in 2-2-28:

It cannot be asserted that external things do not exist. Why? "Because they are perceived." As a matter of fact such things as a pillar, a wall, a pot, a cloth, are perceived along with each act of cognition. And it cannot be that the very thing perceived is non-existent. How can a man's words be acceptable who while himself perceiving an external object through sense contacts still says, "I do not perceive, and that object does not exist", just as much as a man while eating and himself experiencing the
satisfaction arising from that act might say, "Neither do I eat, nor do I get any satisfaction"?

The view of the Sampradaya reconciles this effortlessly with the MK and even agrees with "critical method" scholars while yours has to come up with weird copes about this.

>>23921107
Furthermore, Shankara in that section explicitly affirms that dreams and the waking state are of a different nature in 2-2-29 and 2-2-30, the Sampradaya reconciles this with everything in MK flawlessly so there is zero contradiction with this but your view is unable to.

With regard to this we say, the perceptions of the waking state cannot be classed with those in a dream.
Why?
Because of difference of characteristics; for waking and dream states are really different in nature.
In what does that difference consist?
We say that it consists in being subject to sublation or not. To a man, arisen from sleep, the object perceived in a dream becomes sublated, for he says, "Falsely did I imagine myself in contact with great men. In fact I never came in contact with great men; only my mind became overpowered by sleep; and thus this delusion arose." So also in the case of magic etc., adequate sublation takes place. But. a thing seen in the waking state, a pillar for instance, is not thus sublated (i.e. it's conventional status is not sublated) under any condition (since sublating it as lacking paramarthika existence doesnt revoke or negate its empirical presence on the conventional level). Moreover, dream vision is a kind of memory, whereas the visions of the waking state are forms of perceptions (through valid means of knowledge). And the difference between perception and memory, consisting in the presence and absence of objects, can be understood by oneself, as for instance when one says, "I remember my beloved son, but I do not see him, though I want to see".
-2.2.29

>>23921107
>mithya what? jñana or padartha?
By padartha do you mean a phenomenal object? It makes no difference ultimately if you are talking about a knowledge versus an object or 'thing', because according to the Upanishad-derived theory of mind that is shared both by Sankhya, Yoga and Advaita, thoughts are nothing more than specific agglomerations of subtle matter made of sattva inhering in the buddhi which are being illuminated by the light of the Atman. So, all forms of jñana other than Brahman's svakprakasha are basically thoughts/vrittis which are subtle objects present in the intellect just like trees and rocks are present as phenomonal objects too, the only difference being exterior vs interior and being comprised of different stuff (gross matter vs sattva). So, any kind of thought/belief is a thing present on the phenomenal plane, even undifferentiated avidya is present as the karana-sthula (see: 3 bodies doctrines). Simply because you say "well the false-knowledge isn't "a thing with real existence"" doesn't mean you aren't contradicting yourself by denying its presence even on the empirical level.

> If it's padartha it cannot be removed by knowledge (because knowledge cannot remove a 'thing', only a 'notion') and results in anirmoksha-prasanga.
Again, Shankara doesn't it consider it necessary to remove the false knowledge, only to sublate it, which means to abandon or overcome any belief in what the former error/mistake was, even if it persists for a while in the form of its products like prarabdha-karma until death. In BSSB 4.1.15 he explicitly writes "As for the knowledge of the Self as the non-performer of any act, that destroys the results of works by first sublating false ignorance. THIS FALSE IGNORANCE, EVEN WHEN SUBLATED, CONTINUES FOR A WHILE owing to past tendencies like the continuance of the vision of two moons."

Because Avidya/karana-sthula and the subtle body are each things present on the conventional plane, Shruti-based knowledge sublating avidya simply involves a change happening to the Buddhi and Karana-Sthula where that scriptural knowledge makes them stop causing transmigration. Because the Buddhi, Karana-Sthula and the Shruti are all gross or subtle objects present on the Vyavaharika level, the jiva stopping the cycle of rebirth simply involves these interacting with each other, which Samsara permits them to do because Brahman makes it function that way and endows the Shruti with the ability to induce this change in the sūkṣma śarīra and the kāraṇa śārira when taught properly by a teacher to a qualified student. Indeed, since the Atman is non-volitional and a non-actor, what is bound and what seeks moksha is an assemblage of non-(You)s interacting with things around it (Shruti etc) and being impacted by that.

>>23921107
>If it's due to mithyajñana it can be removed (as it were) and there is no problem.
If the entirety of it is claimed to be removed by knowledge, Shankara says in 3.2.1 that "Now if it be said that this existing universe of manifestations, consisting of the body etc. on the corporeal plane and externally of the earth etc., is to be annihilated, that is a task impossible for any man, and hence the instruction about its extirpation is meaningless. Moreover, (even supposing that such a thing is possible, then) the universe, including the earth etc., having been annihilated by the first man who got liberation, the present universe should have been devoid of the earth etc.", so clearly it's not removed by knowledge but is merely sublated, because Shankara says the complete and immediate removal of ignorance and jagat through knowledge is impossible and illogical and that the Vyavaharika universe remains even after a jiva sublates avidya.
>Your position implies the parallel existence of vyavahara-paramartha by the supposition of a vyavahara-world (labelled as mithya, which makes no difference) independent of mithyajñana or adhyasa (mutual superimposition of atmAnatma)
No, that's a baseless allegation, it simply means that Brahman makes the Vyavaharika manifest or be present without it having paramarthika existence. Something doesn't need to first be conceived of through avidya first in order for it to lack paramarthika existence, Shankara never says that anywhere. Avidya imposes itself upon all concepts within the Vyavaharika, but Brahman can make the Vyavaharika manifest as a false phenomena without it having paramarthika existence independent of the jiva having all its mental categories being based on avidya. The jiva having all notions be due to avidya is downstream of avidya itself being dependent on Brahman.

>>23921119
>There was no continuation. The advaitin in the second thread ignored every argument from the former one and started again with semantic games, trying to show that when Shankara said that the empirical illusory world is superimposed on real Brahman is like the rope and snake confusion, which agrees perfectly with the real sense of the term illusion, the advaitin (you perhaps) resorted to the very same sophism you are presenting now, that Shankara didn't mean what he really meant.
Incorrect, the superimposition of the false world onto Brahman and vice-versa is something different from the false status of the world itself. Superimposition is specifically the process or trick whereby something seems to be associated with a status or traits that it doesn't really have, whereas on the other hand the world is false like a proposition because it lacks Paramarthika existence, and this falsity is not simply superimposition but rather it refers to something that is neither real existence nor absolute nothingness. The false status of the world is independent of any one process of superimposition and is inherent to the world itself due to its very nature as not truly real nor nothingness.

When Shankara says that the illusory world is superimposed onto Brahman, he is just saying that the world illusion (which has being false as its status) involves the jivas wrongly attributing things about the illusion to Brahman like thinking that the Self/Consciousness is an agent etc.

As one of the Shankara quotes you brought up in evidence for example
>>an unreal illusion cannot exist without a substratum: for the illusion of silver , snake , human being. mirage, etc. , cannot be imagined to exist apart from the (corresponding) substrata of the mother of pearl , rope, stump of a tree , desert , etc.
He is just saying that just as the Pratibhasika requires a ground to appear, that Vyavaharika requires its own ground in Brahman to manifest as well. And by ground he doesn't mean "observer" there since he says that rope (and not the witness) is the ground of the snake-image and the rope does not itself observe the snake-illusion itself but merely provides a ground for it while observing nothing.

>>After pointing this out, the original anti-Advaita poster gave up in the second thread.
>Wrong, it is clear in the thread that the advaita defender was making the dumbest and most clueless assertions about Advaita's relation with epistemological/metaphysical realism, making distortions about both of them
Not at all, the fact that Shankara endorses epistemological realism while holding to metaphysical non-realism regarding the universe is the mainstream view of the academic literature on the subject and is considered uncontroversial both by major scholars and the Advaita tradition itself.

>>23920974
>Frankly, I don't know why you are even bothering to reply anymore after you stated "without the complete absence of avidya liberation is impossible"
He didnt reply that I did (another anon) it was also something meant completely out of context as in straight without any dependence upon any of the other stuff you were saying. If the absence of avidya were not the case how could there be liberation? The fact that you equate avidya with parabadha karma and other gymnastics and fail to understand the extreme simplicity of such a statement.

>>23921294
Again falling for contradictory loopholes. It is interesting that whenever advaitins try to deny the obvious (that samsara depends on Brahman and its illusory status is like the illusory perception of the snake upon the rope) they end up bringing a schism between the world/samsara and reality, as if it were a self-cointained realm, regardless of ontological status, being illusory as utterly false, not being dependent on a real ground is a complete divide and obviously not even a connotation of the word illusion.
> epistemological realism while holding to metaphysical non-realism regarding the universe
You have no idea what you’re talking about jesus christ just try reading a book on epistemology.

>>23921310
>He didnt reply that I did (another anon) it was also something meant completely out of context as in straight without any dependence upon any of the other stuff you were saying. If the absence of avidya were not the case how could there be liberation?
Because the things that perpetuate transmigration are desire and non-sublated avidya. When someone has renounced attachment/desire and when they have entirely sublated avidya by abandoning and seeing through all their false notions about duality having real existence, about the Self being an agent and so on etc that are uprooted by the scriptural teaching, then any possible way in which the subtle body or causal body could drive further transmigration for that jiva have already been uprooted and their further productive potential eliminated, so the mere fact of continuing onwards until death "till the acquired momentum of that medium exhausts itself out as in the case of a wheel of a potter" (-BSSB 4.1.15) presents no issue, because this is not the least inconsistent with its production of further rebirths having been stopped.

Shankara repeatedly affirms that avidya is sublated by knowledge, and it's neither removed nor "investigated and found to be absent". Someone with timira can sublate their belief in two moons and abandon the belief in the existence of two moons even when the optical flaw continues to be present and continues to produce the sight of multiple moons.

>>23921247
>>23921241
>>23921183
>>23921180
I'm tired of repeating myself again and again, sorry if i'm not clear enough, i'm using the words 'remove' and 'sublate' as synonymous here, and i do not mean that there is a real removal, this is actually what I'm opposing, anyway, if you wanna know what I mean by this mithyapadartha vs mithyajnana, mithya+jnana vs mithya+Ajnana, etc, read these small lectures by swami Prakasanandendra: https://vedavyasamandala.com/testi/tradizione-hindu/vedanta/adhyasa-bha%e1%b9%a3ya-sugama/

Even though you won't be of much use .. >>23921107
>There can be no dialogue between us: While I hold avidya as adhyasa (just like Shankara in Adhyasa-Bhashya) you hold it as bhavarupa-bijashakti-anirvacanya (for me though, it can be easily conciliated anyways, because it's avidya-kalpita/krta/pratyupasthapita). This simple point, affects all further doctrinal matters (sushupti, prarabhda, avastha,vyavahara, jñana, etc). It is a total waste of time to discuss if there's such a fundamental misunderstanding.
There is really no point in discussing those secondary matters if there is a disagreement in one of the essential tenets (nature of avidya)

>>23921312
>Again falling for contradictory loopholes.
Nothing about that was a contradiction. You didnt even identify an alleged contradiction.
>It is interesting that whenever advaitins try to deny the obvious (that samsara depends on Brahman and its illusory status is like the illusory perception of the snake upon the rope)
You are simply misunderstanding the point of these comparisons like an amateur midwit talking about a subject he knows little about. The snake and rope example is not defining the metaphysical status of the illusion/world, it's only making a pedagogical comparison between Vyavaharika and Pratibhasika to illustrate a common example of something seeming to take on a status which it doesn't really have. The "seeming to take on a status" is not the metaphysical status of the world but is merely a description of how the jiva's interpret the experience. The status of the world itself is false in a way that is independent of any "seeming to take on X" since this falsity is due to the world/phenomena being neither truly real nor nothingness, which is not a "seeming" that requires any observer.

I know that it's upsetting when you carefully devise some sophistic argument and then someone comes alone and explains why it's wrong, but you are engaging in a strawman fallacy if you say that Advaita teaches that the status of the Vyavaharika illusion is the same as the Pratibhasika perceptual illusion. Don't let your emotions make you double down on a fallacy.

>> epistemological realism while holding to metaphysical non-realism regarding the universe
>You have no idea what you’re talking about jesus christ just try reading a book on epistemology.
That's not an argument, clearly you are unable to engage with the actual facts of the matter. Shankara holds an attitude of epistemological realism about epistemic instruments and their relation with the external world of objects that is independent of them. At the same time when it comes to the ultimate metaphysical status of those epistemic instruments and the exterior world he is a non-realist because he affirms only Brahman has truly real existence. This is basic 101 Advaita.

>>23921330
>There is really no point in discussing those secondary matters if there is a disagreement in one of the essential tenets (nature of avidya)
If you are abandoning Shankara's stated position that even after being sublated that avidya remains present and continues until bodily death then there is no longer any point in you propagating the false nonsense that you are explaining the true teaching of Shankara that has been obscured by an ossified tradition. You should just embrace your Neovedanta and claim its a new modern school of Vedanta instead of living a lie and lying to others.

>This passage shows that the inference of avidya of sushupti is baseless and false
No, actually in that passage Shankara says that its both logical and taught by Shruti and that it accounts for re-emergence from pralaya
>If avidya is not absent full stop then termination of further rebirths is impossible
No, Shankara explicitly refutes that in BSSB 4.1.15 and says that even after being sublated avidya continues until death
>Uhhh I didn't actually mean that avidya is removed when I said it has to be "absent full stop", I actually meant it is sublated like you said. I'm done talking with you but you should read this SSSslop
very funny...

>>23921325
>. When someone has renounced attachment/desire and when they have entirely sublated avidya by abandoning and seeing through all their false notions about duality having real existence, about the Self being an agent and so on etc that are uprooted by the scriptural teaching, then any possible way in which the subtle body or causal body could drive further transmigration for that jiva have already been uprooted and their further productive potential eliminated, so the mere fact of continuing onwards until death "till the acquired momentum of that medium exhausts itself out as in the case of a wheel of a potter" (-BSSB 4.1.15) presents no issue


भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वा संपद्यते ॥ १९ ॥
19. But the (enlightened) man merges in Brahman after exhausting the other two, (viz merit and demerit that have started fruition), by experiencing (their results in the present life).

But the (enlightened) man merges in Brahman after exhausting the other two, (viz merit and demerit that have started fruition), by experiencing (their results in the present life). It has been said that the virtues and vices that have not begun yielding their results get annihilated through the power of knowledge. But from the texts like, "He has to tarry so long as the body does not fall, and then he merges (in Brahman)" (Ch. VI. xiv. 2), "Being but Brahman, he is merged in Brahman" (Br. IV. iv. 6), it is known that the other virtues and vices that have already begun to fructify are exhausted through experiencing the results, and then the aspirant becomes Brahman.

Opponent: May it not be that on the analogy of seeing two moons, the dualistic vision will persist even when the body falls just as much as that vision continues as long as the body lasts even after full enlightenment?

Vedantin: No, since there is no reason for this. That the dualistic vision lasts before the fall of the body is because of the need of exhausting the remaining portion of (the result of active virtue and vice) through experience. But here after death there is no such factor present.

Opponent: May not other outstanding virtues and vices produce newer experiences?

Vedantin: No, since their seeds are burnt away. For other outstanding results of works can produce a fresh body after the death of the present one only when they have false ignorance to prop them up. But that false ignorance has been burnt away (sublated) by full enlightenment. Therefore it is but proper that when the effect already produced wears away, liberation comes inevitably to the man of knowledge.

- BSSB 4.1.19

>>23921107
>When it suits yourself you have no problem accepting 'western' ideas and 'modernism', huh? good to know
>Ummm hello? Did you just cite an academic's book as an example of an idea in it being a mainstream view without also automatically agreeing with everything else that the author writes? That's not allowed, you're only allowed to agree with everything a scholar writes in their book or nothing at all! Why?!? Becuase... I say so!
kek

>>23921119
>after all it is known that the illusions don't have existence in themselves and depend on what is real, which was acknowledged several times in the thread
Is it really "known" though?

>>23921176
>The conceptions of Ramanuja are contained in those of Shankara and are transcended by them. When Shankara sees in the localization and duration of sensory objects a direct and tangible manifestation of their unreality, he does not say, as Ramanuja seems to have believed, that they do not exist (conventionally) as objects,
Schuon is not an authority on Vedanta, the fact remains that to even the post shankarite tradition Brahman is unsublatable, what is negated doesnt exist in the first place. To speak of rhe negation of an absolutely existent thing is just a manner of speech in advaita.

By you saying that avidya does truly exist, its removal becomes impossible. The truth is it neither exists because it dissapears and it neither does not exist because it appears, in that sense we can speak about the indefinability of illusory dream perception. But thats all, nothing about that is ontological or philosophical. Who is the one overcoplicating things?

>>23921325
>Because the things that perpetuate transmigration are desire and non-sublated avidya.
Take a step back from all the gymnastics,

Because the things that perpetuate transmigration (samsara) are "desire" and non-sublated avidya. It follows from that statement that the perpetuation of transmigratiob would be endless and liberation would be impossible.

When shankara clearly says samsara is sublatable because it is a lower level reality. Isnt that the whole point of the much unecesserily stretched paramartha/vyavahara distinction?

>>23921541
If the cause of transmigration is unsublatable avidya, then it can never cease. Since it is unsublatable, even if you grab bhashya quotes with similar language, without the guadapada karikas which show that brahman is not a cause, (brahman is unsublatable) you can adopt that manner of speaking. Yet it seems you want to just hold that end of the stick which ensures the perpetuation of transmigration whilst ignoring thenother end which states "no one was even transmigrating to begin with"

There is nothing traditional about your view on advaita, and the prattle about idealism, realism, and so on from sharma is just mental garbage which turns advaita into a system. When without the "shabda" of the perpetual triple veda A U M you have just idle chatter and profane speculation.

>>23921547
To add you never commented on SSS/Shankaras view on the shruti also

Or what he meant by it as a valid source of knowledge continuing even through pralaya
>>23919729
>>23919736
You implied in the last thread that the shruti was a book/birch leaf etc., which is only avidya kalpita. Like the bible, quran and so on, clearly shankara called such an understanding the repugnant error of mutual dependence.

>>23921345
>Nothing about that was a contradiction. You didnt even identify an alleged contradiction
I literally showed the contradiction in the subsequent sentence.
>to illustrate a common example of something seeming to take on a status which it doesn't really have
Yes, which is the same status between the two stances being compared, otherwise the analogy would make no sense at all. And this implies the dependence of what is not self-sufficient on another ground, which is the substance of the analogy regarding illusion.
>The "seeming to take on a status" is not the metaphysical status of the world but is merely a description of how the jiva's interpret the experience
Jiva's interpret the experience of phenomena as external to them, as objectively existing, the analogy makes a comparison to the common sense realism, which is what is illusory because no phenomenon is self-sufficient, has no ground in itself, but like an illusion, dependent on another thing, which is real. You are the one having trouble to understand what Shankara and Advaita Vedanta teach, lol.
>this falsity is due to the world/phenomena being neither truly real nor nothingness, which is not a "seeming" that requires any observer.
The only thing I can think of being neither truly real nor nothingness is, guess what, an illusion. And this is not a manifestation ex nihilo, depending on nothing, it depends on Brahman, just like the illusion depends on real objects. Where is the other advaitin? This one needs to be taught about what he believes in.
>At the same time when it comes to the ultimate metaphysical status of those epistemic instruments and the exterior world he is a non-realist because he affirms only Brahman has truly real existence
You're so insane that you insist on something you have no idea about. A realist does not think that the external object has relative existence, depending on an ultimate metaphysical entity like Brahman as you say, fucking hell. This is not realism for fuck's sake. Kant also ascribes reality to epistemic phenomena, but that doesn't make him a realist you fucking retard, because he ascribes relative reality to them, like Advaita needs to ground all phenomena on another entity, with another ontological status, being MORE real. Holy shit I can't believe I need to explain something so obvious to someone. I refuse to keep wasting time with a retard who doesn't know what he talks about like you.

>>23921700
Of course it does, the kantian noumenon is hyper-realist in the same way the advaitic brahman is
>This is not realism for fuck's sake. Kant also ascribes reality to epistemic phenomena, but that doesn't make him a realist you fucking retard, because he ascribes relative reality to them, like Advaita needs to ground all phenomena on another entity, with another ontological status, being MORE real.
Its wrong to describe Brahman as more real, that is just word games, Brahman is the only reality. Phenomena or not if you were shot in the head right now, it would be shown to something that is not less real, but not real at all just like a waking hallucination.

>>23920623
>V. Panoli anywhere
Not online unfortunately, I doubt someone will scan it through which is unfortunate considering how great of a resource it seems. I may be mistaken but I searched online and I cannot find anything they sell it online in hardvover for hundreds of US dollars, which is obviously unamangable when converted to Brazillian Reals or whatever currency it is that you use.

>>23921884
>word games,
the man Himself says 'vācārambhaṇamātratvāccāvidyākalpitasya nāmarūpabhedasya' (because name-and-form, which is imagined by ignorance, is mere verbal expression, speech alone) BSBh 2-1-27

Advaita in 1 second for the common man:
This is that Devadatta

>>23919914
https://advaita-l.advaita-vedanta.narkive.com/oSIlIcfV/sss-avidya-shri-ramakrishnan

Another link for further context

>>23921884
>the kantian noumenon is hyper-realist
There is no apprehension of noumenon and it is not explicitly affirmed to exist. Affirming noumenon in the sense of grounding experience is falling for dialectical illusion and extension of categories beyond their realm of operation. You are dumb.
> Brahman is the only reality
This is even worse for your position, holy shit.
> if you were shot in the head right now, it would be shown to something that is not less real, but not real at all just like a waking hallucination.
This is what the retard reaches through epistemological realism, everyone.

>>23922418
>There is no apprehension of noumenon and it is not explicitly affirmed to exist
Its the same for Brahman

>>23922439
Yes and this is not realism, holy fucking shit.

>>23921539
>Because the things that perpetuate transmigration (samsara) are "desire" and non-sublated avidya. It follows from that statement that the perpetuation of transmigratiob would be endless and liberation would be impossible.
No, that actually doesn’t follow, because desire can be renounced and avidya can be sublated, making moksha possible.
> By you saying that avidya does truly exist
That’s a retarded strawman, I never said once in this entire thread that avidya truly exists. Whenever you get refuted you cope by resorting to posturing without saying anything or engaging in strawmen.

>>23921541
> Because the things that perpetuate transmigration (samsara) are "desire" and non-sublated avidya. It follows from that statement that the perpetuation of transmigratiob would be endless and liberation would be impossible.
Wrong idiot, because the jiva can overcome both of those through renouncing desire and through sublating avidya. Shankara himself says in BSSB 4.1.15 that the unreal avidya continues until death even after being sublated by the jiva. In fact you didn’t even provide a logical connection from the starting premise to the conclusion “moksha would be impossible”, so what you wrote was a non-sequitur fallacy right there in your post because you presented an argument as being the logical result of something when those aren’t connected logically at all and you never provided the logical link to substantiate your point. Nice fallacy, really showing the intelligence, or the lack thereof, of SSSfags. All the jiva has to do to overcome desire is to renounce is and to sublate avidya the jiva just to receive the proper scriptural instruction and grasp the essential meaning themself, which sublates avidya. At this point, his moksha is automatically assured, as Shankara points out, even though the sublated avidya continues until death (see BSSB 4.1.15) that is no issue since “liberation comes inevitably to the man of knowledge” since there is no non-sublated avidya left that can co-operate with karma in producing a new body, as Shankara points out in BSSB 4.1.19. Further transmigration happens not just because of avidya because avidya has to cooperate with one’s karma to produce the new body, and when avidya has been sublated this is unable to take place even if the sublated avidya is present.

If you aren’t going to stick to Shankara’s stated position on this then just admit you follow a modern school of Neovedanta and stop lying by saying your words represent Shankara’s true teachings, because in BSSB 4.1.15 and 4.1.19 (among many others) Shankara completely BTFOs your viewpoint and pseud talking points on avidya and transmigration.

>>23921547
>If the cause of transmigration is unsublatable avidya, then it can never cease.
Avidya isn't unsublatable, I never once claimed that and nor does the authentic Sampradaya. Sublate means to cease believing in something, to abandon a former notion, it does not mean the removal of the presence of something. You need to get a grip on yourself and stop with these retarded and shameless blatant strawmen fallacies. Avidya is sublated which means that the wrong beliefs and assumptions connected with Avidya (like superimposing Self onto non-Self and vice versa and also belief in the reality of plurality etc) are abandoned, one gives up those views and understands how and why they are wrong, with the help of the scriptural teaching.
>Yet it seems you want to just hold that end of the stick which ensures the perpetuation of transmigration whilst ignoring thenother end which states "no one was even transmigrating to begin with"
No, I'm not ignoring that, more dishonest strawman bullshit from you. Obviously, at the paramarthika level there is no transmigration, but at the Vyavaharika level the jiva transmigrates until it overcomes desire through renouncing (this is more preliminary) and overcomes avidya by sublating it through grasping the scriptural teaching (the final and essential step).
>There is nothing traditional about your view on advaita
Everything I'm saying comes directly from the Bhashyas, It's actually you who are unable to accept Shankara's written words that avidya even after being sublated continues until death in BSSB 4.1.15 and you are feverishly coping in desperation, which is why you have commited strawman fallacies and non-sequitur fallacies in your last several posts about this topic. After being BTFO'd repeatedly in this thread and after being shown repeatedly that Shankara's written words explicitly contradict yours your brain couldn't handle it and 404'd and went offline which is why you started posting fallacies. Your modernist Neovedanta slop is self-destructing in front of everyone for all to see!

>>23921700
>I literally showed the contradiction in the subsequent sentence.
No, in your subsequent sentence you just created a strawman by saying that Advaitins deny that samsara depends on the real ground Brahman, but this is simply not true. Advaita affirms over and over repeatedly that samsara which belongs to the status of the false, depends on Brahman for its manifestation and could not be present without Brahman. However, this an ontological ground and not a perceptual ground. Hence why in the earlier example Shankara describes the rope as the ground of the snake and does not say the observer is the ground. Brahman is the ontological ground of Vyavaharika because Brahman makes it manifest as such, but since the presence of the Vyavaharika as such is not a superimposition it needs no observer.
>Yes, which is the same status between the two stances being compared, otherwise the analogy would make no sense at all.
Incorrect, superimposition is not the stance or status of Vyavaharika, superimposition is something that happens in relation to the Vyavaharika. The citation in question doesn't even mention superimpositon by the way but only talks about illusions needing a ground. It's a perfectly valid and coherent point to say that just as the Pratibhasika involves superimposition, that jivas superimpose things from the Vyavaharika onto Brahman even if Vyavaharika is not itself a superimposition, you don't need Vyavaharika to be a superimposition itself in order to make a valid comparision about this.

>Jiva's interpret the experience of phenomena as external to them
On the Vyavaharika plane objects are made of the gross elements and are indeed external to and independent of any jiva's mind, this is not an interpretation but it is factual, it's an accurate description of how Samsara functions.
>as objectively existing
They don't have Paramarthika existence, to say that something "objectively exists on the Vyavaharika level" merely means that its present as part of what is false or mithya. It does not endowe it with truly real existence like Brahman has.
>the analogy makes a comparison to the common sense realism
No, it fully endorses epistemic realism by holding that objects in Samsara are present in a way that is independent of our epistemic instruments like sense-organs and mind.
>which is what is illusory because no phenomenon is self-sufficient, has no ground in itself, but like an illusion, dependent on another thing, which is real.
The fact of everything with the Samsara that is false depends on Brahman for it's manifestation does not contradict whatsoever the point that this takes place in a manner that is independent of our epistemic insturments (epistemological realism).

>>23921700
>The only thing I can think of being neither truly real nor nothingness is, guess what, an illusion.
Advaita isn't constrainted by "whatever you can think of", their doctrine about this comes from revealed scriptures. Yes, the Vyavaharika is alike in certain respects to perceptual illusions or Pratibhasika, which is why they can be compared and be affirmed to be alike in certain respects, although they are not identical. Vyavaharika is not a superimposition and needs no observer, it's brought about by Brahman's inherent ability to do so and not through anyone superimposing it. Once present, the jivas who are part the Vyavaharika superimpose various elements of it back onto Brahman as part of their delusion or mental error.
>And this is not a manifestation ex nihilo, depending on nothing, it depends on Brahman
The Vyavaharika depends on Brahman and only manifests because Brahman makes it do so.
>You're so insane that you insist on something you have no idea about. A realist does not think that the external object has relative existence
I never said that a realist did hold that view, you're just getting confused and lost. However, that position is not incompatible with epistemological realism. Someone who believes that external objects only have relative existence, but in a way that is independent of our epistemic instruments is still an epistemological realist, it's not ontological realism but it is still episemtological realism. You can have one without the other, there is no logical or philosophical requiremnt that you need to accept both at the same time.
>like Advaita needs to ground all phenomena on another entity, with another ontological status
Brahman is the ground of everything

>>23921924
>the man Himself says 'vācārambhaṇamātratvāccāvidyākalpitasya nāmarūpabhedasya' (because name-and-form, which is imagined by ignorance, is mere verbal expression, speech alone) BSBh 2-1-27
That's only a denial of their Paramarthika existence and not their relative existence as part of the Mithya. In that same exact passage (BSSB 2-1-27), Shankara says that name and form "cannot be determined either as real or unreal" and hence they belong to the false. This accords perfectly with the genuine Sampradaya and it contradicts SSS.

In the false view propagated by SSS and his equally sophistic acolytes, Shankara never has a valid reason to ever refer to Samsara and name and form as "neither as real or unreal" but they would be solely unreal and non-existent according to SSS who does not admit mithya as conventional existence that is neither paramarthika nor nothingness. The fact that Shankara states that name and form cannot be determined as (absolutely) unreal (like nothingness) shows that he regards name and form just like the Sampradaya does, as beloning to the indeterminate falsity (mithya) which has phenomeal presence/manifestation despite lacking paramarthika existence.

>>23922756
>you just created a strawman by saying that Advaitins deny that samsara depends on the real ground Brahman
You have problems with reading comprehension, I literally said the opposite and that in order to avoid the problems with this dependence, one strategy leads to a complete divide.
> samsara which belongs to the status of the false, depends on Brahman for its manifestation and could not be present without Brahman
And in one of those former threads advaitins were denying logic altogether because of the implications of this dependence lmao.
> Shankara describes the rope as the ground of the snake and does not say the observer is the ground
The rope is the ground of the FORM of the illusion, not of the illusion itself you fucking retarded dumbfuck.
> Brahman is the ontological ground of Vyavaharika because Brahman makes it manifest as such, but since the presence of the Vyavaharika as such is not a superimposition it needs no observer.
First, Brahman, which is consciousness in itself, is the cause of illusion but a cause that doesn’t know the effects (contradictory). Second, the analogy Shankara makes is literally to express the superimposition, otherwise there would be no relation between Brahaman/his power and samsara at all, but there is. Third, if what is manifest as samsara is illusory it is like an illusion grounded on real forms and the perception that perceives the represented illusion. I’m just repeating myself at this point, Advaita was refuted alreadt in those threads.
> superimposition is something that happens in relation to the Vyavaharika. The citation in question doesn't even mention superimpositon by the way but only talks about illusions needing a ground.
Which is the point, lmao. The ground effects the superimposition, and the analogy was not self-contained to Vyavaharika, Shankara says that rope snake is like Brahman’s taken by non-Brahman. Holy shit, otherwise it would make no sense to posit an analogy to compare identical things.
> On the Vyavaharika plane objects are made of the gross elements and are indeed external to and independent of any jiva's mind
Yes and since samsara came before jivas, samsara being an illusion needs a perceiver for it, and advaitins have never been able to answer Who perceives samsara. Thus Advaita Vedanta is refuted.
> it fully endorses epistemic realism by holding that objects in Samsara are present in a way that is independent of our epistemic instruments like sense-organs and mind.
Sense-organs and individual mind which is only a relative epistemic stance, relative to jivas, to human mind, not an absolute epistemic stance, you retard. Do you think realists think in this way? You are severely retarded.
> is independent of our epistemic insturments
Epistemological realism does not discriminate between relative epistemic grounds, for fuck’s sake read a book, it cannot say that objects exist independently of certain minds but at the same times dependently on another super mind.

>>23921550
>To add you never commented on SSS/Shankaras view on the shruti also

Shankara has a simple view on Shruti, all of which is negated and overturned in the absurd Neovedanta model of SSS.

In Shankara's view
1) The Shruti is an authoritative pramana about non-empirical matters
2) The Shruti comes from Brahman, the sages who compiled the Shruti merely "heard" a pre-existing message which they transcribed
3) The authority of the Shruti is ensured by it being an eternal text without any human author that Brahman instills with valid teachings
4) Any viewpoint which comes from individual men (singular or plural) and not from a revealed/eternal scripture is liable to being overturned by another person or logician who disagrees with it and is hence not authoritative.
5) Certain things taught by scripture cannot be known via any other means and must be accepted using the Shruti as a pramana

Brahman is the yoni; (i.e. the material and efficient cause) of great scriptures like the Rg-Veda etc. which are supplemented by other scriptures that are themselves sources (of various kinds) of knowledge, which reveal all things like a lamp, and which are almost omniscient. For scriptures like the Rg-Veda, possessed of all good qualities as they are, cannot possibly emerge from any source other than an all-knowing One. For it is a well-recognized fact in the world that the person from whom the scriptures dealing with multifarious subjects emerge is more well informed than the scriptures themselves; for instance, grammar etc., emanating from Panini and others, represent merely a part of the subject known to them. It goes without saying that, that great Being has absolute omniscience and omnipotence, since from Him emerge the Rg-Veda etc.-divided into many branches and constituting the source of classification into gods, animals, men, castes, stages of life, etc., and the source of all kinds of knowledge-and since the emergence of these Vedas from that Being occurs as though in sport (lila) and without any effort like the breath of a man, as is stated in the Vedic text, "Those that are called the Rg-Veda, (Yajur-Veda, etc.) are but the exhalation of this great Being (Br. II. iv. 10).
- Shankara, BSSB 1.1.3

>>23922896
>>23921550
For it is a patent fact of experience, that when a logician asserts, "This indeed is the true knowledge", it is upset by somebody else. And what is established by the latter is disproved by still another. How can any knowledge, arising from reasoning, be correct, when its content has no fixity of
form? Again, the follower of the theory of Pradhana is not accepted by all logicians as the best among adepts in reasoning, in which opposite case alone could his knowledge be accepted by us as right knowledge. It is not also possible to assemble all the logicians of past, present, and future at the same place and time, whereby to arrive at a single idea, having the same form and content, so as to be the right knowledge. But since the Vedas are eternal and a source of knowledge, they can reasonably reveal as their subject-matter something which is (well established and) unchanging; and the knowledge arising from them can be true, so that no logician, past, present, or future can deny it. Hence it is proved that the knowledge arising from
the Upanishads is alone the true knowledge.
- Shankara, BSSB 2.1.12

What is the problem with the view of SSS regarding scripture? Well, every single one of the points Shankara accepts about scriptures becomes negated and the Shruti loses all authority as a pramana about Brahman, showing how unacceptable the viewpoint of SSS is for Shankara. In the view of SSS, since samsara and its contents like avidya does not actually originate from Brahman in any way but is just inexplicably present on its own, the Shruti does not originate from Brahman. Instead, the Shruti originates solely from ignorance and the products of ignorance like men and their minds.

This means that
1) Since the Shruti does not originate from Brahman, Brahman cannot instill any true teachings about Brahman in the Shruti and there is no certainty or guarantee that it reveals the truth about anything
2) Since the Shruti originates solely from the ignorance of individual men, it is no different than the subjective opinions of any logician and can be overturned by someone else who happens to disagree with it, these both being two equally subjective viewpoints of individuals.

>>23921550
>>23922901
I will venture to guess that the SSSfag will desparately try to write some cope reply that none of this matters because the only purpose of the Shruti is to negate, but this is a not-serious answer that fails to address the issue for multiple reasons, namely that

1) Without Brahman ensuring the accuracy of the Shruti teaching, the idea that you should negate something is just the subjective opinion of a random human based on ignorance and it lacks all authority and has no connection with ultimate reality
2) Shankara explicitly says that without being taught about the nature of Brahman by scripture that negation is useless, "But unless Brahman is (first) taught (by scripture etc.), neither does the knowledge of Brahman dawn nor is the universe sublated even though the instruction, "Know Brahman, sublate the world", be imparted a hundred times. " - Shankara, BSSB 3.2.21

So, the viewpoint of SSS is irreconciliably opposed to that of Shankara on scripture, and this is no small matter because the validity of the entire teaching depends upon this from Shankara's perspective.This point alone conclusviely shows how SSS does not understand Shankara's perspective and does not accurately represent his teachings, you don't even need to get into the hundreds of other contradictions between SSS and Shankara to demonstrate that SSS's view is not traditional, this point alone is sufficient.

>>23922901
Good post. Nice to have other people helping to show the deficiencies of Advaita Vedanta.

>>23922917
>Nice to have other people helping to show the deficiencies of Advaita Vedanta.
It only shows the deficiencies of SSS who is a 20th century author and not the traditional form of Advaita of Shankara and others.

>>23922939
The only thing you have achieved throughout all those posts was to show your ignorance regarding SSS's views. The other anon already showed that you didn't even know SSS's views on ignorance in sleep (as agrahana). SSS never supported a thoroughly negation-only method, without a positive teaching (adhyAropa) coming first. He never denied the empirical-reality's conventional status. Who told you that he never addressed the sadAsad-vilakshana issue? He also never denied the shruti's antyapramana status and you didn't even have a clue about the problem regarding that sanskrit compound, among other things. Bet you never read one single book of SSS in its entirety besides petty reviews by Doherty and R.Balasubrahmanian.
You don't even know what you're pretending to refute.

Lastly, your guenonian tendencies blind you to even know what the word 'Traditional' means in India (the real India, not the one conceived in Guénon's head). SSS was never 'excommunicated' or 'banned' because this is not how it works there. FYI a lot of mulavidya-supporters for example, have recognized (directly or not) SSS's contributions (mainly the focus on adhyaropa-apavada, look for Swami Paramarthananda, Swami Paramananda Bharati from Sringeri, etc.), what they disagree most is that SSS does not recognize mulavidya as a possible adhyaropa, while they do. But you sure smarter than everyone, right? You don't even know samskrt, having to rely on translations of the disciples of Ramakrshna-Vivekananda (very traditional!).

>>23923071
>Doherty
Oh, I forgot, its actually SWAMINI (Very traditional, Samkara approves it!) Agamananda Saraswati now
>She has participated in the committee of Scholars for Hindu-Jewish dialogue, World Council of Religious Leaders and was a Participant scholar in the Hindu-Jewish dialogue of Acharya Sabha with the Rabbinate of Israel, Delhi, India (2011). Along with the Secretary-General of the World Council of Religious Leaders, she co-organized a Hindu-Jewish Leadership Summit hosted by the Foreign Ministry of Israel and Rabbinate of Israel, Tel Aviv (2008) as well as the first two-day dialogue between the Ashkenazy Chief Rabbi of Israel who led an international delegation of Rabbis with select Hindu religious leaders, Delhi, India (2007).
>https://www.hua.edu/people/swamini-agamananda-saraswati/

>>23922853
>>23922853
>The rope is the ground of the FORM of the illusion, not of the illusion itself you fucking retarded dumbfuck.
It doesn't matter, the point is just to illustrate how metaphysical falsity, like a perceptual illusion and its form, requires a ground of some sort. By this he is simply pointing out that falsity being present as such dependents on there being a Real that is Brahman that is somehow making it manifest, by extension of the example from empirical experience that an illusion never appears without some sort of basis. It doesn't logically follow from this that Brahman has to necessarily be the observer of the illusion. The knower/known/means of knowing triad is part of what is false and isn't actually real, it doesn't exist at the level of ultimate reality where there is just the non-dual Brahman.

Experience of the illusion consists of intentional vrittis (mental states) happening in the buddhi when the buddhi receives representational forms from the lower functions like manas (mind) and the sense-organ knownledge, like a stained glass window, these are both representional (contain form or data) and are translucent. When they are illuminated by the light of Atma (non-intentional non-dual partless Conciousness), the vrittis glowing is like a stained glass window being lit up with light.

Intentional mental states are like this, they are insentient phenomena that are both representational and translucent, when they are permeated with the light of infinite Self (sentient awareness) they appear to take on that light itself, due to being translucent, and thus the combination of the presence of the representational form and the translucency allows it to falsely appear as a concious, sentient object-directed mental state. The object directed aspect and its form is determined by the form received from manas etc and the appearence of sentience as a sentient mental state that knows the form is due to taking on the appearence of the light (awareness) that it seems to be characterized by, despite being inherently non-luminous. The capacity of observering is not itself concious but is a subtle insentient form whose translucent nature allows it to appear sentient (luminous) when associated with the external luminosity, which is the only thing that is inherently luminous (sentient).

>>23922853
Becuase the capacity of observing (buddhi/vrittis) is not itself concious (luminous) and is another content of the false Vyavaharika, there ceases to be any sort of necessity to invest the Real Awareness with the capacity of observership in order to coherently account for the subjective experience of the Vyavaharika/false/Samsara despite that Awareness being immune to and unaware of the Vyavaharika. All you need to account for observing the contents of the "illusion" or the false Samsara is the insentient structure of the buddhi being invested with this external light and thereby glowing, and Brahman naturally manifests the false Samsara in such a way that this takes place. The insentient structure glows with light because Brahman makes it do so as part of how the Vyavaharika functions and it isn't an empirical perceptual illusion (pratibhasika) that requires an observer standing outside of it while observing it in order that it take place.

>samsara being an illusion needs a perceiver for it,
It's not a perceptual illusion but it's falsity is inherent to Brahman generating it as something neither truly real nor false, it's presence is accounted for by the ability of Brahman to generate it so no observer is required. The status as falsity (lacking real existence) is caused by Brahman and is not relative to any observer and is not determined by language. Denying that Brahman can do this is just placing completely abitrary restraints on what God can or cannot do without any sort of justification. Simply because language associates certain concepts with others is not a determinate of what God can or cannot do—God created language and He isn't bound by His own creation. To assume He is without justifcation is a question-begging fallacy (petitio principii).
>Thus Advaita Vedanta is refuted.
Not with petitio principiis lol

>>23922853
>Sense-organs and individual mind which is only a relative epistemic stance, relative to jivas, to human mind
It's an epistemic distinction about human experience and our epistemic instruments, this isn't relative but it is making a true statement about the status of the exteror objects generated by Brahman in relation to the human mind. This epistemological realism is not contradicted by anything about Brahman either unless you are deeply confused.
>not an absolute epistemic stance, you retard.
You have not even defined what you mean by that, do you mean that the objects have truly real existence? That's ontological realism and its not epistemological realism and its not "absolute" epistemological realism either, it seems like you were just projecting when you said I didn't know what I was talking about.
>it cannot say that objects exist independently of certain minds but at the same times dependently on another super mind.
Advaita and it's epistemological realism doesn't say this, Brahman isn't a super-mind, Brahman is mindless Pure Conciousness. And Samsara doesn't depend on a super-mind knowing it, its manifestation depends on Brahman bringing it into manifestation through his power as the false just as in Classial Theism creation depends on God bringing it into creation. The epistemological realist position is not contradicted by any of this.

>>23923140
>? That's ontological realism and its not epistemological realism
to be clear

epistemic realism + ontic realism (standard realism) = the world of plurality truly exists, and our epistemic instruments receives knowledge from objects present in the world that are in themselves independent of our instruments and our mind

epistemic realism + ontic non-realism (Advaita) = the world of plurality does not truly exist (although an Absolute like Brahman may exist), and the things out there in the world of plurality that lacks real existence are present as such (false objects) in a way that is independent our minds and its instruments, our minds receive knowledge from things present empirically 'out there'

epistemic idealism + ontic realism (pluralistic idealism) = our knowledge of the world is not received from external sources but its just our own mind/delusions representing itself as interacting with an external world when it isn't actually doing so and reality consists of a plurality of these minds all existing truly with their own solipsistic internal world, or reality is one Super-mind that contains smaller minds that are also real

epistemic idealism + ontic non-realism (solipsistic idealism) = our knowledge of the world is not received from external sources but its just our own mind/delusions representing itself as interacting with an external world that seems to be present independent of those epistemtic instruments (but isn't), and furthermore nothing at all really exists, or perhaps just that one deluded mind exists.

>>23923140
>epistemic distinction about human experience and our epistemic instruments, this isn't relative but it is making a true statement about the status of the exteror objects generated by Brahman
It is thus that shows that it is relative. Epistemological realism does not take into account an absolute epistemic stance on truth like Brahman as distinguished from another grounded on human cognition, the only epistemic stance on truth is dependent on human conditions, holy fucking shit, you don't know what you're talking about. There is no truth-relative value, external objects at the same time being dependent on mind (Brahman) and independent of mind (human).
>That's ontological realism and its not epistemological realism
I can't believe I'm discussing with someone this retarded. Ontological realism is established through realist epistemic accounts, like the correspondence theory of truth gives TRUTH TO THE OBJECT, as both existing in itself outside human mind as being grasped as externally like that. You don't know anything about epistemology and metaphysics.
>its not "absolute" epistemological realism
Who said anything about absolute epistemological realism you retard? You can't even comprehend the words from my post.
>Brahman is mindless Pure Conciousness
Retarded semantics again, in philosophy mind has a way broader sense than in your cultist argot system.
>Samsara doesn't depend on a super-mind knowing it, its manifestation depends on Brahman bringing it into manifestation through his power
Whose power? Brahman (which is mind/consciousness), in the end depending on it. And it was avowed here >>23922756 ''Samsara that is false depends on Brahman for it's manifestation''.
>The epistemological realist position is not contradicted by any of this.
It obviously is and you have no idea what epistemological realism is. Try start reading philosophy.

>>23923183
> Epistemological realism does not take into account an absolute epistemic stance on truth like Brahman as distinguished from another grounded on human cognition,
That’s an ontological question and not an epistemological one. One can varying positions on ultimate truth and things like Brahman while holding that minds receive their knowledge from external sources (realist) or whether its solely internal (idealist).
> Ontological realism is established through realist epistemic accounts,
It can be, but there is no logical or philosophical necessity for every epistemological realist to do this, so to bring that up as some of argument is a red herring.
> Whose power? Brahman
Yes, but then it becomes a question of ontology and ceases to be about epistemic instruments anymore.

>>23923134
>It doesn't matter, the point is just to illustrate how metaphysical falsity, like a perceptual illusion and its form, requires a ground of some sort
It does matter, since you derive from the analogy a complete different meaning from that mistake you're making.
>It doesn't logically follow from this that Brahman has to necessarily be the observer of the illusion. The knower/known/means of knowing triad is part of what is false and isn't actually real
But that is the point, SOMETHING must perceive samsara insofar as it is an illusion, there must be a deluded perception for samsara be what it is (illusion).

>>23923137
>It's not a perceptual illusion but it's falsity is inherent to Brahman generating it as something neither truly real nor false
Which is a fitting definition for illusion, being something neither real nor false. But I have already said that above, you just ignored and resorted to the same dishonesty of trying to push something that is neither illusion nor falsity nor reality nor truth, that is nothing that can be defined, when it has been defined by the Upanishads, Shankara, Gaudapada as illusion.

>>23923215
> It does matter, since you derive from the analogy a complete different meaning from that mistake you're making.
Whether or not you choose derive your own retarded bullshit from the comparison is not an example of a flaw or contradiction in anything Advaita is saying, since the context its said in and the other things they say about related subjects is sufficient to clear up misconceptions. It’s sad that this even needs to be pointed out.
> But that is the point, SOMETHING must perceive samsara insofar as it is an illusion
False, it’s not a perceptual illusion that requires an observer since its Vyavaharika and not Pratibhasika. The Vyavaharika is false like a proposition, like how the proposition “the Vyavaharika has real existence” is false. If you want to claim that an observer is logically necessary then you need to explain why. if you fail to do this then its a question-begging fallacy. Simply appealing to perceptual illusions is not a logical demonstration of why the Vyavaharika would need an observer, that’s also a question-begging fallacy because it presumes without logical justification that Vyavaharika is necessarily determined by how Pratibhasika works which is not true.

>>23923220
> Which is a fitting definition for illusion
That is simply because perceptual illusions are necessarily false in the respect in which they are illusory or misleading, but not everything that is false is a perceptual illusion, so there is no requirement that Samsara being false makes it necessary conform to the other concepts associated with the term illusion unless you are engaging in a question-begging fallacy (like so many of your so-called arguments which turn out to be fallacies).

>hen it has been defined by the Upanishads, Shankara, Gaudapada as illusion.
That’s a pathetic lie, in what passage? Shankara and Gauadapa and the Upanishads never gives a formulaic definition of Samsara as being identical in nature to a subjective perceptual illusion, they are only compared as like in certain respects.

>>23923311
>perceptual illusions are necessarily false in the respect in which they are illusory or misleading, but not everything that is false is a perceptual illusion, so there is no requirement that Samsara being false makes it necessary conform to the other concepts associated with the term illusion
You literally gave a specific definition for samsara as not being nothingness nor real nor false but something distinct and the thing is that besides Upanishads’ and Shankaras’s words, and many other adavaitins descriptions, this distinct definition for samsara makes it a synonym of illusion.
> Shankara and Gauadapa and the Upanishads never gives a formulaic definition of Samsara as being identical in nature to a subjective perceptual illusion, they are only compared as like in certain respects.
There are even quotes in the other threads, showing how samsara is taken for somethint that it isn’t, the repeated analogies with illusions etc.

>>23923295
>it’s not a perceptual illusion that requires an observer
It literally does, are you crazy to deny illusions being represented as such to what must be thenceforth deluded?
>it’s Vyavaharika and not Pratibhasika
Samsara is different from jivas, it comes before them, jivas are within samsara, but samsara is illusory and needs a perceiver for itself be what it is.
> If you want to claim that an observer is logically necessary then you need to explain why
But it has been explined why countless of times in detailed explanations, by definitions, by quotes from your authorities, by the relation between Brahman and Maya. You simply resort to fallacies and dishonesty all the time not to admit the logical consequences of what is presented.

>>23923357
> You literally gave a specific definition for samsara as not being nothingness nor real nor false but something distinct and the thing is that besides Upanishads’ and Shankaras’s words, and many other adavaitins descriptions, this distinct definition for samsara makes it a synonym of illusion.
No, that’s not true, that does not make it a synonym of a perceptual illusion. It simply means that its neither true reality nor nothingness, and nothing more. This can be compared in certain respects to a perceptual illusion but its not the same as one, and there is no reason why it would be necessary to treat it as such unless you are committing a question-begging fallacy. Whether this falsity is deceiving and in what regard is a question that is relative to who is being deceived, but its status as being false is not a question of deception or deceiving but it is inherent to the nature of Samsara itself, it status as falsity doesn’t depend on any who or what observing it.
> There are even quotes in the other threads, showing how samsara is taken for somethint that it isn’t
Yes, and that’s referencing a specific action or assumption that ignorant beings have, but they can experience samsara without this (i.e, an enlightened man), because samsara itself is not a Pratibhasika delusion. The Pratibhasika subjective delusion about Samsara is an optional mode of perceiving the Vyavaharika that the mind of embodied beings can engage in or not engage in.

>>23923391
> It literally does, are you crazy to deny illusions being represented as such to what must be thenceforth deluded?
It’s not a perceptual illusion so it doesn’t require one. You are still committing the same question-begging fallacy I’ve already called out and refuted by insisting that the Vyavaharika has to be treated as a perceptual delusion without any valid logical justification. Do you have any arguments which I have not already refuted or are you just going to repeat debunked fallacies? If you cannot provide a valid logical justification then you’re committing a fallacy and just embarrassing yourself.

>>it’s Vyavaharika and not Pratibhasika
>Samsara is different from jivas, it comes before them
Jivas are a part of samsara and not separate, the Atma of each Jiva is the infinite Brahman itself (the Jiva or Jivatman is a composite of this Atma and the false components like buddhi, manas etc making up the jiva), samsara and its contents like jivas are beginningless, but time is part of the illusion and unreal, its not a real frame or container in which the false is contained. Samsara and everything within it are generated by Brahman who is beyond time.
>jivas are within samsara, but samsara is illusory and needs a perceiver for itself be what it is.
No, because it’s not a perceptual illusion, this is the same question-begging fallacy that I already refuted.
> If you want to claim that an observer is logically necessary then you need to explain why
>But it has been explined why countless of times in detailed explanations
No it hasn’t, you’ve only committed fallacies.

Provide ONE (1) logical justification that isn’t a fallacy, I’ll wait. You are a total midwit who literally has nothing but fallacies.

>>23923563
And to be clear, Brahman’s creative ability is not determined by the bounds of language or human concepts, because Brahman creates language and human minds and Brahman and His creative power isnt bound by His creation, so if your argument relies on that assumption (i.e, if Brahman creates X through His power, it’s logically necessary that He do so in X manner because the word illusion means so and so) then that is another question-begging fallacy which has already been refuted.

>>23923547
>It simply means that its neither true reality nor nothingness, and nothing more
Which is exactly a definition of illusion, making these definitions synonymous.
>This can be compared in certain respects to a perceptual illusion but its not the same as one
Although many advaitins affirm that it is exactly like illusion that samsara is taken for existing in itself, and that Brahman is obscured. You are going against your own school of thought.
>there is no reason why it would be necessary to treat it as such unless you are committing a question-begging fallacy
I treat it as such because it is how it is presented in the considered sacred scriptures, this is how commentators and scholars like Shankara and Gaudapada present it to be, and how even from your own definitions they fit into the concept of illusion perfectly.
>Pre-Shankara Vedanta:
>The term maya can be traced to the Rgveda (VI, 47, 18) where the one Supreme is said to appear in many forms through his power of maya.
Hm, maya making one thing appearing in different forms. Sounds very much like an illusion and how there must needs be some mind that is deceived.
>The term avidya is often used in the Upanishads in the sense of ignorance and appearance.
Sharma writes about Gaudapada:
>Through beginningless and indescribable power called maya or avidya, the Absolute *appears* as many. The empirical world of individual subjects and objects is false, because it is neither real nor unreal. Indescribability as either real or unreal (sadasadanirvachaniyata) is the mark of illusion (bhrama), appearance or falsity. The world of plurality, like a dream or an illusion, cannot be called real nor unreal.
From the Gaudapada-karika:
>It is the nature of the inexpressible power of the Lord to project the illusion of creation.

>but its status as being false is not a question of deception or deceiving
It is proved it is from the above and that by its being false it is meant that it is false due to illusion and ignorance, not as an a priori conceptual contradiction, which would even contradict the claim that Brahman is not apprehended discursively and cannot be grasped through conceptual reasoning, since it has no semantic definition.
The rest of your post is incoherent, Samsara is literally perceived as real, it is no matter of choice or will of mind to be deluded, the mind is projected to create fixed categories that gives the illusion fixed categories, predication and externality and correspondence.

>>23923563
>It’s not a perceptual illusion so it doesn’t require one
Already showed that it is here >>23923605.
>Do you have any arguments which I have not already refuted
Besides your own definitions being synonymous with illusion, there are textual authorities like Upanishads, scholars like Gaudapada and Shankara going in the same direction as I am by affirming the illusory character of samsara and its falsity in the way an illusion and ignorance are false. Try reading this post >>23923605.
>it’s not a perceptual illusion
It is an illusion, it is something falsely taken for what it is not. See >>23923605.
>Jivas are a part of samsara and not separate
Jivas are conditioned by time and succession and time and succession are within and are part of Samsara. It is funny that you need to deny the obvious in order to evade the obvious, which ends up contradicting your cultist religion.

>>23923605
>Which is exactly a definition of illusion, making these definitions synonymous.
Incorrect, simply because certain things are shared in both concepts does not make them identical. For example, wine and milk are both liquids, but simply because both include 'liquid' in their definition doesn't mean that you are actually talking about milk when you are talking about wine. Illusion additionally has the connotation of being connected with an observer while something that is simply false (due to it being neither real nor nothingness) does not have to be. Furtheremore, some peoples and philosophies conceptions of illusions regard them as genuinely existing but simply misleading (like in Vishishtadvaita). Illusion does not universally have a definition as something that doesn't exist, everyone agrees that illusions deceive but people disagree about their ontological status.

Your argument here is as stupid as saying "well, you admit that wine is a liquid? That means you are also talking about milk because milk is a liquid too".

This is spurious reasoning because milk and wine have further differences beyond both being a liquid that make them non-identical, so the simple fact of being liquids is insufficent to make them identical.

In exactly the same way, although "false" and "perceptual illusion" share certain similarites (depending on whose definition you use). they have further differences beyond that similarity which makes them non-identical, non-synonymuous. To claim otherwise is pure sophistry and nothing more.

>Although many advaitins affirm that it is exactly like illusion that samsara is taken for existing in itself, and that Brahman is obscured.
That "taking samsara for X" is a specific cognitive action or mistake in the jiva's mind and its not the metaphysical status of Samsara itself.
>You are going against your own school of thought.
Not at all, I'm just btfoing your dumb strawmen
>I treat it as such because it is how it is presented in the considered sacred scriptures, this is how commentators and scholars like Shankara and Gaudapada present it to be, and how even from your own definitions they fit into the concept of illusion perfectly.
3 lies presented one after another

>>23923605
>Hm, maya making one thing appearing in different forms.
By appearing he just means manifesting or being generated as something with a false metaphysical status, not that maya is a subjective hallucination, Sharma explicitly distingushes Pratibhasika and Vyavaharika in that book and specificies that they have different natures.
>Through beginningless and indescribable power called maya or avidya, the Absolute *appears* as many.
Again, appear here just means manifesting, being present as X or Y. The mistaken cognitive assumption that this X or Y is truly real is a separate thing from it's mere presence as such. Enlightened men perceive the empirical presence of forms without having delusions about them having true existence.
>The empirical world of individual subjects and objects is false, because it is neither real nor unreal.
Correct, this is exactly what I've been saying, and what Shankara says too.
>Indescribability as either real or unreal (sadasadanirvachaniyata) is the mark of illusion (bhrama), appearance or falsity. The world of plurality, like a dream or an illusion, cannot be called real nor unreal.
Yes, but in these passages Sharma is using the word illusion loosely in the sense that anything false can be spoken as illusory in the sense of it lacking reality, but without regarding it as a perceptual hallucination, he isn't identifying Samsara with a perceptual hallucination there, he specifies that Pratibhasika and Vyavaharika are different in nature, as do other authors and scholars, both secular and within the tradition.

>It is proved it is from the above
Lmao, you didn't prove anything
>and that by its being false it is meant that it is false due to illusion and ignorance,
No, it's falsity is soley due to it lacking real existence and belonging instead to the category of the indeterminate. What judgement people make on their own about the indeterminate false is something separate from its own inherent status.

>The rest of your post is incoherent, Samsara is literally perceived as real,
No it's not, it's perceived as being empirically present, which is not the same thing as having true reality. Something's reality is not accesible to perception and its instead inferred.
>it is no matter of choice or will of mind to be deluded
Not intentionally, but being deluded is an action the mind engages in and can disengage from, the notion that empirical presence is synonymous with true reality is an optional assumption that not everyone shares, and people don't even believe that fully since they write off as unreal the things in their dreams which had empirical presence in their dreams.

>>23923622
>Already showed that it is here
No you didn't, all you did was cite passages from books and texts that draw comparisions between the status of Samsara and perceptual illusions but without regarding them as identical. That doesn't demonstrate what you claimed it does but it just reflects your poor comprehension of this subject.
>Besides your own definitions being synonymous with illusion
It's not you retard, not everyone shares that definition of illusion for starters, and secondly, just because 'false' shares certain things with the defintion of (some people's conception of) illusion does not make them synonymous because they have further differences that characterize each other and make them mutually different, such that 'false' involves no observer and can be applied to paradoxes, propositions and hypotheticals.
>Jivas are conditioned by time and succession and time and succession are within and are part of Samsara.
Yes, and all that means is that certain parts of Samsara are conditioning other parts of Samsara, you don't need the jiva to be something different from Samsara in order that this take place. That's like saying "one part of the ocean cannot condition another part of the ocean unless the part being conditioned isn't a part of the ocean", it's just nonsense pseudery.

>>23923071
>The only thing you have achieved throughout all those posts was to show your ignorance regarding SSS's views. The other anon already showed that you didn't even know SSS's views on ignorance in sleep (as agrahana).
I'm aware that SSS accepts positing it in sleep as a pedogogical device that isn't really there, but that contradicts Shankara's position, since Shankara says it has causal efficiency and is responsible for re-emergence, but a pedogogical device which isn't actually present is unable to do this.

Also, you failed to identify a single reason why any of that critique of SSS's position on scripture is wrong about anything. If SSS's teaching is genuine and correct it should be no problem at all for you to explain why his teaching and position on Shruti scripture overcomes the aforementioned issues, that you didn't address those points at all speaks volumes.

>SSS was never 'excommunicated' or 'banned' because this is not how it works there.
I never said he was, but he abandoned his monastic training early and did not receive the fully traditonal instruction, and the Mathas don't consider his teaching to be the genuine teaching of Shankara WHICH IS WHY THEY DON'T TEACH IT TO MONKS AND STUDENTS AT THE FOUR MATHAS!!!!!!!!!!!

>But you sure smarter than everyone, right?
I'm a lot smarter than you for sure. That much is clear.

I had an extremely vivid dream last night, so it was as if I were in some lecture theatre and the main anti-SSS guy here was lecturing on advaita, on the subjects here (he was in the form of a really well dressed except vulgat nigerian except he seemed very suspicious like scammer) I felt that what he was saying was not making sense, then SSS came in and then he pushed his view "avidya never existed to begin with," and the crowd which had gathered as an audience to the very verbose nigerian dissipated, the lecturing was pointless and mere academicism and logical pettiness according to SSS. I veered more to what the representative of SSS in the dream was saying. From there I still felt that both parties views were still not satisfactory something was missing and I couldnt figure out, I was half awake/half asleep whilst going over this dream situation finally I felt on my own "who was having this dream" in the first place both apparently opposing views were merely a single dream illusion. From there I woke up and realized I was going to be late to my shift in retail (like an amazon factory). I guess both are false views, just hallucinatory garbage what difference does it make?

>>23924223
>dressed except vulgat nigerian
I guess that appearance was only the result of the underhanded tactics he uses here, jumping to personal defamation and using inane neologisms at every step like "SSSfag" and so on

>>23924223
I say he appeared as a nigerian, but it was really just blackness/darkness maybe symbolically linked to the metaphor of darkness in speaking of avidya/ignorance

poo in loo

>>23924229
>jumping to personal defamation and using inane neologisms
SSSfags do the same thing when they accuse everyone who disagrees with them as being deluded, of being mistaken, of committing some cognitive error etc, calling them mulavidyans and constantly accusing them of not reading something by Shankara etc. They cry out as they strike you and then whine when you point out in return that they are just promoting some 20th century modernist western-influenced Neovedanta.

>>23924260
"Neovedanta" im tired of this loaded word
SSS was born in the 19th century and so was Iyer. Neovedanta is generally a term coined to describe western appropriaters who start their own satsangs inspired by ramana maharshi etc. In general I would recommend halfbass on any these topics if youre really interested (of course youre too steeped in this neologistic reductionism to really care)
Whether you like it or not SSS was a litera sannyasin together with his succesors etc. If you dont realize how moronic it is to call him a neovedantn, geez I dont know what to tell you. He was also far less divisive than you think as he didnt discredit post-shankarites totally, even between the vivarana and bhamati there was more fierce disputes...

>>23924481
*william halbfass

>>23924481
Imagine calling a guy who wrote hundreds upon hundreds of pages of sanskrit (whose first followers werre brahmins from within sringeri etc. To begin with) a "neovedantin"

Im not going to say "delusional" but what you say is not in accordance with facts, especially when you have not exactly defined what this neologism means at least in your own usage

Pure delusion

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>>23919623
Some self-studying scholar and western academic:
Uhhh sorry to tell you, but that guy who wrote books in sanskrit, who wore the bhasma on his head, took up the life of a sannyasin, peformed vedic rituals since birth, including all the samskaras, like upanayana, etc. Who carried the bramhadhanda/ekadhanda was born in 1880, yeah that guy was an antiraditiinal neovedantin fraud. Of course unlike Vivekenanda and Swamina Agamandanda etc.

Of course I am the true easterner and traditionalist, so I can distinguish a fraud from the real deal! See if you just check BSSB 8.2.69 you will see that SSS was a fraudelant person becauae he didnt agree with me and Shaykh Paramahamsa Rene Guénon (PBUH) about the role of Unmanifested Prakrit and Avidya even if under a generous light they can be reconciled and are simply two yet valid diverse approaches to traditional Advaita Vedanta.

>>23924573
Btw I didnt read his books, however I understood all his positions from the paper written by Ramakrishnan Balasubramanian.

>>23924573
Sorry I forgot (PBUH) after Ramakrishnan Balasubramanian (PBUH)

>>23919623
Is abhinavaguptas commentary on the gita compatible with shankara's advaita?

3:11
>Through yajna you should nourish the gods and those gods will nourish you. By nourishing one another you will attain the highest good.
Comment:
>The word gods (devah) stands here for the function of the sense organs that possess a playful nature. In the shastras dealing with the secret texts, gods are known as the Lords of the senses. You should satisfy these gods through action by engaging in the enjoyments of the objects of the senses as appropriate. When satisfied, these gods (in the form of sense organs) will grant you liberations (apavarga), according to the level on which you are established in your own self. Thus, continuous exchange of two contradictory experiences, i.e., gratification of the senses, which brings satisfaction, and samadhi, in which sense organs are reduced to one’s own atman, quickly bring the highest good. This is because these two experiences are mutually helpful. The highest good, however, is the experience of the highest reality (Brahman), in which the distinction between these two expe riences is eliminated. This is a means not only for attaining apavarga but also for achieving perfection (siddhi).

3:12
>Nourished by yajna, the gods will give you the de sired enjoyments. But he who enjoys these gifts without offering anything in return to them is merely a thief.
Comment:
>When the gods in the form of sense organs are pleased with the enjoyments offered to them through sacrifice (yajna), then they will become present in the objects of one’s meditation. When this operation takes place, the objects of enjoyment (become present before us) through the sense organs, and can be experienced through memory, desire (samkalpa), or meditation, etc.
>Because of the fact that the sense organs give us the objects of enjoyment, we should give the same back to them. If however, one does not reciprocate and fails to give back the same to them for their own enjoyment, then such a person is a thief. The Lord has already used the word ‘hypocrite’ for such a person.
>He who desires perfection (siddhi) or moksa by easy means should enjoy the objects of enjoyment available to him only with the idea in mind to bring about detachment by fulfilling the curiosity of the senses.

>>23924873
3:14
>All creatures come into existence from annam (food); annam comes from parjanya (rain); parjanya comes from yajna (sacrifice) and yajna is born of action (karman).
3:15
>Know that action comes from the Brahman. The Brahman springs from the imperishable (aksaram). Therefore, the all-pervading Brahman is ever established in yajna.
Comment:
>From annam which is an undivided object of experience and which has other synonyms such as maya, avidya, kala, etc., emerge the multitude of creatures. Annam comes from parjanya who (as the enjoyer of the object) is of the nature of consciousness. This is be cause the objects of enjoyment gain their existence only as a result of their contact with the enjoyer. Parjanya becomes the enjoyer through sacrifice, which is the act of enjoyment. The act of enjoyment is the result of freedom (svatantrya) of the kriyashakti of Paramesvara.
This absolute freedom ( svatantrya ) is the unbroken flow of con sciousness because of her permanent contact with the highest Brah man, who is nothing else but Mahesvara. This Mahesvara, who pos sesses the fullness of the power of freedom and who is unlimited and eternal, gets manifested outwardly through this power of freedom (svatantrya). This highest reality, i.e., Brahman, who manifests itself externally and is pure and unlimited, comes from the imperishable (aksaram), which is the singleness of consciousness in which all the waves of his glory come to rest.
>Thus, this sacrifice is well disposed, which while carrying the six-spoked wheel grants liberation through the upward facing trian gle of this (six-spoked wheel), and by the downward facing triangle grants worldly enjoyments. Thus, the Brahman, who looks magnificent because of surging waves of both knowledge and ignorance, is based in the act of enjoyment. Other commentators have explained this verse in the following way. The food-stuff (annam) is responsible for the creation of vari ous creatures through the process of production of blood and semen.
And this food-stuff comes from a rainy cloud (parjanya), which in turn comes from sacrifice. Sacrifice comes from action, action from knowledge and knowledge from the imperishable (aksaram). Yet others explain that the multitude of creatures are sense or gans, which (for their enjoyment) depend on the five-fold objects of enjoyment. These five-fold objects of enjoyment are a manifestation of the atman. Therefore, the atman himself is nourished by the process of enjoyment of objects, and the omnipresent Brahman is established in action because it is made of action.

3:16
>16. He who does not here on earth follow the wheel thus revolving, whose life is sinful, who lives for the gratification of the senses, he lives in vain, O Partha.
Comment:
>One who doesn’t accept this well-established path is a sinner because he enjoys only in the field of senses but not in the atman.

>>23924895
3:17
>But he who rejoices in the atman alone, who finds satisfaction in the atman, who is content only in the atman, for him there is no action that he needs to do.
3:18
>Neither has he anything to gain from the actions he has done or from the actions left undone; nor is there any living being on whom he needs to rely for any purpose.
Comment:
>One who rejoices in one’s self alone (atmarateh) remains en gaged in activity only because this is the nature of the sense organs, which remain active regardless if one is active or inactive. Such a person does not engage in communication with other living beings for any selfish purposes. He, knowing his duty, performs it in accordance with sastric instruction.

Now for Shankras gitabhashya on the verses:
3:11
>'Bhavayata, you nourish; devan, the gods, Indra and others; anena, with this sarifice. Let te devah, those gods; bhavayantu, nourish; vah, you-make you contented with rainfall etc. Thus bhavayantah, nourishing; parasparam, one another; avapsyatha, you shall attain; the param, supreme; sreyah, Good, called Liberation, through the attainment of Knowledge;' or, 'you shall attain heaven-which is meant by param 'sreyah.' [The param sreyah (supreme Good) will either mean liberation or heaven in accordance with aspirant's hankering for Liberation or enjoyment.] Moreover,
3:12
>'Yajna-bhavitah, being nourished, i.e. being satisfied, by sacrifices; devah, the gods; dasyante hi, will indeed give, will distribute; among vah, you; the istan, coveted; bhogan, enjoyments, such as wife, childeren and cattle. Sah, he; is eva, certainly; a stenah, thief, a stealer of the wealth of gods and others; yah, who; bhunkte, enjoys, gratifies only his own body and organs; with dattan, what enjoyable things have been given; taih, by them, by the gods; apradaya, without offering (these); ebhyah, to them, i.e. without repaying the debt [The three kinds of debt-to the gods, to the rsis (sage), and to the manes-are repaid by satisfying them through sacrifices, celibacy (including study of the Vedas, etc.), and procreation, respectively. Unless one repays these debts, he incurs sin.] to them.'

>>23924909
3:13
>Those again, who are yajna-sista-asinah, partakers of the remnants of sacrifices, who, after making offering to the gods and others, [The panca-maha-yajnas, five great offerings, which have to be made by every householder are offerings to gods, manes, humans, creatures and rsis (sages).] are habituated to eat the remnants (of those offerings), called nectar; they, santah, by being (so); mucyante, become freed; sarva-kilbisaih, from all sins-from those sins incurred through the five things [the five things are; oven, water-pot, cutting instruments, grinding machines and broom. A householder incurs sin by killing insects etc. with these things, knowingly or unknowingly. It is atoned by making the aforesaid five offerings.], viz oven etc., and also from those others incurred owing to injury etc. caused inadvertently. Tu, but; the papah, unholy persons, who are selfish; ye, who; pacanti, cook; atma-karanat, for themselves; te, they, being themselves sinful; bhunjate, incur; agham, sin. For the following reasons also actions should be undertaken by an eligible person. Action is definitely the cause of the movement of the wheel of the world. How? This is being answered:
3:15
>It is a matter of direct perception that annat, from food, which is eaten and is transformed into blood and semen; bhavanti, are born; bhutani, the creatures. Anna-sambhavah, the origin of food; is parjanyat, from rainfall. Parjanyah, rainfall; bhavati, originates; from yajnat, from sacrifice. This accords with the Smrti, 'The oblations properly poured into fire reaches the sun. From the sun comes rain, from rain comes food, and from the sun comes rain, from rain comes food, and from that the creatures' (Ma.Sm.3.76). (Here) sacrifice means its unique [Also termed as the unseen result (adrsta).-Tr.] result. And that sacrifice, i.e. the unique result, which arises (samudbhavah) from action (karma) undertaken by the priest and the sacrificer, is karma-samudbhavah; it has action for its origin.

>>23924913
3:15
>Again, [a different reading in place of this is: 'Tat ca vividham karma kuto jatamityaha, From where did those various kinds of action originate? In reply the Lord says...' Still another reading is: 'Tat ca karma brahmodbhavam iti aha, And the Lord says: That action has the Vedas as its origin.'-vide A.A., 1936, p. 116).

>Astekar's reading is: Tat ca evam vidham karma kuto jatamityaha, And from where has this kind of action originated? The answers this.'-Tr.] viddhi, know; that karma, action; is brahmodbhavam, it has Brahma, the Veda, as its udbhavam, origin. [Here Ast. adds 'revealer'-Tr.] Further, Brahma, called the Veda, is aksara-samudbhavam, it has aksara, the Immutable, Brahman, the supreme Self, as its source. This is the meaning. Since the Veda came out, like the breath of a man, from the supreme Self Itself, called the Immutable, therefore the Veda, being the revealer of everything, is sarva-gatam, all pervading. Even though all-pervading, the Veda is nityam, for ever; pratisthitam, based; yajne, on sacrifice, because the injunctions about sacrifices predominate in it.

>Another translation: "…yaj~na or sacrifice spoken of refers to what is called `apUrva'; and this is the result of the activities of the sacrificer and his priests (ritviks) engaged in a sacrifice. These activities are enjoined in the Veda (Brahman) , and the Veda comes from the Imperishable, the paramAtman, the Highest Self. Because the Veda has arisen from the Highest Self, the akShara, the Imperishable, as the breath comes out of a man, therefore, the Veda, though all- comprehending as revealing all things, ever rests in sacrifice, i.e. it treats mainly of sacrifices and the mode of their performance."

>>23924922
3:16
>O Partha, sah, he; jivati, lives; mogham, in vain; yah, who, though competent for action; na anuvartayati, does not follow; iha, here, in the world; cakram, the wheel of the world; evam, thus; pravartitam, set in motion, by God, on the basis of the Vedas and the sacrifices; aghayuh, whose life (ayuh) is sinful (agham), i.e. whose life is vile; and indriya-aramah, who indulges in the senses-who has his arama, sport, enjoyment, with objects, indriyaih, through the senses.

>Therefore, the gist of the topic under discussion is that action must be undertaken by one who is qualified (for action) but is unenlightened. In the verses beginning from, '(A person does not attain freedom from action by adstaining from action' (4) and ending with, 'You perform the obligatory duties....And, through inaction, even the maintenance of your body will not be possible' (8), it has been proved that before one attains fitness for steadfastness in the knowledge of the Self, it is the bounden duty of a person who is qualified for action, but is not enlightened, to undertake Karma-yoga for that purpose. And then, also in the verses commencing from '(This man becomes bound) by actions other than that action meant for God' (9) and ending with 'O Partha, he lives in vain,' many reasons [Such as, that it pleases God, secures the affection of the gods, and so on.] have been incidentally stated as to why a competent person has to undertake actions; and the evils arising from their non-performance have also been emphatically declared.

>Such being the conclusion, the question arises whether the wheel thus set in motion should be followed by all, or only by one who is ignorant of the Self and has not attained to the steadfastness which is fit to be practised by the Sankhyas, the knowers of the Self, through the Yoga of Knowledge only, and which is acquired by one ignorant of the Self through the means of the practice of Karma-yoga mentioned above? Either anticipating Arjuna's question to this effect, or in order to make the meaning of the scripture (Gita) clearly understood, the Lord, revealing out of His own accord that the following substance of the Upanisads-Becoming freed from false knowledge by knowing this very Self, the Brahmanas renounce what is a compulsory duty for those having false knoweldge, viz, desire for sons, etc., and then lead a mendicant life just for the purpose of maintaining the body; they have no duty to perform other than steadfastness in the knowledge of the Self (cf. Br. 3.5.1)-has been presented here in the Gita, says:

>>23924927
3:17
>But that man who rejoices only in theSelf and is satisfied with the Self, and is contented only in the Self-for him there is no duty to perform.

>Tu, but; that manavah, man, the sannyasin, the man of Knowledge, steadfast in the knowledge of the Self; yah, who; atmaratih eva syat, rejoices only in the Self-not in the sense objects; and atma-trptah, who is satisfied only with the Self-not with food and drink; and is santustah, contented; eva, only; atmani, in the Self; tasya, for him; na vidyate, there is no; karyam, duty [Duty with a view to securing Liberation.] to perform. [Rati, trpti and santosa, though synonymous, are used to indicate various types of pleasures. Or, rati means attachment to objects; trpti means happiness arising from contact with some particular object; and santosa means happiness in general, arising from the acquisition of some coveted object only.]

>All people surely feel contened by acquiring an external thing. But this one, without depending on it, remains contented only with the Self; thta is to say, he remains detached from everything. The idea it that, for a man who is such a knower of the Self, there is no duty to undertake.

3:18
>Moreover, tasya, for him, who rejoices in the supreme Self; na, there is no; artham, concern; eva, at all; krtena, with performing action.

>Objection: In that case, let there be some evil called sin owing to non-performance!

>Reply: Iha, here, in this world; na, nor is there; for him kascana, any (concern); akrtena, with nonperfromance. Certainly there is no evil in the form of incurring sin or in the form of self-destruction. Ca, moreover; asya, for him; na asti, there is no; kascit artha-vyapasrayah sarva-bhutesu, dependence on any object, from Brahma to an unmoving thing, to serve any purpose. Vyapasrayah is the same as vyapasrayanam, dependence, which is possible of being created by action promted by necessity. (For him) there is no end to gain by depending on any praticular object, due to which there can be some action for that purpose.

>'You (Arjuna) are not established in this fullest realization which is comparable to a flood all around.'

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>>23924260
>calling them mulavidyans
This is not a pejorative term as its used by the mulavidyavadins themselves
>>23924260
>Neovedanta
sss is so fringe that the publication of his books were supported by the mathas lmao
>>23924489
>Pure delusion
what do you expect of a guy who imagines that the goal of vedanta consists in establishing with 'logical necessity' the perpetuation of Saṃsāra? Who thinks that there is connecting line between vyavahara and paramartha as two different levels of 'reality'? who ignores the central tenet of advaita (ajativada)?

>48. No Jīva is ever born. There does not exist any cause which can produce it. This is the highest Truth that nothing is ever born.

>>23924895
By
>maya, avidya, kala, etc
Which abhinavagupta uses apparently a reference to the following is made
>The synonyms of the word annam, i.e. vidyd, kala, maya, that Abhinavagupta gives in verse are known as the five sheaths or veils (kancukas). There are five kancukas: niyati, kāla, vidya, kalā and raga. All these five kancukas have their origin in maya tattva. Maya tattva is responsible for binding the individual self by creating an illusion of individuality. This is accomplished through five kancukas. Niyati binds an individual self by creating the impression that he is bound by the law of cause and effect. Kāla binds an individual self by creating the impression that one is bound by time. Vidya binds an individual self by creating the impression that one possesses only limited knowledge, which is dominated by the notion of duality. Kalā binds an individual self by creating the impression that he possesses only limited power of action. Raga limits the individual self by creating the impression that he is not full or complete but possesses limited na ture. It is because of this impression of limitation that one feels a need to possess various objects, which in turn would help him regain his fullness. This is the reason why one develops desire and attachment for various objects.
The footnotes also describe the other terms
>Kriyasakti is a power of action of Siva through which he brings about the manifestation of the variety of beings, which appear distinct from the Creator and mutually different from each other.
>svatantryasakti is the absolute freedom or autonomy of Siva responsible for creation. As the principal power of Siva, svatantryasakti contains within herself all other powers that will bring creation into existence. The process of creation is the result of the outward flow of bliss, which is the very essence of svatantryasakti.

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>>23924489
>Imagine calling a guy who wrote hundreds upon hundreds of pages of sanskrit (whose first followers werre brahmins from within sringeri etc. To begin with) a "neovedantin"
here's the ''CV'' of sss' first disciple (Sri. Vittala Sastri (Sri. Jnananandendra Saraswathi Swami after Sanyasa):
>Sri. Sastri continued his higher education at Maharaja’s Sanskrit College, Mysore where he studied Sanskrit, Vedas and Prayoga (practical application of Vedas in performing rituals). He stayed at a public choultry and cooked food for himself as Mysore lacked adequate hostels. He continued his higher studies at Madras (Chennai) and obtained the Vedanta Shiromani qualification from Madras University in 1916 and the Vedanta Visharada from Madras Sanskrit College. He had earlier in 1915 passed with distinction the Vidwat examination conducted by Advaita Vedanta Sabha.
>For instance he was teaching Advaita Vedanta to H.H. Krishna Raja Wodeyar IV of Mysore royal dynasty. The Maharaja recognizing Sri. Sastri’s scholastic abilities had conferred the title of Asthana Vidwan on him.
but this is all '20th century modernist western-influenced Neovedanta.'

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https://www.advaita-vedanta.org/archives/advaita-l/2006-October/017606.html
> Later, Sri abhinava vidyAteertha Swamiji, pontiff of
> Sringeri, who visited Holenarasipura, was immensely
> pleased with Swamiji's "Vedanta prakriyApratyAbhigna"
> book and the tremendous efforts that went into the
> book. He offered a contribution to get the book
> published. He visited adhyAtma prakAsha kAryAlaya and
> looked at all other activities of the organizations.
> He genuinely praised Swamiji thus – "You have
> dedicated your life to the propagation of Shankara's
> philosophy. Even in this old age, you work with such
> enthusiasm – you are Shankara's genuine devotee! In
> meeting you and discussing these topics in person,
> many of my doubts have vanished".
> What a heartfelt appreciation!
>
> I could mention a lot of other episodes, where he was
> acknowledged by the Sringeri and the kanchi
> jagadgurus, or other scholars and saints, or when he
> went to OmkAreshwar to read his "ManDUkya rahasya
> vivrutti" to dedicate it to Sri GauDapAdachArya, etc,
> etc., but it suffices to say his life's goal was to
> bring Shankara Vedanta to people. Though his life was
> full of trials and tribulations, he transcended them,
> stood his ground firmly in the face of all opposition,
> and fearlessly reached his supreme goal in spite of
> all odds, thus ultimately helping all aspirants in
> their quest for immortality.
>
> It is easy to wave one's hands and sulk - he was not
> bound by tradition, he claimed to know Shankara better
> than 1200 years of scholars, he is haughty in calling
> the later commentators blind, etc.etc., but only one
> who has studied his life history closely can see his
> sincerity in bringing the lucid essence of Shankara to
> the people and the brilliance of his systematic
> approach. Swamiji had a very sharp intellect and in
> keeping with the gIta verse \"tadviddhi praNipatena
> pariprashnena sevaya…." inquired into the basic nature
> of things. Isn't this what the Upanishads and gIta
> tell us – examine against the touchstones of sruti,
> yukti and anubhava?
> No guru asks his disciple to blindly accept what he
> says.

>>23924939
>Who thinks that there is connecting line between vyavahara and paramartha as two different levels of 'reality'?
The vyavahara/paramartha distinction not so much the framing as not as two different levels of reality (which sounds absurd and imaginary) has some validity in my opinion of course as a provisional teaching, in saying the following that liberation is neither union with Brahman nor seperation from Samsara/Maya/Avidya (of course this is not to be taken as some statement contradicting renunciation). Shankara said this at one point in one of his bhashyas, with basic logic indicating so much as both union and separation are transitory Liberation cannot consist of the individual self going to Brahman or of Brahman coming to it. Since Brahman is causeless and is the Self it would be subject neither to acceptance nor rejection. From this it follows that paramartha/vayavahara are totally distinct (if we have to even use such language). That there is a connecting thread between Vyavahara/Paramartha contradicts that principle.

This may be off topic, however in the new age, people talk about "merging" with oneness, (taking drugs to facilitate this and so on), and then on the other end there is "dissociating" and people taking measures which facilitate escapism, both these tendencies can be seen as contrary to what is implied by advaita (not to say that they cannot be a step folllowed to start)

>>23925062

The vyavahara/paramartha distinction not so much the framing as two different levels of reality with connection (which sounds absurd and imaginary)

>>23925062
Apparently these are some quotes from Ramana Maharshi
>There is no greater mystery than this—viz. ourselves being the Reality we seek to gain reality. We think that there is something hiding our Reality and that it must be destroyed before the Reality is gained. It is ridiculous. A day will dawn when you will yourself laugh at your past efforts. That which will be on the day you laugh is also here and now.

>All the Sastras are meant only to make...man retrace his steps to the original source. He need not gain anything new. He must only give up his false ideas and useless accretions. Instead of doing it he tries to catch hold of something strange and mysterious because he believes that his happiness lies elsewhere. That is the mistake.

>You need not aspire for or get any new state. Get rid of your present thoughts, that is all.

>Realise what is present here and now. The sages did so before and still do that only. Hence they say that it looks as if newly got. Once veiled by ignorance and later revealed, Reality looks as if newly realised. But it is not new.

>That which has a beginning must also end....Realisation is not acquisition of anything new nor is it a new faculty. It is only removal of all camouflage....The ultimate Truth is so simple. It is nothing more than being in the pristine state....Mature minds alone can grasp the simple Truth in all its nakedness.


>The happiness obtained on the cessation of desire is ever the same. Whatever may have been the varieties of desire that preceded it, the bliss had on the cessation of desire is the same. If a man is affected by some disease, you may ask him: ‘What is the disease you are suffering from?’ When he has recovered from the disease and regained his normal health, nobody can ask him: ‘What is the health you are now having?’ The reason is, though diseases may be many and various, health is ever one and the same.
Sri Chandrasekhara Bhâratî Swâmigal

>>23924164
> certain things are shared in both concepts does not make them identical. For example, wine and milk are both liquids, but simply because both include 'liquid' in their definition
‘Liquid’ is not the definition of milk nor of wine. But your definition of samsara is the definition of illusion (it needs nothing more whereas wine and milk need more than just the word liquid). Saying it is just “false” means nothing, though, whatever is false is in a specific way. Something can be false as 2+2=388 is, but it can be false as a delusion is. Now the former case cannot apply to samsara because samsara is not a concept subject to analyticity (an instance of truth of logic, the concept is equal to itself and different from its opposite), so saying “a bachelor is married” is false because it is a priori known to be false by the very concept of bachelor. This is not the case of samsara. Actually samsara is something acknowledged to be illusory, to be something that it is not and this is not an a priori definition of the concept but it is dependent on a pre-existing ignorance, I’ll repeat the point that the Upanishads use avidya as both ignorance and appearance (ignorance applied to what is manifest means that what is manifest deludes, is not what it seems to be). Every conceptual/propositional falsity is a priori and analytically known to be false. This is not the case with samsara and this is acknowledge by the Upanishads, Gaudapada, Shankara, Sharma and all serious advaitins.

> Illusion additionally has the connotation of being connected with an observer while something that is simply false (due to it being neither real nor nothingness)
Illusion can be reduced to “neither real nor nothingness” as I explained several times, but what is false can only be reduced to this definition insofar as it is false as an illusion, for any other form of falsity (conceptual and propositional) is analytically false, what is analytically false is not “neither real nor nothingness”, it is just nothingness, something empty.
> Illusion does not universally have a definition as something that doesn't exist
What are you on about, no one is saying that they don’t exist, that they are nothingness.
> but people disagree about their ontological status
Not even phenomenalism gives illusion a different ontological status from the common sense if illusions are defined as what seems to be and is contradicted by what really is.

>>23924164
>>23925118
Continuation:

>although "false" and "perceptual illusion" share certain similarites (depending on whose definition you use). they have further differences beyond that similarity which makes them non-identical, non-synonymuous
It is not that they share similarities, whatever is false is contingent on how it is false. The definition of false as nor real nor nothingness makes it synonymous, not simply being false. Read above.
> is a specific cognitive action or mistake
Which is what ignorance out of delusion also is.
> in the jiva's mind
Wrong because samsara is not contingent on jiva’s mind since jivas are not beginningless and are not coeternal with samsara, as it was said, samsara has its temporal part and its temporal part conditions the events in a successive chain of cause and effects of which one part of the chain is composed of jivas. Many things in samsara antecede jivas, so samsara is not reduced to jivas as you’re disingenuously trying to make it to be (contradicting even textual and scholarly authorities who affirm that samsara is beginningless).

>>23925062
There is no merging or union at all (it may be talked as 'union' only from mistaken (not relative or 'less-real') standpoint of the empirical ego). Brahmatman (the real 'I', 'me', 'myself', 'you') appears as the individual/jiva, that is all (a basic manana on avasthatraya reveals this: the self appears as individual on waking-dream and formless in deep sleep: BSBh 1.1.9 says: >When, on the cessation of the two limiting adjuncts (i.e. the subtle and the gross bodies), and the consequent absence of the modifications due to the adjuncts, it is, in the state of deep sleep, merged in the Self as it were, then it is said to be asleep (resolved into the Self).)

The distinction vyavahara-paramartha is due to avidya, so it's not real, this cannot be overlooked. Samsara is a mistake due to ignorance and absence of knowledge, that is why it cannot be regarded as some lower reality, because it's the product of a mistake. The empirical knower (pramatr) is the result of a mistaken view, and as everything depends and is filtered by this 'knower', it follows that every empirical action, event or theoretical-view (as in 'there is some powerful and pervasive seed-ignorance over me') is derived from a mistake, that is why Samkara says that all dealings (be it sacred/vedic or secular/profane) are the product of ignorance (avidyakalpita); what ignorance? The mistake that consists in confusing (adhyasa) the self (Kṣetrajña) and the non-self (Kṣetra).

>>23924166
> By appearing he just means manifesting or being generated as something with a false metaphysical status, not that maya is a subjective hallucination
Which is what an illusion is! Thanks for agreeing.
> Pratibhasika and Vyavaharika in that book and specificies that they have different natures.
But no one is saying they are the same, but both share in the metaphysical falsity and are dependent on the illusion of samsara. An individual delusion from a dream or wrong perception does not contradict the fact that samsara is also an illusion, just that one is contingent on jivas and the other is not. So therefore either Brahman is deluded or there is another beginningless mind/consciousness on which samsara can be grounded.
> appear here just means manifesting, being present as X or Y.
Yes, they mean the same thing (a wrong perception is manifested as such and not as an empirically correct one) unless you think that the Absolute can be many.

> The mistaken cognitive assumption that this X or Y is truly real is a separate thing from it's mere presence as such
It cannot be if this X or Y must *****appear***** as real, must delude to be taken as what it is not, if it wasn’t taken to be as what it is not it wouldn’t exist as something false like that. What you are saying is like as if a delusion of someone deluded by the colour of the chair didn’t depend on the chair, this makes no sense whatsoever.
> Enlightened men perceive the empirical presence of forms without having delusions about them having true existence
Samsara is not contingent on individual enlightened people, so this makes no sense again. Plus there are acknowledged natural illusions (stick in the water is perceived as refracted but known to be straight).
> Sharma is using the word illusion loosely in the sense that anything false can be spoken as illusory in the sense of it lacking reality
Yes, very well!
> but without regarding it as a perceptual hallucination
Contradictory. What is illusory, seeming real but lacking reality, cannot be something different from what an illusion, a delusion is. Something that seems to be one thing but is not, is illusory.
> he isn't identifying Samsara with a perceptual hallucination there
He literally says “Indescribability as either real or unreal is the mark of illusion, appearance or falsity” that is, Samsara is false because it is an appearance (only appears something, but is not something), an illusion.
> he specifies that Pratibhasika and Vyavaharika are different in nature
Yes, I explained above that they are different and both share in the metaphysical falsity and are dependent on the illusion of samsara, etc.
> it's falsity is soley due to it lacking real existence and belonging instead to the category of the indeterminate.
Yes, and this befits the definition of a false perception, an illusion, but not a conceptual or propositional falsity.

>>23924166
>>23925227
Cont.:

> it's perceived as being empirically present, which is not the same thing as having true reality.
It’s perceived as having a ground in itself (atoms, particles) since it is beginningless and the cause cannot be perceived (or you think Brahman is apprehended by sense percetion?). Besides, illusions are not perceived as being illusions that are present as real (otherwise they wouldnt be illusions).
> the notion that empirical presence is synonymous with true reality is an optional assumption
It is not an “optional” assumption, it is an epistemological inference from available data. But this discussion however is completely irrelevant to what is being discussed.


Seriously, look at the level of thr discussion, I have to spoonfeed you basic logic, concepts that are employed by your cult’s texts, explain the words and passages of your cult’s scholars. You are ignorant of your own religion.

tldr

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>>23919623
This thread is too long that I can't keep track on who's who due to too many quotes and walls of text. SSSfag, Guenonfag, tag (>>) your own "greatest hits" posts.

>>23925692
There are many SSSfags, one anon apparently trying to refute advaita and guenonfag.

>>23924481
>Neovedanta is a loaded term
Its used not merely to refer to westerners grouped around Ramana but is used for basically anyone (including Indians) propounding a new and novel interpretation of Vedanta that is influenced by modern and western ideas, which SSS’s kalpita clearly are.

>claims Vedanta is empirical and scientific
check

>claims that his analysis is superior to the Sampradaya and their line of initiation because he relies on ‘le western critical method’
check

>elevates “anubhava” to a place it never has in Shankara’s writings (all Neovedanta places a premium on anubhava) and fabricates an invented “atma-anubhava” that is both absent from Shankara’s works and contradicts his stated position because he wants to turn Vedanta into ‘le empirical science of experience!’
check

> In neo-Vedanta, the status of sruti becomes secondary, and "personal experience" itself becomes the primary means to liberation.[88]
check

Also, all of the so-called qualifications you cited mean little, because he did those those in order to provide a veneer of legitimacy to the ideas that his secular academic KA Iyer came up with, who worked at a western-style university. SSS took the ideas of KA Iyer, changed 5-10% of them, and then pursued all those qualifications so he could trick people into thinking KA Iyer’a ideas were “””traditional”””. All the so-called traditional qualifications were grafted on after the fact, to lend a veneer of legitimacy to fraud.

>>23924489
> Imagine calling a guy who wrote hundreds upon hundreds of pages of sanskrit (whose first followers werre brahmins from within sringeri etc. To begin with) a "neovedantin"
Neovedantins are perfectly capable of writing in Sanskrit too, just like anyone else. Just as Guenon says, the Counter-Tradition likes to appropriate traditional forms as its guise while at the same time inverting them.

Charles Upton laid out “6 characteristics of the Counter-Initiation”, lets see how many of them match SSS

>syncretism
not really

>inverted hierarchy
YUP, (western methods of analysis > hierarchy between a student and his Guru and his line) + (the universe doesn’t depend on the One vs the universe does depend on the One

>deviated esoterism;
YUP, (non-duality is no longer an ineffable spiritual truth that transcends empirical matters but its an anubhava you engage with through an epistemic exercise captured in a stale and dead formulae)

>the granting of the temporal transmission of spiritual lore precedence over the vertical descent of Revelation
YUP (It’s most important to historically re-create the perspective of Shankara using western methods and thereby gain ‘horizontal’ access to his thoughts instead of listening to the living tradition that is derived from the vertical descent of the Shruti, just ignore that our position on avidya removes all authority from the revealed Shruti since it doesn’t come from Brahman anymore)

>the reduction of religion to utilitarianism (magic) and esoterism to a purely technical knowledge (Promethean spirituality)
YUP (Vedanta is an empirical science of experience that can be empirically validated and defined systematically based on technical knowledge about adharopa-apavadas etc and experienced with anubhava.

That’s 5/6 signs of the Counter-Initiation, not a good look for SSS. He seems to be a certified agent or puppet of the Counter-Initiation. I suggest that you pray for your soul, you have been ensnared by the maleficent infernal powers and their agents of deception, willing and unwilling. Somewhere in Naraka, an Asura is laughing at you.

>>23925026
I have doubts that is even a real quote, given the propensity of SSSfags for engaging in fantasy, but even if it were, the Mathas dont consider his teaching the valid teaching of Shankara, which is why they don’t teach it to monks and non-monk students. When someone spends countless hours engaging with a subject that you care deeply about, it’s a common courtesy to at least offer a few kind words even if you disagree with their efforts and think that what they produced is not correct. I imagine that if that quote is true (I have doubts) that he was just extending this common courtesy, like praising your classmate with down syndrome for making dozens of abstract paintings even if they all lack artistic value.

>>23925118
> But your definition of samsara is the definition of illusion
No it’s not. If you want to argue based off of definitions, then the language being used here and the gold standard of philosophical and metaphysical expression in India was Sanskrit, not English.

False is mithya. Mithya does not mean delusion but refers to something being untrue and can be applied to hypotheticals, propositions. It just means untrue. Samsara is mithya in this sense only.

The general term for a subjective delusion is Moha. An instance of moha is automatically false, but not everything that is mithya is a moha. A false hypothetical or a false proposition that is untrue is not a delusion (moha), is not a hallucination, is not a perceptual illusion. The way in which samsara lacks reality is inherent to its nature and is not predicated on any observer’s judgement, just like the false proposition is inherently false in a way that is independent of the judgement or perception of any observer.

Furthermore, the Upanishads are not intending to adhere to the standard conception of falsity as people think of normally but they are a revealed source or medium of knowledge (pramana) that are revealing the fact of an ontological or metaphysical falsity that pertains to the nature of plurality, thus they are teaching us about a previously unknown (to those not already acquainted with Shruti) kind of falsity and are thus free to new add information in connection with that which people didn’t consider about falsity/mithya before. Unlike language, the Upanishads reveal the very nature of ultimate reality itself, so arguing that the teaching of the Upanishads has to conform to one of your arbitrary judgements about language (about English terms no less) is putting the cart before the horse.

>Saying it is just “false” means nothing, though, whatever is false is in a specific way.
Yes, and Shankara says that its false due to it not being real, which is the meaning of falsity or mithya in Sanskrit, and not moha (delusion). So, your argument that his description of why its false leads to defining it as delusion (moha) falls flat on its face.

>>23925753
>>23925118

>Something can be false as 2+2=388 is, but it can be false as a delusion is. Now the former case cannot apply to samsara because samsara is not a concept subject to analyticity
Incorrect, samsara is subject to analyticity because it has a common accepted meaning among all Indian schools as referring both to the cycle of transmigration and the realm or universe in which it takes place. Advaitins accept this common definition and say that the Upanishads teach us further things about its metaphysical status, but this doesn’t contradict it analyticity. True and false propositions can be made about samsara in Advaita and non-Advaita schools, so it can be false just like 2+2= 338 is false. For example, from the perspective of the Advaita school, “the Advaitin Samsara lacks true existence” is a true proposition and the opposite claim is a false proposition, whereas for Vishishtadvaita, “the Vishishtadvaita Samsara possesses real existence as Brahman’s mode or body” is a true proposition and the opposite claim is a false proposition. For Buddhists, “the Buddhist Samsara is characterized by the 3 laksanas (marks) of existence” is a true proposition.

>Actually samsara is something acknowledged to be illusory
Incorrect, that’s not inherent to the meaning of samsara which only refers to the realm of rebirth and the process of cycling through it. Realist schools of Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism conceive of Samsara as an existing reality. Whether some schools make some additional metaphysical claim about Samsara is a separate point.

>but it is dependent on a pre-existing ignorance,
No, Samsara depends on Brahman alone. Shankara affirms explicitly that Brahman brings about the world/universe without depending on any other accessory or auxiliary, which means Brahman does not require any pre-existing ignorance in order to do so. People have their own respective mistakes about Samsara and this depends on ignorance, but this is a misjudgment or delusion (moha) particular to them, Samsara itself depends only on Brahman and not on this moha of the individual.

>>23925755
>>23925118
>I’ll repeat the point that the Upanishads use avidya as both ignorance and appearance
Any delusion is secondary to the effects that Samsara produces, the very process of delusion presupposes an intellect that can be deluded, and this intellect is a product of Samsara. Delusion being a state of the intellect that is produced by Samsara, delusion is dependent on Samsara and is not its inherent status. The idea that samsara depends on a delusion that is itself a product or part of samsara is illogical and involves a vicious infinite regress, which is exactly why both Shankara and his disciple Suresvara both refute it as nonsense.

>but what is false can only be reduced to this definition insofar as it is false as an illusion
Incorrect, because Samsara lacking true existence is a formal proposition that is analytically true and the converse proposition being analytically false, and this is not a perceptual hallucination.
> what is analytically false is not “neither real nor nothingness”
The point which you seem to struggle to grasp is that question of whether the “neither real nor nothingness” possess true existence is a proposition that can be answered analytically, and it is in this sense that Samsara is false.
> What are you on about, no one is saying that they don’t exist, that they are nothingness.
The non-philosophical assumptions of the common person tends to assume a binary of exists/doesn’t exist and to identify phenomenal presence with the quality of being real/existing, and it is in this sense that people will often agree illusions dont exist because the object presented is not present in the world, but not every school of thought accepts either this or the aforementioned simplistic two-way division.

>>23925119
> Which is what ignorance out of delusion also is.
All of that is a secondary product of samsara though that is produced through the internal unfolding and differentiation of Samsara as its various internal parts give rise to other parts/products and influence each other (e.g. moha/delusion inheres in intellects which are products formed out of the subtle elements that emerge through the unfolding of prakriti)
> Wrong because samsara is not contingent on jiva’s mind since jivas are not beginningless and are not coeternal with samsara,
Wrong, both Jivas and Samsara are beginningless. However, the Jiva being deluded depends on the constitutive parts of samara forming intellects. The things that make up the constituent causes and components of the jiva are logically prior, but not temporally prior to the jiva’s delusion. In this sense the delusion of the jiva depends on them being such as they are, independently of the jiva’s delusion.
>Many things in samsara antecede jivas
Jivas are beginningless and have never not been present, even in dissolution (pralaya) inbetween cycles of universes they are present as a virtual potentially in an undifferentiated state, however, the more fundamental parts of Samsara are logically prior to this and are brought about by Brahman without depending on any accessory, the jiva’s delusions being dependent on the aspect of Samsara that is more fundamental.

>>23925765
>>23925227
> > By appearing he just means manifesting or being generated as something with a false metaphysical status, not that maya is a subjective hallucination
>Which is what an illusion is!
No, incorrect. Since there is no delusion involved at that point. A planet being generated with a false metaphysical status by Brahman in a corner of the universe with no observers and nobody aware of that planet is not a delusion, and neither is anyone deluded about it. Only once a mind/intellect has knowledge of that planet can you speak about delusion.
> but both share in the metaphysical falsity and are dependent on the illusion of samsara.
The Vyavaharika is Samsara and not something different. The Vyavaharika is a classification of the general status of Samsara. Pratibhasika delusions (Moha) is a special instance of a specific belief or assumption or mistake occurring to the intellect/mind within the Samsara that is Vyavaharika.
> Yes, they mean the same thing (a wrong perception is manifested as such
It’s not a wrong perception dumbass! The empirical perception of the empirical manifestation of an object is true and not wrong in any way whatsoever. It’s true that the empirical object is experienced at the moment its experience and its true that an empirical object is empirically present as part of the universe, all delusion pertains to false judgments about the ontological status of this or things like wrongly attributing bondage, change etc to the Self. The ontological status of the empirically present object and whatever judgement a person has about the ontological value of that object is where wrong perception and delusion takes place, not in the manifestation of the empirical object itself.

>>23925768
>>23925227

> It cannot be if this X or Y must *****appear***** as real,
Again, reality or unreality is not something that is accessible to any perceptual means, it’s instead inferred or assumed. So the phrase “appearing as real” is quite literally nonsense because things don’t have reality or unreality in their phenomenal appearance but this is an inferred judgement or assumption in peoples minds about the empirical object. The only way in which the phrase “appearing as unreal” has any validity is referring to people misjudging the empirical object and its potential to be misjudged as such, but this potential to be judged as such is not itself a delusion, any phenomena can potentially be judged in countless way. It seems like a lot of what you’re saying hinges on your inability to comprehend this simple truth.
> Samsara is not contingent on individual enlightened people, so this makes no sense again.
I never said Samsara was contingent on individuals. Enlightened people perceive the forms that are present in dependence upon Brahman without having delusions about them.
> Plus there are acknowledged natural illusions
Those only can be considered illusionary in respect of someone observing them, them being present in Samsara doesnt mean Samsara is a delusion.
> Contradictory. What is illusory, seeming real but lacking reality, cannot be something different from what an illusion, a delusion is.
No, that’s incorrect. What lacks reality can simply be false. Sophistry (like yours) also “appears real” or “appears true” until its examined and found to have no truth. Similarly, false propositions that are valid on the superficial surface level may also “seem real” until analyzed.
> Yes, and this befits the definition of a false perception
It doesn’t have to be though, which is the essential point. It can also be validly be said of something that is not a delusion and which is false like a proposition. For example, “the indeterminate lacks true reality” is a true proposition, and so is “the indeterminate is not nothingness”, in fact, Shankara’s basic description of the mithya is basically two combined propositions.

> It’s perceived as having a ground in itself (atoms, particles)
No dumbass, that’s an inference or belief about its ground and not a perception. Only the phenomenal form is available to perception. I dont know what you hope to achieve by writing long responses when you are clueless about elementary distinctions like these.

>>23925746>>23925748
Literal reiteration of mandukya-karika verses coupled with Shankara's bhashya are supposed to be K. Iyer's novel ideas?
>anubhava
You don't even know what that means, just like you didn't know what agrahana or mithyajñana meant.
>empirical and scientific
Already replied to this bullshit on other thread.
>the status of sruti becomes secondary, and "personal experience"
Nothing to do with SSSS. You have nothing new to say and start spitting lies?
>“6 characteristics of the Counter-Initiation”
kek, Guénon rotted your brain.
>western methods of analysis
Again?
>an anubhava you engage with through an epistemic exercise captured in a stale and dead formulae)
You're embarassing yourself.
>vertical descent of the Shruti
This is not semitism. AV does not fit into guenonian categories (exo-esoterism), which is mere karmakhanda.

Ngl, until now I was kind of taking this seriously, but you've reduced it all to pure travesty. Those two posts are a complete joke, you just hit bottom.

I'll say it again: You have no idea of what you're pretending to refute; you have never read a book by SSSS nor understood anything about him. You have no clue whatsoever about SSS's positions (and you yourself proved this thorughout the threads) regarding: sruti, anubhava, avidya, agrahana, adhyaropapavada, sushupti, prarabdha....... basically everything.

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>>23925748
>vertical descent of the Shruti

>>23925746
>elevates “anubhava” to a place it never has in Shankara’s writings (all Neovedanta places a premium on anubhava) and fabricates an invented “atma-anubhava” that is both absent from Shankara’s works and contradicts his stated position because he wants to turn Vedanta into ‘le empirical science of experience!’
>check
Absolutely not check, you simply misunderstand. This is like calling Ramana counter-initiation, or Guénon counter-initiation because he spoke intellectual intuition. What a dishonest moron you are.
>claims Vedanta is empirical and scientific
>check
Holy shit you are retarded, nowhere does he do that. SSS and SSSfags have nothing to do with western science or even traditional science (yantra mantra tantra, which they do at least accept as potentially developing into citta shuddhi. Perhaps)
>
> In neo-Vedanta, the status of sruti becomes secondary, and "personal experience" itself becomes the primary means to liberation.[88]
>check
You are not even aware of what he or even guenon talks about, you are a mere profane moron. This is like saying Ramanas or even guénons position (he says the Veda in its true form is shabda/nada, for guènon this has a lot to do with kundalini-shakti/nada/bindu) SSS does not talk about "personal experience" jeez you are a moron. He infact even discredits the validity of yogic perception even if he admits its possibillity during the waking state, individual cases of it.

>Also, all of the so-called qualifications you cited mean little, because he did those those in order to provide a veneer of legitimacy to the ideas that his secular academic KA Iyer came up with, who worked at a western-style university. SSS took the ideas of KA Iyer, changed 5-10% of them, and then pursued all those qualifications so he could trick people into thinking KA Iyer’a ideas were “””traditional”””. All the so-called traditional qualifications were grafted on after the fact, to lend a veneer of legitimacy to fraud.
You are the fraud!

>claims that his analysis is superior to the Sampradaya and their line of initiation because he relies on ‘le western critical method’
>check
Stupid strawman, you dont even understand what initiation is clearly even within the main advaita sampradayas. Also it funny how you reduce initiation to something which only admissable from within the sringeri mathas building, (how does it make sense, for sufi initiation/etc. To be possible)

>Neovedantins are perfectly capable of writing in Sanskrit too, just like anyone else. Just as Guenon says, the Counter-Tradition likes to appropriate traditional forms as its guise while at the same time inverting them.

>>23925760
>Charles Upton laid out “6 characteristics of the Counter-Initiation”, lets see how many of them match SSS
SSSS neither inverts nor counterfeits you absolute moron, his position of the perpetuity of the Veda/its relation to shabda pramana (akash/nada) etc. Is esssntially as real as it gets. If he dismissed the role of a guru, and somehow elevated mere rational analysis (thats not what avasthatraya is by the way, totalstrawman) then maybe. SSSS view on shruti is infact vertical.
>>23925931

>deviated esoterism;
>YUP, (non-duality is no longer an ineffable spiritual truth that transcends empirical matters but its an anubhava you engage with through an epistemic exercise captured in a stale and dead formulae)
He does not reduce nonduality to empirical experience, like sense perception etc. You are a disturbed individual.
>criticizing his guru/etc. As if he came from some sort of false line
You dont know how initiation, a guru, or tradition works. Stop talking rubbish. This can only be the fault of your guenonian conditioning ans perhaps your own intellectual limitations.

>>23925834
>vertical descent of the Shruti
>This is not semitism. AV does not fit into guenonian categories (exo-esoterism), which is mere karmakhanda.
Definitely in the way he understands it (i doubt he even gets guenons whole position on the ether/nada etc.) What these people think a vertical descent is a mere contingent understanding.

He is either retarded or disturbed to spout the outright lie that SSSS has no way to distinguish empirical/individual experience, that includes all the pramanas (and even yogic perception) and then the "intellelctual intuition" which is what guénon also discusses somwhat.

He is both lieing about SSS on one hand and then guénon on the other hand. The only fraud is his own

>>23925267
>It is not an “optional” assumption, it is an epistemological inference from available data

>YUP (It’s most important to historically re-create the perspective of Shankara using western methods and thereby gain ‘horizontal’ access to his thoughts instead of listening to the living tradition that is derived from the vertical descent of the Shruti, just ignore that our position on avidya removes all authority from the revealed Shruti since it doesn’t come from Brahman anymore)
You are a victim of some convuluted theory you dont even understand. Im not giving you the benefit of the doubt anymore, you are a liar. To SSS shankaras individuality counts for naught, shankara is not sharing personal opinions, he merely repeating the vedic tradition contained within the shruris, so what to speak of his thoughts? You on the other hand make absurd arguments on a personal basis where its suits you.
>(non-duality is no longer an ineffable spiritual truth that transcends empirical matters but its an anubhava you engage with through an epistemic exercise captured in a stale and dead formulae)
You are lost in fantasy land, SSSS is uncompromising on his position about the ineffability of brahmatman, by that only the unattainability by speech, mind, etc. Which is not his position but merely a repetition of the shruti texts and the vedantic tradition.

>>23925748
>That’s 5/6 signs of the Counter-Initiation, not a good look for SSS. He seems to be a certified agent or puppet of the Counter-Initiation
Who is the schizo now?
You maybe started with vedanta but you lost track at some point. You may aswell say SSSS is the antichrist, conveniently that would appear to bolster your baseless arguments.

René Guénon, in his review of the book Études sur Ramana Maharshi, validated the conjectures that Jean Herbert wrote in his preface. Guénon thus stated : “It is also entirely true that this one [Śrī Ramaṇa] “accepts no disciples” in the true sense of this word, although many people claim this quality too easily; we even doubt that there is reason to "hope that a day will come when he will agree to assume the role of guru", because it seems that, if he only exercises what we have already called a “action of presence”, this is because of the very exceptional nature of the path he followed” (Études sur l’Hindouisme, Saligny, Les Éditions Traditionnelles, 1989, II éd., p. 180). On the contrary, Śrī Ramaṇa fully exercised both the dīkṣāguru and jñānaguru functions that his complete realisation allowed him (see, in this regard, the article by the Jagadguru Śaṃkarācārya Śrī Śrī Candraśekharendra Sarasvatī entitled “L’educazione nel Gurukula”; https://vedavyasamandala.com/sulleducazione-nel-gurukula/). Bhagavān transmitted regular dīkṣās and held upadeśas to favour śrāvaṇa in his disciples, relying on śaṃkarite texts or on the Yoga Vasiṣṭha. The shoddy human environment that had gathered at Aruṇācala, especially because of the annoying influx of Western onlookers, is certainly not proof that Śrī Ramaṇa did not perform the function of Guru: several saṃnyāsin of deep wisdom who served the Guru are evidence of his masterly effectiveness. We are also aware that Arthur Osborne, with the approval of the Maharṣi, sent a letter to Guénon to correct him. In this message he informed that Śrī Ramaṇa fully exercised the role of Guru, which was not followed by any rectification. What the reviewer called “action de présence”, however, with greater or lesser power, is exercised by any true initiate, or by any object charged with anugraha: this is nothing extraordinary. Therefore, the claim that the “action de présence” can obstruct the practise of gurutva makes a real no-sense. Lastly, Bhagavān‘s exceptionality was certainly not due to the “voie qu’il a suivie”, but rather to the perfection of his human birth that enabled him to attain mokṣa directly and not through a step-by-step path.

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>>23925988
>You maybe started with vedanta but you lost track at some point. You may aswell say SSSS is the antichrist, conveniently that would appear to bolster your baseless arguments.
this retard already lost all credibility, the only thing he achieved [unironically] was to discredit and disgrace advaita by confusing others

https://youtu.be/q_KQ37PM3RI

>>23925753
>If you want to argue based off of definitions, then the language being used here and the gold standard of philosophical and metaphysical expression in India was Sanskrit, not English.
Then I have no idea why you kept insisting on the same definition for several posts, you should have posted in sanskrit not english.
>Mithya does not mean delusion but refers to something being untrue
Yes, which an illusion is: it is not true, or real.
>and can be applied to hypotheticals, propositions
I have explained that whatever is false is false in a specific way. Propositions can be analytically false, samsara is not analytically false, it is something that is synthetically false, because there is only vidya after no longer there being avidya, the change is always from ignorance and delusion to knowledge and truth.
>The way in which samsara lacks reality is inherent to its nature and is not predicated on any observer’s judgement
It is not predicated on any individual observer within samsara, but its illusion is beginningless, and thus there must be a deluded consciousness/mind which is either another beginningless mind coeternal with brahman or brahman himself.
>just like the false proposition is inherently false
A proposition asserts that something is the case or not. If a proposition asserts something about the empirical world (there is an elephant in the room next to the one you are in), it can only be regarded as true or false a posteriori, it needs experience. What is the sense in saying that samsara is like a proposition that depends on experience to be regarded as false (in the case of its being false like samsara)? If anything, this very compatible with the sense of samsara and illusion (appearing true but not being). Now a proposition that asserts ''bachelors are married'' does not need experience, it leaves no room for possibilities, it is analytically, conceptually false. And all advaitins agree and say expressly that samsara is something that appears as true, appears as something it is not, so much so that it is only recognized as not being real after knowledge of Brahman, after avidya no longer being present.
>they are a revealed source or medium of knowledge (pramana) that are revealing the fact of an ontological or metaphysical falsity that pertains to the nature of plurality, thus they are teaching us about a previously unknown kind of falsity
Exactly. This goes hand in hand with what I just said above, the knowledge is present after there is no ignorance, the state of ignorance made both knowledge and the corresponding ignorance unknown.
>the Upanishads has to conform to one of your arbitrary judgements about language
I was just citing Advaitin scholars like Gaudapada, Shankara and these scriptures like the Upanishads. They all say very clearly that samsara is illusory see this here >>23923605.

>>23926057
>>23925753
Cont:
>Shankara says that its false due to it not being real, which is the meaning of falsity or mithya in Sanskrit, and not moha (delusion)
Mithyā (मिथ्या).—ind. [mith-kyap]
1) Falsely, deceitfully, wrongly, incorrectly
मिथ्या • (mithyā) stem, f
illusion, a lie, falsedom, fallacy, trickery, deceit
Mithya can be perfectly applied to illusion, since it literally has the sense of illusion, lol. You don't even know proper sanskrit yet want to appeal to sanskrit words.

>>23925755
>samsara is subject to analyticity because it has a common accepted meaning among all Indian schools
Samsara as false and ''realm of cycle of transmigration'' is not an analytical sense of samsara, it is a doctrinal sense which is contingent on many principles, the main one being Brahman which is the real reality. It is a synthetic case, not analytical.
>but this doesn’t contradict it analyticity
It literally does. Analyticity is an instance of truth of logic, saying that the world is just a specific realm of transmigration of souls is a specifically synthetic addition to the word 'world' and not its logical conceptualization, an analytic proposition is: ''the world is experienced''; now change world for ''realm of cycle of transmigration of souls'' it is not logically the same, even the meaning becomes estranged (as if this cycle could be experienced in the same manner as we do experience a breeze, the sun, etc.), because it is a doctrinal and not a logical instantiation.
>True and false propositions can be made about samsara in Advaita and non-Advaita schools...
This is making a proposition about a factual doctrinal teaching, not about what we are discussing that is the concept of samsara and its definitions given by Advaitins.
>that’s not inherent to the meaning of samsara which only refers to the realm of rebirth and the process of cycling through it. Realist schools of Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism conceive of Samsara as an existing reality
We are discussing samsara and its implications within Advaita Vendata, sorry you are lost here.
>No, Samsara depends on Brahman alone
Then Brahman is ignorant.
>Brahman brings about the world/universe without depending on any other accessory or auxiliary
It doesn't contradict Brahman's being ignorant.
>Brahman does not require any pre-existing ignorance in order to do so
Yes, nothing of that depends on an ignorance, there can be another consciousness that is ignorant, as I said, since samsara will implicate a deluded mind/consciousness insofar as samsara is illusion (there must be what is deluded by that illusion, otherwise it wouldn't be so).

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>An Asura sent by the Counter-Initiation to control SSS and make him create a nefarious inversion of the Primordial Tradition in order to waylay susceptible minds prone to modernistic beliefs and divert them from the path of true Vedanta, -1914 (colorized)

>>23925760
>Any delusion is secondary to the effects that Samsara produces
An illusion has no secondary effect of deluding, it is itself already a deluding effect. Unless you ascribe real metaphysical status to samsara, then illusion will be secondary, but then it will be as real as Brahman.
>The idea that samsara depends on a delusion
Samsara IS a delusion. This has been said 500 times in this thread, you are completely lost.
>Samsara lacking true existence is a formal proposition that is analytically true
See, you are lost, this has been addressed thousands of times before, see >>23926090, >>23926057, >>23925118, >>23925119, >>23923605.

>>23925765
>All of that is a secondary product of samsara
Addressed here >>23926101
>both Jivas and Samsara are beginningless
Jivas are beginningless? They are not part of samsara as said here: >>23924169 where you agree with me that Jivas are conditioned by time and succession and are part of Samsara? Now besides this having no basis in Advaita Vedanta, you are contradicting yourself.
>the things that make up the constituent causes and components of the jiva are logically prior, but not temporally prior to the jiva’s delusion
Jivas are conditioned by time and by the material conditions that are within time and antecede them. You are completely insane.

>>23925768
>there is no delusion involved at that point...
This was addressed here >>23923605
>The empirical perception of the empirical manifestation of an object is true and not wrong in any way whatsoever
It is relatively true, true within samsara, in empirical conditions. Therefore absolutely an illusion.
>all delusion pertains to false judgments about the ontological status of this or things
Yes, the ontological status of empirical objects and world are wrongly taken as absolutely real, existing in themselves, but they are not. This is illusory.
>The ontological status of the empirically present object and whatever judgement a person has about the ontological value of that object is where wrong perception and delusion takes place, not in the manifestation of the empirical object itself.
This does not contradict anything I said, this is exactly what I said, actually. The thing you can't understand is that the manifestation of external objects is taken to be the same as its ontological status as external and independent.

>>23925774
>So the phrase “appearing as real” is quite literally nonsense because things don’t have reality or unreality in their phenomenal appearance but this is an inferred judgement or assumption in peoples minds about the empirical object
The empirical object which conditions jivas' minds and comprehension of the empirical world.
>The only way in which the phrase “appearing as unreal”
It doesn't appear as unreal, it appears as real.
>referring to people misjudging the empirical object and its potential to be misjudged as such
As quoted here >>23923605 the definitions of maya, samsara, world are not contingent on jivas' perceptions, but they are inherent to them
''The term maya can be traced to the Rgveda (VI, 47, 18) where the one Supreme is said to appear in many forms through his power of maya.''
''It is the nature of the inexpressible power of the Lord to project the illusion of creation''
IT IS THE NATURE OF MAYA, not the nature of jivas' minds to prject illusion on the world.
With this the rest of everything you said is completely nullified.

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>>23926092
Lol

>>23925774
>false propositions that are valid on the superficial surface level may also “seem real” until analyzed.
False propositions that are taken to be false by analysis cannot be ''valid on superficial suface lvel'' you fucking retard, you don't know what the word ''analysis'' means, you fucking illiterate ape, I have explained it several times and you still can't comprehend a basic concept, seriously, you are an illiterate retard. This conversation is like a human being trying to teach anything to a monkey. There is no sense in keeping this up. If you don't know what the word ''analysis'' means, then you need to study more before engaging with my arguments.

>>23920915
Underrated.

>>23920915
Soto zen is quite useful speak for yourself

>>23925834
> Literal reiteration of mandukya-karika verses coupled with Shankara's bhashya are supposed to be K. Iyer's novel ideas?
Dont make me laugh
> You don't even know what that means,
I do, anubhava is a pramana. SSS uses it in away that departs from the tradition, whatever modern idea he attaches to it is irrelevant since that’s not Shankara’s view.
> You have nothing new to say and start spitting lies?
This isn’t a lie, the Shruti loses all authority and ceases to be a valid pramanas in the doctrine of SSS. He may not claim this, but its the result of removing the one thing that ensures the validity of the Shruti from Shankara’s perspective. Trying to retain the Shruti as an authoritative pramans while removing the ingredient that gives Shruti its authority is just a shell game, its like trying to have your cake and eat it too. I already made a detailed series of posts explaining the incoherence of the view of SSS viz Shruti and you were unable to debunk or provide a coherent response to any of it.
> Again?
Shankara doesn’t use them but Shankara follows Mimamsa hermeneutical principles, you wont be able to get inside his head using a western interpretive method which Shankara himself did not follow or accept.
> This is not semitism
That’s irrelevant, the Shruti still comes from Brahman either way. That’s what the Upanishads literally say and Shankara affirms that as literally true.

> I'll say it again: You have no idea of what you're pretending to refute
I refuted both you and SSS several times over already in this thread.

>>23925931
> Absolutely not check, you simply misunderstand
Well, then prove me wrong or even give good evidence I’m wrong (you can’t)

> Also it funny how you reduce initiation to something which only admissable from within the sringeri mathas building
I never once said that. But they are the gold standard of the formal study and teaching of the doctrine from within the Sampradaya.

>>23925939
> SSSS neither inverts nor counterfeits you absolute moron
He does absolutely and you’re blind if you don’t see it. I don’t think the counter-initiation is involved, I only said that to mock SSS and his deluded fanboys. The ideas of SSS are truly an inversion of traditional Vedanta though, however I attribute this to SSS being an idiot and a sophist and not because of infernal influence, although the latter is not impossible.

>his position of the perpetuity of the Veda/its relation to shabda pramana (akash/nada) etc. Is esssntially as real as it gets.
Wrong you fool, if Brahman does not cause the Shruti, if the Shruti does not come from Brahman, if Brahman does not “imprint” truth upon the Shruti, then it loses all possible authority. Calling it akash/shaba changes nothing since these are nothing more than avidya and its products. You’re just playing a shell game and then relying on dropping terminology to misdirect when this is pointed out. Please, explain how the Shruti retains any authority of Brahman has no influence upon it or relation with it whatsoever? Please actually answer the question instead of misdirecting with terminology without actually answering it.

>>23926270
>SSS uses it in away that departs from the tradition, whatever modern idea he attaches to it is irrelevant since that’s not Shankara’s view.
I am not that poster, but I must say that this kind of obsession to unbroken lineage compared to modernity is puerile from a view of the Hindu tradition. Guru-shishya-parampara is obviously a crucial part of lineage, but even in kali yuga the possibility for further insights and clarifications to a lineage, or even the formation of a modern lineage are certainly acceptable. I am not saying that Sri Satchidanandendra is deviant from the Advaita tradition as you are arguing, but to call the tantra of the Mahasiddhas, or even the Hinduism of the Bhakti movement as insufficient compared to Vedanta due to not solely taking from the Sruti (even Advaita only nominally does this, for there is clear evidence for Buddhistic borrowings in the Gaudapada-karika) is absurd. No one in their right minds would argue that the Vedic religion is the same as today's Hinduism; the Puranas were revealed intermittently and philosophy came from Magadh, yet all the same Advaita which accepts both is . So long as it fundamentally obeys the Sruti then innovation is acceptable in Hinduism. Who are you to deny this?

>>23926270
>That’s irrelevant, the Shruti still comes from Brahman either way. That’s what the Upanishads literally say and Shankara affirms that as literally true.

>That’s irrelevant, the Shruti still comes from Brahman either way. That’s what the Upanishads literally say and Shankara affirms that as literally true.
I sincerely doubt Sri Satchidanandendra denied this most vital of principles. Also, I must say that you type in an extremely irritating, idiomatic, and needlessly hostile manner. If you are intending to be debating, treat it more seriously.

>>23926057
>Mithya does not mean delusion but refers to something being untrue
>Yes, which an illusion is: it is not true, or real.
Illusion involves delusion, mistake, perception etc, so simply saying “X is untrue” is not sufficient to meet the definition of illusion.
>I have explained that whatever is false is false in a specific way. Propositions can be analytically false, samsara is not analytically false
Incorrect, “Samsara is false because it lacks real existence” is analytical and not synthetic, because the meaning expressed follows from the direct meaning of the words used and not because of any additional contextual knowledge.
>It is not predicated on any individual observer within samsara, but its illusion is beginningless
It’s not a delusion to begin with. It’s a created product of God’s power. God’s power to create a phenomenal form which lacks real existence does not require any accessory or observer. If you want to claim that an observer is logically necessary, you have to explain why. So far, all that you’ve cited as a reason is appealing to the meaning of language, but God/Brahman does not create according to the categories of language and his power is not limited by them, so there is no logical necessity that God’s creation takes place in a way that meets the definition of human words. It’s a question-begging fallacy for your argument to rely on the assumption that God must create in a way that matches the category of human language, and there is no possible logical justification of the necessity of this assumption, so no matter what way you try to slice the cake your argument boils down to a fallacy either way.

>A proposition asserts that something is the case or not. If a proposition asserts something about the empirical world (there is an elephant in the room next to the one you are in), it can only be regarded as true or false a posteriori, it needs experience
Propositions accepted on the basis of revealed scripture as truth don’t need any additional confirmation via experience. That the revealed scripture is stating them is sufficient proof of their truth, if you are someone who accepts said scripture as revealed. Revealed truths are true a priori.

>>23926330
> am not that poster, but I must say that this kind of obsession to unbroken lineage compared to modernity is puerile from a view of the Hindu traditio
SSSfags at once want to raise a fuss about Padmapada not analyzing mithyajnana correctly and other minor details but then at once say its no big deal that SSS uses anubhava in his own novel fashion while claiming to follow Shankara down to the last details including the technical meaning of words. I dont personally care about autistically following earlier precedent but I was just pointing out that SSS is a hypocrite and he fails to meet his own standard, and that if you are trying to determine “does SSS perfectly capture Shankara’s terminology and his use of technical phrases” the clear answer is no. I meant that SSS novel use of anubhava is irrelevant in the sense that no matter what the details of his novel take are that it’s not Shankara’s (the objective he claims to meet).

>>23926330
> I sincerely doubt Sri Satchidanandendra denied this most vital of principles
Hello??? Do you know anything about his ideas whatsoever?

Just ask our resident SSSfags for confirmation. In the view of SSS, avidya/samsara has no relation with Brahman or influence from Brahman whatsoever, and any possible idea about any relation or influence taking place is pure unreality and delusion based on avidya and has no reality/truth. This precludes Brahman having any influence upon the contents of the Shruti.

>>23926330
>Who are you to deny this?
well, he is guenonfag, who are you to condemn??? he is greater than Satchidanandendra (who translated all bhashya to kannada at the command of maharaja of mysore and was respected by the Shankarachayas of major peethas), greater than Jnananandendra (who personally taught vedanta to the maharaja), greater than all other disciples and also academics who confirm Satchidanandendra's views. He is even greater than the Mulavidyavadins themselves (they don't teach about different degrees of reality, nor about brahman being god and making the shruti descend from the sky, so they're all wrong, get it?).
all hail to guenonfag, reencarnation of Adi Shankara

>>23926067
The direct and literal meaning of Mithya is just falsity or false/untrue. Any other usage is derivative of this and is talking about applications where “X is mithya” which may or may not involve illusion.

>>23926341
I have not read the works of Swamiji and I am not homosexual. Anyways, looking at this debate you have provided no evidence that Swamiji uses anubhava in a novel way

>>23926344
I find it very hard to take your clearly cherrypicked view seriously, I will read the relevant information from Sri Satchidanandendra about both then respond

>>23926344
>In the view of SSS,
No, that's YOUR own view falsely attributed to SSSS (as you're completely dishonest), because you haven't read a single book or article by him, as everyone already noticed.

>>23926360
You clearly do not know Sanskrit or any other Indic language, since mithya can indeed be used to refer to illusion. The general meaning does indeed just mean false, but it is also commonly used to this effect

>>23926361
> I will read the relevant information from Sri Satchidanandendra about both then respond
I eagerly await to see what you say, since this is a sore point for SSSfags and they prefer not to talk about it themselves. They autistically replied to every sentence of some of my posts in this thread but were conspicuously silent and provided no answer to the 3-part detailed series of posts in this thread where I laid out exactly why the position of SSS viz. Shruti is totally incoherent.

>>23926373
For example, in Bangla we might poetically say "shobhi mithya" (all is falsehood/illusion)

>>23926378
You're very arrogant when you don't even know a fairly common sanskrit phrase

>>23926373
> since mithya can indeed be used to refer to illusion.
Yes, and that is a usage that is derivative of the primary meaning of mithya.

>>23926381
What do you mean by derivative? Words can have several meanings, and the Advaitin use of the phrase is a more philosophical use of the original meaning to begin with.

>>23926380
> You're very arrogant when you don't even know a fairly common sanskrit phrase
The literal and primary meaning of mithya is false/untrue. This can be validly applied to illusions, but this is just an applied form of the word that is derivative of the primary and literal meaning.

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>>23926361
>relevant information from Sri Satchidanandendra
best intro to satchidanandendra is probably Alston's article 'Śaṃkara in East and West Today' included in 'New Perspectives on Advaita Vedānta: Essays in Commemoration of Professor Richard De Smet, S.J.' (may be found in annas-archive..)

>>23926387
Thank you for the help

>>23926386
I believe that Gaudapada wrote quite explicitly that the world can be described as mithya, which would mean illusionary

>>23926392
Also once again the "primary and literal meaning" simply does not apply to Advaitin context because mithya is used as specialised vocabulary. Raag meant colour at one point but now has a unique term in classical music

>>23926270
>Shankara doesn’t use them but Shankara follows Mimamsa hermeneutical principles, you wont be able to get inside his head using a western interpretive method which Shankara himself did not follow or accept.
By the way what precisely is this method you are talking about, there is a very large amount modern philological techniques, a notable portion of which can be stated to have been used since ancient times so you need to be more specific

>That’s irrelevant, the Shruti still comes from Brahman either way. That’s what the Upanishads literally say and Shankara affirms that as literally true.
To the chela of Sri Satchidanandendra, could you clarify if he really says that Sruti is not revealed text of Brahma

>>23926270
>I do, anubhava is a pramana
Not it isn't:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1399276

>>23926386
If you are trying to find proof that mithya cannot mean illusion then you won't find it, give it a break and stop your pointless criticism of a distinguished teacher

>>23926090
> Samsara as false and ''realm of cycle of transmigration'' is not an analytical sense of samsara, it is a doctrinal sense which is contingent on many principles
That’s irrelevant, because the statement “Samsara is false because its lacks real existence” is analytical and does not depend on contextual knowledge, the meaning follows from the words themselves. You can say that sentence to someone with 0 knowledge of Advaita who only knows the basic definition of Indian words and it still has the same meaning. From the perspective of Indian philosophy, Samsara is basically synonymous with ‘the world’. You can say “the world is false because it lacks real existence” and this communicates the same thing and is also analytical.
> Then Brahman is ignorant.
Incorrect, because you have not provided any logical justification for this. All you have provided instead are logical fallacies like question begging.

Let me summarize what you are arguing:

1) Brahman creates a world said to be false
2) The way in which the world is said to be false is inseparable from the concept of illusions
3) Illusions require an observer
4) Therefore, Brahman creating the false world logically need an outside observer of it, whether that is Brahman or something else; otherwise Brahman’s creation is failing to meet the definition of “illusion”

This argument involves a question-begging fallacy by assuming without justification that Brahman’s creation has to take place in a way that matches the definitions of human language and the concepts associated with them. Advaita rejects this and holds that Brahman’s power is not constrained by anything, not least of all by His own creations like human concepts. Language is not the arbiter of what is metaphysically possible.

At this point, since your central argument was shown to involve an obvious fallacy, your only options remaining are to:
1) Raise a different argument and abandon that one.
2) Try to contest that it’s a fallacy by explaining why it’s not a fallacy.

Failure to do one of the above is tantamount to conceding that you’ve lost. Repeating the same argument that has already been shown to be a fallacy without doing one of the above is just a tacit admission that your argument is fallacious and indefensible.

>>23926101
> An illusion
> Samsara IS a delusion.
Samsara is neither a delusion nor a perceptual illusion.

The main argument you have raised as part of your attempt to demonstrate that it is such has been shown to consist of fallacies (see here >>23926430 which recapitulates points already raised elsewhere). If you can’t demonstrate why it’s not a fallacy, then there is 0 point in even considering any of the derivative points, conclusions or arguments which you attempt to derive from that.

>>23926430
>4) Therefore, Brahman creating the false world logically need an outside observer of it, whether that is Brahman or something else; otherwise Brahman’s creation is failing to meet the definition of “illusion”
I am not that poster, but the word illusion itself is only used out of convenience, since ultimately all is Brahman. Only avidya leads to perception of illusions

>>23926443
>Samsara is neither a delusion nor a perceptual illusion.
Samsara (conventional reality) is obviously a delusion on our part produced from lacking knowledge of the nature of Brahman. Calling the other debater's argument fallacious is only proving the truth of Advaita because a term like illusion is just a guiding instrument to the truth

>>23926419
It refers to the pramanas and experience/knowledge generated by and through them. The point is that the Self is beyond all experience and means of knowledge, being beyond the subject-object duality. Shankara doesn’t ever use the term anubhava as a technical term for how Self-knowledge or Self-realization occurs. It’s not a special means of knowing the Self while SSS uses it in this fashion, which he is perfectly free to do but it invalidates his claim to be recapitulating Shankara’s technical terminology.

>>23926373
> The general meaning does indeed just mean false
Which is all that needs to be said.

>>23926392
> I believe that Gaudapada wrote quite explicitly that the world can be described as mithya
Yes, but he doesn’t define the world as a perceptual illusion. It seems as though by mithya he simply means untrue. The tradition reads him as agreeing with Shankara on this point but some western academics allege a divergence of view between Gaudapada and Shankara.

>>23926458
So raag just means colour because that was the context in which it was first used? Never mind Sanskrit, you don't even know enough linguistics to understand that terms can evolve in meaning. You should learn the language you want to argue over before you argue over it

>>23926461
>Yes, but he doesn’t define the world as a perceptual illusion.
This is absurd, every scholar agrees that Gaudapada says reality is an illusion

>>23926464
This article even has a direct example where he uses mithya:
https://www.advaita-vision.org/origin-and-meaning-of-the-word-mithya/

>>23926425
> If you are trying to find proof that mithya cannot mean illusion
I was never arguing that, I was only saying the primary meaning of mithya is false/untrue, which is objectively true. When the word mithya is used in reference to illusions, its based on the primary meaning of mithya as false and is applying that primary meaning to the illusion by saying the illusion is untrue/false. That sort of usage is derivative of the primary meaning of the word, the primary meaning of the word itself is not delusion, which would be moha, its not ignorance either which would avidya or ajnana.
>give it a break and stop your pointless criticism of a distinguished teacher
This part of the discussion had nothing to do with SSS (solipsistic sophistic simpleton), this was related to the arguments raised by the guy who was arguing against Advaita in general.

>>23926472
>I was never arguing that, I was only saying the primary meaning of mithya is false/untrue, which is objectively true. When the word mithya is used in reference to illusions, its based on the primary meaning of mithya as false and is applying that primary meaning to the illusion by saying the illusion is untrue/false. That
How many times must I explain this fact? The basic meaning of mithya means false but when used in Advaita it is used in a very specific way that means illusionary as shown in the article I posted earlier with quotation

>>23926450
> Samsara (conventional reality) is obviously a delusion on our part produced from lacking knowledge of the nature of Brahman
No, the incorrect judgements about samsara are moha/avidya and the superimposition of traits of Samsara onto Brahman and vice-versa is moha/avidya. But there is nothing about the simple act of perceptual observation without any judgement which is a delusion, and indeed that is why enlightened people are not deluded but they still have knowledge of the empirical world around them.

>>23926480
If you essentially conceive of objects as anything but manifestations of Brahman that is just an illusory way of viewing reality and not the truth. It does not have to be avidya but just used out of convenience

>>23926464
> This is absurd, every scholar agrees that Gaudapada says reality is an illusion
Every scholar does not agree that Gaudapada says that reality is a subjective hallucination or Pratibhasika. They may use the word “illusion” in the broader sense of “an X that is not real”, but in saying this people are not using it exclusively in the narrow sense of “a subjective hallucination that is only imagined by an observer”.

>>23926489
>a subjective hallucination that is only imagined by an observer
He explicitly uses it in that way, refer to the article again. And if you complain about the interpretation of the Sanskrit, I can read it myself and the interpretation is perfectly fine . He really is using the word in an illusionary context to describe a relative phenomenon

>>23926469
In neither of those cited quotes is he saying its a perceptual hallucination. In the first its talking about the false metaphysical status about something that has a beginning and end (the Real is eternal) and in the second its talking about an impression that is described as false, but there the word impression that comes after mithya refers to the hallucination himself. If he meant mithya as the perception/impression itself it wouldn't make sense because he would be saying “the impression impression”.

>>23926496
I'll just address the first citations to not be redundant. In the context of the shloka Gaudapadacarya is mithya to reject false conceptions of what is real, which can easily be translated delusion or illusion without issue

>>23926503
>is mithya
is using mithya

>>23926475
> The basic meaning of mithya means false but when used in Advaita it is used in a very specific way that means illusionary
No, the article did not in fact show that. Not if by ‘illusionary’ you mean a subjective hallucination.

>as shown in the article I posted earlier with quotation
I already replied to that, in doing so I made a mistake and thought the second usage cited was from Gaudapada but its from another text. The point I made about the first verse still stands though. In both verses where Gaudapada uses mithya the verses are basically saying the exact same thing about something that has a beginning and an end being false, not real. But that isn’t directly addressing whether this is a subjective hallucination of someone or whether the fact that it’s false is a direct consequence of having a beginning and an end (and hence naturally unreal).

>>23926493
> He explicitly uses it in that way, refer to the article again
How about you read it again.

Saying something is false because it doesn’t possess the attributes of Reality (i.e. being without beginning or end) is not the same as saying its a hallucination.

>>23926482
> If you essentially conceive of objects as anything but manifestations of Brahman that is just an illusory way of viewing reality and not the truth
Okay, but bare perception without any ontological judgements or conceptualization about their status doesn’t involve any delusion.

>>23926511
>But that isn’t directly addressing whether this is a subjective hallucination of someone or whether the fact that it’s false is a direct consequence of having a beginning and an end (and hence naturally unreal).
This is the last time I will repeat this, but he's clearly discussing subjective experience in the shloka and uses mithya in the context of it meaning that it may be translated as illusion

>>23926513
The shloka is calling mithya objects perceived in dreams, which can easily be called illusionary

>>23926519
>bare perception without any ontological judgements or conceptualization about their status doesn’t involve any delusion.
You're correct a priori but whenever we use the word "reality" we necessarily force perception into a conceptualised category as you put it. But that is just the weakness of language, which we use out of convenience anyways. This is the truth of Brahman

>>23926520
I'm going to lunch now so this will be all I will be saying unless I come back later, but I think I said enough. Don't take this as patronising, but you really should learn sanskrit at one point to truly grasp the sacred texts

>pratyetyeva hi kevalaṃ rajatamiti, na tu tatra rajatamasti – [BSBh. 4.1.5]
>A man merely perceives it as silver, when actually no silver is there.

shell = brahman;
silver = samsara (everything perceivable or conceivable)

there is shell, you take it as silver, there was never any silver though, just a fucking shell. No need to discuss the nature of damn illusions, or worse: to reify them! if they were meant to be meticulously analyzed, wouldn't be illusions. Samkara had some words for this type of waste-of-time reasoning: kutarka/śuṣkatarka

here's all vedanta you need
simples as,

>>23926278
We already have, check the excerpts above or read the vedavyasmandala article which distinguishes atma anubhava from "empirical experience"

Id also point you to writings on the halbfast on the traditional meaning of "experience" in the vedic tradition and how this is easily distinguished from the neovededantic understanding of experience

To say I cant when Shankara himself did, and it has already been echoed in this thread 1000 times is disingenuous and moronic.
"The nature of intuitive experience in advaita"
https://vedavyasamandala.com/en/la-natura-dellesperienza-intuitiva/

Anubhava literally means “that which follows” ( anusṛtya bhavati ). It is of five types:

1. Prayatnajanya anubhava : Experience arising from effort ( prayatna ), such as driving a vehicle.

2. Pramāṇajanya anubhava : Experience arising from valid means of knowledge ( pramāṇa ), such as [direct perception of] the sweetness of sugar.

3. Vedanājanya anubhava : Experience arising from emotions ( vedanā ), such as hunger or sadness.

4. Yogajanya anubhava : Experience that arises following the practice of yoga ( yoga-sādhanam ), including austerities ( tapas ) and the like, is the direct perception ( yogi-pratyakṣa ) of the yogi .

5. Pūrvasiddha anubhava : Pre-established experience, the experience-witness ( sākṣi-anubhava ), of the nature of observation of states [of consciousness].

Among these, prayatnajanya anubhava (experience resulting from effort), although it leads to great riches and respect in the worldly sphere, is useless and even hinders the understanding of the meaning of the commentary ( bhāṣyavākyārthavagati ).


The swami goes through each of these and establishes that these pramanas are insufficient when it comes to vedantic atma anubhava (shankara also does not say the self is ascertainable by means of pramana, you moronic liar)


...

Finally, it is good to understand that in the investigation of Brahman ( brahma jijñāsā ), experience ( anubhava ) is the instrument of knowledge ( pramāṇa ). This statement ( anubhavaḥ pramāṇam ) superimposes on experience ( anubhava ) the attribute of being a valid means of knowledge ( pramāṇatvam ) to disprove the validity of all other means of knowledge ( pramāṇa ), such as perception ( pratyakṣa ), etc.

>>23926549
Furthermore, unlike Dharma inquiry ( dharma – jijñāsā ), the unity of Brahman and Ātman ( brahmātmaikyatvam ) is not to be accepted solely on the basis of scriptural statements ( śāstravākya ) or faith ( śraddhā ). Rather, since knowledge ( jñāna ) and Brahman [non-being different] are intrinsically real ( vastu-tantra ), constituting the very nature of reality ( bhūta-vastu ), and self-evident ( svayaṃ-siddha ), they are understood as independent from all valid means of knowledge ( sarvapramāṇa ).

The two phrases “ Brahma anubhavātmakam ” (Brahman is of the nature of experience) and “ parinṣṭhitavasturūpam ” (Brahman is the ultimate reality) indicate that we do not recognize the existence of Brahman solely on the basis of the authority of statements or faith. Instead, since Brahman is the Self of all ( sarvasya ātmābhūtatvāt ), its Reality can be known through our experience ( svānubhavena yāthātmyaṃ jñātuṃ śakyate ).


Read it in detail

There are many more articles and writings
A link I have already sent:
https://www.advaita-vision.org/atma-anubhava-anubhuti/

The chapter by Halbfas in the comments:
>Anyone interested in this important subject should read Wilhelm Halbfass’s seminal study “The Concept of Experience in the Encounter Between India and the West” which illuminates the philosophical ambiguities of the term and its recent appropriations by some neo-Advaitins to serve apologetic ends. Halbfass discusses how Shankara himself deals with experience and his use of the terms “anubhava”, “anubhuti”, “saksatkara”, “darsana”, and so on.

I already see you replying with your venemous sophism....

A modernist westernized empiricist Neovedanta professor was teaching a class on SSS, a modern author.

"Before the class begins, you must get on your knees and worship SSS and accept that he was the most expert interpreter of Shankara that the world has ever known, even greater than Shankara’s own student Padmapada!”

At this moment, a brave, patriotic, traditional chad who had already read Guenon and Shankara and understood the pitfalls of modern assumptions, stood up and held up a copy of the Upanishads.

"Does the Shruti come from Brahman like an exhalation, like the Upanishads affirm in Brihadaranyaka 2.4.10 and as Shankara himself affirms and says takes place without any effort like sport (lila) in BSSB 1.1.3?”

The arrogant professor smirked quite Jewishly and smugly replied “No, this is only an application of the method of Adhyaropa-Apavada (attribution and retraction), since causation is predicated on avidya, any mention of Brahman causing or having influence upon the Shruti is foolish nonsense which can only be a pedagogical device that is retracted but which can never be literally true.”

The student replied:

"Wrong. If Brahman has no influence upon the contents of the scripture, then it’s solely a product of samsara and is not assured to contain any truth about ultimate reality because it lacks any connection or relation with ultimate reality that would provide this, in which case even things like Adhyaropa-Apavada lose all possible justification.”

The professor was visibly shaken, and dropped his chalk and copy of ‘Modernism for Dummies’. He stormed out of the room crying those crocodile tears. There is no doubt that at this point our professor wished he listened to the traditional Sampradaya and become more than a sophist Neovedantist.

The students applauded and all registered as Traditionalists that day and rejected modernism. An eagle named "Tradition" flew into the room and perched atop the saffron Hindu flag and shed a tear on the cloth. The Bhagavad-Gita was read several times, and Kalki himself showed up and ended the Kali Yuga.

Satyameva Jayate.

>>23926295
"I dont think the counter initiation is involved"
Oh tell me more...! You absolute slave, you are not fit for vedantic inquiry.

>Wrong you fool, if Brahman does not cause the Shruti, if the Shruti does not come from Brahman, if Brahman does not “imprint” truth upon the Shruti, then it loses all possible authority. Calling it akash/shaba changes nothing since these are nothing more than avidya and its products. You’re just playing a shell game and then relying on dropping terminology to misdirect when this is pointed out. Please, explain how the Shruti retains any authority of Brahman has no influence upon it or relation with it whatsoever? Please actually answer the question instead of misdirecting with terminology without actually answering it.
The shruti in the etymological sense is Shabdabrahman, the nada of the bindu. Guénon corroborates this and this is infact the very means of revelation of the rishis they directly saw and heard the shruti.
>Please, explain how the Shruti retains any authority of Brahman has no influence upon it or relation with it whatsoever? Please actually answer the question instead of misdirecting with terminology without actually answering it.
Your talk is mere mithya, shabdabrahman has already been discussed by ancient sages. The veda is merely that which expresses the inexpressible, insofar as it it expresses anything expressible it is neither veda nor shruti, in so far as it expresses the inexpressible it is directly the shabda brahman. Upon the revelation of shabda brahman the physical shruti is also mere mithya (it always was)

>>23926520
> This is the last time I will repeat this, but he's clearly discussing subjective experience in the shloka
In 2.7 it follows the immediate discussion of a general philosophical principle in the prior verse (2.6) that “that which is non-existent at the beginning and in the end, is necessarily so in the middle”, so 2.7 could just be a particular example provided that instantiates this general principe without necessarily identifying this as identical with subjective hallucinations.

In the second instance in 4.32, once it again it follows the discussion of the same principle in the immediately preceding verse.

>>23926543
> . No need to discuss the nature of damn illusions, or worse: to reify them!
Shankara’s perspective is that if your school gives a metaphysical account that is self-evidently absurd and contradictory then it is to be rejected. And many of the things that SSS says fall into these categories of things Shankara regards as self-evidently absurd. Accusing everyone who points this out as “reifying” is just cope.

>>23926560
> The shruti in the etymological sense is Shabdabrahman, the nada of the bindu. Guénon corroborates this and this is infact the very means of revelation of the rishis they directly saw and heard the shruti.
That’s not directly answering the question, you’re just proving my point. Citing Guenon won’t help you here. The issue is with the view of SSS, and not Guenon, who does not even agree with SSS.

> shabdabrahman has already been discussed by ancient sages.
Again, that is not answering the question, you are just proving my point.

>The veda is merely that which expresses the inexpressible
If Brahman has no real relation with or influence upon Shruti then it has no way of revealing or ‘expressing’ the truth about Brahman. You still are not addressing the central contradiction in your own view and that of SSS, you are just dancing around it and posturing while failing to answer the question.

I’ll give you another chance to answer the question. Let’s see if you have what it takes.

>>23926576
Notice how you ignored the posts below and jumped on the lure of an irrelevant decoy post. At least retract your nonsense statement that SSS pushed neovedantic pramanic agentative experience as the main proof of concept of his sattvic shantic shri shuddha shankara Vedantic prakriya. Take back your treacherous insults against Lord Shri Shri Shri Shri Sadhu Satcidanandendra Swamiji

>>23926549
>>23926555

You are like the antifa protesting fallaciously and in increasingly ridiculous ways which everyone can see against the fascism of ruling government of white men in america with the government (supposedly constituted by white men) supporting them

>>23926571
>Shankara’s perspective is that if your school gives a metaphysical account that is self-evidently absurd and contradictory then it is to be rejected. And many of the things that SSS says fall into these categories of things Shankara regards as self-evidently absurd. Accusing everyone who points this out as “reifying” is just cope.
Every word of yours is a mere hallucination

>>23926576
>who does not even agree with SSS.
How do you know?

Freshly uploaded 15 minutes ago, new counter-initiation content:

https://youtu.be/SdYktzCcIY8?si=n8p3H3CvbajDDoR-

>>23926556
>"Does the Shruti come from Brahman like an exhalation, like the Upanishads affirm in Brihadaranyaka 2.4.10 and as Shankara himself affirms and says takes place without any effort like sport (lila) in BSSB 1.1.3?”
Its an exhalation in the same way action originates from brahman
>>23924922
Abhinavagupta also comments
>>23924895
Notice how he can take this verse without any reference to Veda? And Also Brahman is the meaning not some idea like a book

>>23926725
>>23924909
Notice how that teaching was mere adhyaropa and the apavada comes in the following verses in the BG showing that all such apparent exhalation of Brahman/Veda from the Immutable is mere kalpita/asat-kalpa for the jnani

>But he who rejoices in the atman alone, who finds satisfaction in the atman, who is content only in the atman, for him there is no action that he needs to do.
3:18
>Neither has he anything to gain from the actions he has done or from the actions left undone; nor is there any living being on whom he needs to rely for any purpose.

Abhinavagupta:
>One who rejoices in one’s self alone (atmarateh) remains en gaged in activity only because this is the nature of the sense organs, which remain active regardless if one is active or inactive. Such a person does not engage in communication with other living beings for any selfish purposes. He, knowing his duty, performs it in accordance with sastric instruction.

Shankara:
3:17
>But that man who rejoices only in theSelf and is satisfied with the Self, and is contented only in the Self-for him there is no duty to perform.

>Tu, but; that manavah, man, the sannyasin, the man of Knowledge, steadfast in the knowledge of the Self; yah, who; atmaratih eva syat, rejoices only in the Self-not in the sense objects; and atma-trptah, who is satisfied only with the Self-not with food and drink; and is santustah, contented; eva, only; atmani, in the Self; tasya, for him; na vidyate, there is no; karyam, duty [Duty with a view to securing Liberation.] to perform. [Rati, trpti and santosa, though synonymous, are used to indicate various types of pleasures. Or, rati means attachment to objects; trpti means happiness arising from contact with some particular object; and santosa means happiness in general, arising from the acquisition of some coveted object only.]

>All people surely feel contened by acquiring an external thing. But this one, without depending on it, remains contented only with the Self; thta is to say, he remains detached from everything. The idea it that, for a man who is such a knower of the Self, there is no duty to undertake.

3:18
>Moreover, tasya, for him, who rejoices in the supreme Self; na, there is no; artham, concern; eva, at all; krtena, with performing action.

>Objection: In that case, let there be some evil called sin owing to non-performance!

>>23926728
>Reply: Iha, here, in this world; na, nor is there; for him kascana, any (concern); akrtena, with nonperfromance. Certainly there is no evil in the form of incurring sin or in the form of self-destruction. Ca, moreover; asya, for him; na asti, there is no; kascit artha-vyapasrayah sarva-bhutesu, dependence on any object, from Brahma to an unmoving thing, to serve any purpose. Vyapasrayah is the same as vyapasrayanam, dependence, which is possible of being created by action promted by necessity. (For him) there is no end to gain by depending on any praticular object, due to which there can be some action for that purpose.

>'You (Arjuna) are not established in this fullest realization which is comparable to a flood all around.'

Notice the follow up to that verse of the exhalation of the veda from the immutable is begun by "but" meaning it is overturned by jnana. See Satcidanandendra super-swami can explain such things perfectly whereas you and your defective prakriya grasps at straws and illusory mere notions concerning imaginary descents, vertical/horizontal etc. As if any of this was independently verifiable apart from the Self and can serve as the basis of a vitriolic argument and personal attack.

It is always the case that people attack SSSS out of mere insecurity jealousu when confronted by his magna-animus intellect

>>23926564
> so 2.7 could just be a particular example provided that instantiates this general principe without necessarily identifying this as identical with subjective hallucinations.
There is no way to say "could be" in this case, this is not philosophical debate but textual analysis. Gaudapada clearly used mithya to indicate illusion in that shlok, but since you disagree you are just giving some vague platitude without saying anything. If the meaning is so general then why didn't he use one of so many other words in Sanskrit he could have and use a word (and not in the conventional way as shown by the verse) he didn't use before as the article points put. Know when to accept you have made mistake, dodging the topic is shameful

>>23926556
Many things of your concern you are arguing over feel artificial, but this dichotomy between modern and tradition is the most artificial. What you would consider traditional Hinduism unless you are an arya samaji or conservative brahmana, neither of which I believe you are, is only about as old as Magadh or ancient Greece, certainly not the age of the Vedas. If you call modernity degenerate than the late Vedic period could easily be called degenerate, for spiritual contentment was only provided to a happy few through elaborate ritual. The Śramanas, current ideas of bhakti and indeed current gods all emerged from the later period in response to this dissatisfaction with any Vedic remnants being subsumed, all of which created Advaita. So then the past can be degenerate as well, which seems to go against your polemic, also empiricism existed in ancient India under the name ajñana. Last thing, what exactly is so wrong with Europe? The computer is an invention of Germany for example and is a useful tool. In our life we are equally affected by the Indian, Chinese, Mesopotamian and European inventions, so why suddenly call one bad? Of course we dislike colonialism but its impacts are soon vanishing

>>23926336
>Illusion involves delusion, mistake, perception etc, so simply saying “X is untrue” is not sufficient to meet the definition of illusion.
It was proved that Mithya means illusion, plus: the context Advaitins use the word mithya/false is always in connection with illusion and appearance.
>”Samsara is false because it lacks real existence” is analytical
This is the ninth time I’m explaining this to you, I guess: analyticity is an instatiation of logical truth, when a proposition is analytical this means that substituting the terms for their logical equivalent the proposition stays the same, has the same meaning, for instance:
2+2=4 can be logically instatiated as (1+1)+(1+1)=4. Now subtitute Samsara for universe, world, “the world is false because it lacks real existence”, this is completely illogical, the world as false in this way is only a specific principle of a doctrinal teaching, not what is logically understood by the word “world”, there is no epistemological connotations in the logical sense of words. Plus as I said before, the doctrinal teaching of samsara as false because lacks real existence is always contingent on the elimination of avidya, so it is always synthetic.
> It’s a created product of God’s power. God’s power to create a phenomenal form which lacks real existence does not require any accessory or observer. If you want to claim that an observer is logically necessary, you have to explain why
I have demonstrated this several times when it is proved that all Advaitins and Upanishads refer to samsara as illusion, maya as illusion, the created world as illusory, that Sharma cites Gaudapada’s: ''It is the nature of the inexpressible power of the Lord to project the illusion of creation''. And all illusions can only be illusory for a deluded perception. Period.
> Propositions accepted on the basis of revealed scripture as truth don’t need any additional confirmation via experience.
They are not propositions, they are dogmas. A proposition is always asserting that something either is or is not the case, a dogma is not proposed to be subject to verification.

>>23927026
Do you see anything seriously flawed about that anons reasoning
>>23926556
>"Wrong. If Brahman has no influence upon the contents of the scripture, then it’s solely a product of samsara and is not assured to contain any truth about ultimate reality because it lacks any connection or relation with ultimate reality that would provide this, in which case even things like Adhyaropa-Apavada lose all possible justification.”
Again demanding a "connection" between vyavahara and parmartha

Anyhow, the post is clearly chat GPT or some other ai

>>23927076
>Do you see anything seriously flawed about that anons reasoning
I just think that hating modernity unconditionally is a shortsighted idea

I think one of the main issues of the hostile poster is he is trying to grasp Hindu philosophy without proper knowledge of Indian culture and Sanskrit. In the first place, he is hostile even by the standards of Indian philosophical debate easily insulting gurus without sufficient evidence. In the second, verses he posted before are without Sanskrit original and thus inherently unreliable. The reason bilingual double editions of books exist is to check difficult translations with the original to extract full meaning instead of taking excessive time to read fully in the original, here he just argues about English translations (mostly about definitions of a spare word or verse as part of some vendetta it seems) without any basis to prove this in the original. This really is "splitting hairs", first don't be so hostile and after that learn Sanskrit

>>23926336
>>23927050
Cont:

> “Samsara is false because it lacks real existence”
Also this is a petitio principii fallacy, what lacks real existence is false, this amounts to saying “samsara is false because it is false” the premise and the conclusion are literally the same.