Thought, in thinking itself, thinks what it is to think as such, and what it is to think as such is to think the object of thought per se, that is, pure being.Pure being, as the formal object of thought, is, analytically, the first concept of thought. As the first concept of thought, it has an infinite extension and no intensional content. That is, it has no given definition. Thought, in thinking pure being, thinks nothing.Thinking nothing is not not thinking. To think nothing is to think thought as unfettered by any given determination. To think nothing is to think the beginning of thought's own self-determination. Thought, in thinking nothing, thinks the illimitability of its formal object: pure being.The opening of the logic repeats Aristotle: thought is nothing before it thinks, for it has no given nature. If it did, it would delimit the formal object of thought.This is all that is needed to get started on the greatest philosophical adventure ever. Please start reading the Science of Logic.
Hegel is too ontic
Yes, this is all true, and painfully obvious to any cultivate. But what about LOVE and BEAUTY ?
I'm so tired of this inauthentic shit. Why did Europe spend 2500 years $oyjakking over abstract reason to the point of thorough absurdity? Reason isn't that special. It isn't the ground of knowledge, it isn't the key to new knowledge, and it certainly isn't the path to a better life.
>>24696955But reason is special, anon. Man's crowning jewel. And what's more, the form of reason is the form of all things.
>>24696894what would be hegel's interpretation of goblins, trolls, gnomes, and other such creatures rumoured to dwell in wild forest-places?>>24696955what would heidegger's be? thank you in advance.
>>24696903no hes not. He's ontological as can be. Guess why Heidegger was too scared to actually touch him outside recapping the foreword of the PdG. He was scared he'd get exposed as being a charlatan ontological philosopher and second rate to Hegel.His lines in Logik 1 are the most sublime thinking on Being you will ever read.>>24696894I will need that in German, Tommy.
>>24696995>>24695255
>>24696894This is beautiful. I should try reading Hegel again.
>>24697009>spinozist>ontologicalI am read in Hegel but I see you are unread in HeideggerThe logic is all presupp bs and modernist copeWhich is btfo by proper theological logic as disclosed in ontological religion prior the modern ontotheological contamination
>>24697010i have no doubt about it
>>24696894So if I'm just sitting here not doing anything not even thinking just staring blankly at a wall—I'm still thinking? I can't not think?
>>24696995Imo the whole concept of the clearing alludes to the Germanic relation to the mythical forest. But Heidegger didn’t talk about myth much. You should look into Colin Cleary if you want to pursue that line.
>>24696894If Pure Being is truly illimitable, how can it possibly be a concept of thought? How can the illimitable be truly conceived in Thought?>"Thinking nothing is to think thought-undetermined?" This seems like a circular reason to justify how, firstly, that "Thought, in thinking pure being, thinks nothing." Or how is "thinking nothing" the beginning of thoughts self-determination when 'nothing' cannot begin in any determination? Seems to equivocate 'Nothing' as the thinking of Pure Being? Why not have Limitlessness rather than Nothing? What is Nothing?
>>24696955>>24697020>>24696903>inauthentic shitAuthentic to what? An anxiety emptied of content or some arbitrary historical contingency? How do you discern between the authentic and the inauthentic? Hermeneutics try to be "authentic" to the historical contingency, but this just leads to relativism. Gadamer tried to solve this problem by going back to Hegel and limiting the scope of dialectics. But for the dialectics to work, it must be thought itself the one that introduces new determinations into the dialectic by its own potency, and this movement must be the same as the movement of the thing itself, or better yet, thought and being must be identical. If those conditions aren't met, the relation between one thought and another (or the moment of synthesis, fusion or whatever you may call it) is external, thus a mere contingency that can be negated with no problem at all; and the relation between what we think and the thing itself is contingent too, thus relativism.The second Heidegger is aware that the hermeneutic circle is indeed vicious, so he tries to go back to the nothingness of anxiety or primordial openness of being before any ontological horizon is posited. His treatment further shows that Heidegger is the one limited by abstract thought, since he's unable to move within being's self-contradiction. This leads him to reject thought, instead of thinking of thought as the self-movement that finds itself in its negation. His reasoning is quite close to Spinoza's. I think that Hegel's critique of Heidegger would be similar to his critiques of Schelling and Jacobi,he was quite critical of isolating both sides of oppositions or uniting them while excluding difference. They accept that everything that is, is being, but when we point to this or that being, we lose being itself and now we have determinate being. Every being is invariantly being, therefore in order to grasp being itself, we must negate every determinate content of being. Thus being is both the absolute affirmation and negation of content i.e. Being and Nothingness are the same and the opposite. Spinoza avoids Nothingness since he's on the positive side, whereas Heidegger stays on the negative side. Because of this reason, the transition from indeterminacy to determinacy fails. Determinacy comes from the self-negation of indeterminacy. It's not just that indeterminacy is both pure positivity or negativity, but that its already determined to be undetermined. If was not determined, then it wouldn't be determined to negate determinacy, and thus it would affirm determinacy. That's implicit on Spinoza's omnis determinatio ist negatio. If determination is negation, then indetermination is the negation of negation. Determinacy is contained within indeterminacy, and determinacy is ideally related to indeterminacy. The ontical is ontological and the ontological is ontical. A thought unable to grasp this movement is not thought but an abstract and dead understanding.
>>24696955>Reason isn't that special. It isn't the ground of knowledgeBoth the concept of knowledge and ground entail reason. To give a ground is to give a reason. We say that one thing grounds another one if one is the explanation of the other. In a strict sense, the explanation contains the whole of the explained, since if it's not contained then it's outside the explanation, thus the explained wouldn't be explained at all; and the explained must contain the whole of the explanation, since the explanation is the very essence of the explained, hence if the explained does not contain the explanation then the essential would be something external, but the essence is precisely the internal. The activity between the explanation and the explained is reason as such.On the other hand, what differentiates knowledge from opinion is justification. You could say that knowledge is the web that ties the objects of knowledge together. But the web must always mantain the figure of necessary connection, for if the connections were contingent then the web could be easily negated by anyone.>>24699128I'll give you a hegelian response later. Rn I'm too tired to write
>>24699426An explanation need not and cannot contain the explained in its entirety. It can only gesture at a relationship. Reductionism is in principle impossible and the whole of analytic philosophy has demonstrated what a dead end it is.
>>24696906For that there's the Philosophy of Mind (Encyclopedia v III) and the Aesthetic Lectures
>>24697009>>24699406Heidegger does engage with Hegel's Logic in both Identity and Difference and in the addresses and notes collected in GA 68 (simply published as "Hegel"), as well as a discussion of the Encyclopedia section on nature (Logic: The Question of Truth), and the Philosophy of Right (On Hegel's Philosophy of Right).Heidegger's Seinsfrage, while often coming across as though he were after the Sein of metaphysics, is not in fact what he's after, but rather the phenomenological account of the pre-theoretical experience with beings that allows us to understand them as beings of whatever sort (truly, indifferently, theoretically, falsely, poetically, as equipment, etc.).
I’m reading it now. Don’t have many thoughts yet but it’s exciting stuff. The idealism you see in the Phenomenology justifies thinking itself as the principle of all reality; and this shouldn’t be too controversial maybe since even without idealism you can see how everything proceeds rationally. So if thought is first, how does it work? It has to be a circular, teleological system (it can’t get its content from elsewhere, so it has to somehow differentiate itself by negativity), and that’s what SoL gives you. It is dry stuff so far desu, not like the swashbuckling PoS.
>>24699128Of course you can think of the illimitable, you did it yourself in writing your post. You just can’t imagine it, or grasp it with merely representational thought. It’s impossible to imagine but it’s not a difficult idea at all, and the whole point is that it doesn’t remain abstractly illimitable anyway. Also he’s not talking about limits of extension, he means a limit like being contrasted with something else. It’s Just being. Can you think of a thing in general.? Of course you can but try imagining it.
>>24699406Excellent post
>>24701051>Of course you can think of the illimitableThinking requires knowledge. Strictly speaking, it isn't possible to entirely know Limitlessness because thinking a thought requires Limit. So we are not thinking of Limitless but something else. We can conceive of it but not """purely.""" Anyway, what is "Nothing" then and how is "that" related to all that by Hegel?
>>24696894
