>Why it matters
A Tough Line on Beijing. Donald Trump’s stance on China may appear straightforward, but it is more complex than it seems. On the one hand, he has already vowed to take a tougher stance than Joe Biden, proposing to raise tariffs on Chinese imports to 60%. Trump’s political strategy of framing China as a severe threat has proven effective among his base, and he is likely to double down on this narrative. However, Trump’s inner circle includes influential business figures like Elon Musk, who have significant investments in China and could influence the President elect’s behaviour toward Beijing.
Uncertainty in South Korea and Japan. Washington’s allies in East Asia are approaching Donald Trump’s return with caution. During his first term, Japan was led by Shinzo Abe, who cultivated a close personal relationship with Trump. This relationship encouraged Trump to adopt the Indo-Pacific strategy promoted by Japan, making the region a key focus of US foreign policy. Today, however, Japan’s political landscape is less stable making it harder to replicate such personal ties with Trump’s team. Nevertheless, Japan is one of the few US allies whose increasing defense spending aligns with Trump’s preferences. In South Korea, President Yoon Suk-yeol faces a more delicate situation. There are concerns in Seoul that Trump might revive his personal rapport with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, potentially sidelining South Korea’s interests, while on the other hand demanding an increased burden-sharing commitment for its security.

The Brewing Storm on the Seas. The South China Sea remains a major flashpoint for escalating tensions between Washington and Beijing. On the Taiwan front, Trump’s stance has oscillated between open hostility toward Beijing and support for Taiwan’s government, while also suggesting that Taipei should bear a greater share of the costs for US military protection. Additionally, he has criticized Taiwan’s role in the global semiconductors manufacturing sector, implying that the island has taken advantage of the US economy. Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te has already begun efforts to strengthen ties with the new Trump administration, but it remains unclear how Trump will respond to potential Chinese provocations. Similarly concerned are Southeast Asian countries like the Philippines, which oppose Chinese encroachment in the South China Sea and fear a reduction in US military engagement under Trump – thus leaving them more vulnerable to Beijing’s regional ambitions. For example, despite Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s efforts to deepen military alliance with the US, Trump’s transactional foreign policy style could complicate these initiatives.
Modi Hopes to Capitalize on Trump’s New Presidency. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi sees Trump’s return as an opportunity to advance India’s interests. With Trump’s tough stance on China, Modi hopes to deepen defense and economic ties with Washington, leveraging this renewed partnership to counterbalance Beijing’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. India is particularly keen to enhance its strategic partnership with the US in critical areas such as technology, infrastructure, and defense procurement.

>OUR TAKE
Washington’s partners in Asia are aware that Trump’s comeback to the White House may result in reduced US support. The new administration is expected to adopt a harder line toward China, while becoming less engaged militarily in the Indo-Pacific, also favoring bilateral deals at the expense of multilateral economic platforms like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Conversely, Biden’s administration had focused largely on strengthening ties with a network of Asian partners, viewing these relations as an effective counterbalance to China’s influence. This shift in priorities will force Asian allies to adjust to a new, more transactional era of US foreign policy. While the US will likely remain involved in the region, its approach will shift toward economic containment through bilateral agreements, and putting less emphasis on military deployments in the Indo-Pacific.

>How will US-South Korea relations evolve under Trump’s second presidency?
During Donald Trump’s second term, there will be no major changes in US-South Korea relations. Given that there is no change in the structural framework of US-China competition in the international order, South Korea’s strategic importance in helping the US counter China in Northeast Asia will remain significant. Furthermore, following the Biden administration, the Trump administration is also likely to prioritize issues other than North Korea. As a result, the significance of the US-South Korea alliance, particularly with US forces stationed in South Korea, in managing North Korea’s nuclear threat and ensuring security on the Korean Peninsula will remain strong. On the other hand, the likelihood of the Trump administration demanding a renegotiation of defense cost-sharing is relatively high. However, this is likely to serve as a bargaining chip for the US, either to secure other “interests” from South Korea or to press for a stronger role for South Korea in regional security.
Author Taeeun Min from the Korea Institute for National Unification

>What direction will Japanese foreign policy take over the next years?
The result of the last US presidential election ascertained the return of the former president to power. Japan does not have any other option than to strengthen alliance with the United States, regardless of the ideological orientation of the administration and who occupies White House. It is still too early to tell what adjustments Japan would need to make in its defence posture when facing the incoming administration, including the decision Japan made earlier to increase its defence spending to 2% of the GDP by 2027, which was an autonomous action based upon its own assessment of the strategic situation in Asia. The most likely complication may lie in the disturbance to the hard-won linkage between security in Europe and in Japan/Asia in the context of ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine. The mantra Japan adopted since the previous Kishida administration that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow” may become more difficult to sustain, if Europe faces mounting its own defence as the US ponders withdrawing support for Ukraine. If Europe focuses more closely on its own region, less attention or capability might become available for cooperation with the Indo-Pacific. This is an outcome both Europe and Japan would have to try to avoid.
Author Chiyuki Aoi from University of Tokyo

>APEC Leaders push for enhanced cooperation amid fear of Trump 2.0 at Lima Summit
The 35th edition of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit came to an end in Lima on Saturday, November 16, with a 36-point long joint declaration on strengthening cooperation and fostering trade among its members. This came amidst growing international concerns about the potential impact of Trump’s presidency on global trade. On the margin of the event, a series of bilateral and minilateral side meetings have taken place. Leaders of the US, South Korea and Japan (Ishiba Shigeru made his first international appearance as Prime Minister) have discussed their trilateral security alliance, advancing the proposal of a trilateral secretariat, which would mean establishing permanent working offices to foster the work of this partnership. China played a central role at the Summit, with Xi Jinping taking the lead in multilateral discussions and engaging in meaningful bilateral meetings. In a one-on-one with Joe Biden he expressed his readiness to work with the next US administration, while once again condemning Taiwan’s independence aspirations. Additionally, Xi Jinping participated in the opening of the Chinese-funded deep sea port of Chancay (Peru), a key project for the South American pillar of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

> Sri Lanka takes a left-wing turn to accelerate economic recovery
On November 14, left-wing candidate Anura Kumara Dissanayake secured a commanding victory in Sri Lanka’s Parliamentary elections, with almost 62% of the total preferences. Dissanayake had called for the snap electionhimself to consolidate the electoral success of last September, when he defeated opposition leader Sajith Premadasa. Dissanayake’s National People’s Power alliance (NPP) now faces the daunting task of steering the country out of economic stagnation and the lasting repercussions of the 2022 crisis. The collapse, caused by the inability to repay external debt, the impact of Covid-19 and mismanagement of taxation and inflation, led to widespread popular protest and the resignation of President Rajapaksa. With a strong majority of 159 seats out of the total 225 of the unicameral Parliament, and widespread popular support, Dissanayake is poised to implement new domestic economic policies and revisit the debt bailout deal his predecessor made with the IMF, key promises that contributed to his electoral success.

>Is China getting closer with Myanmar’s military junta?
Myanmar’s junta leader, General Min Aung Hlaing, made his first visit to China after taking control of the country through a military coup in February 2021, which plunged Myanmar into a protracted civil war. China is currently the junta’s most significant international partner and supplier of arms; however, it simultaneously maintains strong ties with various ethnic rebel groups that are militarily opposing the junta and that effectively control large swathes of Myanmar’s territory. Nonetheless, Aung Hlaing’s visit to Beijing appears to signals a shift towards increased support from China for the junta. Over the past year, Myanmar’s military has lost significant ground to ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and their allies, the People’s Defense Forces. In October 2023 the Three Brotherhood Alliance – comprising the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army – launched the successful Operation 1027, that focused on countering military forces, particularly in regions close to the Chinese border. While initially China appeared to be endorsing the first phase of Operation 1027, it has been less supportive of the continued offensive, which has resulted in resistance forces gaining control over key trade routes with China. Fearing the potential collapse of the military regime and the outbreak of further unrest along its border, China’s invitation to Min Aung Hlaing seems to be an attempt to exert greater influence over the course of the conflict. Beijing’s primary goal is to maintain stability along its shared border with Myanmar and avoid the complete collapse of the junta regime, at least until the election that should take place in 2025. However, this closer alignment with the junta could backfire for Beijing, as it risks alienating a significant portion of Myanmar’s population, which remains firmly opposed to the military government.

>Chinese economic stimulus puzzles everyone involved.
The Chinese government is debating an appropriate response to the challenging economic situation. Since late this summer when the year-on-year Q3 GDP grew by 4.6%, a figure much lower than expected, the Chinese leadership has vented the possibility of an economic stimulus. However, while Beijing authorities announced some monetary measures in September and October, it failed to present substantial plans to boost domestic demand, which was what foreign investors had hoped for. Instead, in early November the leadership approved a 6 trillion yuan (US$838 billion) debt-swapping programme to relieve local governments from the burden of hidden debt. The total amount adds up to 10 trillion yuan (US$1.4 trillion) including previous allotments for special local bonds, and is expected to reduce off-balance-sheet debt to only 2.3 trillion yuan by 2028. Yet, restoring financial health at the local level will not contribute much to reflate the economy and address the issue at the centre of Chinese economic hardship. “More supportive fiscal policy” may come next year, as finance minister Lan Foan pledged, but this scope is up for debate. Striking the right balance between different necessities has proved to be a complex dilemma for Chinese decisionmakers, and the patchwork of announcements seems to suggest the current lack of a unified vision for economic recovery. Alternatively, these piecemeal adjustments may simply reflect a cautious experimental approach, especially considering Trump’s intention to put China under increased economic pressure, through additional tariffs.

>TREND: Southeast Asian trade boom caught between China and the US
Southeast Asia is poised to play a pivotal role in global trade flows over the next decade. According to data elaborated by consultancy group BCG, global trade in goods is expected to grow by 2.8% between 2022 and 2032, amounting to an increase of US$6.8 trillion. Much of this growth will center around ASEAN, which encompasses all Southeast Asian nations, since they will account for around US$1.2 trillion, a figure surpassing that of major economic powers. Southeast Asia stands to gain considerably from the contraction of US-China trade, driven by the ongoing technological-industrial competition. The region will also benefit from the diversification and de-risking efforts of major international companies moving their production out of China. While US-China trade in goods is expected to decrease by US$197 billion by 2032, US-ASEAN trade at the same time will be up $201 billion. Yet, Southeast Asia has no intention of picking any sides in current geopolitical turbulences and aims to remain an open door for the world economy, especially for China. Trade between China and ASEAN is expected to account for about half of the forecasted trade growth in Southeast Asia, increasing by approximately US$616 billion. Although the political outlooks of ASEAN countries may shift over time, so far it seems unlikely that China’s influence in the region may diminish.

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